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2ABSTRACT.
The Conservative approach to sectarianism in Liverpool and Belfast 
provides two paradigms for analysing the response of political movements to 
collective violence. The response helps to determine the manifestation of 
volatile grassroots passion, whether through formal politics and organisation or 
violent direct-action in the street. Consequently, the two cities provide a 
framework for dissecting the complex interaction between political movements 
and collective violence through an understanding of the location and 
distribution of power and leadership within such relationships.
Liverpool and Belfast highlight the complex interaction, in British 
society, between the local and national and how this interplay impacted upon 
local political imperatives. Liverpool Tory Democracy was a political 
movement that lost control over popular sectarianism being reliant for its local 
hegemony upon an expedient alliance with populist organisations and 
personalities as a bridge to the Protestant grassroots. This arrangement 
empowered popular Protestant organisations and personalities with the 
subsequent development of a dynamic grassroots force. This force was set on a 
collision course with the political establishment. It sought guidance from 
‘community’ leaders and popular Protestant organisations who earned their 
legitimacy through direct-action at street level, generating sustained communal 
violence.
In contrast Ulster Unionism was a political movement that contained 
and controlled popular sectarianism; a force with a history of violent expression 
on Belfast’s streets. With the national threat of Home Rule the movement 
intervened, drawing popular activity away from collective action in the street 
into ‘representative’ political and organisational structures. This was part of a 
co-ordinated strategy of resistance designed to harness and ‘police’ popular 
sectarianism and to emasculate alternative sources of power within the 
Protestant community. During the period, the British working class could be 
shaped by highly specific local factors with a dominant local culture 
engendering a wider sense of allegiance, whilst also providing expression for 
limited forms of class conflict including collective violence as a mode of ‘social 
protest’.
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9INTRODUCTION.
This thesis explores the relationship between political movements and 
popular ‘collective violence’ in relation to sectarianism.1 Liverpool and 
Belfast serve as case studies for two cities wracked by sectarian ‘communal 
strife’. In 1909, the Head Constable remarked that Liverpool was ‘in some 
way peculiar among the cities on this side of St. George’s channel, being 
comparable almost to Belfast for displays of sectarian bigotry and hatred’. 
My intention is to examine the attitude and response of the dominant 
Conservative political movements to sectarian collective violence. My 
original intention had been to examine the impact of sectarianism upon the 
Labour movement in Belfast, Liverpool and Glasgow, incorporating both a 
Protestant and Catholic perspective. Not only did this prove daunting in terms 
of scale; but a more intriguing potentially controversial question emerged. 
How did Ulster Unionism succeed, in a city synonymous with sectarian 
conflict, in containing the excesses of popular Protestant sectarianism during 
the critical period 1880-1921, and to what extent did this contribute to its 
ultimate success in the ‘battle of politics’ in relation to Home Rule? In 
contrast, why did Liverpool, until recently synonymous with Labour 
militancy, experience an upsurge in serious and prolonged sectarian violence 
during the same period, Tory Democracy appearing weak and impotent in the 
face of this challenge? Consequently, my argument is not preoccupied with 
the relative disadvantages or advantages of sectarianism, but looks instead at
1 For a definition of ‘collective violence’ see H.G.Haupt, ‘’History of 
Violence” , in NeilJ.Smelser & Paul.B.Baltes, eds., International 
Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences. Amsterdam, Paris, New 
York, Oxford, Shannon, Singapore, Tokyo, Elsevier, 2001,16197 ‘In the 
current discussion among historians, violence is widely understood as injury 
to people’s physical integrity, caused by various historical actors in various 
contexts. Here, violence is not seen as an anthropological constant, nor as a 
universal historical trait held in common, but tied to the actions of specific 
groups and conditions that are subject to change in various national societies 
and epochs’. John Bohstedt, ‘’Gender, household and community politics: 
Women in English Riots 1790-1810” , in: Past and Present 120 (1988), 90 
defines a riot as an ‘incident in which a crowd of fifty or more people 
damaged or seized property, assaulted someone or forced a victim to perform 
some action’.
2HQ45/11138. Central Police Office. Liverpool. W24/05/1909
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how two political movements responded to sectarian violence in light of 
conflicting local and national political imperatives.
Although I primarily deal with Catholics as the ‘other’ , this should not 
diminish their role and importance as ‘historical actors’, as active participants 
in the events described. As ‘Romanists’, ‘Fenians’, or the ‘common enemy’ 
they played a pivotal role in efforts by the local political establishment to 
galvanise the Protestant community to counter a real or imagined threat. 
Additionally, the representatives of the Protestant working class employed 
such emotive terminology as a justification, in the face of their traditional 
leader’s apathy and impotence, to directly counter perceived Catholic self- 
assertion or ‘aggression’.
Historians have identified some of the key characteristics of 
sectarianism, without having formulated a coherent definition. Sectarianism 
is more than animosity between two or more confessional groups, or simple 
‘tribalism’; but a complex and frequently contradictory force operating on a 
number of levels, the religious, social, economic, political, and ideological.4
John Belchem, ‘’Ethnicity and Labour History. With special reference to 
Irish Migration” , in Lex Heerma van Voss & Marcel van der Linden, eds, 
Class and Other Identitities. Gender. Religion and Ethnicity in the Writing of 
European Labour History. New York, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2002, 89 
states that from the 1830’s and 1840’s, Irish migrants, whether in Britain or 
America were ‘cast as the internal ‘other’ against whom the host identity or 
‘ethnicity’ was defined and confirmed’.
4 John Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class: Protestant-Catholic Riots 
in Edwardian Liverpool” , in John Belchem, ed, Popular Politics. Riot and 
Labour. Essays in Liverpool History. 1790-1940. Univ. of Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1992,214 argues that ‘ethnic violence’ 
(Protestant-Catholic) in Liverpool has ‘its history, its sociology, its 
anthropology. We cannot understand it merely by reference to hatred or 
psychology’. Frank Neal, Sectarian Violence: The Liverpool Experience. 
1819-1914: An Aspect of Anglo-Irish History. New York: St.Martin’s Press, 
1988,252-3 states that an ‘important factor, difficult to measure, is simple 
tribalism, with all territorial and symbolic connotations’. Tom Gallagher, ‘’A 
Tale of Two Cities: Communal Strife in Glasgow and Liverpool before 
1914” , in: R.Swift & S.Gilley, eds., The Irish in The Victorian Citv. London. 
Croom Helm, 1985,106 argues that sectarianism in Glasgow and Liverpool 
was ‘a complex phenomenon, taking a variety of forms’. John Belchem,
‘’The Peculiarities of Liverpool” , in: Belchem, ed, Popular Politics. Riot and 
Labour. 15 suggests that sectarianism in Liverpool was ‘political in 
construction’, whilst David.W.Miller, Queen’s Rebels. Ulster I^ovalism in 
Historical Perspective. Dublin & New York, Barnes & Noble Books, 1978,
11
Sectarian sentiment is capable of being a galvanising source of communal co­
operation and unity5 as well as a cause of internal (within a particular 
community) and external (inter-communal) division and conflict.6 It can 
manifest itself through a ‘respectable’ consensual strand (Ulster Unionism in 
Belfast/anti-Ritualist coalition in Liverpool)7 and a belligerent, 
fundamentalist form (anti-Ritualism /Catholicism in Belfast and anti- 
Catholicism in Liverpool) epitomised by the popular Protestant slogan, ‘No 
Compromise and No Surrender’. Consequently, sectarianism can be a vital 
catalyst in cementing broad social, political and class alliances, whilst also 
constituting an effective medium for articulating sectional grievances and 
aspirations within a particular community, whether religious, class, or 
political in content.8 It can provide a foundation for social and political
89 argues that a leading goal of Protestant political activity in Ireland had 
been ‘the maintenance of Protestant ascendancy’.
5 Patrick Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two: Ulster Unionism and the Origins of 
Northern Ireland. 1886-1922. Dublin, Gill & Macmillan, 1973, XX & XXXI1 
argues that despite denominational differences, during the Nineteenth 
Century, Ulster Protestantism ‘found common ground in a fervent anti- 
Catholicism’, with many believing that ‘Home Rule meant Rome Rule’, 
whilst Peter Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism. The Formation of 
Popular Protestant Politics and Ideology in Nineteenth Century Ireland. 
Manchester, Manchester Univ. Press, 1975,9 identifies the most significant 
empirical characteristics of Ulster Unionism as being its ‘regional status, the 
uniformly sectarian character of its following.. .and its integration of all the 
major classes in Protestant Ulster’.
6 Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two. 3 noted how many Ulster Protestants 
objected to the Orange Order’s ‘sectarian exuberance’, whilst Belchem, ‘’The 
Peculiarities of Liverpool” , 11-12 notes how ‘No Popery’ in Liverpool 
acquired a ‘libertarian anti-establishment tenor’.
7 Miller, Queen’s Rebels. 91 emphasises that public Unionist rhetoric stressed 
that opposition to Home Rule ‘arose out of no desire to reimpose Protestant 
ascendancy’, whilst John.F.Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party. 1882-1973- 
Its Development and Organisation. Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 1973,10,18 
states, that from its inception, it was important that Ulster Unionism should be 
seen as ‘respectable, and not as Orange rabble-rousers’.
8 A.Shallice, ‘’Orange and Green and Militancy: Sectarianism and Working 
Class Politics in Liverpool, 1900-14” , Bulletin North West Labour History 
Document 6 (1979-80), 17,30 argues that the ideology of Liverpool’s 
Protestant working class was capable of ‘encompassing a growing articulation 
of class consciousness’, whilst Henry Patterson, Class Conflict and 
Sectarianism. The Protestant Working Class and the Belfast Labour 
Movement 1868-1920. Ulster Poly, Blackstaff Press, 1980, X I1 has
12
organisation and mobilisation9 of economic solidarity and discrimination and 
of community identity, allegiance and support, as well as fuelling intense 
suspicion, conflict and violence, whether motivated by a desire to secure 
religious ‘ascendancy’ or retain ‘marginal privilege’.10 Popular Protestantism 
represented a powerful ‘world vision’11 emphasising unity through collective 
fidelity to a particular conception of the Protestant religion, the British nation 
and its key institutions, embodied by the slogan, ‘Church, Crown and 
Constitution’.12 It also bestowed a set of obligations upon both the rank and 
file as well as their leaders, as guardians of Protestant tradition and heritage. 
Consequently, sectarianism constituted both a vital and an expedient factor in 
the construction of ‘representative’ social and political alliances and a 
dynamic potentially autonomous force capable of expressing grassroots fears 
and aspirations through both violent confrontation and positive forms of self- 
assertion, leverage and power.13
identified a similar trait in the Orange ideology of Belfast’s Protestant 
working class.
9 Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of Liverpool” , 7 ,9  argues that the strength and 
appeal of sectarianism in Liverpool lay in the ‘provision of positive and 
attractive forms of political and associational culture’, maintaining that 
sectarian allegiance was the ‘crucial determinant in the political arena’, whilst 
Geoffrey Bell, The Protestants of Ulster. Pluto Press, 1976,38 & P.Berresford 
Ellis, A History of the Irish Working Class. London, Sydney, Pluto
Press,1972,204 emphasise the ‘organising role’ played by sectarianism in 
Ulster Unionist mobilisation to resist Home Rule.
10 see Frank Neal, Sectarian Violence. 252 & Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of 
Liverpool” , 11 who argues that ‘No Popery’ in Liverpool served to ‘protect 
the ‘marginal privilege’ of the Protestant worker’.
11 see Joan Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism in Glasgow and Liverpool, 
1880-1914” , in: RJ.Morris, ed, Class. Power and Social Structure in British 
Nineteenth Century Towns Leicester, Leicester Univ.Press, 1986,165 & 
Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of Liverpool” , 11 on this ‘belief system’.
12 Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 165,202 argues that sectarianism 
played an instrumental role, during the Nineteenth Century, in both the 
construction of a ‘national identity’ and of an ‘ethnic minority’. She states 
that it is ‘necessary to look at the way the state constructs a national identity 
which incorporates some ethnic groups and shuts out others, and how this 
changes over time’. Many studies on Liverpool refer to sectarianism in 
association with Irish ethnicity.
13 Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class” , 175,214 argues that 
sectarianism in Liverpool enlisted thousands ‘not simply by brutal hatreds but 
by sustaining values and organisations that served progressive functions in 
working class life’.
13
The Conservative response to sectarian conflict in Liverpool and Belfast 
allows us to formulate two paradigms illustrating the relationship between 
political movements and collective violence. The first paradigm, epitomised 
by Liverpool Tory-Democracy, describes political movements largely 
dependent for the maintenance of their hegemony upon a pragmatic, fragile 
relationship to volatile popular forces. This relationship could be based upon 
a combination of appeasement, common cause, forms of power sharing and 
patronage, and mutual utilisation. The second paradigm, epitomised by Ulster 
Unionism, provides an illustration of political movements that seek to co-opt 
or integrate volatile popular forces into an overarching political strategy.
These latter movements seek to harness and deploy such popular forces as a 
vital component of the process of constructing political hegemony. Their aim 
is to contain and control them in an effort to preserve a respectable facade and 
to emasculate them as an alternative source of social and political power.
This type of relationship is characterised by the maintenance of a heightened 
sense of common threat as a unifying cement underpinned by a high degree of 
political and organisational mobilisation, including the creation of 
‘representative’ umbrella organisations, and a drive towards increased 
centralisation of power and leadership. This thesis argues, illustrating the two 
paradigms, that the mechanics of the relationship between particular types of 
political movement and popular forces help to determine the principal 
manifestations of these volatile forces, whether primarily expressed through 
formal politics and organisation or collective violence in the street. 
Consequently, the experience of the two cities can provide an explanatory 
framework for dissecting the complex interaction between political 
movements and collective violence through an understanding of the location 
and distribution of power and leadership within these political relationships. 
As Charles Tilly states, there is ‘accumulating evidence that the structure and 
dynamics of political power themselves account for patterns and fluctuations 
of protest, conflict, collective violence and collective action’.14
My contention is that outbreaks of collective violence can be interpreted 
as a symptom not only of the state of inter-communal relations (i.e.
14 Charles Tilly, The Rebellious Century. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univ.
14
Protestant-Catholic) but also as a form of ‘social protest’ directed against 
community and national elite’s.15 In this latter scenario, collective violence 
can highlight relations within a particular community (i.e. Protestant), 
symbolising the vulnerability of established social and political arrangements 
and avenues of power and leadership. Popular violence can be seen as a 
contingent manifestation of the process of transformation within existing 
power relationships highlighting the erosion of traditional mechanisms of 
restraint and control. Recent work in the field of contentious politics and 
social movements has challenged the largely deterministic stress on social 
disorganisation and breakdown in the older collective behaviour paradigm. In 
1975 Charles Tilly stated in relation to Emile Durkheim’s ‘breakdown 
theory’, that ‘it is the idea that collective violence appears as a by-product of 
processes o f breakdown in a society. Large structural rearrangements in 
societies-such as urbanisation and industrialisation-in this view tend to 
dissolve existing controls over antisocial behaviour just as the very fact of 
rearrangement is subjecting many men to uncertainty and strain. The strain in 
turn heightens the impulse toward antisocial behaviour. That behaviour may 
take the form of personal disorganisation or crime and protest’.16
Whilst critical of this model, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly identify the 
following factors in the classical social movement agenda contributing to the 
study of contentious politics. First, this agenda, ‘made strong claims 
regarding the close connection between routine and contentious politics’; 
secondly, it emphasised the role of ‘mobilising structures’, and thirdly, it 
produced a ‘credible picture of mobilisation into social movements’. Their
Press, 1975,298
15 Haupt, ‘’History of Violence” , 16199-200 states that, influenced by 
English, often Marxist-inspired social history since the 1950’s and American 
research on urban riots during the 1960’s, insight into the ‘inherent logic of 
popular action has supplanted the condemnation of rage-blinded, aggressive 
mob and crowd activity. Their violent nature has been interpreted less as a 
defining characteristic than as an aspect of social protests and less as irrational 
than as a rational strategy’. Haupt states that the history of violence has also 
asked about its instigators and causes, with Bohstedt (‘’Gender, household 
and community politics” , 121) highlighting ‘disturbed societal relations as 
one of the causes o f violence in Britain, especially where social contact and 
dependencies between the upper classes and the masses were attenuated’.
16 Tilly, The Rebellious Century. 4
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new approach criticises the overly structural and ‘static individualistic’ nature 
of this agenda, instead offering a more credible and dynamic explanation of 
collective violence emphasising contingent events and the complex, multi­
layered nature of the contentious processes from which it arises.17 They argue 
that whereas the classic agenda assigned central weight to ‘social change, 
political opportunities, mobilising structures, frames, and transgressive forms 
of action’, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly identify the dynamic mechanisms that 
brought these variables into relation with one another and with other 
significant actors.18 In both the classic and contemporary models, opportunity 
structures and constraints play a central role in triggering cycles of 
contentious politics.
These concepts help us to understand how contingent events can impact 
upon longer term structural changes, providing both openings for, and limits 
upon, potentially violent contentious episodes. Tarrow convincingly argues 
that ‘changes in political opportunities and constraints create the most 
important incentives for initiating new phases of contention. These actions in 
turn create new opportunities both for the original insurgents and for 
latecomers, and eventually for opponents and power holders’.19 He continues, 
stating in general episodes of contention ‘elites reveal their vulnerability, new 
social actors and forms of conflict appear, alliances are struck, and repression 
becomes sluggish or inconsistent’.20 Contention arises in circumstances when 
people (1) ‘gain the external resources to escape their compliance and find 
opportunities in which to use them’; and (2) when they are ‘threatened with 
costs they cannot bear or which outrage their sense of justice’.21 Such 
variables increase ‘threats to interests, values and, at times, survival that 
different groups and individuals experience’. Those most likely to seize
17 McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001,41-42,307
18 McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. 43
19 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement. Social Movements and Contentious 
Politics. 2nd edition. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 7
20 Tarrow, Power in Movement 200
21 Tarrow, Power in Movement 71
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external opportunities and engage in contention are those with ‘the most to 
lose.. .since they face the greatest threat from inaction’.
Tarrow also highlights how contentious collective action can contribute 
to the general diffusion of opportunities. A movement that ‘offends 
influential groups can trigger a counter movement. Movements that employ 
violence invite physical repression. Movements that make extreme forms of 
policy demands can be outmanoeuvred by groups that pose the same claim in 
more acceptable form. And when a movement’s success threatens another 
group in a context of a heightened mobilisation, it can lead to outbidding and 
counterprotests’. Tarrow notes how ‘political opportunities are fickle friends’, 
which can shift from initial challengers to their allies and opponents and, 
ultimately, to elite’s and authorities.23 Having identified the pivotal role of 
opportunity structures and constraints, recent work introduces the concept of 
‘attribution’, arguing that no opportunity or threat, ‘however objectively open, 
will invite mobilisation unless it is (a) visible to potential challengers and (b) 
perceived as an opportunity’. The attribution of opportunity or threat is 
described as an ‘activating mechanism’.24
Consequently, in this analysis political opportunities and constraints 
may not only trigger protest cycles but also galvanise elite’s, opponents and 
authorities. A contentious cycle may be accompanied by the devolution of 
power and authority to grassroots organisations and leaders, primarily 
mobilising in the ‘community of the street’. Tarrow argues that when ‘backed 
by dense social networks and galvanised by culturally resonant, action- 
oriented symbols, contentious politics leads to sustained interaction with 
opponents. The result is the social movement’. He sees the social movement 
as an ‘invention of the modem age and an accompaniment to the rise of the 
modem state’.25 Elaborating upon this position, Michael Mann rejects ethnic 
violence as a ‘primitive throwback’, identifying ethnonationalist movements 
as a by-product of modernity, of the process of democratisation in multi­
22 Tarrow, Power in Movement 86
23 Tarrow, Power in Movement 87-89
McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. 43
25 Tarrow, Power in Movement 2-5
17
ethnic environments.26 He sees ethnic conflict, generated by such movements, 
as a largely contingent27 outcome of struggles over political power, rejecting 
simplistic explanations focusing upon 'malevolent leaders or ethnic groups en 
masse'. This more nuanced approach draws attention to the complex links 
between particular elite’s, militants and core constituencies within movements 
which ‘embody mundane power relations’.28
Having identified the social movement as a product of sustained 
contention and as the principal dynamic behind contentious collective action 
in differing environments, how has this phenomenon been defined. Tarrow 
identifies four empirical properties of social movements:
(1) Collective challenge. He maintains that movements 
characteristically mount contentious challenges ‘through disruptive direct 
action against elites, authorities, other groups, or cultural codes. Most often 
public in nature, disruption can also take the form of co-ordinated personal 
resistance or the collective affirmation of new values’. Movements use 
collective challenge to become ‘the focal points of supporters, gain the 
attention of opponents and third parties, and create constituencies to 
represent’. However, Tarrow points out that movements may also provide 
‘selective incentives to members, building consensus among current or 
prospective supporters, lobbying or negotiating with authorities’ and 
‘challenging cultural codes through new religious or personal practises’.29
(2) Common purpose. Tarrow argues that some movements ‘are 
marked by a spirit of play and carnival whereas others reveal the grim frenzy 
of the mob: however, a more basic-if more prosaic-reason why people band 
together in movements is to mount common claims against opponents, 
authorities or elite’s.’ Common or overlapping interests and values are at the 
basis of their common actions.30
(3) Solidarity and collective identity. By mobilising consensus 
‘movement entrepreneurs’ play an important role in stimulating such
26 Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy. Exploring Ethnic Cleansing. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005,2, 3,18
27 Mann, The Dark side of Democracy. 8,505,523
28 Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy. 6, 8,20-21, 504
29 Tarrow, Power in Movement 5
30 Tarrow, Power in Movement 5-6
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consensus. But leaders can only create a social movement when they ‘tap 
more deep-rooted feelings of solidarity or identity. This is almost certainly 
why nationalism and ethnicity or religion have been more reliable bases of 
movement organisation than the categorical imperative of social class’.31 
Reinforcing this observation, Mann identifies ‘core constituencies’, 
particularly in environments favouring ‘combinations of nationalism, statism 
and violence’. However, he rightly criticises studies that neglect or downplay 
class relations arguing that, alongside regional and gender sentiments, class 
can infuse ethnonationalist movements. This was certainly the case in Belfast 
and Liverpool.32
(4) Sustained interaction. Tarrow theorises that it is only by 
‘sustaining collective action against antagonists that a contentious episode 
becomes a social movement. Common purposes, collective identities and 
identifiable challenges help movements to do this; but unless they can 
maintain their challenge, they will either evaporate into the kind of 
individualistic resentment that James Scott calls ‘resistance’, harden into 
intellectual or religious sects, or retreat into isolation’ 33 Scott illuminates the 
forms of contention, or ‘infrapolitics’, employed by subordinate groups in 
‘conditions of tyranny and persecution’, which precede, sustain and outlive 
more ‘practical forms of resistance’. Although such ‘disguised, low profile, 
undeclared resistance’ is significant, as Scott emphasises it tends to be 
employed when ‘frontal assaults are precluded by the realities of power’. In 
the case of Liverpool and Belfast the social movement paradigm provides a 
more appropriate explanatory framework for analysing the ‘open, declared 
forms of resistance’ more characteristic of Western liberal democracies.34
In addition to these, Tarrow identifies three other resources ‘necessary 
to turn contention into sustained social movements’.35
31 Tarrow, Power in Movement 6
32 Mann, The Dark side of Democracy. 8
33 Tarrow, Power in Movement 6-7
James C.Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance. Hidden Transcripts. 
Cambridge, Cambridge Univ.Press, 2003,191,192,198-99,201 & McAdam, 
Tarrow & Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. 18
35 Tarrow, Power in Movement 89-90
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(1) ‘Repertoires of contention’ refers to the forms of contention that 
‘arise out of-and innovate upon-culturally familiar repertoires’. Movements 
may use different forms of collective action ‘singly and in combination to link 
people to one another and to opponents, supporters and third parties’. Tarrow 
argues that collective action, including violence, is best seen ‘not as a simple 
cost, but as both cost and benefit for some social movements, for it is a means 
of communication and mobilisation as well as a message and a challenge to 
opponents’. This balance between costs and benefits determines the 
‘dynamics’ of the movement. As the benefits of forms of collective action 
wane and people weary of contention ‘organisations have incentives to 
develop new ones, appeal to new participants, or radicalise their interaction 
with opponents’. The conflicts and defections prevalent within movements, 
and their increasing confrontations with the state, result ‘from the attempt to 
maintain momentum through the use of new and more daring forms of 
collective action and in particular from the changing balance of moderates and 
radicals within the circle of activists’. In a similar vein Mann sees ethnic 
violence as part of the repertoire of ethnonationalist movements, as the 
contingent outcome of escalation and radicalisation.37
(2) In terms of collective action ‘frames’. Tarrow states ‘solidarity 
has much to do with interest, but it produces a sustained movement only when 
consensus is built around common meanings and identities'. These may be 
‘partly inherited and partly constructed in the act of confronting opponents. 
They are also constituted by the interaction within movements’. One of the 
distinguishing features of successful movements ‘is their capacity to link 
inherited understandings to the imperative for activism’.38 Within this 
context, Mann emphasises the importance of ‘ideological power’, or 
mobilisation of values, norms and rituals in ethnic conflict. He argues that 
people ‘accept ideologies that make some plausible sense of their world, and 
they actively reinterpret them’.39
36 Tarrow, Power in Movement 201
37 Mann, The Dark side of Democracy. 24-25,200,503-04
38 Tarrow, Power in Movement 201
39 Mann, The Dark side of Democracy. 30
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(3) ‘Mobilising structures’ refer to the ‘informal networks and 
connective structures that people live within and build’. Tarrow argues that 
although collective action is often led by organisations, these are sometimes 
‘the beneficiaries, sometimes inciters, and at other times destroyers o f popular 
politics’. The only way to resolve the controversy as to whether organisations 
produce movements or suppress them is by examining the ‘less formal 
structures they draw upon-the social networks at the base of society and the 
connective structures that link them to one another’.40 Mann also identifies 
the role of ‘normal social structures’ in generating ethnonationalist 
movements, arguing they often succeed ‘precisely because their civil society 
networks are denser and more mobilising than those of their more moderate 
rivals.’ This contradicts civil society theory, which proposes that democracy, 
peace and tolerance ensue when individuals are ‘engaged in vibrant, dense 
social relations provided by voluntary associations’ protecting them from the 
manipulations of state elite’s. Although Mann’s analysis corresponds to 
Liverpool, in Belfast voluntary associations, albeit elite conceived, succeeded 
in instilling a semblance of democracy and peace but not tolerance 41 
Tarrow argues that the capacity to sustain collective action with 
powerful opponents distinguishes the social movement from earlier forms of 
contention. In the absence of viable or alternative avenues of social and 
political influence, street mobilisation with its associated violence, can be 
employed by complex social movements as part of their repertoire of 
contention. This can be interpreted, not only as an expression of hatred and 
fear against the ‘other’, but also as an effective vehicle of grassroots 
influence, leverage, and crucially struggles for power within a community.
The social movement paradigm provides an effective theoretical framework 
for comprehending how sectarian collective violence in Liverpool and Belfast 
was mobilised, sustained and deployed. However, it is insufficient, on its 
own, to explain why sectarian violence persisted in Liverpool and was 
effectively contained in Belfast. An additional dimension was the impact 
upon, and response to, the process of democratisation in both contexts. I
40 Tarrow, Power in Movement 201
41 Mann, The Dark side of Democracy. 9,21
42 Tarrow, Power in Movement 7
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argue that popular collective violence can represent a form of surrogate 
4 democratisation’ operating outside, and parallel to, a largely dysfunctional 
political system.
Some social scientists argue that conflict and disorder are an integral 
characteristic of democratisation and democracy, criticising democratic theory 
for postulating that stability is ‘democracy tout court’.43 As Przeworski states, 
‘democracy is always a contingent outcome of conflict and has never been 
advanced without struggle’. Whilst he highlights how democratic institutions 
create the possibility for ‘conflicts to be processed in a rule-governed and 
limited manner,^democratisation, with its opening of political access, also 
creates opportunities for contentious cycles and the formation of social 
movements. Tarrow argues that a protest cycle arises when ‘structural 
cleavages are both deep and visible and when opportunities for mass protest 
are opened up by the political system’.45 As Eisinger observes, protest is most 
likely in systems characterised by a ‘mix of open and closed factors’ in which 
heightened expectations are frustrated and avenues of institutional resolution 
attenuated.46 The narrower pre-existing avenues to participation 'the more 
likely each new opening is to produce new opportunities for contention’.47 
Consequently, contentious processes can either ‘detour politics from 
democratisation’ or result in the expansion of ‘protected consultation’. In the 
former scenario, this detour can occur either because ‘some people oppose 
democratisation itself, but also and probably primarily-because claims made 
in the name of democracy threaten their vested interests’.48
Michael Mann has identified the dynamic impact of democratisation and 
democracy upon multi-ethnic environments, examining how the conflation of 
the demos with the ethnos within organic conceptions of the nation-state can 
lead to serious ethnic conflict. Mann describes ethnic cleansing as modem,
A.“X Sidney Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder. Protest and Politics in Italy. 
1965-75. Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1989,6 & McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 
Dynamics of Contention. 265,271-72
44 Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder. 1-2 & Adam Przeworski, Sustainable 
Democracy. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ.Press, 1995,51,53
45 Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder. 13
46 Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder. 22 & Tarrow, Power in Movement 77
47 Tarrow, Power in Movement 78
48 McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. 268
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because ‘it is the dark side of democracy’.49 Echoing McAdam, Tarrow and 
Tilly, he criticises perceptions that democracy and the people are necessarily 
‘pacific’ and democratic peace theory for asserting that elections guarantee 
‘social peace’. Mann argues that ‘civil society may be evil’, as witnessed by 
the mobilising capacity of ethnonationalist movements,50 stating that ‘ethnic 
cleansing diffuses along with the process of democratisation’.51This analysis 
helps to explain the pivotal role of expanding, but partial, democratisation in 
the evolution of a complex protest cycle in Liverpool characterised by 
escalating ethnic violence. However, it does not explain the absence of 
widespread ethnic violence in Belfast despite a similar democratisation 
process.
Mann claims that democracy is ‘no protection’52 against escalation in 
ethnic conflict if the demos and ethnos (or the proletariat) are confused. The 
only effective solution is the institutionalisation of democracy ‘without the 
ethnos’.53 However, I contend that even within a multi-ethnic environment 
like Belfast democratisation can be an effective way of resolving conflicting 
claims and, alongside forms of social control, of channelling disorder into 
legitimate and contained avenues of expression. Mann emphasises that class, 
regional and gender conflicts can infuse violent ethnonationalism, whilst 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly highlight how democratisation not only 
exacerbates, but can also transform, the internal dynamics of power relations 
within particular communities. They argue that ‘democracy results from, 
mobilises and reshapes popular contention’ identifying two features of 
democratisation that facilitate this transformation. Firstly, it ‘greatly limits 
life and property-threatening forms of public, collective claim making, 
substituting for them highly visible but less directly destructive varieties of 
interaction’. Secondly, on average, ‘threats and declared intentions to act in a 
certain way (instead of nonnegotiable direct actions) occupy much more 
central positions in popular politics’.54
49 Mann, The Dark side of Democracy. 2
50 Mann, The Dark side of Democracy. 21-22
51 Mann, The Dark side of Democracy. 505
52 Mann, The Dark side of Democracy. 7
53 Mann, The Dark side of Democracy. 505
54 McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. 269
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In Mann’s scenario the process of democratisation in multi-ethnic 
environments can lead to escalating conflict, whilst in the latter, the absence 
of widespread violence can be attributed to the capacity of the dominant social 
and political arrangements and avenues of power and leadership to integrate 
and contain volatile popular forces. The absence of violence highlights the 
ability of these power relationships to divert ‘illegitimate private violence’55 
away from the street into alternative avenues of expression, including formal 
democratic political and associational channels. Tarrow argues that protest 
cycles not only mobilise social movements, but also provide opportunities for 
elite’s. Whether powerholders adopt ‘facilitative strategies’ or repression, or 
both, can determine whether popular contention ultimately diverges towards 
violence or institutionalisation.56 He argues the end of a protest cycle is 
produced by ‘exhaustion, repression, and reform’. Reform is most likely 
when ‘general confrontations’ among challengers, elites and authorities, 
provide incentives for elite’s to ‘advance their own policies and careers’58 and 
to selectively facilitate some movements, whilst repressing or ignoring 
others.59
This analysis provides an insight into some of the major factors 
contributing to the containment of sectarian violence in Belfast during the 
critical Home Rule period. Effectively institutionalised and controlled 
through political and associational channels popular passion and prejudice, 
whether religious, ethnic, nationalist or class, can provide a basis of mass
55 Haupt, ‘’The History of Violence” , 16197 states, in relation to the process 
of forming states, that ‘legitimate violence is distinguished from illegitimate 
private violence, independent of whether the latter is wielded in revolutions or 
in defence of the status quo’. Haupt refers to Lindenberger and Ludtke 
(T.Lindenberger & A.Ludtke, ‘’Physische Gewalt-eine Kontinuitat der 
Modeme” , in: T.Lindenberger & A.Ludtke, eds., Phvsische Gewalt. 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, Germany, 1995) who saw the hallmark of modernity in 
the ‘network of relationships between physically suffered violence, on the one 
hand, and the state monopoly on violence, on the other'. Haupt (16201) 
believes that ‘Special attention should be paid to the degree to which state 
authorities and the upper strata of societies have intervened in the justification 
of forms of violence and in its condemnation’.
56 Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder. 4 & Tarrow, Power in Movement 7
57 Tarrow, Democracy and Disorder. 26
58 Tarrow, Power in Movement 88-89
59 Tarrow, Power in Movement 202
24
political mobilisation and organisation, of communal co-operation and unity 
and of intense loyalty and allegiance. Whether expressed in an explicit form, 
or presented in a more 'respectable9 fashion, popular passion and prejudice 
can constitute a potent source of social and political power. However, the 
retention of such power is predicated, to a large extent, upon the maintenance 
of a heightened sense of threat against the internal or external ‘other’, 
underpinned by a high degree of political and organisational mobilisation, the 
partial accommodation of grassroots concerns, and increasing centralisation of 
power and control.
The main threat to such popular political movements is the potential 
diminution of the unifying cement of a common threat accompanied by a 
waning of popular motivation and enthusiasm underpinning political and 
organisational mobilisation. In such circumstances, the legitimacy of existing 
political arrangements and the authority of the established leadership becomes 
increasingly tenuous and highly vulnerable. This contingent scenario 
provides opportunities for the development of a sustained protest cycle. In the 
absence of effective political alternatives and methods of restraint, social 
movements may employ street mobilisation and collective violence as part of 
their contentious repertoires, as a means of attacking the ‘other’ and as a more 
general tool of social and political leverage and power.
Although these theories help to explain the processes of triggering, 
sustaining and resolving sectarian violence in Belfast and Liverpool they do 
not elucidate the whole story. The aforementioned theoreticians emphasise 
the applicability of their paradigms to both general and particular historical 
and cultural contexts, and to both the national and transnational.60 However, I 
believe greater attention should be accorded the following additional factors 
when analysing collective violence within particular regional and national 
contexts. Not only the role of external intervention61 and contingent events in 
triggering and/or regulating conflict, but also the relationship of particular 
movements to underlying modernisation processes, especially their adaptation 
to and/or alienation from the growing nationalisation of political culture and
60 see McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, Dynamics of Contention. 346 & Mann, The 
Dark Side of Democracy. 504
61 see Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy. 505
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identity. Attention must be focused upon the construction and role of wider 
communal and national identities, in addition to those inherited and 
constructed by social movements, and upon the relationship of such 
movements to their wider national political culture's.
Whilst Sam Davies and Dan Jackson criticise respectively, the centrality 
accorded sectarianism within Liverpool's political culture and its associated 
violence as an articulation of communal identity (discussed later), MaCraild 
suggests that ‘historians are wrong to argue that anti-Irish animosity and 
violence died out quickly after the mid-Victorian years’. Liverpool must be 
central to any serious examination of this controversy. Several studies on 
Liverpool have examined the causes of sectarian violence or ‘communal 
strife’. These have identified the consequences of Irish immigration,64 
economic rivalry within the working class, religious disputes and the Irish 
Question as contributory factors.65 Other studies have sought an explanation 
by analysing ‘crowd behaviour’,66 the ‘structures and processes’ of 
‘community politics’ and the development of ‘ethnic ‘cocoons” of values and 
organisations.67 Frank Neal rejected a ‘single all embracing theory’ preferring 
to present ‘tentative conclusions’ encompassing the role of Tory-Anglican 
ideology, the absence of the ‘culture of the factory town’, the role of the 
Orange Order, the strength of ‘folklore’ amongst the working class and 
‘simple tribalism’.68 Another set of studies examined the social and political 
life of Liverpool. Shallice looked at early twentieth century working class 
political behaviour through an analysis of the ‘dynamic interrelationship
62 Sam Davies, Liverpool Labour. Social and Political Influences on the 
Development of the Labour Party in Liverpool. 1900-1939. Keele, Keele 
Univ.Press, Staffordshire, 1996,233 & Dan Jackson, ‘’Friends of the Union’: 
Liverpool, Ulster, and Home Rule, 1910-14” , in: Transactions of the Historic 
Society of Lancashire and Cheshire. 152 (2004), 102
63 Donald MMaCraild, Irish Migrants in Modem Britain. 1750-1922. 
MacMillan Press Ltd, St.Martins Press, inc, 1999,2
64 Eric Taplin on Frank Neal, ‘’Sectarian Violence: The Liverpool Experience, 
1819-1914: An Aspect of Anglo-Irish History” , in: International Labor and 
Working Class History. 37 (Spring, 1990), 94
65 Gallagher, ‘’A Tale of Two Cities” , 106
66 Taplin on Neal, ’’Sectarian Violence” , 94
67 Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class” , 175
68 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 250-53
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between class, national identity and religion’,69 whilst Philip Waller undertook 
a more orthodox social and political history.70 Through a comparison with 
Glasgow, Joan Smith sought answers to the two cities contrasting social and 
political development by investigating their different ‘industrial and 
neighbourhood structures’ and belief systems71 and tried to resolve wider 
questions concerning the ‘status of the Irish in Britain’.72
In terms of Belfast, several historians have looked at the city within the
77 7A.context of wider studies on Irish history and the history of Ulster; 
particularly the origins, development and character of both Irish and Ulster 
Unionism.75 Another set of historians focused on the Belfast working class. 
This class has been examined as part of broader studies on the Irish working 
class76 in general as well as part of an examination of the relationship
7 7between class, sectarianism and the development of the labour movement. 
Additionally, via an analysis of their politics and ideology, Peter Gibbon 
looked at the impact of the Belfast Protestant working class upon the
7  fidevelopment of Ulster Unionism. Other works have specifically focused
69 Shallice, ‘’Orange and Green and Militancy” , 16
70 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism: A political and social history of 
Liverpool. 1868-1939. Liverpool, Liverpool Univ.Press, 1983
71 Smith, ‘’Labour Tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool” , in: History 
Workshop Journal. 17 (Spring, 1984), 48-9
72 Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 159
73 see Erich Strauss, Irish Nationalism and British Democracy. Westport, 
Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1975.
74 see Bell, The Protestants of Ulster: Miller, Queen’s Rebels.: Stewart, The 
Narrow Ground. Aspects of Ulster. 1609-1969. London, Faber, 1977; David 
Hempton & Myrtle Hill, Evangelical Protestantism in Ulster Society 1740- 
1890. London & New York, Routledge, 1992 & Brendan O’Leary & John 
McGarrv. Conflict and Change in Britain series-A New Audit.3. The Politics 
of Antagonism-Understanding Northern Ireland. London & Atlantic 
Highlands, New Jersey, The Athlone Press, 1993.
75 see Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two.; Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party. 
1882-1973. & D.George Boyce & Alan O’Day, eds, Defenders of the Union. 
A Survey of British and Irish Unionism since 1801. London, Routledge, 2001.
76 see Berresford Ellis, A History of the Irish Working Class.
77 see Patterson, Class Conflict and Sectarianism. & Austin Morgan, Labour 
and Partition. The Belfast Working Class. 1905-23. London, Concord, Mass, 
1991.
78 see Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism.
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upon Belfast and aspects of its history, ranging from its industrial structure, its
7 0Catholic community and its sectarian conflict.
As outlined, several studies have contrasted sectarianism in Liverpool 
and Glasgow80 with analogies being made to Liverpool as the closest 
mainland approximation to Belfast in terms of sustained sectarian violence 
and conflict.81 Tom Gallagher sought an explanation for the differences in 
‘communal strife’ between Glasgow and Liverpool by examining the 
contrasting impact upon both cities of economic rivalry within the working 
class, religious disputes and the Irish Question.82 Joan Smith on the other 
hand sought to explain the contrasting development of social and political life 
and ‘workers beliefs’, (1880-1914) by analysing the industrial and 
neighbourhood structure of the two cities and the evolution of their dominant 
political culture.83 Using this explanatory framework, Smith sought to explain 
why, despite similar levels of Irish immigration, Glasgow developed a Liberal 
‘commonsense’; whilst Liverpool was preoccupied with questions of religion 
and nationality, and convulsed by sectarian strife.84 She argued that 
Liverpool’s unskilled labour market encouraged appeals to ‘ethnic identity’; 
and that discrimination in the housing market led to the development of an
79 see Sybil Gribbon, ‘’An Irish City: Belfast 1911 ” , in David Harkness & 
Mary O’Dowd, The Town in Ireland. Belfast, The Appletree Press, 1981; 
A.C.Hepbum & B.Collins, ‘’Industrial Society: The Structure of Belfast,
1901 ” , in Peter Roebuck, ed, Plantation to Partition. Essays in Honour of 
J.L.McCraken. Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 1981.; A.C.Hepbum, A Past Apart. 
Studies in the History of Catholic Belfast 1850-1950. Ulster, 1996 & Andrew 
Boyd, Holy War in Belfast. Belfast, 1987.
80 See Joan Smith, ‘’Labour tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool” , in History 
Workshop Journal. 17 (1984); Joan Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 
& Tom Gallagher, ‘’A Tale of Two Cities: Communal Strife in Glasgow and 
Liverpool before 1914” , in: R.Swift & S.Gilley, eds, The Irish in the 
Victorian Citv.
81 see Gallagher, ‘’A Tale o f Two Cities” , 106; Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and 
Sectarianism” , 163, A.Shallice, ‘’Orange and Green and Militancy: 
Sectarianism and Working Class Politics in Liverpool, 1900-14” , Bulletin 
North West Labour History Document 6 (1979-80), 15 & Bohstedt, ‘’More 
Than One Working Class” , 202
82 Gallagher, ‘’A Tale of Two Cities” , 106
83 see Smith, ‘’Labour Tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool” , 48-9 & Smith, 
‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 159
84 see Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 163-4,202
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‘Irish ghetto’.85 On the other hand, Glasgow, dominated by skilled
o /
employment in shipbuilding and marine-engineering, experienced no ‘direct 
competition’ between Catholic and Protestant87 and avoided the development 
of ‘exclusive communities’.88
I argue that, although industrial and particularly neighbourhood 
structure, contributed to sectarian conflict in Liverpool and Belfast, Smith’s 
explanatory framework is inadequate and does not explain the different 
manifestations that sectarian conflict took in the two cities during 1880-1921. 
In Liverpool, ‘communal strife’ was primarily expressed through sustained 
confrontation in the ‘community of the street’; whilst in Belfast, politics and 
propaganda became the principal modes of expression. Belfast was more 
akin to ‘Liberal’ Glasgow in terms of its industrial structure, with a powerful 
artisan elite and strong Trade Union movement, and yet experienced a 
significantly higher level of industrial and residential segregation, and, in the 
period through to 1886, more sustained sectarian conflict than in Liverpool. 
Despite contrasting industrial, but similar neighbourhood structures, both 
Belfast and Liverpool shared a dominant Conservative political culture based 
upon an alliance with popular sectarianism.89 However, despite experiencing 
a greater degree of industrial and neighbourhood segregation, and sustained 
‘communal strife’ than its English counterpart, Ulster Unionism proved 
remarkably successful in Belfast, in the post-1886 period, at containing and 
controlling popular sectarianism, whilst Liverpool continued to be wracked 
by ‘endemic’ sectarian confrontation and violence. I have sought an 
explanation for this apparent anomaly, not through differences in industrial 
and neighbourhood structure, but instead through an understanding of the
85 Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 163
86 Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 184
87 Smith, ‘’Labour Tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool” , 48
88 Smith, ‘’Labour Tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool” , 49
89 Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 202 does clarify that it is wrong to 
interpret the history of relations between Irish ethnic groups and others in 
Glasgow and Liverpool, as if those relations were ‘bom directly out of the job 
or housing markets’. Instead, she states that such relations were ‘negotiated 
and constructed within political contexts, determined largely by the strength 
of identity with the nation and of the social organisations that reinforced or 
challenged nationalist beliefs’. However, this still does not help to explain 
differences in ‘communal strife’ between Liverpool and Belfast.
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location and distribution of power and leadership within the relationship 
between the dominant Conservative political culture and the forces of popular 
sectarianism.
In terms of their similarities, both Liverpool and Belfast experienced 
intense phases of urbanisation, fuelled by mass immigration, a substantial 
proportion of which was Catholic. The Catholic community in each city was 
relatively disadvantaged, in relation to the Protestant majority, both socially 
and economically. Both cities witnessed forms of sectarian discrimination in 
the labour market and the evolution of patterns of residential concentration 
and segregation producing recognisable Protestant and Catholic ‘enclaves’. 
These enclaves generated ‘endemic’ sectarian rioting. In both cities there 
emerged extensive associational networks organised along sectarian lines, 
whilst sectarianism entered the political arena during roughly the same period 
(1830’s). In each context, the Conservative establishment (Tory-Anglican in 
Liverpool; Episcopalian-Conservative in Belfast) forged an alliance with the 
Orange Order, exploiting popular Protestantism as part of the process of 
constructing local political hegemony. In both cities, Liberalism was 
marginal, or subordinate, and Irish Nationalism emerged as the principal local 
opposition. Additionally, both overlapped in terms of particular political 
developments such as the struggle against Home Rule and the anti-Ritualist 
agitation, with this trait being particularly pronounced in the area of 
independent Protestant politics during the early Edwardian period, when a 
political vacuum occurred in both cities.
Despite these compelling similarities, I set out to expose profound 
differences in the manifestation of ‘communal strife’ in Liverpool and Belfast 
during the period 1880-1921. The primary difference between sectarian 
conflict in the two cities comes down to a question of control and leadership 
over this volatile popular force. This issue contributes to a wider 
understanding of the complex interaction between political movements and 
collective violence. In Liverpool, the dominant Tory-Anglican 
establishment’s legitimacy and authority, as the ‘bulwark of the 
Reformation’, was gradually eroded and undermined, with sectarianism being 
transformed into a volatile agency of grassroots Protestant power, principally 
exercised in the community of the street. In Belfast, sectarianism was also
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an agency of popular Protestant identity, expression and assertion, but unlike 
Liverpool Tory Democracy, Ulster Unionism, via its political and 
organisational initiatives, ensured that control and leadership over this 
powerful force, was largely retained. By integrating the principal agency of 
popular sectarianism, the Orange Order, Ulster Unionism was able to harness, 
mobilise and deploy popular sectarian sentiment, whilst simultaneously 
circumscribing its prominence, role and expression. This was achieved by 
incorporating popular sectarianism into a broad coalition of interests and into 
a political and ideological strategy of which sectarianism was a crucial, but 
subordinate, component.
In the following section, I highlight four central themes that help to 
explain the ascendancy of belligerent popular sectarianism, embodied by the 
powerful ‘Protestant Democracy’, in Liverpool; and the ability of Ulster 
Unionism to harness, contain and crucially control popular sectarianism and 
its excesses, in Belfast Through these themes, I will seek to explain how 
Ulster Unionism effectively managed popular sectarianism, despite Belfast 
experiencing a higher degree of entrenched economic, political and 
residential discrimination and segregation. Despite the exuberance of popular 
sectarianism in Liverpool and the relative control and discipline exercised 
over it in Belfast, sectarianism has all but died out in contemporary 
Liverpool, whilst, in Belfast, despite the ‘peace process’, deep-rooted 
suspicion and animosity appears unlikely to fade away and die in the near 
future.
My contention is that Ulster Unionism’s success in winning the battle 
of politics and propaganda in relation to Home Rule was its ability to prevent 
the potentially catastrophic developments that occurred in Liverpool during 
the same period. Ulster Unionism avoided the split that occurred within 
Liverpool’s Protestant community between formal politics and organisation 
and the belligerent politics of the street. This development was accompanied 
by the rise of the powerful ‘Protestant Democracy’, an increasingly 
autonomous, explicitly sectarian movement primarily operating in the volatile 
community of the street. By preventing the evolution in Belfast of a 
sustained popular movement akin to the aggressive ‘Protestant Democracy’, 
Ulster Unionism was able to both preserve the fragile, representative Ulster
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Protestant coalition and present itself as the united, law-abiding section of the 
community. I argue that a number of key factors informed the contrasting 
attitude and approach of Tory-Democracy and Ulster Unionism to popular 
sectarianism and its associated collective violence.
(Is) The Parochial Mentality versus the National Movement.
A critical determinant in the relationship between Tory Democracy, 
Ulster Unionism and sectarian violence was these movements’ interaction 
with evolving, competing and conflicting conceptions of British identity. 
Historians have acknowledged the fundamentally modem, constructed or
Q A
"imagined’ character of the British national community. This constructivist 
approach is part of the dominant modernisation paradigm, which draws upon 
political science and sociology. This attributes the processes of 
modernisation and modernity, particularly capitalism, industrialisation and 
urbanisation, as necessary, albeit insufficient, preconditions for the 
emergence of nations, national identity and nationalism. This process is 
invariably dated back to the French Revolution.91
This paradigm constitutes a profound departure from, and critique of, 
primordialist and perennialist approaches with their highly controversial
90 see Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects. Metropole and Colony in the 
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Nineteenth Century. Oxford, New York, Berg, 2000,108,110; Linda Colley, 
Britons. Forging the Nation 1707-1837. New Haven & London, Yale Univ. 
Press, 1992,5 & David Cannadine, Omamentalism. How the British Saw 
Their Empire. London, New York, Victoria, Toronto, New Delhi, Auckland, 
Rosebank, Penguin Books, 2001,3
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and Approaches” , in: Heinz Gerhard Haupt/Michael G.Muller/Stuart Woolf, 
eds. Regional and National Identities in Europe in the XlXth and XXth 
Centuries. The Hague, London, Boston, European Univ.Institute. European
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emphasis upon the ‘innate’ qualities, or organic character of the nation and 
nationalism.92 Primordialism argues that nations and nationalism derive from 
‘primordial attributes of basic social and cultural phenomena like language, 
religion, territory, and especially kinship’.93 The perennialist approach views 
nations over the ‘longue duree’, attempting ‘to grasp their role as long-term 
components of historical development-whether they are seen as temporally 
continuous or recurrent in history’. Perennialists tend to derive modem 
nations from ‘fundamental ethnic ties, rather than from the processes of 
modernisation’
Such approaches are largely discredited amongst those theorists who 
see nationalism as a modem phenomenon. However, the question as to 
whether we can speak of ‘pre-modem nations’, or the extent to which ‘pre­
modem forms of national consciousness’ can be linked, in any politically 
significant way, to the rise of nationalism and of modem national identities 
remain highly contested issues.95 In this context, Adrian Hastings argues that 
England was a ‘prototype’ nation-state, with Bible Protestantism pivotal to its 
pre-modem expressions of national consciousness.96 In a critique of 
‘modernist’ instrumentalist and constructivist approaches to national identity, 
Anthony D.Smith, through his concept of ‘ethnosymbolism’, attempts to 
'uncover the symbolic legacy of ethnic identities for particular nations, and to 
show how modem nations and nationalists rediscover and reinterpret the 
symbols, myths, memories, values and traditions of their ethno-histories, as 
they face the problems of modernity’.97 Smith defines ethnies as ‘named
Forum. Centre for Advanced Studies. Florence, Italy, Kluwer Law 
International, 1998, 17
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human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories, and cultures, having 
an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity’. 
Consequently, he locates modem nations and nationalism in the ‘historical 
longue duree’ emphasising potential continuities between pre-modem forms 
of ethnic and national awareness and modem nationalism.98
This approach has been criticised for regarding ‘existing ethnic myths 
and symbols as more than merely a resource from which actors can pick and 
choose’.99 Breuilly’s reservations concern the assumption that the ‘stronger 
and more persistent such (ethnic) identities, the more successful will be 
modem nationalism’ citing the absence of three vital ingredients necessary 
for the formation of modem national identities, legal, political and economic 
identity. Gellner argues that, unlike the ‘structural transformation brought 
about by industrialisation’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnosymbolism’ were not 
‘determinative’ factors but simply provided ‘cultural resources’ for modem 
nationalist rhetoric.
Consequently, although it is highly debatable whether there were 
continuities, or a ‘casual link’, between pre-modem nations and national 
identities and the modem nation-state and nationalism, an alternative 
approach, emphasising potential connections, has been advanced by Eric 
Hobsbawm. This formulation certainly has resonance in relation to popular 
Protestantism in Belfast and Liverpool, with Colley identifying Reformation 
Protestantism as a cultural resource at the ‘core’ of British identity.101 
Hobsbawm’s concept o f ‘proto-nationalism’ refers to ‘certain variants of 
feelings of collective belonging which already existed and which could 
operate.. .potentially on the macro-political scale which could fit in with 
modem states and nations’. These formations constituted a ‘toolkit from 
which modem political actors (and particularly nationalists) select certain 
elements depending on their situational needs’.102
Most new approaches have built upon and refined the modernisation 
paradigm. These have concentrated upon the processes of construction of
98 Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe. 20
99 Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe. 22
100 Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe. 22-23
101 Colley, Britons. 368-9
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nationalist ideologies, the conditions facilitating (without necessarily 
ensuring) their diffusion, and the social mechanisms through which they 
operated. Two fundamentally different contemporary approaches have 
emerged. The first studies national movements' and nationalism as 
‘manifestations of political power, in which social, economic and cultural 
aspects are considered as explanatory factors, but only in their relationship to 
the state’.103 John Breuilly reserves the term ‘nationalism’ for ‘political 
movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with 
nationalist arguments’. In this analysis, the ‘dynamic interaction’ between 
the political movement and the modem state provides the ‘engine’ of modem 
nationalism, with nationalists attempting to bridge the widening gulf between 
the increasingly powerful state and civil society. In this struggle over the 
state, nationalist ideas acquire political significance by serving three 
important functions. The first is ‘interest co-ordination’, whereby nationalist 
ideas were utilised to ‘promote the idea of common interests amongst a 
number of elites which otherwise have rather distinct interests in opposing the 
existing state’. The second, ‘mobilisation’, refers to the ‘use of nationalist 
ideas to generate support for the political movement from broad groups 
hitherto excluded from the political process’. Finally, nationalist arguments 
serve as a ‘legitimation for the goals of a political movement’.104
The second approach sees national identity as a ‘cultural construction, 
not a fixed objective reality, but an ongoing and changeable process, 
dependent on and deriving from social relations, and hence not exclusive of 
other identities’.105 Hobsbawm and Anderson formulated, respectively, the 
idea of nationality based on ‘invented traditions’ and ‘imagined 
communities’. Hobsbawm identified ‘sociopolitical constructs’ forged, even 
fabricated, by cultural engineers, who designed symbols, mythologies, rituals, 
and histories. In order to respond to social changes unleashed by late 
Nineteenth century industrialisation, ‘invented traditions’ sought to historicise 
the present inculcating ‘certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition,
102 Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe. 19-20,22,24
103 Woolf, ‘’Introduction” , 8
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which automatically implies continuity with the past’, constituting a source of 
political legitimation and instrument of social control.106 Anderson presented 
nationalism as a new 'cognitive formation’ and the nation as an 'imagined 
political community and hence as a cultural artifact, at once sovereign, finite 
and horizontally cross-class and moving along linear, ‘empty homogeneous 
time” .107 Emphasising cultural representation and social engineering and the 
importance of deliberate elite innovation, nations and national identity in the 
constructionist view are the product of ‘cultural work’ on the part of elite’s.108
Another vital factor is the role of ‘Othering’, or membership and 
exclusion, in the construction of the imagined political community. Hall, 
Cannadine and Colley emphasise the transnational dimension to British 
identity, the central relationship between Britain and Europe, and the ‘mother 
country’ and its empire, with the interaction between coloniser and the 
colonised in Hall and Cannadine’s analysis comprising a constitutive feature 
of British imperial identity.109 Whilst Hall gives central weight to the ‘rule of 
difference’ in determining subjects and citizens along gender, racial, ethnic 
and class grounds,110 Cannadine stresses the generalisation of ‘long-standing 
and deep-rooted’ principles, practises and perceptions of social hierarchy in 
determining the character of Britain and her empire.111 Colley also identifies 
the role of ‘Othering’, and particularly warfare with Catholic France, in the 
construction of British identity, explicitly grasping the role of Protestantism 
as the ‘raison d’etre’ under girding British national imaginings.112
Instrumental to the process of constructing national identity is the act of 
‘nation building’. Two main approaches predominate. The first emphasises
106 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘’Intoduction: Inventing Traditions” , in: Eric Hobsbawm 
& Terence Ranger, eds, The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge, London,
New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1983, 
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the ‘deliberate action of the state’ highlighting ‘material measures’ including 
common legislation, policing, tax collection and infrastructure development 
and the utility of ‘symbolic forms of identification’ like national mass rituals 
and commemorative festivals.113 Hobsbawm emphasises the ‘state-building’ 
propensity of nationalism aiming at ethnolinguistic and/or institutional 
homogeneity via strategies of institutional penetration and cultural policy, 
through to forced assimilation and expulsion.114 Zimmer refers to the 
‘nationalisation of the masses’ during the late Nineteenth/early Twentieth 
Century’s, resulting from the interplay between state-induced nationalism and 
the nation-oriented activity fostered within civil society. Nationalism offered 
‘a promising ideological device to shore up a potentially endangered power 
base, an ideological tool to secure state authority in an era of mass 
democratisation’. Consequently nationalism became an integral part of 
political culture, with ‘struggles over the definition of national identity’.115
The second approach to nation building focuses upon the almost 
inevitable consequences of modernisation stressing ‘processes of social 
change’. For K.W.Deutsch, market forces and the modem state broke down 
‘familial and local ties and value systems characteristic of traditional 
societies; mobility and literacy encouraged new forms of social 
communication, secular ideologies of mobilisation and participation steadily 
thickened relations within the parameters of the nation state’.116 Gellner’s 
sociocultural modernism argues that nationalism was functional and 
necessary for industrialism, a ‘cultural glue’117 providing a ‘high culture’ that 
is specialist, literate and based on mass standardised schooling.118
Alternative, potentially more subtle approaches highlight the 
fragmentation, or deconstruction, of contemporary national identities, 
advancing understanding of the ‘dynamics of identity in plural Western 
societies’. This led to a growing appreciation of the complexity, diversity and
113 Woolf, ‘’Introduction” , 27 & Zimmer, Nationalism in Europe. 28
114 Smith, The Nation in History. 28
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interaction between identities, and to how this interplay contributed to 
differing and conflicting, conceptions of national identity.119 These could be 
influenced by religious or regional affiliations or by occupational and class 
position.120 Hall and Colley dismiss the idea of a homogeneous British 
identity, which precluded or supplanted alternative sometimes pre-existing 
identities and allegiances. Hall stresses the ‘fragile’ nature of this imagined 
identity, possibly ‘threatening dissolution’.121 Whilst Hall and Colley focus 
upon the forging122 of British identity (1707-1867) I examine a later period 
when British identity was evolving, being renegotiated and contested with its 
Protestant ‘core’ eroded by increasingly secular ‘nationalising forces’. This 
process generated intense conflict with, and adaptation to, competing and 
conflicting conceptions of British identity at both the national, regional and 
local level.
Recent studies have focused upon the relationship between regional and 
national identities, arguing that regions and localities, along with political 
parties and cultural associations, were not passive recipients but ‘actively 
contributed to the national project’ redefining and transforming official 
messages.123 Haupt, Muller and Woolf argue the importance of studying ‘how 
social and national classifications and orderings combine, how religious and 
national compounds conflict or agree, or how definitions of history become 
part of national mythologies, are instrumentalised or else call the latter into
I
question’. Applegate states that, historians no longer make the ‘’axiomatic 
assumption’ that countries or nations can be treated as the unproblematic 
givens of historical analysis, that cultures and polities will converge in
119 see Celia Applegate, ‘’Europe of Regions: reflections on the historiography 
of sub-national places in modem times” , American Historical Review. Vol 
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industrialised countries, or that a normal and unitary path of modem 
development can be distinguished amidst the fits and starts of European life’. 
She argues that the study of regional identities will provide ‘a more nuanced 
understanding of the nation-ness of modem states’ emphasising the role of 
regions and localities in the economic, political and cultural development of 
nations and national identity. Regions and localities constituted sites of both 
reaction, accommodation and negotiation between 'nationalising forces' and 
alternative identities.125
Historians have identified a number of contested trends during this 
period of British national development. Amongst the most important were 
the erosion of parochialism, the decline of organised religion, accompanied 
by secularisation and the emergence of a national political culture. The 
experience of Liverpool illustrates that although these modernising trends 
were evident, particularly during the later period, they did not necessarily 
advance at an even pace, or have a uniform impact from one region or locality 
to the next
This process of uneven national development has been termed the 
‘diflusionist’ model.126 Hechter argued that in Britain the ‘salience of local 
attachments has been significantly eroded by the social changes of the past 
two centuries’.127 However, Liverpool continued to be preoccupied with 
largely local issues and concerns. This leads us to the contested question of 
Liverpool’s ‘exceptionalism’.
Feuchtwanger argues the ‘spread of religious doubt and secularism 
were perhaps the most important among all the agents of change in late 
Victorian England’.128 However, in Liverpool, this process contributed to the
Haupt/Michael G.Muller/Stuart Woolf, eds, Regional and National Identities 
in Europe in the XlXth and XXth Centuries. 5
125 Applegate, ‘’Europe o f Regions” , 1164,1176-77 & Celia Applegate, A 
Nation of Provincials. The German Idea of Heimat. Berkeley, L.A., Oxford, 
Univ. of California Press, 1990,12
126 Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism. The Celtic Fringe in British 
National Development 1536-1966. Berkeley & L.A, Univ. of California Press, 
1975,23-27 & D.George Boyce, Nationalism in Ireland. London & New 
York, Routledge, 1982,1991,375-6
1 /7*7 Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 316
128 EJ.Feuchtwanger, Democracy and Empire. Britain 1865-1914. Edward 
Arnold, 1985,24
39
emergence of alternative forms of populist Protestant religious identity and 
expression and to the concomitant revival of belligerent sectarianism during 
the late Victorian/early Edwardian period.
Interrelated was the identification of the emergence of a genuinely 
national political culture. Feuchtwanger argues during 1865-1914, British
1 *)Qpolitics became ‘more national and less local and community based’. Both 
he and Hechter identify the growing pre-eminence of class cleavages over 
religious and ethnic allegiances.130 However, this was not the case in 
Liverpool where religious and ethnic allegiance remained a dynamic force 
within local political culture.
Neil Collins argues ‘it was only in the second half of the Twentieth 
century that it became accurate to discount religion as a major influence on 
Liverpool’s election’s: in the Nineteenth century it was of paramount 
importance’. Where ‘national’ issues did impinge they tended to be ‘locally 
important, and were generally religious or ethnic in nature’.131 In contrast, 
Sam Davies rejects ‘exceptionalism’ in relation to Liverpool’s working class 
politics, defining this approach as ‘one which assumes a normal pattern of 
growth, to be contrasted with occasional exceptions which deviate from the 
pattern’.132 He emphasises the specifically local factors influencing working 
class development, arguing that ‘local economic structures were decisive in 
forming a Liverpool working class that was distinctively differentiated by 
occupation’.133 Davies states, although ‘relevant’, religious sectarianism ‘was 
almost certainly not as important as Twentieth century convention has made it 
out to be’.134
In contrast, Mary Hickman criticises historiography treating Twentieth 
century ‘anti-Catholic and anti-Irish racism’ in Scotland and Liverpool as
129 Feuchtwanger, Democracy and Empire. 4
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'marginal to the life of the British body politic’, analysing such racism as part 
of the ‘development of a racist British nationalism’.135 However, I concur 
with Loughlin’s comment in relation to Belfast, that in ‘fighting for religion’ 
that city was increasingly seen as ‘beyond the British national pale’.136 This 
argument takes account of changing and conflicting conceptions of British 
national identity throughout the period.
Liverpool experienced growing conflict between two evolving local 
conceptions of British identity. Tory Democracy was a modem Conservative 
nationalism137 with a pronounced regionalist138 character and strong, but 
ultimately contingent, proto-nationalist dimension139 conceived to win over 
the Protestant working class. In contrast, the Protestant Democracy was a 
potent amalgam of established Protestant proto-nationalism intertwined with 
local class and national identities.140 Growing conflict was refracted through 
the Ritualist/Romanist threat and how best to counter it. This was 
exacerbated by Tory Democracy’s moderation of its more extreme proto­
nationalist elements as part of a prolonged adaptation to national political 
culture and identity. Despite gradual loss of control over sectarianism, 
accompanied by an upsurge in collective violence, Tory-Democracy 
continued to capitalise politically, in the absence of both credible local 
political alternatives for Protestant working class votes and determined 
national intervention in Liverpool’s affairs.
In contrast, I argue that in Belfast, with the advent of Home Rule in 
1886 and its implications for all Ulster’s Protestants, the local state 
constructed by the Episcopalian-Conservative establishment was shattered 
and its relationship to popular sectarianism transformed. Crucial was Ulster 
Unionism’s relationship to the British mainland and its role in the debate
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upon British national identity central to the Home Rule struggle. Boyce 
argues that in all its modes, Nationalism in Ireland ‘has been profoundly 
influenced by the power and proximity of Britain’, stating that ‘after 1800 
Ireland was an integral part of the British polity, inextricably linked with 
British politics and, as always, exposed to British cultural influence’.141 He 
identifies the pivotal importance of 1886, when Irish nationality ‘became the 
major political issue of the age’. This question was ‘inextricably bound up 
with the future of the British constitution and more importantly the British
1 AOnation. Home Rule provoked the slumbering genie of British nationalism’. 
Central to this struggle was politics and propaganda.
Belfast’s Episcopalian Conservative establishment was confronted with 
the imperative of building a representative coalition, of integrating its 
grassroots sectarian support143 and of projecting a united respectable front on 
the mainland.144 Certain historians and social scientists characterised Ulster’s 
Protestants as an ‘ethnic nation’ or ‘ethnic community’,145 whilst others 
highlight the ‘fissiparous’ nature of the convenient ‘politico-religious’ label 
Protestant146 I argue that Ulster Unionism was a constructed, invented or 
‘imagined’ identity with strong Protestant proto-nationalist bonds juxtaposed 
in relation to the Irish Nationalist ‘other’. It was an intrinsically modem 
nationalism, engineered by local elite’s with a national political agenda in 
order to mobilise a disparate and fractious constituency. Its adaptability to 
changing conceptions of British identity and political culture illustrate its 
instrumental, contingent and evolving character. In order to achieve its aims,
141 Boyce, Nationalism in Ireland 388
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the new movement sought to distance itself from explicit sectarianism 
emphasising ideals of unity and law-abiding respectability.147
Liverpool’s ‘local state’ mentality was gradually eroded by the impact 
of events of national import. The Transport Strike of 1911 focused attention 
upon the role of sectarian street mobilisation;148 whilst the First World War 
further undermined parochialism and accelerated secularisation.
Additionally, local developments like the mass inter-war slum clearances 
dismantled ‘cultural and community infrastructure’, further undermining the 
basis of popular sectarianism.149 I believe this interplay between local and 
national developments witnessed the diminution in the centrality of religious 
sectarianism, symbolised by street mobilisation, as a ‘distinctive feature’ of 
Liverpool’s political culture and identity. This process was accompanied by 
the slow growth of the Labour Party and the decline of Irish Nationalism, 
rendering sectarianism by the inter-war period, as an important but no longer 
pivotal determinant of political allegiance within a highly distinctive, but no 
longer fundamentally ‘exceptional’ local context.
In contrast, with the passage of the Fourth Home Rule Bill in 1920 and 
the creation of Northern Ireland in May 1921, Belfast became the capital of a 
sectarian ‘local state’ with an accompanying upsurge in serious sectarian 
violence costing nearly 300 lives between 1920-22.150 With the ‘battle of 
politics’ and propaganda won, the unifying cement of the struggle against 
Home Rule along with the imperative for Ulster Unionism to project a 
respectable fa9ade were heavily reduced. Critical to this transition was 
Britain’s changing relationship to Ireland. Boyce and Loughlin identify 
growing disengagement by British political parties with the Irish question
147 For a contradictory view see Berresford-Ellis, A History of the Irish 
Working Class. 204 & Bell, The Protestants of Ulster. 38 who argues that 
during the Third Home Rule crisis the Unionists employed ‘fenian-bashing’ in 
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during the First World War. By 1918 none of the parties ‘existed for reasons 
to do with Ireland’,151 with Loughlin stating the war ‘destroyed the deep 
divisions between the major British parties that had existed.. .on the question
1 S9of national identity and the national interest’. According to Boyce, this
transition ‘placed Ireland firmly outside the realm of British party politics’,153 
whilst for Loughlin it rendered Northern Ireland ‘an expendable part of the 
United Kingdom’.154 In this new political environment the capacity and 
desire of Unionism to exercise control and restraint over its volatile sectarian 
support was severely diminished. A situation akin to that in Liverpool during 
1880-1921 arose with a degree of devolution of power and leadership 
occurring within the Unionist bloc. This was characterised by the 
development of a more pragmatic relationship between the movement’s 
leadership and the proletarian Orange Order and its associated excesses.155
The modernisation paradigm remains the best explanatory framework 
for dissecting British national identity during this period. Rejecting 
primordialist and perennialist emphases upon continuities between pre­
modem forms of ethnic and national awareness and contemporary 
nationalism and national identity, Hobsbawm’s ‘proto-nationalism’ 
nevertheless highlights potential connections, or the ‘toolkit’ exploited by 
modem nationalists. One of the central planks of British identity was 
Reformation Protestantism. This established resource, along with the 
transnational dimension and the role of ‘Othering’ along gender, racial, ethnic
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Protestant class bloc’. Bew attributes these changes to the fact that ‘in its 
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independently of the British authorities, the Unionist leadership had been 
forced to make considerable concessions to the Orange section of the working 
class’, in the process acquiescing in, and justifying, the July expulsions.
44
and class lines, were vital ingredients in the cultural construction of British 
national identity, diffused through both deliberate state activity and the 
impersonal forces associated with modernisation. Additionally, Breuilly has 
highlighted the role of nationalism as a political movement seeking state 
control in an era of mass democratisation. Whilst both theories have then- 
particular merits, I also believe it is essential, as recent studies have 
emphasised, to adopt a more nuanced approach to the complex, multi-layered 
and frequently contradictory character of British identity formation and 
diffusion. This allows for contingency, accommodation, conflict, negotiation 
and interaction between 'nationalising forces' and alternative social, 
religious, local or regional identities.
1 argue that during 1880-1921 British national identity was a complex, 
multi-layered phenomenon. There was constant interaction between, 
adaptation to and reaction against evolving and competing 'official 
nationalism's' (a Conservative ‘organic’ and Liberal ‘pluralist’ conception)156 
and strong local and regional identifications with the nation. The latter could 
be constructed or imagined by dominant elite's, incorporating a pronounced 
but potentially instrumental and contingent proto-nationalist dimension.
These identities could be employed by modem political movements to 
mobilise cross-class constituencies in multi-ethnic environments in an era of 
democratisation.
(2) Devolution and Fragmentation versus Centralisation and Control.
The construction, character and internal dynamics of the Protestant 
communities of Liverpool and Belfast profoundly impacted upon the 
relationship between Tory Democracy, Ulster Unionism and sectarian 
violence. There is considerable debate amongst historians and social 
scientists concerning the definition, nature and decline of community. These 
can be characterised by the following themes.
The first examines the impact of modernisation. Under pressure from 
demographic, cultural and economic change dating back to the
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Enlightenment, social theorists have been concerned with the transformation 
and decline of community. Classic theorists like Durkheim, Marx and Weber 
identified a profound transformation in social relationships from the ‘ascribed 
statuses of communities regulated by custom’ to ‘statuses achieved by 
individuals’.157 Urbanisation has been associated with the development of a 
‘culture of impersonality and alienation’,158 leading to the decline of the 
‘morally coercive or normative’ community and the rise of the individual 
‘ego-centred network’. These ‘personal communities’ are ‘loosely bounded, 
sparsely knit networks of specialised ties’.159 Modernisation is associated 
with the decline in locality as the basis for social organisation.
Locality based communities are predicated upon face-to-face group 
interaction and largely shaped by local environmental economic, social and 
political factors. These structural and cultural factors embody opportunities 
and constraints and constitute the ingredients from which ‘social space’, or 
community, is constructed and derives meaning.160 Consequently, each place 
trails ‘long histories: histories of economics and politics, of gender, class and 
ethnicity; and histories, too, of the many different stories which have been 
told about all of these’.161 Such ‘spatial articulations of social relations’ can 
develop a seeming fixity, with ethnic and racial ghettos perpetuating 
themselves through the ‘interaction of majority exclusionary practises and 
minority preferences’. Fainstein and Campbell argue it is possible to “ read’ 
the divisions and values of a society in the lineaments of its spatial 
configurations’ with group proximity breeding enmity as well as tolerance.162
156 Alan O’Day, The Edwardian Age: Conflict and Stability 1900-14. London 
& Basingstoke, MacMillan, 1979,118-9
143 N.W.Townsend & K.V.Hansen, ‘’Community, Expression o f ’, in: 
International Encvlopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences. Vol.4. 
3355-2357
144 Susan S.Fainstein & Scott Campbell, eds, Readings in Urban Theory. 
Oxford, Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2002,12
159 Townsend & Hansen, ‘’Community, Expression o f ’, 2356
160 William Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears. The World of the New 
Urban Poor. New York, Vintage Books, 1997, X V I11,6
161 John Allen, Doreen Massey & Alan Cochrane with Julie Charlesworth, 
Gill Court, Nick Henry & Phil Sarre, Rethinking the Region. London & New 
York, Routledge, 1998,9
162 Fainstein & Campbell, Readings in Urban Theory. 8,12
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With the theoretical receding of locality as a basis of social 
organisation, and the rise of individualism, attention has focused upon the 
transformation in the foundation of communities. The emphasis in such 
approaches is upon the contingent cultural construction, or imagining, of 
social identities as the basis of community organisation. Sorensen and Strath 
argue that all ‘social coherence and community is symbolically and 
mythically based’.163 Symbolic, or expressive, communities are not 
predicated upon localised interaction but upon a common cause or identity. 
As Townsend argues ‘shared values or beliefs, expressed or manifested 
through ethnicity or nationality, or the symbolism of a shared history or a 
common cause, have.. .proven effective bases for community expression and 
as rhetorical levers in political actions’.164 Symbolic communal identities 
may be invoked by political elite’s165 as an effective ‘rallying cry’.166
Central to the concept of community are notions of membership and 
exclusion, or ‘Othering’. Townsend states, whilst necessarily expressing 
‘what the members have in common, the concept and rhetoric of community 
is frequently used to divide, to exclude, and to justify differential treatment 
and access’.167 Allen highlights how social and spatial ‘Othering’ 
complement each other, with spatial barriers erected to ‘maintain a valued 
social character or tight boundaries drawn to register and operationalise a 
social divide’.168 Robert.D.Putnam identifies two types of social capital 
characteristic of communities. Bridging (or inclusive) capital is embodied by 
networks which are ‘outward looking and encompass people across diverse 
social cleavages’ facilitating broader identities and reciprocity. Bonded (or 
exclusive) capital is inward looking and tends to ‘reinforce exclusive
163 Oystein Sorensen & Bo Strath, ‘’Introduction: The Cultural Construction 
of Norden” , in: Oystein Sorensen & Bo Strath, eds, The Cultural 
Construction of Norden. Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Oxford, Boston, 
Scandinavian Univ.Press, 1997,23
164 Townsend & Hansen, ‘’Community, Expression o f ’, 2356-7
165 John Allen, Doreen Massey & Alan Cochrane with Julie Charlesworth, 
Gill Court, Nick Henry & Phil Sane, Rethinking the Region. 90
166 Townsend & Hansen, ‘’Community, Expression o f ’, 2357
167 Townsend & Hansen, ‘’Community, Expression o f ’, 2357 & Sorensen & 
Strath, ‘’Introduction: The Cultural Construction of Norden” , 21
168 John Allen, Doreen Massey & Alan Cochrane with Julie Charlesworth, 
Gill Court, Nick Henry & Phil Sane, Rethinking the Region. 82-83
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identities and homogeneous groups’. It is good for ‘undergirding specific 
reciprocity and mobilising solidarity’ but can generate ‘strong out-group 
antagonism’. Putnam emphasises these are not ‘either-or’ categories, with 
certain communities encompassing both forms of capital.169
A contested question is the extent to which communal identity implies 
homogeneity,170 or allows for heterogeneity and dissent.171 Townsend argues
177they may be used as a ‘concealment o f internal divisions’, whilst Klaus 
Eder believes communal identities can derive from, and constitute, a 
compromise between consensus and conflict. He argues that collective 
identities and memories are the ‘medium and outcome of social struggles’. In 
modem societies they ‘provide a common frame of reference for a people
1 71beyond their local identities such as a class or a nation’. Through out 
much of the period, Liverpool’s Protestant community was primarily locality 
based, constructed out of local environmental cultural and structural resources 
and juxtaposed socially and spatially in relation to the Irish Catholic ‘Other’. 
It was characterised by predominantly exclusionary bonded social capital but 
was also heterogeneous. This diversity increasingly translated into internal 
fragmentation and conflict, exacerbated by the insidious impact of 
modernisation.
169 Robert.D.Putnam, Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American 
Community. New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Singapore, Touchstone, 
Simon & Schuster, 2001,22-23
170 MaryJ.Hickman, ‘’Alternative historiographies of the Irish in Britain: a 
critique of the segregation/assimilation model” , in: R.Swift & S.Gilley, eds, 
The Irish in Victorian Britain. The Local Dimension. Dublin & Portland, 
Oregon, four Courts Press, 1999,240-41 & see Bo Strath, ‘’Europe as a 
Discourse” , in: Bo Strath, ed, Europe and the Other and Europe as the Other. 
Bruxelles, Bern, Berlin, Frankfurt/M, New York, Oxford, Wren, P.I.E, Peter 
Lang, 2000,19
171 see Mikael af Malmborg & Bo Strath, ‘’Introduction: The National 
Meanings of Europe” , in: Mikael af Malmborg & Bo Strath, eds, The 
Meaning of Europe. Variety and Contention within and among Nations. 
Oxford, New York, Berg, 2002,6,11 & Hickman, ‘’Alternative 
historiographies of the Irish in Britain” , 242,253
172 Townsend & Hansen, ‘’Community, Expression o f ’, 2357
173 Klaus Eder, ‘’RememberingNational Memories Together: The Formation 
of a Transnational Identity in Europe” , in Klaus Eder & Willfried Spohn, eds, 
Collective Memory and European Identity. The Effects of Integration and 
Enlargement. Ashgate, Aldershot, England, Burlington, U.S.A., 2005,209 & 
Bo Strath, ‘’Introduction: Europe as a Discourse” , 17-18
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A number of historians have identified key factors in Conservatism’s 
‘permanent hegemony’ in Liverpool.174 These ranged from its alliance with 
popular sectarianism, via the Orange Order (the ‘Tory-Orange bloc’), its 
‘power-sharing’ arrangement with the Protestant working class through the 
Working Men’s Conservative Association (W.M.C.A) and its social reform 
agenda.175 However, I argue that the continued vitality of belligerent 
sectarianism in Liverpool was attributable to the fragility, not stability, of the 
relationship between Conservatism and popular sectarianism, to the 
fragmented and devolved nature of power and leadership over the Protestant 
working class. Unlike the increasingly centralised control exercised by Ulster 
Unionism, the degree of authority exercised by the Conservative ‘political 
machine’ in Liverpool was gradually eroded. Disenchanted with the 
limitations of formal politics and organisation, Liverpool’s Protestant 
working class increasingly looked for guidance to grassroots organisations, 
and rival community leader’s who affirmed their legitimacy through
17Aconfrontation in the street. Historians have identified the role of
17 7individuals like Pastor George Wise, the structure of ‘community 
politics’178 and a ‘commonsense’ sectarian ideology179 as contributing to 
major riots, like those of 1909. However, they have not explicitly identified
174 Taplin on Neal’s ‘’Sectarian Violence” , 94
175 see Smith, ‘’Labour Tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool” , 33-39; Smith, 
‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 163 & Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of 
Liverpool” , 11
176 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 250 highlights that, unlike Lancashire mill towns, 
deference ‘was not a feature of the Liverpool working class’, whilst Shallice, 
‘’Orange, and Green and Militancy” , 17,30 argues that political ‘utilisation’ 
was ‘as much concerned with political leaders by the Orange community as 
the reverse’.
177 See Taplin on Neal ‘’Sectarian Violence” , 95 & Neal, Sectarian Violence. 
252 who also points out, that in many respects, Wise’s influence was 
‘beneficial’ to the Protestant community of the North End.
178 John Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class: Protestant-Catholic Riots 
in Edwardian Liverpool” , in: John Belchem, ed, Popular Politics. Riot and 
Labour. 175,214 argues that sectarian violence was ‘rooted in structures of 
community politics with their own intelligible goals and raison d’etre’.
179 Smith, ‘’Class, Skill, and Sectarianism” , 165 refers to a ‘common sense’ 
anti-Catholicism comprising a ‘heady brew of upright Protestantism and 
scandalous rumour’, whilst Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of Liverpool” , 11 
states that sectarian ideology derived its resonance from its ‘practical 
adequacy’, its ability to make ‘discursive and common-sense of the world’.
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the process of fragmentation and devolution, the erosion of central 
organisational, political and ideological control, which saw the Protestant 
working class resort to the politics of the street in order to express their fears 
and aspirations.
Historians like Shallice and Patterson have convincingly argued that 
sectarianism and limited forms of class conflict could co-exist, with 
Protestant ideology providing a medium for the articulation of class and 
labour grievances.180 The anti-Ritualist agitation in Liverpool contained a 
pronounced class dimension, whether a vague grassroots cynicism and 
frustration directed against the perceived timidity and political manipulation 
of the ‘swells’ or the explicit association made between ritualists and 
aristocrats. The latter was exploited as part of the ‘ democratisation’ process 
within the local Conservative ‘political machine’ directed against the ‘currant 
jelly’ element, or ‘upper tenth’, concentrated in the patrician Constitutional 
Association. This potent combination of religion and class was instrumental 
in the process of fragmentation and devolution of power and leadership 
within Liverpool’s Protestant community. However, despite these 
developments Tory-Democracy was able to preserve its political hegemony, 
capitalising upon sectarian hostility and adopting a pragmatic approach to 
accompanying disorder. A number of factors contributed to Tory- 
Democracy’s continued political dominance in the period after 1900.
After the abortive Independent Protestant revolt of 1903-05 there were 
no political alternatives to Conservatism amenable to the Protestant vote. 
Consequently, a state of pragmatic co-existence developed between the 
‘Protestant Democracy’, which continued to mobilise at street level to counter 
Roman Catholic ‘aggression’, and Tory-Democracy which retained the 
Protestant vote by exploiting alternative popular issues like Tariff Reform, 
defence of the Union and anti-Socialism. A crucial factor in preserving this 
pragmatic relationship was Liverpool’s enduring parochialism which ensured 
that Tory-Democracy was neither overly preoccupied with local political 
repercussions nor wider national perceptions arising from its close 
relationship to sectarianism and collective violence.
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In contrast, Belfast’s Protestant’s were pivotal to Ulster Unionism, a 
constructed, expressive community, transcending the locality and symbolising
101 '
a common identity, cause, or ‘frame of reference’. Although juxtaposed in 
relation to the Irish Nationalist ‘Other’, Unionism, in its instrumental 
relationship to British political culture and identity, incorporated both bonded 
and bridging capital. With Ulster’s Protestant’s both heterogeneous and 
fractious, this imagined communal identity was invoked, in light of 
overarching political imperatives, to both mobilise solidarity and to mediate 
and conceal internal divisions.
Consequently, Ulster Unionism was characterised by a drive towards 
centralised power and control. Historians have identified the disjointed 
response to Home Rule in 1886182, acknowledged the historic 
denominational, political and class divisions within the Protestant 
community183 and traced the emergence of a recognised local leadership as a 
necessary factor in the development of a ‘coherent’ Unionist movement. 
However, I argue that centralised control was not only vital in preserving a 
‘united front’; and for mobilising Unionist forces to resist Home Rule, but 
was also crucial in efforts to harness, contain, and ‘police’ popular 
sectarianism. This goal was to be achieved by integrating the Orange Order 
into an overarching strategy of resistance.185 Consequently, whereas the 
fragmentation of power that occurred within the Protestant community in 
Liverpool fed directly into sectarian disorder; in Belfast I argue that Ulster
180 see Shallice, ‘’Orange and Green and Militancy” , 15-16,17,30 & 
Patterson, Class Conflict and Sectarianism. X I1
181 Eder, ‘’Remembering National Memories Together” , 209
182 David.W.Miller, Queen’s Rebels. Ulster Lovalism in Historical 
Perspective. 91
183 Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two. 22
184 Peter Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism. The Formation of Popular 
Protestant Politics and Ideology in Nineteenth Century Ireland 121 argues, in 
relation to 1886, that a ‘coherent’ Unionist political organisation only 
emerged after a ‘protracted political struggle had seen the evolution of a 
recognised local leadership’.
183 Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party. 8 argues that the emergence of 
Orangeism as a political force in 1885 contributed to a ‘coherent’ Unionist 
movement, with the Conservatives realising that ‘if they were to retain their 
power in Ulster they had to come to terms with the Orange Order’. He states
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Unionism, through its political and organisational initiatives, drew Protestant 
activity away from the streets. It sought to integrate the principal ‘local 
proletarian idiom’, the Orange Order, into structured, disciplined forms of 
activity and organisation and to emasculate it as the main source of political 
dissent and disunity. The only time this unity came under serious threat was 
in the vacuum after the Second Home Rule crisis, when Unionist initiatives 
were relaxed and the Protestant working class, employing ‘Independent’ 
Orangeism and militant Protestantism, sought to express their grievances 
through increased ‘rowdyism’ in the street and autonomous political action. 
As in Liverpool, Protestant ideology in Belfast, specifically Independent 
Orange, contained a pronounced class dimension. ‘Independent’ anger 
focused upon the perceived ‘dictation’ exercised over the Orange Order by 
the industrial bourgeoisie (‘Deadheads’) concentrated in the Belfast Grand 
Orange Lodge and the Belfast Conservative Association. However, whereas 
Liverpool witnessed the continued divergence between formal politics and the 
politics of the street, Ulster Unionism responded to this threat with greater 
centralisation in the form of the representative Ulster Unionist Council and 
the Ulster Unionist Party, both formed in 1905.186
Despite profound tensions within the Protestant communities of Belfast 
and Liverpool, nascent class conflict was largely contained within an 
overarching sectarian political and ideological framework. This placed a 
premium upon unity, including class co-operation, in the cause of ‘Protestant 
Defence’. Limited forms of class conflict tended to be confined to grassroots 
demands for recognition and representation within the Conservative ‘political 
machine’, or the Unionist bloc. There were also demands for the redress of 
specific class and labour issues within the confines of existing sectarian 
political formations or, in the case of Belfast, the context of the legislative 
Union. Consequently, genuine opportunities for the development of wider 
class co-operation and solidarity like the Belfast Dockers and Carter’s strike 
of 1907 and the Liverpool Transport Strike of 1911, were comparatively rare.
that in essence this amounted to a ‘take over of the Order by the conservative 
business and professional classes’.
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Throughout the period, the political Labour movement effectively failed 
to implant in either city. In both contexts independent Labour failed to 
resolve, or transcend, the complex interplay of motivations, passions and 
allegiances produced by popular sectarianism. In Belfast, the dominant 
Independent Labour Party, in its efforts to promote Labour representation, 
was gradually forced into an accommodation with the ideological 
preoccupations of the strategic skilled Protestant working class, culminating 
in the ‘socialist’ justification of Unionism.187 The I.L.P in Liverpool also 
failed to formulate a credible alternative to the dominant political culture, 
with both Tory Democracy and Irish Nationalism outmanoeuvring 
independent Labour by offering their working class support a potent 
combination of sectarianism and populist social reform.
(3YThe ‘Community of the Street’, versus Politics and Propaganda.
Throughout the period, the ‘community of the street’, with its contested 
territory and ‘ritualised’ skirmishing, was the principal arena of sectarian 
confrontation in Liverpool.188 In 1909, the Head Constable proclaimed, ‘If the 
public highway were regarded and used for the sole purpose of going to and 
fro upon legitimate business and pleasure, Liverpool would enjoy a larger 
measure of peace than is possible when its streets are used, or rather abused, 
as places for the demonstration of adherence to this or abhorrence for that 
form of religious, political or social belief.189 In stark contrast, politics and 
propaganda became the main means of combating Home Rule in Belfast. I 
argue that far from the community of the street being merely the location, or
186 Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two, 21 correctly asserts that the Ulster 
Unionist Council would effectively become the ‘directing power of Ulster 
Unionism’.
187 Morgan, Labour and Partition. 83
188 see Eric Taplin’s review of Frank Neal, ‘’Sectarian Violence: The 
Liverpool Experience, 1819-1914: An Aspect of Anglo-Irish History” , in: 
International Labor and Working Class History. 37 (1990), 96; Frank Neal, 
The Liverpool Experience. 1819-1914: An Aspect of Anglo-Irish History. 
252-3; J. Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of Liverpool” , in John Belchem, ed, 
Popular Politics. Riot and Labour. Essays in Liverpool History. 1790-1940. 
9,11
189H045/1138 Dunning 17/05/1909
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context, for sectarian confrontation in Liverpool, it was also a vital factor in 
the assertion of the ‘Protestant Democracy’s social and political influence. 
Increasingly disenchanted with formal politics and alienated from their 
traditional leaders in the Tory-Anglican establishment, the Protestant working 
class sought to assert their strength at street level. Consequently, the street 
became the context for the establishment of leadership over the ‘Protestant 
Democracy’, the mobilisation of this force to directly counter Roman 
Catholicism and the primary arena for the exercising of its power increasingly 
autonomous from the local establishment190
In contrast, in Belfast, politics and propaganda became the main means 
of combating Home Rule.191 Loughlin characterised the discourse on Home 
Rule as a contest between ‘Enlightenment and Reaction’,192 with Ulster
Unionism defined as a ‘negative appendage’ of Irish Nationalism caricatured
101by its extreme manifestations, particularly bigoted Orangeism. Within this 
propaganda battle, primarily conducted through ‘verbal violence’, a crucial 
variable was British public opinion.194
Loughlin identifies a transition, from the late 1870’s, from a Northern, 
industrialist popular Protestant conception of British identity to a Southern, 
ruralist Arcadian vision. He argues, because of this transition Ulster 
Unionism was increasingly seen as ‘marginal’ to the British national 
community. By the end of the period, Belfast’s ‘integration of religion and 
politics in going beyond the British understanding that fighting for religion
190Whereas, I argue that the street (particularly after 1900) became the 
principal arena for the assertion of the ‘Protestant Democracy’s social and 
political influence, Belchem (Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of Liverpool” , 12) 
asserts that riot was a ‘symptom of temporary breakdown and dysfiinction 
within the city’s sectarian formations’.
191 Patrick Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two: Ulster Unionism and the Origins 
of Northern Ireland. 1886-1922. 8 & John.F.Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist 
Party. 1882-1973-Its Development and Organisation. 32 argues that with the 
establishment of the Northern Parliament in 1921, Ulster Unionism had ‘won 
the battle of politics’.
192 James Loughlin, Gladstone. Home Rule and the Ulster Question. 1882-93. 
Dublin, Gill & MacMillan, 1986,1
Paul Bew, Ideology and the Irish Question. Ulster Unionism and Irish 
Nationalism 1912-16. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, X
194 Bew, Ideology and the Irish Question. 95
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was out of date’, meant that ‘Belfast was no longer a British, but an Irish 
city’.195
However, I argue that Ulster Unionism’s ultimate success was its 
recognition of this transition in British attitudes and perceptions. 
Consequently, Ulster Unionism was not characterised by ‘alienation’ from,196 
but by, adaptation to changing conceptions of British identity. One function 
of Unionist political and organisational initiatives was to draw popular 
Protestant agitation away from the street into more controlled, disciplined 
activity with set political and ideological goals.197 This major contrast with 
Liverpool can be explained by Ulster Unionism’s desire to preserve both the 
unity of the fragile Protestant coalition, which included influential elements 
hostile to sectarian bigotry and violence and of projecting an image of law- 
abiding respectability principally aimed at the British mainland.
(41 Grassroots Sectarian Associational Culture versus politically- 
conceived. Centrally organised Associational Culture.
Liverpool’s Protestant associational culture, primarily geared towards 
direct-action in the community of the street, was the organisational 
foundation and mobilisational mechanism, or ‘arms and legs’, of the 
‘Protestant Democracy’. However, because of its diverse character, which 
reflected the fragmented nature of power and leadership over the Protestant 
working class, this culture proved extremely difficult for Tory-Democracy to 
harness and contain on a coherent and sustained basis. In Belfast, in order to 
harness and contain the Protestant working class, Ulster Unionism needed to 
exercise control over one dominant organisation the Orange Order.
Subsequent Unionist initiatives were designed to harness, contain and control 
the Orange Order and through it the strategic Protestant working class.
195 Loughlin, Ulster Unionism and British National Identity. 13-16,40
196 Loughlin, Ulster Unionism and British National Identity. 226
197 A.T.Q.Stewart, The Narrow Ground. Aspects of Ulster. 1609-1969.167 
argues that both Saunderson’s (leader of Irish Unionism during 1886,1893) 
and Carson’s (Ulster Unionist leader 1910-21) schemes to organise opposition 
on ‘military lines’ was ‘as much to impose discipline and order’ on Protestant 
mobs ‘as to make his (Carson’s) determination clear to the Government’.
55
A number of historians have focused upon the strength and vitality of 
Liverpool Orangeism, its ‘power-sharing’ relationship with the W.M.C.A, 
and the role of both organisations in sustaining a political system and social 
arrangements based upon popular sectarianism.198 However, I argue that 
unlike its Belfast counterpart, the Liverpool Order played neither such a 
central role in Protestant culture nor was it the sole or even dominant ‘local 
proletarian idiom’. Neal has identified the difficulty in controlling the Order 
in Liverpool199 with growing Orange dissent during the late 1880s/early 
1890s compelling elements within Conservatism to seek to marginalise the 
Order, forging an alliance, via the W.M.C.A., with the burgeoning culture 
associated with the anti-Ritualist crusade. Patronised initially by elements 
within the Tory-Anglican establishment, this crusade legitimised, empowered 
and politicised militant Protestant organisations and personalities, with these 
becoming critical of and increasingly autonomous from this local 
establishment. Liverpool’s Protestant culture reflected the growing 
fragmentation and devolution of local power and the divergence between 
formal politics and the politics of the street in the period after 1900.
Protestant organisations were the bedrock of the ‘personal empires’ of leaders 
like Wise, Stones and Ewart, with these overlapping and exerting 
considerable influence upon substantial numbers of grassroots Orangemen. 
Consequently, Protestant culture was the organisational foundation, 
mobilisational device200 and principal mechanism for expressing the growing 
power and influence of the ‘Protestant Democracy’. Due to its diversity and 
relative autonomy this culture proved virtually impossible for Tory- 
Democracy to contain or control. This reality helps us to understand the 
primacy of sectarian collective violence in Liverpool.
198 see Taplin on Neal, ‘’Sectarian Violence” , 95; Need, Sectarian Violence. 
250-1 & Smith, ‘’Labour Tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool” , 48
199 Neal, Sectarian Violence, 251
200 As Bohstedt, ‘’More than One Working Class” , 214 points out in relation 
to sectarian violence, what needs to be explained ‘is not simply motivation but 
mobilisation’.
56
In Belfast there was one dominant iocal proletarian idiom’ and agency
<JA 1
of popular sectarianism. This was the Orange Order. The dilemma posed 
by the Order has been highlighted by historians. In order to construct a 
viable, representative movement, the Unionist establishment needed to 
integrate the Order, not only as a bridge to the Protestant working class and 
as an effective mobilisational mechanism;203 but also in order to ensure 
political stability by emasculating a potent source of local dissent.204 
However, in light of the ‘battle of politics’ embodied by Home Rule, the 
Order and its excesses represented a liability, both in terms of projecting a 
respectable front in mainland Britain205 and also coalition-building within 
Ulster.206
Loughlin argues that the Pamellites, and leading Liberals like 
Gladstone, ‘identified Unionism with Protestant bigotry, but in particular with 
extreme Orangemen who had no legitimate grievances against Home Rule 
and who wanted merely to discriminate against Catholics. Thus Ulster 
Unionism was discreditable and morally reprehensible’.207 Some historians 
have acknowledged Unionist efforts at countering these negative perceptions, 
with Bew correctly asserting that they ‘were fully aware of this ideological
201 Remarkably, Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism. 9 argues that it was 
not until the formation of the U.V.F in 1912, that the Order played ‘a really 
significant part in the development of Unionism’, whilst Stewart, The Narrow 
Ground 137 argued that for the Ulster landed classes, clergy, and politicians, 
the Order provided a ‘loyal vassalage, an electorate and ultimately a citizen 
army’.
202 Geoffrey Bell, The Protestants of Ulster. Pluto Press, 1976, 88 has argued 
that the Orange Order played a pivotal role in the construction of the Unionist 
‘all-class alliance’, by providing a ‘social service’ to the Protestant worker.
203 Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two. 12 states that Orangemen ‘took the lead’ 
during 1886 in organising the new Unionist movement.
204 See Henry Patterson, Class Conflict and Sectarianism. The Protestant 
Working Class and the Belfast Labour Movement 1868-1920. X I1; Gibbon, 
The Origins of Ulster Unionism. 103 & Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party. 
8
205 Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party. 10 states, in relation to 1886, that it 
was important that the Unionist movement should be ‘seen as respectable, and 
not as Orange rabble-rousers’.
206 Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two. 3 argues in relation to Orange attempts,
during the early 1880’s, to rally ‘anti-Nationalist’ forces in Ulster, that these 
failed because many Protestants objected to the Order’s ‘working class 
character’ and ‘sectarian exuberance’.
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onslaught and sought to combat it’.208 Consequently, I argue that a major 
goal of Unionist organisation was not only to integrate the Order, but also to 
control and ‘police’ its volatile support, in the process drawing Protestant 
agitation away from the street into formal disciplined structures and activities. 
Unionist organisations not only fulfilled a mobilisational function but also an 
explicit political and ideological role. They embodied, in contrast to the 
sectarian Order, ideals of unity and respectability and distanced the 
movement from explicit sectarianism or accusations of ‘Ulster bigotry’. 
Consequently, whereas Liverpool’s Protestant culture was the foundation of 
the principal agency of belligerent sectarianism, the ‘Protestant Democracy’; 
in Belfast, Unionist culture proved highly effective at both integrating and 
managing popular sectarianism. The main threat to Unionist cohesion 
coincided with the relaxation of political and organisational initiatives, which 
left disaffected Orangemen, in conjunction with militant Protestants, to 
express their frustration and grievances in the streets of Belfast.
The themes I have outlined above are explored in detail throughout the 
four main chapters of my thesis. The first examines the social, economic and 
political background to sectarianism in both cities. The second analyses the 
role of religion in the evolution of Liverpool Tory-Democracy and Ulster 
Unionism together with the problems it posed in terms of dissent and 
disunity. The third looks at the character of Protestant associational culture 
and whether this was primarily utilised as either a medium of political power 
and control or of grassroots leverage and influence. The final chapter dissects 
the political relationship between Tory-Democracy, Ulster Unionism and
207 Loughlin, Gladstone, Home Rule and the Ulster Question. 133
208 Bew, Ideology and the Irish Question. 43-44
209 In contrast Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism. 140 argues that from 
1905, as ‘proletarian allegiance to entrepreneurs became increasingly 
tenuous’, Ulster Unionism ‘re-invested heavily in Orange rhetoric and 
organisation’. Gibbon argues that by 1911, opposition to Irish Nationalism 
was ‘organised almost entirely through the Order’, whilst P.Berresford Ellis, 
A History of the Irish Working Class. 204 argues that during the Third Home 
Rule Crisis the ‘Northern industrialists’ ruthlessly played the ‘Orange card’.
210 Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism. 138 points out that once the 
Second Home Rule crisis had passed, so did ‘enthusiasm for popular activity 
and political unity’.
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popular sectarianism and whether such a relationship was based upon power 
and control or pragmatism and co-existence.
The Social. Economic and Political Background.
This chapter examines the background to sectarianism in both cities. 
Although Liverpool’s ‘peculiar’ economic structure clearly had an impact on 
sectarianism , with discrimination existing in the casual labour market, I 
agree with John Belchem’s analysis that the principal arena of sectarian 
confrontation was not the ‘workplace’ but the ‘community of the street’. I
argue that a vital factor in the emergence of the militant ‘Protestant 
Democracy’ was the decomposition of the existing relationship between the 
Tory-Anglican establishment and popular sectarianism. This resulted in the 
divergence between formal politics and the politics of the street with the 
evolution of the ‘Protestant Democracy’ into a largely autonomous 
movement, the principal dynamic behind sectarian violence. In Belfast, I 
argue that despite greater entrenched discrimination and potential for 
‘endemic’ violence, the Episcopalian-Conservative establishment, the initial 
architects of Unionism, re-evaluated their relationship to popular sectarianism 
in light of the threat posed by Home Rule.214 In order to win the ‘battle of 
politics’ they had to confront the dilemma posed by popular sectarianism, 
primarily in the form of the strategic Orange Order. This was imperative both 
in terms of building a representative Ulster Protestant coalition and of 
projecting a respectable front on the mainland. Unionism’s response to these 
challenges would profoundly influence its political, ideological and 
organisational development and ultimately determine its success. Religion 
also played a vital role in the development of both Tory-Democracy and
2,1 see Taplin on Neal, ‘’Sectarian Violence” , 95; Smith, ‘’Labour Tradition in 
Glasgow and Liverpool” , 48,49; Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” ,
159,202 & Shallice, ‘’Orange and Green and Militancy” , 15.
212 see Smith, ‘’Labour Tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool” , 46 & Smith, 
‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 163
213 Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of Liverpool” , 7 argues that the strength and 
appeal of sectarianism ‘lay outside work in the provision of positive and 
attractive forms of political and associational culture’.
214 see Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party, 8,10
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Ulster Unionism, whilst at the same time proving to be a source of conflict 
and disunity.
Religion
The history and sociology of religion has been dominated by 
secularisation theory, part of the modernisation paradigm, with this process 
dated to the French Revolution, or as far back as the Reformation. Steve 
Bruce identifies four modernisation processes contributing to secularisation. 
Firstly, social differentiation, accompanying structural differentiation, with 
fragmentation militating against "traditional integrated organic or communal 
conceptions of the moral and supernatural order’. In Protestant countries this 
witnessed a ‘series of schisms from the dominant traditions’.215 The second 
process, ‘Societalization’. refers to the ‘way in which life is increasingly 
enmeshed and organised, not locally but societally (that society being most 
evidently, but not uniquely, the nation-state)’. Bryan Wilson argues that with 
the decline of community, religion’s primary source and strength, it is 
increasingly ‘shorn of its functions’, accompanied in Protestant countries by 
the development of the ‘religiously neutral state’.216 The third process, 
‘Rationalisation’ involves ‘changes in the way people think and 
consequentially in the way they act’. Interrelated is the ‘pursuit of technically 
efficient means of securing this worldly ends’ with reduced uncertainty 
diminishing ‘reliance upon faith’.217 Finally, ‘Egalitarianism and Cultural 
Diversity’, asserts that modernisation ‘created cultural pluralism through the 
creation of classes and class fragments with increasingly diverse interests’, 
secularisation arising in cultures accepting ‘a basic egalitarianism and a polity 
that is more or less democratic’. Social harmony is emphasised above 
religious orthodoxy, accompanied by the separation of church and state and 
the break between community and ‘religious world view’.218
215 Steve Bruce, Choice and Religion. A Critique of Rational Choice Theory. 
Oxford, Oxford Univ.Press, 1999, 8-11
216 Bruce, Choice and Religion. 11-13
217 Bruce, Choice and Religion. 13-17
218 Bruce, Choice and Religion. 17-23
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However, secularisation theory has come under concerted criticism, 
Green identifying four principal strands. The most radical, transformation 
theory, contends that the ‘unquestioned-institutional decline of traditional 
organised religion’s actually constitutes the transformation of the ‘sacred’ 
from old, acknowledged, elementary forms to new, implicit, complex 
manifestations as part of the wider shift from ancient order to modem 
society’. It involves a fundamental re-evaluation of ‘religion’, arguing it 
constitutes the ‘sacred bond of society’, a ‘unified system of beliefs and 
practises relative to sacred things’.219 Sacred relocation argues that religious 
beliefs in modem societies have ‘relocated themselves beyond.. .traditional, 
declining, ecclesiastical institutions into new developing, religious and quasi­
religious organisations’. Consequently, religion has not declined, but 
‘dispersed’ into modem public institutions, like political parties, Trade 
Unions and welfare organisations, and into private life 220 The theory of 
‘divergence’ rejects the ‘uni-dimensional model’ of religious commitment, 
centred upon church membership and attendance, presumed by the prevailing 
secularisation model. It proposes a ‘multi-dimensional model’ of 
commitment, affiliation and devotion highlighting how different kinds of 
commitment are skewed by ‘disparate cultural values reflecting diverging 
social priorities’ like class. Consequently, it allows for the ‘significance of 
particular social contexts as well as for the importance of general historical 
change in the fortunes of religious organisations’.221 Finally, the 
‘spontaneous renewal’ theory of religious economies postulates that 
secularisation is a ‘specific-and limited-phenomenon’, identified as the 
‘contingent and measurable product of a sufficient degree of institutional 
accommodation between religious organisations and secular powers, 
especially between the dominant religious organisations in society and those 
worldly authorities’. However, this process ‘spontaneously induces’ two 
countervailing and renewing processes. Religious revival results in schism, 
‘wrought by disheartened adherents of a particular faith who create a new sect
219 •  •S.J.D Green, Religion in the Age of Decline. Organisation and experience 
in industrial Yorkshire. 1870-1920. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, 
Cambridge Univ.Press, 1996,9-10
220 Green, Religion in the Age of Decline. 10-12
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in the name, or spirit, of their old beliefs’, whilst religious innovation issues 
in the ‘’cult’ of new beliefs, or novel expressions of belief.
Both the secularisation and desecularisation paradigms are useful for 
analysing religious sectarianism in Belfast and Liverpool. However, as recent 
studies demonstrate, greater emphasis should be placed upon the uneven 
diffusion and contingent, contradictory impact of secularisation, alongside 
other modernising forces, at the regional and local level. In locations 
where religion was linked to the construction of communal and national 
identities the impact of national secularising processes, whether institutional, 
political or cultural, could generate both accommodation and resistance. 
Consequently, in both the short and long term, some of the desecularising 
trends identified by Green coexisted with a wider secularisation process. To 
varying degrees ‘sacred relocation’, ‘social divergence’ and ‘spontaneous 
renewal’ can be identified in Belfast and Liverpool. In these multi-ethnic 
environments a key factor was the extent to which the growing nationalisation 
of political culture and identity, including secularisation, resulted in 
negotiation, accommodation and conflict.
Hugh McLeod focuses upon the religious development of Nineteenth, 
and early Twentieth century European cities. He argues the salient feature 
was neither decline nor vitality, but ‘religious conflict’. He asserts that 
Nineteenth century urbanisation did not produce a religious or ethnic ‘melting 
pot’ or ‘tolerant relativism’, but religious pluralism became a ‘major source 
of internal division’. In comparison with the later Twentieth century,
‘religion or irreligion were far more closely bound up with the identity of
221 Green, Religion in the Age of Decline. 12-14
222 Green, Religion in the Age of Decline. 14-16
223 Patrick Pasture, ‘’The Role of Religion in Social and Labour History” , in 
Lex Heerma van Voss & Marcel van der Linden, eds, Class and Other 
Identities. Gender. Religion and Ethnicity in the Writing of European Labour 
History. New York, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 111 concludes that the ‘general 
theory of secularisation as a consequence of social differentiation, 
socialisation and rationalisation, the idea of a universal and inevitable process- 
central features of modernity in the old paradigm-is being replaced by a much 
more flexible theoretical framework. This allows for contingency, for 
regional as well as social variation, for divergent trajectories (for 
secularisation as well as religious renewal and changing conceptions about the
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social classes or ethnic groups-religious convictions were more of a collective 
phenomenon and less a matter of individual choice’.224 Similarly, Bruce 
identifies two retarding tendencies upon secularisation, cultural transition and 
cultural defence. In the former, where social identity is threatened in the 
course of major cultural transitions ‘religion may provide resources for 
negotiating such transitions or asserting a new claim to a sense of worth’. In 
this analysis, industrialisation and urbanisation tended to ‘give rise to 
movements’ of revival and reform, drawing the lapsed and heterodox into the 
orbit of orthodoxy. The new converts and their over enthusiastic religion 
often offended the dominant religious organisations’. Dissent amongst the 
formerly deferential middling and lower orders, expressed through the 
medium of evangelicalism, ‘marked a withdrawal from the old system of 
dependency..., an assertion of their autonomy, and the acceptance of new 
religious values and practises that endorsed their recently acquired socio­
economic and democratic aspirations’. Consequently, in the short term, 
modernisation can create a ‘new role for religion as a socialising agent in 
times of rapid social change*.
Equally relevant to Belfast and Liverpool, cultural defence asserts that 
religion acts as a ‘guarantor of group identity’ where ‘culture, identity, and 
sense of worth are challenged by a source promoting either an alien religion 
or a rampant secularism and that source is negatively valued’. Consequently, 
religion can ‘provide resources for the definition of a national, local, ethnic, 
or status-group culture’. To illustrate this concept Bruce cites the examples 
of Northern Ireland, other ‘dual’ societies, or the ‘peripheries of secularising 
societies resistant to the alien encroachment of the centre’.225
Christiano, Swatos and Kivisto identify three principal relational 
patterns between religion and ethnicity. The first, ‘ethnic fusion’, refers to 
cases where ‘ethnicity is the major foundation of a religion’; the second,
role and function of the churches), and for very complex and diverse relations 
between churches, denominations and modem states’.
224 Hugh McLeod, ‘’Introduction” , in: Hugh McLeod, ed, European Religion 
in the Age of Great Cities 1830-1930. London & New York, Routledge, 1995, 
23-24 & also Hugh McLeod, Religion and the People of Western Europe 
1789-1989. Oxford & New York, Oxford Univ.Press, 1997
225 Bruce. Choice and Religion. 24-26
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‘ethnic religion’ occurs when ‘religion is linked to language and to national 
identity’ as in the Church of England. The final type, ‘religious ethnicity’ 
occurs where ‘more than one ethnic group may share the same religion’ with 
religion extending beyond ethnicity.226
Historians have identified the pivotal role of religion in the 
development of British identity,227 (in the English case predating the modem 
era)228 and its role, alongside national allegiance, in the ‘hegemonisation’ of 
the working class. For Mary Hickman, the anti-Catholicism inherent within 
British Protestantism, ‘continued to be significant in the Nineteenth century 
as a means of unifying sections of the population with otherwise different 
interests by mobilising them for the nation and against popery, often a 
specifically Irish popery’.229 The main repository of this tradition was the 
Tory-Anglican establishment, with popular Protestantism a vital component 
of Nineteenth century Tory nationalism, used ‘ruthlessly at times to inflame 
opinion against Irish Catholic immigrants to Britain’.230
However, historians have also highlighted the decline in organised 
religion and the erosion of popular Protestantism as a central component of 
British identity.231 The chronology and extent of secularisation in Britain is 
highly contested. This uneven and contradictory process was characterised 
by both institutional decline and religious fragmentation and by revival and 
innovation, particularly during the late Nineteenth century.232 Despite this 
temporary revival and growing religious pluralism, the insidious effects of
226 Kevin J.Christiano, William H.Swatos Jr, & Peter Kivisto, Sociology of 
Religion. Contemporary Developments. Walnut Creek, Lanham, New York, 
Oxford, Altamira Press, 2002,159-60
227 see John Belchem, ‘’Class, creed and country: the Irish middle class in 
Victorian Liverpool” , in: Swift & Gilley, The Irish in Victorian Britain. 206
228 see Smith, The Nation in History. 36-39 & Adrian Hastings, The 
Construction of Nationhood. 6-28
229 Hickman, Religion. Class and Identity. 15, 54
230 Loughlin, Ulster Unionism and British National Identity. 10
231 Loughlin, Ulster Unionism and British National Identity. 13-16,40
232 see Callum G.Brown, ‘’The Mechanism of Religious Growth in Urban 
Societies. British Cities since the Eighteenth Century” , in: McLeod, ed, 
European Religion in the Age of Great Cities. 239-262; Green, Religion in the 
Age of Decline. 17-21, 382-3 & Simon Dentith, Society and Cultural Forms in 
Nineteenth Century England. Basingstoke, London & New York, MacMillan, 
St.Martins Press, 1998,30
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modernisation were mirrored in long-term religious decline. This was 
particularly pronounced after the First World War with little evidence of 
sustained desecularisation in the ensuing period.
I assert that this complex secularisation process, both at an institutional 
level and within the social and political arenas, generated profound tensions 
within Liverpool’s Protestant community. Growing fragmentation and social 
divergence produced sustained religious and ethnic conflict. The alienation 
of the Protestant working class with established religion galvanised local 
innovation and revival culminating in the respectable anti-Ritualist coalition 
with its implicit anti-Catholicism. However, this agitation witnessed the 
evolution of a new ethno-nationalist movement, the Protestant Democracy, 
generating a contest for the allegiance of the Protestant working class with the 
Tory-Anglican establishment. This centred upon who constituted the 
‘bulwark’ of the Reformation, the bedrock of local Protestant communal, 
ethnic and national identity. As Boyce states, ‘citizenship in the United 
Kingdom was informally, as well as constitutionally, defined by religion. 
Church and state were part of the one constitutional settlement of 1688’.234 In 
Liverpool’s multi-ethnic environment this proletarian anti-Catholic 
movement provoked serious communal violence as a means of ‘cultural 
defence’ and protection against ‘cultural transition’. However, after the First 
World War, secularisation signalled the gradual demise of large-scale 
sectarian clashes and a political culture delineated along religious and ethnic 
lines.
Certain historians argue that Belfast was not unique in the British, 
European and North American urban environment, in terms of its communal 
antagonisms, only in their scale, duration and political significance. Whilst 
Nineteenth century urban religious pluralism was conducive to conflict, what 
is remarkable about Belfast, a city unparalleled in its ‘recurrent communal 
violence’, was Ulster Unionism’s ability to contain these excesses during the
233 see Green, Religion in the Age of Decline. 16,380,389 & Steve Bruce, 
God is Dead. Secularisation in the W est Malden, Oxford, Victoria, Berlin, 
Blackwell Publishing, 2002,60,74
234 Boyce, The Irish Question and British Politics. 7
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Home Rule period.235 The Home Rule threat proved the catalyst for the 
construction of Ulster Unionism, transcending denominational identities and 
rivalries in the cause of local and national Protestant defence. This ‘religious 
ethnicity’ deflected local Protestant enmities onto the Irish Nationalist 
‘Other’. However, beneath this facade profound tensions persisted, which in 
the aftermath of the Second Home Rule bill, witnessed the emergence of a 
new proletarian ethno-nationalist movement. This threatened Unionism as a 
coherent force and provoked a resurgence of communal violence.
David Hempton argues that the ‘multi-layered’ nature of religious 
conflict in Belfast, diffused beyond the local and regional, and 
‘institutionalised into political parties’ embodying competing national 
loyalties, thwarted the ‘ether’ of Twentieth century secularisation and made 
its communal conflict intractable.^^owever, I argue that this national 
dimension, through to the creation of Northern Ireland, made Ulster 
Unionism particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in the British political 
environment and conceptions of national identity. This stimulated its drive 
towards containing Belfast’s communal violence. Pivotal to this process was 
the creation of an extensive Unionist political and associational network. In 
contrast to its Protestant counterpart in Liverpool, this Unionist network was 
far from being a vehicle of autonomous grassroots leverage and power.
Associational Culture.
Far from Protestant culture in Liverpool being integrated into an 
efficient Conservative ‘political machine’, in reality it reflected the 
fragmented and devolved nature of power and leadership over the Protestant 
working class.237 Initially enlisted through the anti-Ritualist crusade by 
elements within the Tory-Anglican establishment as a medium for engaging
McLeod, ‘’Intoduction” , in: McLeod, European Religion in the Age of 
Great Cities. 27-28 
6 David Hempton, ‘’Belfast: The Unique City?” , in: McLeod, ed, European
Religion in the Age of Great Cities. 152-161
237 Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of Liverpool” , 11 sees this ‘interlocking 
associational network’, comprising the ‘party, popular and sectarian’ as an 
integral component of Salvidge’s ‘electoral machine’.
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with the Protestant working class, the activities of popular Protestant 
organisations proved difficult to control.238 With the decomposition of the 
anti>Ritualist coalition, the community of the street became the primary arena 
for the assertion of the ‘Protestant Democracy’s influence. Liverpool’s 
diverse, yet inter-connected Protestant culture, contributed to the demarcation 
o f‘territory’,239 provided a ‘social service’ for the Protestant working class 
and was the mechanism for mobilising the ‘Protestant Democracy’s social 
and political muscle.240
In contrast, I argue that in Belfast associational culture reflected 
Unionism’s drive for centralisation and control. With Protestant religious 
culture largely divided along denominational lines and preoccupied with 
parochial and missionary work, the Orange Order remained the dominant 
‘local proletarian idiom’. With the introduction of Home Rule, the 
Episcopalian-Conservative establishment’s relationship to popular 
sectarianism was transformed, with subsequent Unionist initiatives reflecting 
new political imperatives. Unionist organisations not only fulfilled a vital 
propaganda function embodying ideals of unity and respectability, they
also provided political and organisational stability, an efficient mobilisational 
mechanism and a means of integrating and emasculating alternative sources 
of social and political power.242 Crucially, they were also instrumental in
238 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 251 & P.J.Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism: 
A political and social history of Liverpool 1868-1939. have outlined the 
difficulty in controlling the Order in Liverpool.
239 Smith, ‘’Labour Tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool” , 49 convincingly 
argues that Liverpool’s industrial structure as well as its ‘political and 
religious organisations greatly influenced the predominant neighbourhood 
structure’.
240 Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class” , 175,214 refers to ‘ethnic 
cocoons’ of values and organisations which ‘comprehensively answered the 
needs of working class life and created the mentalities and regiments for 
combat’.
241 Historians like Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party. 21 & Buckland have 
recognised the propaganda role of Unionist organisations. Buckland, Irish 
Unionism: Two. 17,63 described the work of the Ulster Unionist Clubs 
Council as being ‘largely propagandist’, and notes a similar dimension to the 
U.V.F.
242 Bell, The Protestants of Ulster. 139 argues that the Protestant leadership 
preferred to ‘head-off, rather than react to, independent Protestant working
67
harnessing, containing and ultimately controlling popular sectarianism, in the 
process distancing Unionism from perceptions of ‘Ulster bigotry’.243 
Consequently, whereas Unionist infrastructure proved to be a remarkably 
effective medium for exercising central political control, its Protestant 
counterpart in Liverpool became the principal mechanism for mobilising the 
muscle of the ‘Protestant Democracy’.
Politics
This chapter examines the attitudes of Tory-Democracy and Ulster 
Unionism to popular sectarianism. I argue that in Liverpool the 
Conservative’s relationship to popular sectarianism was transformed, with 
this process contributing to the evolution of the ‘Protestant Democracy’ and 
the ascendancy of belligerent sectarianism.244 I identify four key phases 
chronicling the transformation in relations between Conservatism and popular 
sectarianism. This process culminated in the development of an expedient 
co-existence between Tory-Democracy and popular sectarianism. This was 
attributable to the absence of effective alternatives for Protestant political 
expression, Tory-Democracy ’ s pragmatic approach to sectarian street
class activity, by sponsoring such organisations ('B-Specials', Ulster Unionist 
Labour Association) which permit the activity but deny it independence’.
243 see Stewart, The Narrow Ground. 167 & Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two. 
63 on this containment strategy and Berresford-Ellis, A History of the Irish 
Working Class. 204 & Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism. 140 for the 
view that Unionism, particularly during the later period, ‘re-invested heavily 
in Orange rhetoric and organisation’.
244 Taplin on Neal ‘’Sectarian Violence” , 94; Smith, ‘’Labour Tradition in 
Glasgow and Liverpool” , 33,39 & Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 
163 emphasise the importance of the ‘Orange-Tory bloc’ in ensuring 
Liverpool Conservatism’s ‘permanent hegemony’, whilst Belchem, ‘’The 
Peculiarities of Liverpool” , 11 refers to class interaction through Liverpool’s 
associational network, with Tory ‘local notables’ displaying the ‘common 
touch’, a ‘distinguishing (and essential) characteristic of local Tory 
leadership’. Although Belchem acknowledges that the Protestant working 
class were not ‘passive instruments’, it is Shallice, ‘’Orange and Green and 
Militancy” , 17,30 who explicitly states that, politically, Protestant working 
people were capable of attacking ‘their own traditional leaders in the 
Conservative and Unionist party’.
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mobilisation and the enduring parochialism of Liverpool politics. The latter 
was gradually eroded during the later period.
I argue that in Belfast the Episcopalian-Conservative relationship to 
popular sectarianism was also transformed, but with completely different 
consequences. Confronted by the necessity of winning the ‘battle of politics’ 
and propaganda in relation to Home Rule245 whilst simultaneously mobilising 
and integrating their working class constituency, the dilemma posed by 
popular sectarianism proved to be a considerable challenge. Unionism’s 
response was to exert increasingly centralised control over Ulster’s anti- 
Home Rule forces through the creation of elaborate political and 
organisational structures designed to integrate, contain and ‘police’ its 
volatile sectarian support, whilst simultaneously minimising the role and 
influence of popular sectarianism. Unionism’s ultimate success was its
ability to present itself as a national movement predicated upon ideals of 
unity and respectability whilst simultaneously integrating and containing its 
core support which remained fundamentally sectarian in character and 
outlook.
Comparative Methodology.
The aim of the double focus is to explore through Liverpool and 
Belfast’s experiences of popular sectarianism the relationship between 
political movements and popular collective violence. The comparative 
method allows us, in H.G.Haupt’s estimation, to compare a number of cases 
stemming from different contexts through the adoption of an explicit line of 
questioning. He states that the comparative function is either to ‘bring out the 
similarities and differences of the different cases or to determine the scope of 
social scientific theories or approaches’.247 In Eisenberg’s view comparison 
provides a ‘rough negative check on accepted historical interpretations and a
245 see Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two. 8
246 Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party. 18 argues, in relation to the Ulster 
Unionist Convention of 1892, that from the outset, ‘a fundamental part of 
Unionist concern was the defence of civil and religious liberty’.
247 H,G,Haupt, ‘’Comparative History” , in Neil,J,Smelser & Paul,B,Baltes, 
eds, International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural Sciences. 2397
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tool for criticising and invalidating mistaken theoretical assumptions’.248 
Haupt identifies four key functions of comparison, the heuristic, the 
contrastive, the analytical and the distancing. He contends that comparison 
plays a heuristic role when ‘it alone can offer explanations and reveal 
phenomena that had been unknown or inadequately known up to that point’; a 
contrastive role, when ‘it serves to define more precisely the special features 
of a specific case’; and an analytical role when ‘it either tests a scientific 
hypothesis or identifies constellations of causes in a specific situation’. 
Finally, comparison performs a distancing function when it ‘offers another 
perspective to observation and analysis’, potentially revealing ‘surprising 
discoveries as well as relativizing the tradition-based context of national 
historiographies’.249 Both Haupt, and Eisenberg, point out that the 
identification and analysis of a ‘common point of reference’, or 
‘commonalities’, is also an integral feature of comparative history.
In 1975, Charles Tilly hypothesised with ‘hesitations and 
qualifications’, that ‘an approach to democracy diminishes both the 
effectiveness and prevalence of collective violence’.251 However, recent 
research has seen democracy as a contingent outcome of struggle. The 
process of democratisation, with its opening of political access, has been 
interpreted as not only providing opportunities for the extension of protected 
consultation, but also of sparking violent protest cycles. Michael Mann 
argues that in multi-ethnic environments, democratisation can produce radical 
ethno-nationalist movements inciting ethnic conflict.252Consequently, I 
explore the impact of democratisation upon two multi-ethnic environments, 
examining how this process intertwined with a growing nationalisation of 
political culture and identity, generating both serious ethnic violence and 
contributing to the containment and institutionalisation of such conflict.
248 Christiane Eisenberg, ‘’The Comparative View of Labour History” , 
International Review of Social History. 34. (1989), 429
249 Haupt, ‘’Comparative History” , 2400-2401
250 Haupt, ‘’Comparative History” , 2400 & Eisenberg, ‘’The Comparative 
View of Labour History” , 410
251 Tilly, The Rebellious Century. 286-7
252 Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy. 2-3
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Belfast and Liverpool provide an excellent insight into the relationship 
between political movements and popular collective violence, as well as into 
the ‘charged question of modem research on violence, whether private and 
public violence dwindles in or is compatible with the functioning of modem 
society’.253 Employing a comparative methodology, my thesis analyses the 
contrasting responses of two British-based Conservative political movements 
at the turn of the 20th Century to the ‘commonality’ that was popular 
sectarianism. Through this comparison it seeks to identify key characteristics 
underpinning the relationship between political movements and popular 
collective violence within an evolving democratic political context. The 
central question is why was Ulster Unionism remarkably successful at 
containing and controlling the excesses of sectarianism; whilst, despite 
comparable circumstances in terms of the national electoral system and 
potential for ‘endemic’ communal violence, Tory Democracy appeared 
largely impotent in the face of mounting sectarian disorder and collective 
violence?
I have sought an explanation to this central question through the 
identification and analysis of the distinctive factors that underpinned relations 
between Tory-Democracy, Ulster Unionism and popular sectarianism and 
how these factors influenced the contrasting manifestations that sectarian 
conflict took in Liverpool and Belfast. These distinctive factors arose out of 
the four principal themes identified earlier. The central theme examined, in 
relation to British political culture and conceptions of national identity, the 
intrinsic character of the two dominant political movements, whether 
essentially local or national in outlook. The others comprised a comparative 
analysis of the location and distribution of power and leadership over the
253 Haupt, ‘’History of Violence” , 16199
254 Brian.M.Walker, ed, Parliamentary Election Results in Ireland. 1801-1922. 
Dublin, Royal Irish Academy, 1978, X I11, the 1884 Reform Act ‘created a 
uniform householder and lodger franchise’ for the U.K, whilst the 1918 Act 
extended the franchise to all adult males, to women of thirty and over and to 
soldiers over 18’. A.Morgan, Labour and Partition. 18 claimed the Third 
Reform Act trebled the Irish electorate, with David Fitzpatrick(‘’The 
Geography of Irish Nationalism, 1910-21” , Past and Present 78,122) stating, 
that by 1910, over half Irish adult males were entitled to vote at parliamentary
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forces of popular sectarianism, the primary location of ‘communal strife’ in 
each city and the nature of each city’s associational culture. Through the 
exploration of these themes, my contention is that Liverpool Tory Democracy 
as a political movement lost control over popular sectarianism, resulting in 
sustained communal violence. The following factors contributed to this 
fracturing in relations between the dominant political movement and the 
forces of popular sectarianism, resulting in a climate of sectarian collective 
violence.
(1) In order to construct and maintain its local hegemony, within a 
democratising and uneven national modernising context, Tory-Democracy 
was largely reliant upon an expedient and ultimately fragile alliance with 
populist sectarian organisations and personalities as a bridge to the Protestant 
working class.
(2) These organisations and personalities employed violence as an 
integral part of their collective action.
(3) The management and control of the forces of popular sectarianism 
was dependent upon a combination of flattery and appeasement, common 
cause, forms of power-sharing, patronage and mutual utilisation.
(4) The stability of the relationship between Tory-Democracy and 
popular sectarianism was predicated upon a substantial degree of compliance 
and passivity on the part of the Protestant grassroots and flexibility and 
compromise by the local Conservative political establishment.
(5) The bye-product of such an instrumental relationship was the 
legitimisation, empowerment and politicisation of popular Protestant 
organisations and personalities and the subsequent development of a 
dynamic, increasingly autonomous ‘grassroots’ sectarian movement.
(6) This explicitly sectarian movement was set on an almost inevitable 
collision course with the Conservative political establishment resulting in a 
prolonged protest cycle. This struggle was the contingent outcome of the 
local opportunities and constraints revealed by democratisation. The uneven, 
and contradictory, secularisation process at an ecclesiastical, social and 
political level exacerbated tensions. With Protestantism central to local
elections. At the same date, Bohstedt (‘’More than One Working Class” ,
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ethnic and national identity, this process, a product of wider modernisation, 
developed into a struggle for the allegiance of the local Protestant working 
class between competing ethno-nationalist movements. Liverpool Tory 
Democracy was a modem Conservative nationalism with a contingent proto­
nationalist content, whilst the Protestant Democracy was a radical proletarian 
movement with an intractable anti-Catholic proto-nationalist core.
The Protestant Democracy constituted a complex social movement, 
earning its legitimacy through direct-action at street level. In the process it 
generated serious and sustained communal violence. Within Liverpool’s 
multi-ethnic environment this action embodied a form of cultural defence and 
resistance to cultural transition.
My proposition is that within a prolonged protest cycle, this erosion of 
control over popular sectarianism by the Tory-Anglican establishment and the 
subsequent devolution of power and leadership to the community of the street 
were fundamental factors in generating and sustaining sectarian collective 
violence in Liverpool.
In contrast, Ulster Unionism was a political movement that largely 
succeeded, in comparable circumstances, in integrating and exercising 
effective control over popular sectarianism, a force with a history of violent 
expression on the streets of Belfast The following factors compelled and 
enabled Ulster Unionism, in contrast to Tory Democracy, to exercise control 
over popular sectarianism in Belfast channelling its energy away from 
collective violence in the street into formal politics and organisation.
(1) New political imperatives forced the Belfast Episcopalian- 
Conservative establishment to re-evaluate its relationship to popular 
sectarianism. The external or overarching threat posed by Home Rule had a 
galvanising and unifying impact upon Ulster’s Protestants. The contingent 
outcome was a modem nationalism constructed by local Protestant elite’s. 
Ulster Unionism was an imagined or invented collective identity, with a 
strong but contingent proto-nationalist dimension. It was politically
204) stated that approximately half of Liverpool men could vote.
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engineered to transcend historic Protestant rivalries, a form of religious 
ethnicity, or symbolic community, juxtaposed in relation to the Irish 
Nationalist ‘Other’ and instrumentalised in its relationship to British political 
culture and identity.
(2) Under the ‘umbrella’ of Unionism the political establishment 
directly intervened, drawing popular activity away from the volatile street into 
representative, seemingly democratic political and organisational structures, 
as part of a co-ordinated strategy of national resistance. The Ulster Unionist 
establishment created, co-opted and integrated popular organisations both as a 
means of harnessing and ‘policing’ popular sectarianism and in an effort to 
emasculate an alternative and potentially divisive, source of social and 
political power.
(3) Ulster Unionism was characterised by an increased concentration 
of power and leadership over the anti-Home Rule movement, exercised 
through an elaborate seemingly democratic structure. This representative 
structure militated against the emergence of alternative sources of power and 
leadership with their frequently violent modes of popular collective action.
(4) Ulster Unionism’s coherence and the leadership’s legitimacy and 
control was largely dependent upon the maintenance of a heightened sense of 
emergency or collective threat, underpinned by a high degree of political and 
organisational mobilisation. The Unionist leadership sought to avoid a 
vacuum in which a protest cycle could develop with underlying grassroots 
Protestant identities, grievances and aspirations finding expression in a radical 
ethno-nationalist movement provoking collective violence on the streets of 
Belfast.
The contrasting responses of Tory-Democracy and Ulster Unionism to 
popular sectarianism during 1880-1921 contribute to a wider understanding of 
the relationship between political movements and popular collective violence. 
An analysis of the location and distribution of power and leadership within 
such relationships throws light upon the ability of political movements to 
contain and control volatile popular movements. Additionally, their 
experience reveals that there is not necessarily a simple or direct correlation 
between ‘an approach to democracy’ and a diminution in the ‘effectiveness 
and prevalence’ of collective violence. An equally important factor in the
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relationship between the development of national electoral systems, political 
movements and collective violence is the intrinsic character of the political 
movement itself. In other words, the extent to which the movement’s 
character and outlook is determined by primarily local or national 
considerations. The complex interplay between local and national political 
culture and identities, and the response to uneven modernising processes like 
industrialisation, urbanisation and secularisation can determine a particular 
political movement’s response to ‘democratisation’. It can influence the 
character of its engagement with new and pre-existing core constituencies 
responsible for perpetrating acts of popular collective violence.
I argue that in Liverpool sectarian rioting, a contingent mode of 
collective social protest was mobilised and deployed by a modem ethno- 
nationalist movement as part of its repertoire of contention. This mode of 
disruptive collective action co-existed alongside an expanding democratic 
political system, constituting an effective means of community influence, 
leverage and power. The escalation in this form of action, as part of a 
sustained protest cycle, can be attributed to the opportunities and constraints 
exposed by democratisation and to the complex and uneven impact of 
modernisation, particularly secularisation, upon Liverpool’s Protestant 
community. With Protestantism central to local ethnic and national identity, 
this process produced fragmentation and conflict within this locality-based 
community.
This struggle centred upon conflicting conceptions of British identity, a 
contingent proto-nationalist Tory Democratic variety and a radical anti- 
Catholic hybrid of religious, class and ethnic compounds. During this protest 
cycle, Tory Democracy proved incapable of exerting effective social control, 
or facilitating forms of integration, resulting in sustained interaction and 
pragmatic co-existence between formal politics and sectarian violence. This 
situation was sustained by Liverpool’s relative exceptionalism in relation to 
developments in national political culture and British identity.
In Belfast, the Episcopalian-Conservative establishment reacted to a 
similar situation of sustained sectarian violence by creating a modem 
nationalist movement, an invented or imagined identity with a pronounced 
but contingent Protestant proto-nationalist dimension. This expressive or
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symbolic community, a form of religious ethnicity diffused beyond the 
locality and region, provided a rallying point for Ulster’s fractious 
Protestants. Crucially, in the context of the Home Rule struggle, this socio­
political construct was highly attuned to developments in British political 
culture and national identity.
Under the umbrella of local and national Protestant defence, the 
Unionist establishment constructed an increasingly elaborate, seemingly 
democratic, machinery which both facilitated the integration of the principal 
agency of local sectarian violence, the Orange Order, whilst simultaneously 
exerting effective forms of ‘social control’.255 In the process, the Unionist 
political elite delineated between legitimate and ‘illegitimate private violence’ 
and channelled popular agitation away from the street into more formal 
avenues of political and associational expression and resolution. An analysis 
of the experience of collective violence in the two cities reveals that the 
evolution toward democratic modernity could either be accompanied by a 
diminution in the ‘effectiveness’ and ‘prevalence’ of collective violence256 or 
provide opportunities for the development of violent ethno-nationalist 
movements. However, neither outcome was preordained or necessarily 
irreversible. With its growing marginality to British political culture and 
identity Belfast reverted to a sectarian ‘local state’ after 1920, witnessing a 
resurgence of widespread forms of collective violence. In contrast, with the 
gradual erosion of Liverpool’s exceptionalism during the inter-war period 
violent forms of collective action were gradually superceded by more 
institutionalised forms of ‘social protest’.
To conclude, I aim to demonstrate that sectarian conflict in Liverpool 
was fuelled and sustained, despite a lower level of entrenched discrimination 
and segregation than its Irish counterpart, by the following key factors.
(l)-Liverpool’s enduring ‘local state’ mentality, or relative 
exceptionalism in relation to national political culture and identity. This 
scenario provided little or no internal or external incentive for Tory 
Democracy to fundamentally re-evaluate its relationship to popular 
sectarianism.
255 see Graham & Gurr, The History of Violence in America. 814
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(2) The opportunities and constraints exposed by democratisation, 
combined with an uneven and contradictory secularisation process, triggered 
a prolonged protest cycle, a contingent outcome of which was a diminution of 
political and organisational control on the part of the Tory-Anglican 
establishment. This resulted in the fragmentation and devolution of authority 
over the Protestant working class. With Protestantism central to local 
identity, this schism was precipitated by conflict over competing conceptions 
of British identity. These were a pragmatic Tory Democratic variety and a 
radical hybrid of local class, ethnic and national allegiances, the Protestant 
Democracy.
(3) With the emergence of this radical ethno-nationalist movement 
the establishment of power and leadership devolved to the community of the 
street with its extensive associational networks and rival community leaders 
who consolidated their local authority by orchestrating sectarian 
confrontation at street level.
(4) The primacy of the street with its ‘shatter-zones’, contested 
territory and endemic confrontation forced the Conservative political 
establishment, conscious of its impotence, to adopt an increasingly pragmatic 
approach to sectarian disorder, untroubled either by its national image or any 
significant adverse local impact upon its political fortunes.
Despite far greater potential for sustained sectarian violence the 
Episcopalian-Conservative establishment in Belfast was faced with new 
political imperatives with the advent of Home Rule in 1886. These 
compelled it to adapt to national political culture and evolving conceptions of 
British identity.
(l)-It was forced to re-evaluate its relationship to popular sectarianism 
both in light of coalition formation within Ulster and of forming a respectable 
political movement designed to win over a sceptical mainland public opinion. 
Ulster Unionism was constructed to facilitate these political aims. It was an 
invented or imagined nationalism with a crucial but ultimately contingent 
proto-nationalist dimension. It was conditioned by the British political 
climate and changing attitudes towards national identity.
256 Tilly, The Rebellious Century. 287
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(2) Unlike its Liverpool counterpart, this local establishment under the 
umbrella of Unionism, intervened directly to integrate the Protestant working 
class into an overarching national political strategy.
(3) It drew Protestant activity away from the street creating elaborate, 
centrally controlled, political and organisational structures designed to 
harness, contain and control popular sectarianism.
Without these initiatives Belfast would have undoubtedly experienced 
far worse sectarian disorder than that which engulfed Liverpool in 1909 and 
in all probability Ulster Unionism would have lost the crucial ‘battle of 
politics' and propaganda in relation to Home Rule.
In terms of popular sectarianism and collective violence, the two city’s 
experiences provide an insight into the complex interplay between local and 
national forces in British society. Between 1880-1914, Joan Smith referred to 
Britain as a ‘highly local society’, describing Liverpool and Glasgow as two 
‘local states’257 whilst Belchem has referred to Liverpool’s ‘peculiarities’258 
or ‘exceptionalism’.259 In a similar vein, James Connolly at the time and 
Greaves later referred to Belfast’s ‘peculiar parochialism’.260 The case of the 
two cities illustrates that distinct ethnic, religious, political and class identities 
and cultures, largely immune to national political culture and identity, 
continued to flourish in 19th and early 20th Century British society. Local and 
regional identities and cultures profoundly influenced political behaviour, 
social and economic organisation and popular customs and national 
imaginings. However, in light of the complex and uneven modernisation 
process, with its erosion of parochialism and insidious nationalisation of 
political culture and identity, local political imperatives could be transformed 
and distinctive cultures and communal identities fragmented. Within this 
context the experiences of the Protestant working class in both Liverpool and
257 Smith, ‘’Class, skill and Sectarianism” , 202
258 see Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of Liverpool” .
John Belchem, Mersey Pride: essays in Liverpool exceptionalism. 
Liverpool, Liverpool Univ.Press, 2000, XI states, ‘outside the main narrative 
frameworks of modem British history, Liverpool’s past has been characterised 
as different, the exception which proved the rule. Liverpool’s apartness, 
indeed, is crucial to its identity’.
260 C..D.Greaves, The Life and Times of James Connolly London, Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1961,210
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Belfast demonstrates that the British working class could be shaped by highly 
specific local factors.261 This could be a dominant social and political culture 
or religious and ethnic ‘world view’ transcending and circumscribing wider 
class allegiance, whilst providing a medium for the articulation of grassroots 
dissent, limited forms of class conflict and labour and socio-economic 
grievances. Within working class communities, local ‘proletarian idioms’, 
religious and ethnic compounds could cross-fertilise with national allegiances 
and orthodox forms of working class politics and organisation producing 
hybrids, like Independent Orangeism in Belfast. These could reinforce local 
and/or national identities or generate profound tensions, and in multi-ethnic 
environments, sustained communal violence. Consequently, within dominant 
local religious and ethnic cultures, elements of the working class could 
comprise a crucial component of ethno-nationalist movements based upon 
locality or symbolic communities. They could eschew conventional labour 
and working class politics, whilst simultaneously exerting highly effective 
forms of influence, leverage and power^predicated upon conflicting 
conceptions of ethnic, religious or national identity.
This thesis is mostly based on the analysis of newspapers and papers of 
local associations, which provide valuable insight into the contrasting
261 see Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class” , 214 who argued that 
‘More than one working class was making itself in Edwardian Britain. 
Liverpool sustained a Protestant and Catholic working class who placed the 
advance of their own communal interest above the economic and political 
interests pointed out for them by conventional politicians and historians’.
262 John Belchem ‘’Ethnicity and Labour History. With Special reference to 
Irish Migration” in Lex Heerma van Voss & Marcel van Der Linden, eds, 
Class and Other Identitities. Gender. Religion and Ethnicity in the Writing of 
European Labour History. New York, Oxford, Berghahn Books, 2002,97 
states that ‘until recently, labour historians tended to regard ethnicity as 
divisive and dysfunctional, a hindrance to working class collectivism. 
Perspectives are changing to suggest a positive or symbiotic relationship 
between ethnicity and class’, whilst Patrick Pasture, ‘’The Role of religion in 
Social and Labour History” , 112,113 comments, in relation to the ‘post­
modern world view’, that this leads to ‘an extremely fragmented overall 
picture of working class organisation and of the origins of its development.
No longer the unity, but the diversity of the working class and its social 
organisation has a central place in today’s social history’. He continues, 
‘religion was not only a part of certain working class cultures; it also 
contributed to the formation of a distinct class identity and to specific political 
behaviour, though these differed from the socialist vision (s) of class’.
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Protestant political and associational cultures of Liverpool and Belfast. These 
sources cast light upon the organisations and personalities that comprised 
these cultures, the issues and campaigns that mobilised and motivated them, 
and on the politics and ideology that underpinned them, as well as the 
consequences of their activities and actions. In terms of Liverpool, the British 
Newspaper Library holds a comprehensive range of local publications, of 
which the Protestant Standard and the Protestant Search-Light provide a 
revealing insight into the city’s Evangelical Protestant culture. For an 
alternative, Liberal perspective I consulted the Liberal Review, which later 
became the Liverpool Review, changing its political affiliation in the process. 
Liverpool City Libraries stocks a wide range of material, including the Police 
(Liverpool Inquiry) Act 1909. and the City of Liverpool. Protestant 
Demonstration. Report of the Head Constable. Liverpool. 1903. both of 
which chronicle the processes and outcome of sectarian street mobilisation. 
The National Archive holds material chronicling the civil authorities response 
to sectarian disturbance. The British Library holds some relevant material, 
including Councillor R.F.Henderson’s George Wise of Liverpool. Protestant 
Stalwart. Twice Imprisoned for the Gospel’s Sake and the Loyal Orange 
Institution of England. In relation to Belfast, there exists a far greater volume 
of primary material available for consultation. The British Newspaper Library 
holds copies of the Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette (Episcopalian), the Witness 
(Presbyterian), the Belfast News Letter (organ of the Conservative/Unionist 
establishment), the Northern Whig (Liberal) and the Irish Protestant 
(Independent Orange Order). The Public Record Office of Northern Ireland is 
an excellent source for Ulster Unionism, particularly the archive of the Ulster 
Unionist Council (written permission only). This contains comprehensive 
material on the Ulster Unionist Club’s Council, the Ulster Volunteer Force, 
the Irish Unionist Association’s and the Ulster Unionist Labour Association 
plus copies of the Ulster Unionist Council’s Year Book. The Public Record 
Office of Northern Ireland also holds material relating to the Ulster Women’s 
Unionist Council, plus the papers and collections of important figures like 
Colonel Edward Saunderson and William Johnston. Belfast’s Linen Hall 
library holds important material, particularly relating to the Orange Order, 
including Reports of the Proceedings of the Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland
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(incomplete) and of the Grand Lodge of Belfast (incomplete). Finally, Belfast 
City Library holds a copy of the Belfast Riots Commission. 1886. Report of 
the Belfast Riots Commissioners. Dublin. 1887.
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CHAPTER ONE - THE SOCIAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
BACKGROUND
This chapter examines the background to sectarianism in both cities, 
identifying some of the key factors which contributed to the ascendancy of 
sectarian collective violence in Liverpool and which enabled Ulster Unionism 
to exercise restraint and control over popular sectarianism in Belfast. As 
explained in the introduction, Liverpool’s ‘peculiar’ economic structure clearly 
had an impact upon ‘communal strife’1, with sectarian discrimination existing 
in the casual labour market2 However I agree with John Belchem’s analysis 
that the principal arena of sectarian confrontation was not the ‘workplace’ but 
the ‘community of the street’.3 This arena with its ‘contested territory’, 
‘shatter-zones’ and ‘endemic’ skirmishing was a catalyst in the rioting that 
periodically erupted.4 It also profoundly influenced communal identity, 
sectarian organisation and I argue, the establishment of local leadership over 
the Protestant working class, and the assertion of the ‘Protestant Democracy’s 
considerable muscle.
1 see Taplin on Neal, ‘’Sectarian Violence” , 95; Smith, ‘’Labour Tradition in 
Glasgow and Liverpool” , 48,49; Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 159, 
202 & Shallice, ‘’Orange and Green and Militancy” , 15.
2 see Smith, ‘’Labour Tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool” , 46 & Smith, 
‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 163
3 see Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of Liverpool” , 7
4 Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of Liverpool” , 15 suggested that the ‘negative’ 
aspects of sectarianism had ‘much to do with social geography, with fierce 
border disputes over ‘contested territory” .
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I argue that a decisive factor in the emergence of this force was the 
erosion of the existing relationship between the Tory-Anglican establishment 
and the forces of popular sectarianism as part of a prolonged protest cycle. 
This transformation witnessed growing interaction and divergence between 
formal politics and organisation and the belligerent ‘politics of the street’. 
This process resulted in the development of the ‘Protestant Democracy’ into 
an autonomous ‘grassroots’ social movement, the main dynamic behind 
sectarian collective violence. In Belfast, I assert that despite a greater degree 
of entrenched sectarian discrimination and potential for ‘endemic’ communal 
violence, the Episcopalian-Conservative establishment, the architects of 
Unionism, re-assessed their relationship to popular sectarianism in light of the 
national threat posed by Home Rule.5 In order to win the crucial ‘battle of 
politics’ and propaganda they were forced to confront the dilemma posed by 
popular sectarianism in terms of building a ‘representative’ Ulster Protestant 
coalition and of presenting a ‘respectable’ law-abiding front in mainland 
Britain. The new movement had to integrate the strategic Orange Order 
whilst also accommodating influential forces hostile to the Institution, resolve 
the liability that was sectarian street mobilisation and contend with a dissident 
strand of ‘Independent’ Orangeism which constituted the main threat to the 
long term stability of the movement Unionism’s response to these major 
challenges would influence its political, ideological and organisational 
development and determine its ultimate success in the struggle against Home 
Rule.
LIVERPOOL
IMMIGRATION.
In 1801, the population of Liverpool stood at 77,600; by 1851 it was 
376,000, equal to a 360 per cent increase in fifty years.6 Then between 1871
5 see Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party. 8,10
6 Tom Gallagher, ‘A Tale of Two Cities: Communal Strife in Glasgow and 
Liverpool before 1914’, in R.Swift & S.Gilley, eds, The Irish in the Victorian 
City. 107
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and 1921 it rose from 493,405 to 805,100.7 Immigration contributed to the 
growth, character and sectarian difficulties with the Irish being the largest 
group. However, Irish immigration did not begin with the ‘Great Hunger’ of 
1845-47, nor was it restricted to Catholics. Shallice noted the ‘long 
established practise, dating back to the Eighteenth Century, of yearly 
migratory labour, predominantly agricultural, spending time in and around the 
city’.8 This migratory flow was aggravated by periodic famines and evictions 
of Irish peasantry. Additionally, Shallice observed that by the 1830’s 
Liverpool’s Irish community, comprising both Catholics and Protestants, 
numbered around 60, 000.9
Glasgow and Liverpool bore the brunt of the wave of famine migration, 
between 1847-54.10 The first wave of migrants to Liverpool hit around 
December 1846, with 280,000, whilst during the first half of ‘Black’ 1847, 
over 300,000 entered the city.11 Many of these were ‘uneducated, penniless,
17many speaking only Gaelic, and some disease-ridden’. This mass influx not 
only had a profound contemporary social impact13 but also an enduring 
cultural impact, in terms of implanting popular stereotypes, or as Frank Neal 
terms it ‘folk-lore’, which continued to be exploited throughout the period.14
With a substantial proportion remaining in the city, by the mid­
nineteenth century Liverpool boasted the largest Irish diaspora community 
outside London.15 At the time of the 1851 Census Liverpool contained 83,
7 Colin.G.Pooley, ‘Segregation or Integration? The Residential Experience of 
the Irish in mid-Victorian Britain’, in: R.Swift & S.Gilley, eds, The Irish in 
Britain. 1815-1939. 74 & Sheila Marriner, The Economic and Social 
Development of Merseyside. London, Croom Helm, 1982,142
8 A.Shallice, ‘Orange and Green and Militancy: Sectarianism and Working 
Class Politics in Liverpool, 1900-1914’, Bulletin North-West Labour History 
Documents 6 (1979-80), 16
9 Richard Dennis, English Industrial Cities of the Nineteenth Century. A 
Social Geography. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ.Press, 1984,18
10 Dennis. English Industrial Cities of the Nineteenth Century. 35
11 Dennis, English Industrial Cities of the Nineteenth Century. 35
12 Gallagher, ‘A Tale of Two Cities’, 107
13 Gallagher, ‘A Tale of Two Cities’, 108
14 Frank Neal, Sectarian Violence. 251
15 Colin Pooley, ‘Segregation or Integration?’, 66
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813 Irish-born, constituting 22.3 per cent of the population.16 However, after 
1861 Irish immigration declined with the number of Irish-born falling to 76, 
761, or 15.56 per cent of the population by 1871.17 By 1901 the Irish-born had 
declined to just 6.67 per cent of the population; so, by the time of rising 
sectarian tension, with the launch of George Wise’s anti-Catholic crusade in 
May 1901, Liverpool’s Irish Catholics were an established, as opposed to a 
transient community. From 1900 this community began to increasingly assert 
its social and political influence.18 By 1921 the Irish-born had declined to just 
3.90 per cent of the population.19
Attracted by the prospect of skilled employment, other substantial 
immigrant communities included Welsh-born, Scots-bom, foreign-born, and 
those from other parts of England. It is difficult to determine the contribution 
these communities made to sectarian strife. As the Welsh and Scots tended to 
be concentrated amongst the skilled working class in the labour market, they 
were not in direct competition with the mass of unskilled Irish-Catholics. 
However, many did reside in Protestant, or ‘Orange’ strongholds in the North 
End, and as Methodists and Presbyterians, Liverpool’s Evangelical culture 
was a source of interaction between Evangelical Anglicans and 
Nonconformity, with many working class Nonconformists being politically 
Conservative.
The Religious Character of Liverpool, 1880-1921.
Despite the decline in the Irish-born after 1861, the Irish community 
continued to grow and flourish. By the 1890’s Liverpool was recognised as
16 Pooley, ‘Segregation or Integration?’, 74 The Census did not distinguish 
between Irish-Catholics and Protestants. However, for this study, unless 
specified, ‘Irish-born’ refers to the overwhelming mass of Catholic-Irish 
immigrants.
17 Pooley, ‘Segregation or Integration?’, 74
18 John Bohstedt, ‘More Than One Working Class: Protestant-Catholic Riots 
in Edwardian Liverpool,’ in: John Belchem, ed, Popular Politics. Riot and 
Labour. 214
19 David Fitzpatrick, ‘A Curious Middle Place: The Irish in Britain, 1871- 
1921’, in: Swift & Gilley, eds, The Irish in Britain. 1815-1939.13
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the largest Roman Catholic diocese in England, with over 400 000 adherents 
constituting a fifth of the total Catholic population of England.20
This community supported a vast infrastructure reinforcing a distinctive 
collective identity and comprised two main elements, the Irish and the 
Catholic. The bulk of the city’s Catholic culture, which offered ‘cradle to 
grave sustenance and support for Irish immigrants’, was constructed during 
the nineteenth century by Father James Nugent.21 In Nugent’s words, it 
provided improved educational standards and the provision of ‘rational 
amusements’ which were ‘calculated to safeguard them from temptation’.22 
This culture included charitable organisations like the Sisters of Notre Dame 
plus, organisations like the Young Men’s Societies which offered cards and 
billiards, teas and parties, and affiliated cycling clubs and debating societies. 
Catholic processions involved bodies like the Third Order of St. Francis a 
men’s devotional group, and various guilds and confraternities. Street 
processions, particularly in the aftermath of the Eucharistic Conference of 
1908, were pivotal in provoking sectarian confrontation. These were 
interpreted as an act of local Catholic assertion, or ‘aggression’, which 
Liverpool’s militant Protestants deemed ‘illegal’ and mobilised to resist.
Paralleling this culture were organisations aligned with Irish Nationalist 
factions in the city. Amongst the most important was the Irish National 
League (INL), formed in October 1882, of which T.P.O’Connor, M.P for 
Liverpool’s Scotland division and the only Irish Nationalist MP in England, 
was the British President for over twenty-five years commencing in 1885.23 
The INL was superceded by the United Irish League (UIL), the ‘political’ 
wing of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP). By 1908 the League claimed 800 
members in Liverpool.24 The UIL in Liverpool emerged in 1902 from the 
dissident ‘Pamellite’ Irish Nationalist Association (INA) formed in the 1890’s 
as a consequence of a split in the IPP (1890-1900) caused by the scandal
20 Tom Gallagher, ‘A Tale of two Cities’, 107
21 Conference Report, ‘The Irish in British Labour History’, Labour History 
Review Vol .57, (1992), Part No.3,6
22 Smith, ‘Class, Skill and Sectarianism in Glasgow and Liverpool, 1880- 
1914’, 179
23 Steele, ‘The Irish Presence in the North of England, 1850-1914’, Northern 
History Vol. X I1 (1976), 233
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surrounding Charles Stewart Parnell.25 The leading local lights in the INA 
were the ‘insurgent’ Harford brothers (Austin and Frank). They rose to 
prominence during 1898-99 on a radical social reform agenda aimed at the 
Irish Catholic working class.26 The rise in the fortunes of Irish Nationalism 
was one factor, which after 1900 fed into George Wise’s decision to drive the 
‘Protestant agitation’ in an explicitly anti-Catholic direction. This would lead 
to the fragmentation of the anti-Ritualist coalition and facilitate the emergence 
of the ‘Protestant Democracy’ as an autonomous social and political 
movement
Within the UIL, the Harford brothers shared local political mastery with 
the old guard centred around the Nationalist M.P. O’Connor.27 An indication 
of the strength of this political machinery is provided by Neal, who claims 
that the Irish Nationalist Connection had 17 branches and 10,000 members by 
1890, whilst at its peak the Home Rule movement boasted 17,000 members.28 
Ranged alongside these political structures were organisations like the Irish 
National Foresters, which counteracted Orange marches and was one of the 
two largest Friendly Societies in the city.29 The Ancient Order of Hibernians 
(AOH) was another important organisation, offering burial and Friendly 
Society facilities as well as being linked to the UIL and the IPP. The Gaelic 
Athletic Association (GAA), formed in 1884, promoted Irish sports; whilst the
• J A
Gaelic League (1893) promoted Irish culture. Both were closely associated 
with Republicanism, with David Fitzpatrick asserting that the post-1916 
Gaelic League was in reality a ‘front’ organisation for Sinn Fein.31
24 Fitzpatrick, ‘A Curious Middle Place’, 38
25 Smith, ‘Class, Skill and Sectarianism in Glasgow and Liverpool, 1880- 
1914’, 184
26 Bohstedt, ‘More Than One Working Class’, 206
27 Smith, ‘Class, Skill and Sectarianism in Glasgow and Liverpool, 1880- 
1914’, 178
28 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 185 & Gallagher, ‘A Tale of Two Cities’, 116
29 Smith, ‘Class, Skill and Sectarianism in Glasgow and Liverpool, 1880- 
1914’, 173-4 & Smith, ‘Labour Tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool’, History 
Workshop Journal. Issue 17, (Spring 1984), 47
30 Fitzpatrick, ‘A Curious Middle Place’, 36
31 David Fitzpatrick, ‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism, 1910-21’, Past and 
Present No.78. (19781.128
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Despite occasional tensions, this culture provided a context for the 
forging of a ‘symbiotic’ relationship, which made ‘Irish Catholic and Catholic 
Irish’, and it also provided a base for the evolution of effective forms of 
political expression.32
Its Protestant counterpart was also pivotal in the consolidation of a 
distinctive Protestant identity, ideology, culture and politics. It not only 
provided a context for the interaction of Evangelical Anglicans and 
Nonconformity, but was also utilised as a medium for engagement with the 
Protestant working class by influential religious and political elements. Most 
significantly of all, it provided the organisational foundation for the 
‘Protestant Democracy’.
Other groups also had their own cultural networks, albeit on a smaller 
and less coherent scale. Irish Protestants described as the catalyst which 
‘activated the latent anti-Catholicism of the native population’, had their own 
organisations, of which the imported Loyal Orange Institution was the most 
significant.33 The first English Lodges had been formed in Manchester in 
1798-99, whilst Liverpool was organised in 1807-8, with its membership 
restricted initially to Liverpool’s Ulster Protestant ranks. This reflects 
Belchem’s assertion that sectarian violence was initially an ‘internal Irish, 
private battle’.34 Ulster Protestants were heavily involved in the religious 
sphere, as epitomised by the Reverend Hugh McNeile, ‘one of Liverpool’s 
brigade of immigrant Ulster Pastors’.35
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LIVERPOOL.
A number of historians have argued that Liverpool’s peculiar economic 
structure impacted upon the city’s sectarian conflict and specifically upon its 
‘social and political life’ and its dominant ‘neighbourhood structure’.36
32 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 6
33 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 10
34 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 10
35 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 10
36 see Eric Taplin’s review of Frank Neal, The Liverpool Experience, in: 
International Labour and Working Class History 37 (Spring 1990), 95; Joan 
Smith, ‘Labour Tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool’, History Workshop
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Liverpool was characterised by the twin forces of commerce and conveyance. 
By 1858 the seven mile Dock Estate, managed by the Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Board (a ‘public utility trust’), consisted of 60 docks and 27 miles of 
quay space.37 By 1911 this had expanded to 37 miles of quay with the Estate 
divided into ‘a number of partially specialised sections, each with its own 
methods of working and deployment of labour’.38 The South End, initially 
comprising the sailing ship and later the small steamship sector, handled the 
South American trade; the central docks dealt with the coastal trade, whilst the 
deep water North End docks handled the lucrative North American trade 
including cotton, grain and passenger traffic.
According to Sheila Marriner, the docks experienced ‘long term upward 
trends’, so that by the end of the mid-Victorian period Liverpool, along with 
London, was pre-eminent amongst the seven or eight major cities established 
as the principal centres of British sea-going trade, both ‘unsurpassed’ in the 
world as a whole.40
Journal 17 (Spring, 1984), 48 & A.Shallice, ‘Orange and Green and 
Militancy: Sectarianism and Working Class politics in Liverpool, 1900-14’, 
Bulletin North-West Labour History Documents 6 (1979-80), 15
37 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 2; Smith, ‘Class, Skill and 
Sectarianism’, 168 & Gordon Phillips and Noel Whiteside, Casual Labour. 
The unemployment question in the Port Transport Industry. 1880-1970. 
Oxford, Clarendon, 1985,14
38 R.Bean, ‘Custom, Job Regulation and Dock Labour in Liverpool, 1911-39’, 
International Review of Social History. VoLXXXVl 11, Part 3 (1982), 274
39 Smith, ‘Class, Skill and Sectarianism’, 168
40 Marriner, The Economic and Social Development of Merseyside. 94-5 & 
Phillips and Whiteside, Casual Labour. 13
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Net registered Tonnage of shipping using the port of Liverpool after the 
establishment of the Mersev Docks and Harbour Board.
Net Registered Tons-million
Date Tons Date Tons
1858 4.4 1890 9.6
1860 4.7 1900 12.3
1870 5.7 1910 16.6
1880 7.5 1914 19.0
Note: Hyde states that tonnages are ‘drawn from dues paid and, as only 
one charge was made for both inward and outward berthing and clearance, the 
entries and clearances amounted roughly to double those given’.
Source: F.E.Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersev. An Economic History of a 
Port. Newton Abbot, David & Charles, 1971,96-7
However, by 1914 Liverpool’s share of total exports by value had 
declined from just under half the U.K.’s total in 1857, to about 36 per cent, 
whilst its share of the import trade declined from approximately one third of 
the UK total to just under a quarter.41 During the inter-war years the tonnage 
of shipping handled by the port did not change markedly, fluctuating between 
16.5 and 21.7 million tons. However, it became increasingly apparent that 
Liverpool had passed its peak relative to other ports.42
The docks were one of the main areas of employment in Liverpool. In 
1901 there were 26,000 dock and wharf labourers rising only slightly to 26, 
946 by 1911 43 Other occupations fell within the category of ‘conveyance’, 
with Liverpool containing 10, 000 general labourers, many irregular dockers, 
plus 11,000 carters by 1911.44 In 1891,27 per cent of men aged 10 and over 
worked in occupations classified as ‘conveyance’. The predominance of other 
categories within the labour market illustrates the pre-eminence of casual 
labour. The next largest group of occupied males in 1891 were the 15.9 per 
cent in the ‘without specific occupation’ category, followed by 9.7 per cent in 
‘general and unspecified’.45
41 Hyde, Liverpool and the Mersev. 97
42 Marriner, The Economic and Social Development of Merseyside. 101
43 Smith, ‘Class, Skill and Sectarianism’, 207, fii.48
44 Smith, ‘Class, Skill and Sectarianism’, 169
45 Smith, ‘Class, Skill and Sectarianism’, 168
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Within the docks there were four principal categories of employers. 
Firstly, there was the Mersey Docks and Harbour Board which employed a 
small number of men; secondly, there were the master stevedores and master 
porters who contracted directly to load and unload cargo on board ship 
(master stevedores), or on the quay (master porters), or were employed 
directly by the ship owners. The independent master stevedores and porters 
were concentrated in the South End, or ‘contractors’ sector, where initially the 
sailing ship and later the small steamship companies operated. The third 
category were large ship owners who undertook their own portering or 
stevedore work, and the fourth were merchants who did their own portering.46 
Despite increased capital concentration, resulting in the industry being 
dominated by a limited number of big North End shipping firms, there were 
still 246 individual employers o f dock labour in 1914, the majority of which 
had their own customs regulating work organisation.47
Regular and experienced dockers were the first to find employment, 
with specialisation being a highly important factor. Lovell outlined that far 
from dock labour being an ‘undifferentiated mass’, in reality, ‘specialisms 
abounded’. He observed that the majority of these ‘owed more to the working 
of the casual labour market than to real differences in...skills required to 
perform various jobs’. In order to gain ‘preference’, dockers’ attached 
themselves to particular employers, shipping lines, familiarised themselves 
with particular types of work, or simply attended the same stand on a regular 
basis. However, there were genuine skill differentials, primarily related to 
type of cargo handled or function performed in the labour process. The 
former category included handlers of bulk commodities, particularly com and 
coal, whilst the latter included lightermen and shipworkers.48
The distinction between shipworkers, comprising regular ‘specialised’ 
dockers and ‘purely casual, irregular, unskilled’ quay labourers, was
46 Smith, ‘Class, Skill and Sectarianism’, 169 & John Lovell, ‘Sail, Steam and 
Emergent Dockers Unionism in Britain 1850-1914’, International Review of 
Social History Vol. XXXI1 (1987), 238-9
47 R.Bean, ‘Custom, Job Regulation and Dock Labour in Liverpool, 1911-39’, 
International Review of Social History Vol.XXVl 1 (1982, Part 3), 274
48 Lovell, ‘Sail, Steam and Emergent Dockers Unionism in Britain 1850- 
1914’. International Review of Social History Vol.XXX11 (1987), 234-5
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fundamental to the working of almost all ports.49 Shipworkers were regarded 
as a ‘superior group’, reflected in the fact that they enjoyed a wage differential 
over quay labourers. This strategic group therefore formed the nucleus of 
permanently employed ‘preference’ men and it was amongst these that early 
forms of labour organisation evolved, particularly in the ‘contractors’ sector in 
the South End.50 According to a contemporary categorisation, shipworkers 
would have been members of the well-paid waterside ‘aristocracy’. The other 
two categories were the poverty-stricken ‘residuum’ and the large 
intermediate class of ‘ordinary docker’.51
Despite extensive differentials in specialisation and weekly wage, James 
Sexton, the General Secretary of the National Union of Dock Labourers 
(NUDL) observed in 1908 that less than a third of dockers earned a living 
wage.52 The large body of unskilled had to contend with periods of 
unemployment and under-employment owing to seasonal fluctuations and 
competition from other ‘casuals’ moving into Merseyside from rural areas.
The problem was illustrated by R. Williams in 1912, who estimated a labour 
surplus of at least 7000 over and above port requirements even during the 
busiest season.54
Despite obvious drawbacks, the majority of dockers opted to remain 
‘casual’ hands in the period preceding 1914. The system bestowed upon them
49 Lovell, ‘Sail, Steam and Emergent Dockers Unionism in Britain 1850- 
1914’, 235
50 Lovell, ‘Sail, Steam and Emergent Dockers Unionism in Britain 1850- 
1914’, 237
51 Phillips and Whiteside. Casual Labour. 28
Smith, ‘Class, Skill and Sectarianism’, 169 Sexton argued that nearly a third 
of dockers might earn an average of 30s a week, and a full quarter averaged 
15s a week. However, another quarter took home only 7s. 6d a week and the 
remainder averaged just 5s a week. It was estimated (Commission on the 
Unemployed, 1894) that in the 1890’s, a careful married couple with four 
children could live respectably (by contemporary standards) on £1.10s per
week. This allowed 6s for rent, and just under 7d per head per day for food, 
clothing, coal; etc. Unskilled men, including a large number of dockers, could 
earn 4s to 5s a day. However, this was not necessarily a reliable guide to 
‘take home pay’, because of the impact of casual employment. Marriner, The 
Economic and Social Development of Merseyside. 151 
5 Marriner, The Economic and Social Development of Merseyside. 153
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‘a kind of skill and status by virtue of occupational specialisation’ with many 
preferring ‘irregular to continuous work’. This enabled them to take up ‘a 
variety of job opportunities (on or off the docks) when these presented 
themselves’. They were also ‘less subject to supervision than many permanent 
hands’.55 Consequently, attempts at de-casualising encountered substantial 
resistance and met with little genuine success.
According to Pooley’s analysis, by 1871, approximately 57.4 per cent of 
Liverpool’s Irish-born were concentrated amongst the semi-skilled (social 
group 5) and the unskilled (social group 6).56 In this unskilled and semi­
skilled category, the primary source of employment was the waterfront In 
1891 the English census undertook a special survey of immigrant occupations, 
examining 1000 adult males of Irish birth, revealing that nearly half were 
classified as dock labourers with this figure being over five times the 
proportion for the local workforce. The survey revealed that the Irish were 
over-represented amongst coal porters and heavers, sailors and general 
labourers and under-represented amongst general porters and carters.57 The 
Irish found ‘a ‘niche’ in...labouring jobs which native workers wished not to 
do...whether in the docks or...waterfront industry’.58 Consequently, the Irish 
were associated with low status, unskilled or semi-skilled employment.
On the commercial front Liverpool had sought to establish itself as a 
‘self-dependent financial centre’ rivalling London. By 1868 the Chamber of 
Commerce declared Liverpool to be the second city of industrial Britain. By
54 Bean, ‘Custom, Job Regulation and Dock Labour’, I.R.S.H Vol.XXVl 1 
(1982, Part3), 279 citing R.Williams, The Liverpool Docks Problem. 
Liverpool, 1912
55 Phillips and Whiteside, Casual Labour. 228
56 Pooley, ‘Segregation or Integration?’, 71 Pooley employs the following 
categories.
Seg 1/2 = Professional and intermediate occupations
Seg 3 = Skilled non-manual occupations
Seg 4 = Skilled manual occupations
Seg 5/6 = Semi-skilled and unskilled occupations
Pooley states that ‘categories are unlikely to be precisely the same in different 
studies because of the different classification systems used’.
57 Fitzpatrick, ‘A Curious Middle Place’, 21 & Dennis, English Industrial 
Cities of the Nineteenth Century. 232
8 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 8
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1911, this sector would employ 31,000.59 Matthew Vickers argues that 
commerce was central to Liverpool’s dominant municipal ideology and to 
‘official images’ o f its civic glory and civic patriotism.60 He asserts that civic 
images illuminate ‘power structures, social relationships and ideological 
contests’ and yet it is difficult to ‘unravel the attitude of the working classes to 
the elite’s pretensions to be citizens of the ‘second city of the Empire” .61 
This conundrum can be partly resolved by re-inserting Protestantism as a 
central component of Liverpool’s civic identity. Protestantism was strongly 
equated with prosperity and progress and for the city’s dominant working 
class community ‘Protestant principle’ provided an effective litmus test for 
evaluating the legitimacy and leadership of this commercial elite. 
Consequently, for the bulk of the working class religious conviction 
transcended ‘commercial grandeur’ in their conception of Liverpool’s civic 
image and civic patriotism.62
Liverpool also supported a small manufacturing sector comprising oil 
cake mills, iron-founding, ship-repairing and marine-engineering. Skilled 
occupations were concentrated in the areas of engineering and construction, 
employing 20,000 workers both skilled and unskilled, and printing. There 
was also a strata of permanently employed, semi-skilled occupations like 
railway and postal workers, with the railway companies employing 9000 and 
Liverpool Corporation 6000 by 1911. As Smith points out, in the context of 
the predominant casual labour market ‘permanent employment was prized-no 
matter how badly paid’.63 Alongside these principal areas there were also a 
range of poorly-paid and menial jobs.
59 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’,2
60 Matthew Vickers, ‘’Civic Image and Civic Patriotism in Liverpool, 1880- 
1914” , (unpub.PhD Thesis, Oxford Univ., 2000), 316,5
61 Vickers, ‘’Civic Image and Civic Patriotism in Liverpool, 1880-1914” , 2, 5
62 Vickers, ‘’Civic Image and Civic Patriotism in Liverpool, 1880-1914” , 316
63 Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of Liverpool”, 169
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Social Composition of the Migrant Population in Liverpool.
Liverpool 1871 (% in each class).
Class Irish Scots Welsh
1
Professional
0 1 1
11
Intermediate
6 16 13
11 IN 
Skilled-non-manual
10 15 14
111M 
Skilled manual
24 39 35
IV
Semi-skilled
16 19 19
V
Unskilled
42 16 16
Other 3 3 2
Note: The English in Liverpool also shared similar social characteristics 
to the Welsh and Scots, being described as primarily ‘skilled working class or 
above.’64
Source: R.Lawton & C.G.Poolev. The Urban Dimensions of Nineteenth 
Century Liverpool. Liverpool Dept of Geography, Univ.of Liverpool, 1975 
The classification employed is R.Dennis’ adaptation of W.A.Armstrong’s 
(W.A.Armstrong, ‘’Social Structure from the early census returns” , in: 
E.A.Wrigley, ed, An Introduction to English Historical Demography. London, 
1966,209-37 & W. A. Armstrong, ‘’The use of information about 
occupation” , in: E.A.Wrigley, ed, Nineteenth Century Society. Cambridge, 
1972,191-310) modification of the 1950 General Register Office 
classification of occupations. For the 1951 Census, the Registrar General 
divided the economically active among 5 socio-economic classes, ranging 
from ‘professional’ (Class 1), through ‘intermediate’, ‘skilled’ and ‘semi­
skilled’ to ‘unskilled’ (Class V). Armstrong advocated the retrospective 
application of this classification, amending it to reflect changes in the status of 
certain occupations between 1851-1951 and the availability of additional 
information when the original enumerators returns were used. Persons 
employing 25 or more were allocated to Class 1, whatever their occupation; 
those employing 1-25 to Class 11; but dealers and tradesmen not recorded as
64 Smith, ‘Class, Skill and Sectarianism’, 172
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employing others were assigned to Class 111. Dennis, English Industrial 
Cities of the Nineteenth Century. 188
There is considerable debate as to what extent the low social status of 
the Irish was attributable to sectarian discrimination. Belchem argued 
sectarianism was ‘a decisive factor in certain occupations...and at certain 
hiring stands, but it was by no means an irrefragable force throughout the 
wider labour market and industrial relations’.65 This view is supported by 
Taplin, whilst Smith has gone further arguing that in ‘key industries’ the 
labour force was divided on sectarian grounds.66 The occupations referred to 
in relation to ‘exclusivity’ included carters, shipwrights and coal-heavers. The 
carters, almost exclusively Protestant, had according to Tom Mann a ‘close’ 
relationship with the North of Ireland and were identified as heavily involved 
in the sectarian rioting of 1909.67 The shipwrights were also predominantly 
Protestant having been the backbone of McNeile’s Conservative Operatives 
Association from the early Nineteenth Century with some of them also being 
officials of the Liverpool Orange Institution in 1885.68 In contrast, the coal- 
heavers were practically all Irish-Catholics, boasting a strong Trade Union 
organisation representing their interests from 1879. However, Shallice argues 
that on the whole there was little direct correlation between discrimination and 
differences in skill or trade. Sectarianism in the economic sphere was related 
more to specific employers’ practises. He asserted that incidences of 
discrimination resided in the ‘folk memory’ with accounts of how 
Blackledges’ bakers would not employ Protestants, whilst Bibby’s oil cake 
mill would not employ Catholics.69 Smith, however, argued that Liverpool’s 
unskilled labour market led to the establishment of ‘extremely strong religious
65 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 7
66 see Taplin on Neal International Labour and Working Class History 37 
(Spring, 1990), 96 & Smith, ‘Labour Tradition’, History Workshop Journal 17
anamce, urange and Green and Militancy’, Bulletin N.W.L.H. Documents 
6 (1979-80), 21
68 Eric Taplin, ‘Review of Frank Neal’s Sectarian Violence: The Liverpool 
Experience, 1819-1914’. International Labour and Working Class History 37
anaince, urange and Green and Militancy’, Bulletin N.W.L.H. Documents 
6 (1979-80), 21
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and gender barriers’, with Belchem asserting that in the workplace the
70  *‘unbridgeable division was not sectarian, but sexual’. Despite this debate 
concerning the extent of sectarian discrimination in the local labour market, 
the principal arena of ‘communal strife’ and sectarian collective action in 
Liverpool remained the volatile ‘community of the street’.
In the dock labour market there were opportunities for sectarianism to 
permeate the largely informal ‘established practises’ and ‘customary rules’, 
governing working conditions with these serving as a defence against 
‘excessive labour effort, speed-up and overwork’.71 It was these traditional 
codes and practises which were threatened by the Irish who were prepared to 
work ‘hard and fast’, for relatively low pay.72
However, with the transition from sail to steam, ‘specialist ability’ was 
at ‘least as important as sectarian allegiance’ in the dock labour market, whilst 
the culture of the ‘work gang’ was capable of mitigating the worst aspects of 
sectarianism, producing a ‘community of work’ strong enough to override 
‘divisions of skill, ethnicity, and religion, if not gender’.73
It is difficult to determine to what extent the ‘folk memory’ of a 
predominantly Catholic North End and a Protestant South End, was related to 
the fact the Irish were prepared to work longer hours and accept the faster 
pace of operations in the large steamship sector in the North End. On the 
other hand, early forms of labour organisation, which in Lovell’s words 
represented an ‘expression of pre-existing sectional (and possibly sectarian) 
solidarities’ may have been a significant factor in this configuration. These 
organisations successfully implanted in the South End, in the process 
maximising the observance of ‘traditional regulatory practises’.74 However, as 
many historians have argued, working class institutions like Trades Unions, 
Friendly Societies and the Co-operative movement were weak and confined to
70 see Smith, ‘Labour Tradition’, History Workshop Journal 17 (Spring, 
1984), 49 & Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 7
71 Bean, ‘Custom, Job Regulation and Dock Labour’, International Review of 
Social History VoLXXVl 1 (1982, Part3), 273
7 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 9
73 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 7,9
74 Lovell, ‘Sail, Steam and Emergent Dockers Unionism’, International 
Review of Social History VoLXXXl 1 (1987), 234,246
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a small minority in Liverpool. This left ample room for alternative forms of 
invariably sectarian popular organisation.75
The extent to which economic factors influenced sectarianism and the 
degree to which sectarian practises permeated the labour market remain highly 
contentious. However, the culture of casualism with its irregularity and 
uncertainty of employment, heavy job competition, coupled with periods of 
under and un-employment, comparatively low pay and absence of extensive 
labour organisation contributed to the attractiveness of sectarian based 
associational culture and everything it offered in terms of social, recreational, 
political, ideological and practical opportunities. Many casual workers would 
have been members of, or counted amongst the ’hangers-on’, of Protestant 
organisations, attracted by street preachers like Wise. They comprised the 
bedrock of his ‘personal empire’ and the vaunted ‘Protestant Democracy’.
Consequently, it will be argued that the principal arena of sectarian 
conflict in Liverpool was not the economic sphere, but the ‘community of the 
street’. This arena has been explicitly identified by Eric Taplin, whilst 
Belchem argued that the strength and appeal o f sectarianism ‘lay outside 
work, in the provision of positive and attractive forms of political and 
associational culture’.76 This reality had a significant impact not only upon the 
composition of Protestant political and associational culture, but also helped 
shape the character of popular sectarianism in the city.
75 see Taplin on Neal, International Labour and Working Class History 37 
(Spring, 1990), 95; Smith, ‘Labour Tradition’, History Workshop Journal 17 
(Spring, 1984), 47; Shallice, ‘Orange and Green and Militancy’, Bulletin 
North-West Labour History Documents 6 (1979-80), 15 & Belchem, ‘The 
Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 9
76 Taplin on Neal, International Labour and Working Class History 37 
(Spring, 1990), 96 & Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 7
98
RESIDENTIAL CONCENTRATION AND SEGREGATION.
The Evolution of Patterns of Residential Concentration and Residential 
Segregation.
A significant factor in the evolution of sectarianism in Liverpool was, in 
Belchem’s words, ‘social geography’ involving ‘fierce border disputes over 
contested territory’.77 A number of historians argued that both a considerable 
degree of residential concentration and dispersal characterised the Irish in 
Liverpool. As early as 1841, Papworth identified seven wards, adjacent to the 
docks, principally in the North and West of the city in which Irish-born 
immigrants concentrated. Under the pressure of Famine migration Papworth 
identified the areas of high Irish concentration after 1851 as situated in the 
docks to the North and South of the town centre, with a major cluster 
stretching from the centre outwards through Exchange, Vauxhall and Scotland 
wards. Papworth calculated that approximately 50 per cent of the Irish-born 
settled in these ‘high-density’ districts, with a further 50 per cent settling in 
areas of medium and low concentration like St.Annes and the two Toxteth
7flwards. Pooley argued much of this residential patterning can be explained by 
socio-economic factors related to housing, family composition and social
7 7  _ .Belchem ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’* 15 It is important to distinguish 
between ‘concentration’ and ‘segregation’. Residential ‘concentration’ was 
primarily related to socio-economic factors, with Dennis (Dennis, English 
Industrial Cities of the Nineteenth Century. 230) arguing that ‘much of the 
explanation of Irish residential patterns must lie in their socio-economic 
status’ (Pooley’s correlation between ethnicity, socio-economic status and 
housing) whilst ‘segregation’ was more of a social and cultural phenomena, 
with Pooley (Pooley, ‘Segregation or Integration?’, 79) arguing that this 
should be related to the ‘likelihood of intermixing on a daily basis’. 
Residential ‘concentration’ and ‘segregation’ also needs to be related to scale. 
Pooley (79) argues that, although the Irish in Liverpool experienced both 
concentration and dispersal, the scale of the Irish unskilled community ‘gave 
more opportunity to withdraw into an Irish residential area’, whilst, in relation 
to the ‘host community’, Papworth (J.D.Papworth, The Irish in Liverpool.
1853-71: Family Structure and Residential Mobility. (PhD Thesis, Univ.of 
Liverpool, 1982) asserts, that at the ‘street level’, the perception of the Irish 
presence may have been alarming’.
8 Graham Davis, ‘Little Ireland’s’, in Swift and Gilley, eds, The Irish in 
Britain. 111-14
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status. From his analysis of household heads in 1871 Pooley discovered that 
the predominant unskilled and semi-skilled Irish, like other poor families, 
were concentrated in the run-down, inner-city areas, where low-cost housing 
was readily available. On the other hand, amongst the Irish in skilled and 
white-collar occupations the tendency was towards dispersal into middle class 
neighbourhoods.79 Overall, Pooley calculated that during 1851-71 Liverpool 
had a comparatively low index of Irish segregation, well below that of 
Belfast.80
Despite comparatively low levels of residential segregation, Catholic 
and Protestant areas were evident throughout the period. The evolution of 
these distinctive areas, in Pooley’s analysis, should be related to social and 
cultural factors reinforcing socio-economic concentration. The development 
of extensive associational networks, the presence of partisan organisations like 
the Orange Order and activities of Protestant street preachers, provided the 
social and cultural ingredients contributing to the establishment of sectarian 
‘territory’. ‘Territory’ was integral to the activities of organisations and 
personalities associated with the ‘Protestant Democracy’. The development of 
this force and the primacy of the ‘community of the street’ will be related to 
additional social and political developments in subsequent chapters.
Territory
There is considerable contention amongst historians as to whether the 
degree of residential concentration evident amongst the Irish in Liverpool 
warrants the description ‘ghetto’ or ‘colony’. Papworth concluded these terms 
did not apply, whilst Pooley and Dennis argued that the Irish did occupy a 
‘ghetto’ with the latter stating that this formed a ‘distinctive and extensive
oi m
area’. What is clear is that whole areas were ‘recognised’ as belonging to 
either Irish or other religious and ethnic factions and that these areas 
effectively constituted their ‘territory’.
79 Pooley, ‘Segregation or Integration?’, 75-79
80 Dennis, English Industrial Cities of the Nineteenth Century. 224
81 Davis, ‘Little Irelands’, 114 & Dennis, English Industrial Cities of the 
Nineteenth Century. 246
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In the case of the Catholic-Irish Shallice traced their ‘territory’ by 
identifying the principal areas of strength of the Irish Nationalist Party (INP). 
The two Scotland wards, comprising Vauxhall and Sandhills and Brunswick, 
represented areas of ‘total strength’, whilst the I.N.P. exercised considerable 
influence in the StAnnes and Great George wards. All of these were close by 
the docks, sandwiched between the heights of Everton and the Mersey.82By 
the end of the nineteenth century the principal dividing line between Catholic 
and Protestant ‘territory’ in the North End was Great Homer Street, with 
Catholics concentrated to the West of this area. In 1902, the Head Constable 
observed that Liverpool had ‘distinct Roman Catholic and Orange quarters’.83
The role of Protestant organisations and personalities in demarcating and 
defining ‘territory’ is illustrated by the fact that whole areas were identified 
with the Orange Order or the leading Protestant street preacher, George Wise. 
The principal militant Protestant concentration in the North End, by the end of 
the Nineteenth Century, was to the North of Netherfield Road. The primary 
areas of Orange concentration provide a good indication of militant Protestant 
strength. By 1885 the main Orange areas were Kirkdale, Everton and 
Toxteth. Kirkdale, an Ulster Protestant area, was the location of Wise’s 
‘personal empire’; Wise described Everton as over 90 per cent Protestant.
The Order also had a considerable presence in Kensington and Garston and to 
a lesser extent over the water in Wallasey and Birkenhead. A further 
indication of the strength of militant Protestantism is illustrated by support for 
the National Protestant Electoral Federation (N.P.E.F) during 1903-05, when 
Independent Protestant councillors were elected in Kirkdale, St.Domingo and 
Netherfield. All these were described by Shallice as ‘solid working class 
areas and...being notably Orange...up to the Second World War’.84 The 
N.P.E.F also won Garston, in the South of the city, which was the base of 
Louis Ewart, the regional leader of the Kensit Crusade and just missed out on 
the working class, Orange area of Breckfield in Everton. ‘Territory’ was also
82 Shallice, ‘Orange and Green and Militancy’, Bulletin N.W.L.H. Documents 
6 (1979-80), 21
83 HQ144/659/V36777/182. Dunning to Under Secretary of State, Home 
Office, 15/11/1902
84 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 200 & Shallice, ‘Orange and Green 
and Militancy’, Bulletin N.W.L.H. Documents 6 (1979-80), 18
101
the basis of the ‘personal empires’ established by rival ‘community leaders’ 
like Wise, Ewart and Albert Stones who operated in the South End. The 
establishment of these bases after 1900 was symptomatic of the fragmentation 
and devolution of power and leadership over the ‘Protestant Democracy’.
Such leadership was established and affirmed at street level involving the 
fermenting of sectarian tension and violence.
The Contribution o f‘Territory’ to Sectarian Strife.
The ‘community of the street’, with its associated ‘territory’, was pivotal 
in the establishment and validation of local leadership over the ‘Protestant 
Democracy’ and was the location for the assertion of the latter’s social and 
political influence. It also played a crucial role in the activities of the city’s 
Protestant culture. Dunning stated in 1909 that ‘street demonstrations of 
adherence to this or that form of religious belief are much to be deprecated in 
Liverpool, where they are often understood to, and occasionally meant to, 
express antipathy to some other form of religion rather than sympathy for that 
professed by those who take part in them’.85 The establishment and denial of 
‘territory’, particularly during a period like 1909, was linked to a wider 
struggle for symbolic control of the city. Consequently, there were distinct 
Catholic and Protestant areas identifiable, with these ‘enclaves’ playing a 
prominent role in the sectarian violence that erupted. The Commissioner’ s 
Report into the 1909 riots concluded ‘the predisposing cause of these 
disturbances is to be found in the fact that Roman Catholics and Protestants 
living in neighbouring districts, which imperceptibly shade into one another, 
are alike animated and at times dominated, by intense sectarian feeling’.
Direct incursions into ‘enemy’ territory were ‘comparatively rare and 
generally ill*advised’.87 ‘Territory’ was also a feature of sectarian ritual, with 
the processions of Wise’s Men’s Bible Class around Kirkdale and Everton 
described as an assertion of Protestant ‘strength’ and ‘territoriality’. Shallice 
argued that one function of Protestant and Orange marches was to serve as a
85 HQ45/11138. Dunning 17/05/1909
86 HO144/1050. Commissioner’s Report, 1909,63
87 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 16
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‘physical designation of the geographical extent...of the community’.88 There 
was also a territorial dimension to major sectarian riots, like those duringl909, 
which are dealt with extensively in subsequent chapters. The spark usually 
occurred in ‘neutral’ territory along a parade route. In the case of the Catholic 
Holy Cross procession of Sunday 09th May, this was the main thoroughfares 
of Dale Street and Byrom Street, near StGeorges Hall. In relation to the 
Catholic St Joseph’s procession of Sunday 20th June it was Juvenal Street, at 
the border between the Catholic Scotland ward and Protestant Netherfield.
However, repercussions were directed against ‘outsiders’ within 
territorial boundaries. In the aftermath of the St. Joseph’s procession, Father 
Fitzgerald of Our Lady the Immaculate parish reported how its 5,500 strong 
Catholic congregation, plus those around All Souls and St.Anthony’s, bore the 
brunt of the Protestant backlash in Everton. These riots were characterised by 
the exodus and expulsion of ‘outsiders’ from both communities, with Neal 
observing that ‘the position of Catholics and Protestants alike who found 
themselves a minority in a street or neighbourhood became dangerous’ and 
many either chose or were forced to flee.89
THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECTARIANISM IN 
LIVERPOOL PRIOR TO 1880.
Sectarianism entered the political arena from the 1830’s. One of the 
principal architects was the Anglican Reverend Hugh McNeile, part of 
Liverpool’s brigade of immigrant Ulster pastors. A wealthy scholar and 
theologian with oratorical powers and political acumen, McNeile expressed a 
vehement hatred of Ritualism in the Church of England and Roman 
Catholicism, alongside pronounced anti-Irish sensibilities. He was a strong 
anti-reformer and protectionist, who in Belchem’s words ‘combined biblical 
scholarship with populist political rhethoric’.90 This ‘demagogue’ conceived 
the slogan ‘No Popery’ in order to protect the Tory-Anglican establishment
88 Shallice, ‘Orange and Green and Militancy’, Bulletin N.W.L.H. Documents 
6(1979-80), 24
89 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 231
90 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 10
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and the ‘marginal privilege’ of the local Protestant working class. During his 
‘No Popery’ campaign of 1841-52 McNeile was influential in swaying this 
class, both Anglican and Nonconformist, behind the Tories, emphasising the 
threat to freedom posed by ‘tyrannical Catholicism and its misguided ally, 
radical dissent, with its dangerous manifesto of ‘liberal’ reform and free 
trade’.91Ironically, Wise would later, via the anti-Ritualist ‘crusade’, tap into 
the same anti-Catholicism. However, in Wise’s hands, anti-Ritualism did not 
reinforce the Tory-Anglican establishment, but was increasingly utilised to 
criticise and undermine it, in the process witnessing the evolution of the
cyy‘Protestant Democracy’ into an autonomous ‘grassroots’ force.
When the Tories gained control of Liverpool council in 1842,
McNeile’s message was compatible with Tory attempts to consolidate their 
hegemony, particularly during the mass Irish influx. They sought to achieve 
this by associating themselves with the defence of ‘local interests’, militant 
Protestantism and the preservation of the Constitution and the established 
Churches in Britain and Ireland. During 1880-1921 there occurred tension 
and disparity between the ‘Protestant Democracy’s conception of traditional 
‘Constitutional’ Conservatism, the bulwark of the Reformation, and the 
contemporary party. The campaign against Ritualism with its emphasis upon 
‘principle before politics’ exposed and exacerbated these underlying tensions, 
culminating in open revolt. Another component of establishing local 
hegemony was the Tories’ courting of the Orange Order, the Order being 
‘appropriated and amplified by the local establishment’, and incorporated into 
the ‘Tory narrative of religious and constitutional freedom’.93 These new 
alignments were reflected in the makeup of Liverpool Conservatism, with 
McNeile’s largely working class Operative Protestant Association and the 
rejuvenated Orange Order co-existing alongside a ‘panoply’ of local Tory 
organisations, including the Operative Conservative Association, the 
precursor of the Liverpool Working Men’s Conservative Association 
(L.W.M.C.A). The latter was transformed during the late 1880’s into an 
agency of the ‘democratic’ Conservative forces, as part of the
91 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 11
92 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 12
93 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 10
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‘democratisation’ process within the local Tory ‘political machine’. This 
process, conducted in tandem with the ‘Protestant Democracy’, eventually 
culminated in Salvidge’s brand of Tory Democracy.
Sectarian allegiance was, in Belchem’s words, already a ‘crucial 
determinant in the political arena’, a powerful force which the Tories could 
neither ‘neglect nor infringe without serious electoral consequences’.94 This 
statement was particularly true of the later period, with a growing divergence 
occurring after 1900 between formal Tory Democratic politics and the 
‘politics of the street’ as practised by the ‘Protestant Democracy’.
Another factor in the politicisation of sectarianism was the emergence of 
Irish Nationalism. As early as 1844, the interests of Liverpool’s Catholic- 
Irish were represented within the Liberal minority on the Council by the 
middle class Catholic Club. Subsequent decades witnessed the emergence of 
Home Rule as a political force through such organisations as the Liverpool 
Irish Liberal Association and the Liverpool Home Rule Association 
established around December 1871. Despite the Catholic Club’s opposition to 
a strategy of Home Rule, the first Home Rule councillor was elected in 
Liverpool in November 1875 and five were returned in the municipal 
elections of 1877.95
This proved a watershed. The Catholic Club dropped its opposition to 
Home Rule and an alliance emerged between respectable Home Rulers and 
the Liberals, with Irish Nationalists sitting on the Liberal Executive. This 
identification between Liberalism and Irish Nationalism proved a significant 
factor in swinging the bulk of the Nonconformist working class behind the 
Tories. Other factors included ‘No Popery’ sentiment, a pronounced 
evangelicalism, and Irish job competition. Despite recurrent threats from 
more belligerent Nationalists, such as a secret ‘Fenian wing’ during the 
1870’s, this alliance paved the way for the election of the first mainland Irish 
Nationalist M.P, T.P.O’Connor for the Scotland division in November 1885. 
The Irish Nationalist Party eventually established itself as the principal 
opposition to the Conservatives on the Council after 1900. The growing 
social and political confidence of Liverpool’s Irish Catholic community
94 Belchem, ‘The Peculiarities of Liverpool’, 9,11
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highlighted the inadequacy of existing political arrangements and 
organisation, the ‘Protestant Democracy’ exploring alternative modes of 
collective action to counter this threat. This resulted, in the period after 1900, 
in a sustained upsurge in sectarian violence.
BELFAST.
IMMIGRATION.
Belfast experienced rapid urbanisation, being described by Hepburn and 
Collins as ‘the United Kingdom’s fastest-growing city for much of the 
Nineteenth Century’, with the population increasing from 121,602 at the 
beginning of the 1860’s to 378,000 by 1911.96 By this date Belfast 
represented 31 per cent of the population of the six counties of Ulster and was 
the ninth city in the UK.97 Immigration played a major role in the growth and 
character of Belfast, with Hepburn and Collins observing that the city was in 
1901 ‘a predominantly immigrant town’, with little over a fifth of its 
household heads being city-born.98 Of these immigrants a large number were 
Catholic. In 1800 they represented less than 10 per cent, but following the 
Famine this rose substantially, generating fears amongst Protestants of the 
‘colonialism of the dispossessed’.99 Many were impoverished rural migrants 
attracted by Belfast’s expanding mechanised textile and urban construction 
industries. Consequently, by 1861, Catholics peaked at 33.9 per cent of the 
population, or 41,000 people.100 Whilst this community increased to around
100,000 by 1911, the proportion of Catholics actually declined as a total of 
the population during 1861-1901, representing 24 per cent at the end of this
95 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 185
96 A.C.Hepbum and B.Collins, ‘Industrial Society: The Structure of Belfast, 
1901 ’, in P.Roebuck, ed, Plantation to Partition. Essays in Ulster History in 
Honour of J.L.McCraken. 210
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period.101 This demographic reversal, combined with Protestant growth, was 
intimately linked to the decline in the Catholic proportion of the six counties 
from 41 per cent in 1861 to a relatively stable twentieth century level of 34 
per cent. Hepburn attributes two-thirds of this provincial decline to the 
‘relative loss of numbers in Belfast’, concluding that the city was ‘truly the 
cockpit of community conflict in late Nineteenth Century Ulster’.102 This 
battle for control of Belfast was seen as ‘crucial to the struggle for
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predominance in the province as a whole’. Belfast was not only crucial in 
the demographic struggle within Ulster, but was also of symbolic importance 
to both Unionism and the principal agency of sectarianism, the Orange Order. 
The Belfast Grand Master referred to the city in 1893 as the ‘metropolis of 
Orangeism’.104 With Unionism’s determination to project a ‘respectable’ 
image after the 1886 riots, the maintenance of ‘law and order’ in Belfast 
became of prime importance.105
Catholic demographic decline during the late Nineteenth Century has 
been attributed to a number of factors including entrenched discrimination in 
the key skilled manufacturing sector and the major outbreaks of sectarian 
rioting in 1864,1872 and 1886. After this reversal Belfast’s Catholic 
population stabilised and remained fairly consistent throughout the period, 
constituting less than a quarter of the population by 1911.106
Despite the Catholic influx, Belfast conformed to the general Irish trend, 
whereby ‘most of the expanding industrial towns became more 
Protestant’. 107The principal origin of migrants was Belfast’s vast,
101 Sybil Gribbon, ‘An Irish City: Belfast 1911’, in David Harkness & Mary 
O’Dowd, eds, The Town in Ireland. 215 & Hepburn Sc Collins, ‘Industrial 
Society’, 228,211
102 Hepburn, ‘Catholics in the North of Ireland’, 85
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104 Belfast News Letter. 20 February 1893
105 Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism. The Formation of Popular 
Protestant Politics and Ideology in Nineteenth Century Ireland. 137-8 argues 
that Ulster Unionism was ‘heavily weighted towards die urban Ulsterman. 
The Ulster it glorified was Belfast and the modernity it used as a symbol was 
confined to that city’.
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overwhelmingly Protestant, East Ulster hinterland of Antrim and Down.108 
Gribbon argued that ‘methods had...been applied in Nineteenth Century 
Belfast to preserve those proportions’ of Protestants in the adjacent territory of 
South Antrim, North Down and North Armagh.109 Consequently, by 1911 
Protestants comprised approximately three-quarters of Belfast’s population 
and over half of Ulster’s.
THE RELIGIOUS CHARACTER OF BELFAST. 1880-1921.
The Catholic Church in Belfast performed many similar functions to its 
counterpart in Liverpool. Fitzpatrick argued that virtually every Irish 
organisation before the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 was political, either in the 
sense of ‘participating in local elections or of professing a political 
programme’.110 These organisations tended to be aligned with one of three 
principal political configurations, classified as pre-Easter Rising (January 
1916) Orthodox nationalism, or the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP); post- 
Rising (January 1919) Orthodox nationalism, or Sinn Fein and pre-Rising 
Heterodox nationalism, centred around William O’Brien’s ‘All for Ireland 
League’ (AFIL) formed in March 1910. As well as functioning as ‘political 
schools’, instilling the ‘nationalist gospel’ amongst the men of violence and 
electoral uniformity amongst the Catholic electorate, these organisations 
fulfilled other tasks. In Fitzpatrick’s words, participation ‘was the only path 
towards local and political office and one of the paths towards higher social 
status and towards the remedy of grievances’.111
The principal group of Nationalist organisations in Ulster were those 
associated with the constitutional nationalism of the IPP. Amongst the most 
important was the United Irish League (UIL), which superceded the (October 
1882) Irish National League (INL) in the period after 1898. The UIL was 
conceived as a means of ‘extending the political influence of the middle class 
over the whole country’ but was transformed into a ‘political machine’ or the
108 Hepburn & Collins, ‘Industrial Society’, 220
109 Gribbon, ‘An Irish City’, 213
110 David Fitzpatrick, ‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism, 1910-21’, Past 
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‘National Organisation’ of the IPP.112 Ulster Catholics, including the clergy, 
were prominent in the UIL and Joseph Devlin, M.P for West Belfast and 
secretary of the UIL in the city, was an influential figure within the IPP.113
Another prominent organisation affiliated to the IPP was the Ancient 
Order of Hibernians (AOH). Dominated by the Church, the A.O.H. was 
regarded as a ‘real asset...in its struggle for survival against powerful and 
ruthless enemies’. It also constituted the means by which Ulster’s Catholics 
progressively gained control over the official Nationalist organisation.114
Although Republicanism did implant in Ulster, Fitzpatrick asserts that 
‘Republican bodies were at their weakest’ in the province, with Sinn Fein 
mustering only a membership of 25 per 10,000 of Belfast’s population by 
January 1919.115 Other affiliated bodies were also comparatively weak. This 
weakness has been attributed to the continued strength of constitutional 
Nationalism amongst Northern Catholics.116 Overall, Irish Nationalism, in 
terms of its organisational strength, was weakest in Ulster (particularly Belfast 
and Antrim). This could be explained by the presence of a hostile Unionist 
majority and because urban Nationalism was generally ‘less efficiently 
organised and disciplined than rural Nationalism’.117
111 Fitzpatrick, ‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism, 1910-21 127
112 Erich Strauss, Irish Nationalism and British Democracy. 214 & Fitzpatrick, 
‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism’, Past and Present 78,127
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115 Fitzpatrick, ‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism’, Past and Present 78, 
128,138
116 Fitzpatrick, ‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism’, 128
117 Fitzpatrick, ‘The Geography of Irish Nationalism’, 124 Fitzpatrick argues 
that orthodox nationalism (I.P.P., pre-1918; Sinn Fein, post 1918) was 
'surprisingly unsuccessful in eliciting displays of electoral unanimity from 
those Irish voters offered a choice of candidates’. He observed that the 
‘strength of orthodoxy’ was least in Ulster, whilst Paul Bew suggested that 
Belfast Catholics were possibly ‘less intransigent than their rural 
counterparts’.
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THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF BELFAST.
A number of historians have emphasised the central importance of 
Belfast’s economic development upon sectarianism and Ulster Unionism. In 
relation to the early 1880’s Gibbon argued that in metropolitan Ulster a 
relationship developed between the Conservative bourgeoisie and ‘labour- 
aristocratic Orangeism’, predicated upon an appeal ‘to the necessity of Belfast 
business representation at the heart of the imperialist state’.118 This 
bourgeoisie is central to Gibbon’s analysis and understanding of the evolution 
of Unionism. Similarly, Bell argued in relation to the Third Home Rule crisis 
that Sir James Craig used Unionism to ‘defend the economic and political 
supremacy of Belfast’s industrial bourgeoisie’. He states that the Orange 
Order, controlled by the Unionist establishment, was utilised to provide a 
‘social service’ for the Protestant worker, helping to prevent the ‘emergence 
of a class consciousness’.119 Although Gibbon acknowledges the ‘fundamental 
structural weakness’ of the expedient alliance that was Unionism, he fails to 
emphasise, within the context of the coalition, the profound denominational 
and political divisions within the Protestant bourgeoisie.120 He underestimates 
the contribution of the Liberal-Presbyterians to the political, ideological and 
organisational development of Unionism, particularly their hostile attitude 
towards explicit sectarianism and the Order. Alongside denominational 
divisions Buckland identified ‘class and economic rivalries and political 
division’, as constituting the principal threats to the cohesion of Unionism.121 
Whilst historians like Bell have depicted the Order as a pliant tool in the 
hands of the local bourgeoisie, determined to forge an ‘all-class alliance’, 
Patterson convincingly argued that Orange ideology ‘provided the main 
categories by which certain limited forms of class conflict could be 
expressed’.122 The convergence between this ‘Independent’ Orange strand and
118 Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism. 119
119 Geoffrey Bell, The Protestants of Ulster. 38, 88
120 Gibbon, The Origin of Ulster Unionism. 138
121 Patrick Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two. 22
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militant Protestantism in the period after the defeat of the Second Home Rule 
bill posed the greatest threat to Unionism’s ‘respectable’ united front and 
heralded the possible evolution of a movement akin to the increasingly 
autonomous and confrontational ‘Protestant Democracy’ in Liverpool.
Belfast’s economic prosperity relied primarily upon linen, textiles, 
shipbuilding and engineering. Gibbon identified two main phases of 
industrialisation, with the first revolving around mechanised textile 
manufacturing, particularly after 1850, and the second post-1860 phase 
involving capital-intensive industry123 in the form of shipbuilding and 
engineering, with the yards experiencing continuous expansion up until 
1914.124
The development of shipbuilding, particularly Harland and Wolff, was 
initially dependent upon the ‘incorporation of the Ulster economy into Britain 
on an equal footing’, with the attraction of capital and labour from other parts 
of the UK. By 1900, shipbuilding had ‘outgrown dependence for marketing 
purposes on the UK’, but still remained conspicuously dependent upon 
mainland Britain in terms of large-scale credit and for its technological 
base.125
These industrial sectors dominated its labour market By 1901 almost 
half the adult male population was employed in shipbuilding and engineering 
and linen and the textile finishing trades.126 Shipyard workers were regarded 
as Belfast’s ‘labour aristocracy’, with a quarter of the male labour force being 
absorbed by the industry by 1915.127 The yards employed 5000 men by 1886,
10 Sand 20,000 by 1914. These skilled tradesmen and their apprentices 
experienced both an ‘extremely high degree of material independence’ and a 
considerable degree of autonomy from their employers. Gibbon argued the 
shipyard provided an environment of ‘culture-building’ fostering an ideology 
of independence. However, the fortunes of most shipyard workers were
123 Peter Gibbon, The Origin of Ulster Unionism. 106
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inextricably tied not ‘simply to the...fluctuations of particular trades but to the 
state of British capitalism internationally’.129 Despite these fluctuations by 
1887 the shipwrights, known as the ‘Islandmen’ (after Queen’s Island where 
they worked), were regarded as the ‘strongest, healthiest and most highly 
intelligent and highly paid body of men in the whole of Belfast’.130
Catholics were heavily under-represented in the important 
manufacturing sector, particularly in engineering, shipbuilding and iron- 
working, declining as a percentage of shipyard workers from over 11% in 
1881, to 7% by 1901.131 This decline was pronounced amongst groups like 
the carpenters and fitters from 1881, with Catholics also being under­
represented amongst shipwrights, shipbuilders, and engine and machine 
makers.132 In contrast Protestants were heavily concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector, especially in the primarily skilled, engineering, 
shipbuilding and iron subdivision.133 This key sector was crucial in relation to 
the establishment of both relative Protestant advantage and relative Catholic 
deprivation in the local labour market.
Linen and textiles was the largest industrial employer, with a workforce 
fluctuating between 20,000-50,000.134 Despite the encroachment of 
shipbuilding and engineering, the textile sector remained the largest employer 
of industrial male labour in 1871 the majority of these concentrated in skilled 
grades. The industry was also a substantial employer of female labour, with 
the ratio of adult women to adult men in the trade being 3 to 1.135 Most 
textile workers were poorly paid particularly those engaged in out-work with 
average wages in 1877 being between a quarter and a third of those in the 
shipyards.136
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Other important components of Belfast’s economy included 
construction, printing and waterfront-related industries. Between 1860-1914 
the port experienced a five fold multiplication in tonnage with the docks 
employing over 3,000 by 1907.137
Industrial Male Distribution bv Religion (Male household heads %)
Occupation Roman Catholic Other
Denominations
Construction 9 9
Manufacture 33 41
(a)engineering, 
shipbuilding, iron
9 16
(b)textiles an dress 12 14
Transport 10 9
Commerce 12 8
Financial Services 2 5
General Labourers 22 14
Public service, 
Professional
8 6
Independent 1 1
Other 3 7
Source: A.C.Hepbum & B.Collins, ‘Industrial Society: The Structure of 
Belfast, 1901 ’, in P.Roebuck, ed, Plantation to Partition. Essavs in Ulster 
History in Honour of J.L.McCraken. Belfast, Blackstaff Press, 1981,225
In terms of overall structural patterns, Hepburn and Collins argued that 
by 1901 Protestants had established a relatively advantageous position in the 
local labour market, whilst Catholics were relatively disadvantaged in terms 
of social class in the local context. They concluded that ‘relative 
deprivation...was clearly an important feature of the situation’.138
137 Gribbon, ‘An Irish City’, 215
138 Hepburn & Collins, ‘Industrial Society’, 226
113
Social Class bv Religion in Belfast 1901 
(Male household heads %)
Classes Roman Other Great
(Census) Catholic Denominations Britain 1911.*
1 & 11 13 13 15
11 IN 8 12 7
h i m 31 35 33
IV & v 44 36 45
Not 4 4 -
Classified
Sources: A.C.Hepbum & B.Collins, ‘Industrial Society: The Structure 
of Belfast, 1901’, in P.Roebuck, ed, Plantation to Partition. Essays in Ulster 
History in Honour of J.L.McCraken. 225-226 Hepburn & Collins constructed 
their categories, along ‘roughly comparable’ lines to those employed by the 
British Census Commissioners in 1911. Classes 1 and 2 include 
professionals, higher public servants, businessmen and managers; Class 111 is 
divided into non-manual (lower white collar) workers, and manual (skilled) 
workers; Class IV refers to semi-skilled jobs, such as those not requiring an 
apprenticeship; and Class V includes unskilled and casual workers. About 
half the unclassified categoiy, both Catholics and Protestants consisted of 
members of the armed forces. * G.Routh, Occupations and Pay in Great 
Britain. 1906-60. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ.Press,1965,4-5
Unlike Liverpool there is convincing evidence to support Hepburn’s 
assertion that sectarian discrimination was widespread in the Belfast labour 
market during 1850-1921.139 The shipyards were a ‘Protestant preserve’, with 
a ‘strong sectarian group consciousness’. Those who worked in them were 
regarded as ‘militant partisans’, who from the sectarian riots of 1857 had been 
identified as the vanguard of the Protestant rioters.140 These workers believed 
they had a ‘special obligation’ to act as an ‘expeditionary vanguard, making 
periodic pre-emptive interventions’ in order to ‘regulate the balance of 
embattlement’ on behalf of the Protestant community.141 According to 
Patterson, one method of ensuring a virtually Protestant labour force in the
139 Hepburn, ‘Catholics in the North of Ireland’, 88
140 Patterson, Class Conflict and Sectarianism. XVI1
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shipyards and other industries was via the manipulation of established 
methods of self-regulation and exclusion employed by craft unions.142 This 
practise reinforced existing patterns of structural inequality evident in the 
labour market. Skilled metal workers (iron moulders, boilermakers, 
engineers) formed craft unions during the first half of the nineteenth century 
and Unions consolidated their position during the second half of the century in 
shipbuilding and engineering, building and printing.143
The Orange Order was also active in the economic sphere from as early 
as 1858, with many lodges acting as trade associations.144 By 1889 there were 
six Orange Labourer’s Lodges with a total membership of 259.145 The 
masters of these lodges tended to be foremen, hirers and firers of labour, 
possessing the ability to ‘detect job applicants of the wrong persuasion or to 
put them at the top of the list for redundancy’.146 Those lodges associated with 
skilled trades tended to be political and ideological as opposed to purely 
economic in character, complementing existing methods of craft regulation, 
with a concrete ideology of sectarian exclusion.147
In trades unprotected by craft unions the Labourers Lodges acted as an 
alternative or substitute mechanism of exclusion and as a potential avenue of
1 A ftpatronage for Protestant workers. Although comparatively small in 
numerical terms, the impact of Orange, particularly ‘Independent’ Orange, 
ideology upon the Protestant working class was significant, extending to the 
employees of Liberal capitalists such as the linen barons Grimshaw, Ross and 
Barbour, and the shipbuilder Thomas McClure.149
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Protestant workers were also not averse to resorting to direct-action, 
usually during times of political crisis. The employment of expulsions and 
rioting by the Protestant working class during 1886 not only generated debate 
within the coalition as to the character of Unionism, but also about the 
movement’s relationship to the principal Protestant proletarian idiom the 
Orange Order. Concerned about both the threat posed to the unity of the 
coalition and about Unionism’s image as a ‘respectable’ political movement, a 
growing consensus evolved around the desirability of containing Orange 
‘excesses’, exercising some degree of control over the Order. Subsequent 
Unionist political and organisational initiatives came into conflict not only 
with the strategic ‘Islandmen’s role as a Protestant ‘expeditionary vanguard’ 
but also with the Order’s self-appointed ‘policing’ function on behalf of the 
Protestant community. Unlike the devolution and fragmentation of power and 
influence over the ‘Protestant Democracy’ in Liverpool, Belfast’s Unionist 
establishment realised if they could contain and integrate the Order, they 
would have a good chance of circumscribing its ‘excesses’, and minimising its 
public profile. In Gibbon’s words, they could deny potential opponents the 
‘most potent local proletarian idiom’.150 However, this strategy did not always 
succeed.
Political crises and the accompanying riots provided a pretext for the 
expulsion of Catholics and other ‘undesirables’ (mainly ‘rotten Prods’) from 
the workplace. These expulsions characterised shipbuilding and engineering. 
The first occurred at Harland and W olffs against the backdrop of the first 
Home Rule Bill, the perpetrators being unskilled Protestant rivet-heaters. Of 
the 225 Catholics employed by the firm in 1886, (out of a total workforce of 
over 3000) 190 were expelled.151 Similar actions followed in 1912 during the 
mobilisations against the Third Home Rule Bill and in July 1920, when over
8,000 were expelled in a week from across the city’s principle industries.152
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This latter mass expulsion was in response to the Fourth Home Rule Bill, and 
the Anglo-Irish war of January 1919 to November 1921.
RESIDENTIAL CONCENTRATION AND SEGREGATION
The Evolution of Patterns of Residential Concentration and Segregation.
Despite Belfast experiencing a higher degree of residential segregation 
than Liverpool, and witnessing up until 1886 ‘endemic sectarian rioting’, 
Ulster Unionism proved more successful at limiting street disturbances than 
its Tory counterpart in Liverpool. Whilst the community of the street, with its 
collective violence, predominated in Liverpool the opposite became true of 
Belfast. The riots of 1886 were interpreted as a political liability in terms of 
both Unionism’s public image and its efforts to preserve the ‘unity’ of the 
fragile coalition. Over the ensuing years Unionism attempted to co-opt, 
integrate and contain the proletarian Order, the principal protagonist in street 
violence. It developed elaborate methods and structures to ‘police’ Orange 
support and to draw popular Protestant activity away from street 
confrontation.
Gibbon identified another factor enabling Unionism to limit 
disturbances. He identified a transition in the location and character of the 
1886 riots. The focus of these riots had shifted away from the Sandy-Row- 
Pound ‘shatter-zone’, characterised by ‘ritualised territorial skirmishing’ akin 
to Liverpool, to the Shankill, home to Belfast’s ‘labour aristocracy’ the 
shipyard workers. In the Shankill political and economic as opposed to 
territorial factors were more important in precipitating riots, with confessional 
boundaries becoming ‘generalised, even secularised’. As stated, the strategic 
‘Islandmen’, who employed the Order as a mobilisational device, were at the 
vanguard of these riots.153 Consequently, with the diminuition of the territorial 
dimension and the rise of economic and political factors, anyone establishing 
power and influence over the Order and through it, the elite ‘Islandmen’ could 
exercise a semblance of restraint, minimising the risk of spontaneous
153 Gibbon, The Origin of Ulster Unionism. 69-70, 78-79
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‘excesses’. In Liverpool this capacity for centralised control was severely 
inhibited by the growing fragmentation and devolution of power after 1900, a 
period which witnessed the worst outbreaks of sectarian violence.
Hepburn and Collins’, analysis of thirty-four District Electoral Divisions 
(D.E.D’s) in 1901, provides a comprehensive picture of concentration and 
segregation in Belfast (see figure l) .154 Employing the Dissimilarity Index 
(DI) to measure residential segregation, a picture similar to that of Liverpool 
emerges, with differing degrees of Catholic concentration and dispersal (see 
figure 2). Of the nine most highly segregated D.E.D’s, seven were located in 
the West of the city, six, including the highest five, being predominantly 
Catholic. These districts included part of the Lower Falls, the old Pound area 
of Smithfield (also in the West) and the Ardoyne district of Clifton in the 
North-West. The most highly concentrated Catholic streets (91-100 per cent 
Catholic) within these areas were inhabited by the semi-skilled, the unskilled 
and the skilled manual working class, illustrating, as in Liverpool, the added 
importance of socio-economic factors upon residential patterning.
By 1901, taking the street as the ‘most meaningful unit of 
measurement’, overall Belfast had a high (in comparison with the rest of the 
U.K) DI of 65.7. Consequently, as Hepburn and Collins point out, ‘residential 
segregation of the Catholic and Protestant communities was...a dominant 
feature of life in Belfast’.155
154 Hepburn & Collins, ‘Industrial Society’, 212,215,227 The Dissimilarity 
Index (DI) employed a scale of 0 to 100, with 100 representing a city where 
no unit (i.e. the street) ‘contained any mixing of the two communities* and a 
minimum of zero where every street reflected the ‘overall city-wide 
proportion of one community to the other’.
55 Hepburn & Collins, ‘Industrial Society’, 215
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Territory.
As in Liverpool, the territorial strength of the Catholic and Protestant 
communities were centred on the proletarian quarters of Belfast. The 
principal Catholic enclave, constructed in the 1840’s to serve the linen 
industry, was the Pound, which evolved into the lower Falls area of West 
Belfast, the pre-eminent source of support for Irish Nationalism. The New 
Lodge Road area of North Belfast constructed in the 1870’s was initially 
mixed in character, but later emerged as a Catholic enclave.
The working class Sandy Row district of South Belfast built adjacent to 
the Pound in the 1840’s, was a centre of linen production and an area of 
Protestant strength, being mainly Episcopalian in composition. Other 
Protestant districts included the Presbyterian York Street area of North Belfast 
(1840’s) and the Shankill and Ballymacarret districts (1870’s). The Shankill, 
in North Belfast, was described as ‘distinctly Protestant’ and home to shipyard 
workers.156 During the 1890’s many of these elite workers moved to the 
mainly Protestant district of Ballymacarret, located in East Belfast near to the 
shipyards. As in Liverpool there were very distinct Protestant and Catholic 
areas of tightly-knit residential ‘territory’.
The Contribution of Territory to Sectarian Strife.
This social geography was a key component in the sectarian riots that 
erupted, particularly those in 1857 and 1864, centred on Sandy Row. As in 
Liverpool, the principal flash points were areas of ‘contested territory between 
confessional boundaries’ or ‘shatter zones’. These zones were at the 
boundaries of the Sandy Row and Pound districts, such as the contested 
Durham Street and the no-man’s land around Cullingtree Road.157 The 
cumulative impact of these often highly ritualised expulsions of ‘outsiders’ is
156 Gibbon, The Origin of Ulster Unionism. 69
157 Gibbon, The Origin of Ulster Unionism. 69
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revealed by Hepburn, who states that by 1886 Sandy Row and the Pound were 
‘almost exclusively Protestant and Catholic’.158
Gibbon argued the ideology of Protestant ‘insiders’ engaged in 
expulsions in both Sandy Row and to a lesser extent the Shankill, involved a 
‘recognition of the liability of confessional boundaries to porousness and 
contraction and the need to maintain constant vigilance over and where 
possible extend’ those boundaries. Therefore, a ‘sound’ Protestant was one 
who ‘engaged in the activity of extending the sphere of the Protestant- 
Catholic division’.159 Crucially from 1886, the centre of rioting shifted to the 
Shankill. This reflected the increasing influence of the ‘Islandmen’.
Although riots in the Shankill, unlike Sandy Row, were not inspired by 
‘spatial transgressions’, they still had a spatial dimension. These riots were 
usually provoked by a perceived economic and political threat to the 
Protestant community, manifesting themselves less at territorial boundaries, 
but more at the centre of the Shankill directed against the police. Secondary 
riots occurred in ‘confessionally indifferent zones’, like the commercial areas, 
characterised by sectarian faction fighting. Gibbon identified a transition in 
the character of sectarian rioting during this period, noting a ‘progressive 
decline in the localisation of the riot’, particularly from 1886 as rioters found 
more ‘neutral’ targets and sites’.160 Despite this decline in the importance of 
local ‘shatter zones’, Austin Morgan observed that territory was still an 
‘important principle’ of the two communities ‘social organisation’.161 This 
statement is certainly applicable to ‘grassroots’ Protestant organisations like 
the Order and the B.P.A, which operated in the community of the street. 
However, it is less relevant to Unionist organisations, which although 
benefiting from the critical mass of Protestant concentration, attempted to 
shift popular Protestant mobilisation into more disciplined, controlled forms 
of activity.
158 Hepburn, ‘Catholics in the North of Ireland’, 87
159 Gibbon, The Origin of Ulster Unionism. 78-9
160 Gibbon, The Origin of Ulster Unionism. 69-70
161 Morgan, Labour and Partition. 13
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THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SECTARIANISM IN 
BELFAST PRIOR TO 1880.
Sectarianism entered Belfast’s political arena during the 1830’s via the
‘ fundamentalist’ Presbyterian preacher Dr Henry Cooke, described by
10Harbinson as the ‘framer of sectarianism in the politics of Ulster’. O’Leary 
and McGarry argued that Cooke quashed the last vestiges of radicalism and 
liberalism embodied by the ‘new light’ Presbyterian forces which embraced 
the Enlightenment and instead aligned himself with Toryism.163 This 
argument is an over-simplification. Cooke’s militant brand of 
‘fundamentalist’ preaching had a profound legacy upon the Presbyterian 
working class, with many subsequently joining the Episcopalian-Conservative 
dominated Order. During the later period, a common evangelicalism also 
constituted a bridge between Nonconformity and Evangelical Episcopalians, 
largely revolving around a shared fear over the growth of Ritualism in the 
Church of Ireland.164 However, profound denominational tensions between 
Presbyterians and Episcopalians remained on political, ideological and class 
grounds, with these differences impacting upon the long term stability and 
development of Unionism, particularly its relationship to Orangeism and 
explicit sectarianism.
Cooke played the sectarian card at Hillsborough County Down on the 
30th October 1834. He urged Presbyterians to join with the Established 
Episcopalian Church and the Tories to combat the Catholic Emancipation Act
162 John.F.Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party. 1882-1973. Its Development 
and Organisation. 20
163 Brendan O’Leary & John McGarry, Conflict and Change in Britain Series- 
A New Audit. 3. The Politics of Antagonism-Understanding Northern Ireland. 
80
164 Hempton & Hill, Evangelical Protestantism in Ulster Society. 1740-1890. 
184 have argued that evangelicalism ‘helped to build bridges between 
denominations, between clergy and laity, and between Churches and 
voluntary associations’ within the Protestant community.
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of 1829.165 Significantly, he also forged a relationship with the Orange Order 
in the North, the latter assuming ‘more and more a strong and violent anti- 
Catholic attitude’ paralleling Cooke’s teachings.166
The Belfast Conservative Association (BCA) also courted the Order, 
resulting by the 1860’s, in an elaborate system o f‘political brokerage’ which 
governed the relationship between the Protestant working class and the local 
Tory and Orange notables. These Orange brokers were in the direct service of 
local Conservatives and often operated full-time corporation sinecures. For 
their part the Tories unashamedly ‘proclaimed their partisanship for all they 
were worth’. As a consequence of this system Gibbon observed that the 
Orange Order ‘gradually became the main medium for the maintenance of 
political control’ in the city.167
165 This Act had politically emancipated Catholics and enabled them to stand 
for parliamentary and political office.
166Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party. 1882-1973.20
167 Gibbon, The Origin of Ulster Unionism. 97-8
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However, this relationship did not remain unchallenged as witnessed by 
the emergence of Independent Orange political expression during the late 
1860’s. The most important Independent body was the largely skilled 
working class ‘Orange and Protestant Working Men’s Association’ 
(OPWMA), formed in March 1868. This evolved out of popular Protestant 
indignation caused by the imprisonment of William Johnston (the original 
‘fearless Martyr for the Protestant cause’) for violating the provisions of the 
hated Party Processions Act (PPA) of 1832. This was seen as an infringement 
of the ‘Protestant right to march’. The OPWMA was instrumental in securing 
Johnston’s election as an Independent Conservative for Belfast in the General 
Election of November 1868. This same election witnessed the defeat of the 
two Conservative nominees, exposing serious tensions in the Tory-Orange 
alliance. These tensions included the manifestation of a nascent class 
antagonism, articulated through the phraseology of the principled ‘true blue’ 
working class Orangeism of the rank and file, in contrast to the opportunism 
of the upper and middle class supporters of the Order. Patterson refers to this 
process as the ‘domestication of class issues by Orange ideology’.168
To reduce the threat, the local Conservative Association orchestrated an 
amalgamation of the OPWMA and the Conservative Working Men’s 
Association (CWMA) and initiated a ‘ Democratisation’ of the BCA during 
1873-4. The Conservatives acceded to the OPWMA’s precondition for 
amalgamation, the adoption of Johnston as a Conservative candidate for the 
1874 General Election. The BCA also created local ward committees and a 
Central Committee two-thirds of which was proletarian. It also reformed the 
nomination and selection procedure for candidates and cemented its 
institutional relationship with the Orange Order.
Despite this (largely cosmetic) ‘Democratisation’, Independent Orange 
activity, although largely emasculated, did not cease. The OPWMA was to 
support an unsuccessful Independent Conservative in a by-election in 1878 
and the General Election of 1880. Alongside demands for Disraelian-style 
social reform, both the Independent’s campaigns emphasised class-related 
issues, particularly claims for the just representation of the interests of
168 Patterson, Class Conflict and Sectarianism. 6
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Protestant labour, interests perceived to have been usurped by ‘bourgeois 
politicking and disregard for working class interests’.169
Despite the emergence of the Unionist coalition in 1886, tensions 
persisted in the relationship with the Orange Order. Due to the new political 
imperatives confronting the Episcopalian-Conservative establishment and the 
compromises entered into as part of coalition formation, the role and function 
of the Order was increasingly circumscribed. This progressive subordination 
of the Institution aroused growing ‘grassroots’ anger manifesting itself during 
the period after the Second Home Rule bill in a growing alliance between 
‘Independent’ Orange elements and the militant B.P.A centred upon the 
question of Ritualism. This threatened the unravelling of Unionism as an 
organised force. Unlike Liverpool, one of the key determinants in ensuring 
both ‘law and order’ and political stability was Unionism’s ability to both 
appease and integrate the Orange Order.
On the Catholic front an effective form of Irish Nationalist politics 
emerged in Belfast during the 1880’s. Prior to this the political interests of 
working class Catholic areas like the Pound were represented by various 
maverick, but ‘charismatic’ ‘carpet-bagging’ outsiders who in Gibbon’s words 
gained support by ‘threatening to remove the ‘Toiy clique’ with a few sharp 
and well-timed blows’.170 From the 1860’s Catholic politics ‘ceased their 
preoccupation with localistic opposition to Sandy Row and the (Tory) clique 
and became concerned with ethnic issues concerning the relations of Catholics 
and Protestants in general’. This transition resulted in the emergence of 
‘ethnic formal politics’ symbolised by the formation in the early 1880’s of a 
local branch of the Irish National League.171
The Liberals primarily represented the interests of Belfast’s Presbyterian 
community against Episcopalian/Tory domination of parliamentary 
representation in the city. Their efforts (from the mid-1850’s) to recruit 
members of the emergent Catholic middle class, in an attempt to rally working 
class Catholic support, proved largely unsuccessful. Gibbon outlined the 
‘failure of urban Liberalism’ preceding the emergence of Unionism. Despite
169 Patterson, Class Conflict and Sectarianism. 10
170 Gibbon, The Origin of Ulster Unionism. 90
171 Gibbon, The Origin of Ulster Unionism. 91-2
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this position of ‘subordinated integration’, Liberal-Presbyterian influence 
within the coalition was increasingly evident. 172It informed the new 
movement’s relationship to the Order and its sectarian ‘excesses’. It also 
contributed to Unionism’s ideological development, with the downplaying of 
explicit sectarianism and promotion of the ‘liberal-humanitarian’ strand and 
influenced Unionist organisational initiatives.
CONCLUSION.
The themes outlined in this chapter contribute to an understanding of the 
ascendancy of popular sectarian collective violence in Liverpool. During the 
period the city was characterised by a growing fragmentation and devolution 
of power and leadership over the Protestant working class, increasing 
divergence between formal Conservative politics and the politics of the street, 
and the gradual evolution of the Protestant Democracy into a dynamic 
sectarian force. As a consequence of this fracturing in relations between 
Conservatism and popular sectarianism the ‘Protestant Democracy’ became 
the principal agency of belligerent Protestant collective action.
In contrast, during the same period Ulster Unionism, via the creation of 
elaborate political and organisational structures, succeeded in containing and 
controlling popular sectarianism in Belfast. This proved a vital corollary of 
coalition building and of maintaining a ‘respectable’ front in the crucial battle 
of politics and propaganda in relation to Home Rule.
In Liverpool, the community of the street was the principal arena of 
sectarian confrontation with its contested ‘territory’ influencing sectarian 
social and political organisation. It also acted as a catalyst in the periodic 
outbreaks of disorder. An interrelated factor was the disintegration of the 
political relationship established in the earlier period between popular 
sectarianism and the Tory-Anglican establishment, and the subsequent 
divergence and interaction between formal politics and the politics of the 
street culminating in the emergence of the Protestant Democracy. In 
Liverpool political control over the Protestant working class was illusory,
172 Gibbon, The Origin of Ulster Unionism. 87,143
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often devolving to a series of expedient alliances or pragmatic sense of 
common cause. The Protestant working class, organised in both the W.M.C.A 
(the ‘British Democracy’) and the city’s Evangelical culture (the ‘Protestant 
Democracy’), became an increasingly influential factor, initially as ‘pawns’ in 
power struggles within the ‘political machine’, and subsequently, as an 
autonomous source of social and political influence. Initially, through its 
alliance with Salvidge, Chairman of the W.M.C.A, the Protestant Democracy 
imposed its popular Protestant agenda upon local Conservatism culminating in 
the ascendancy of ‘Tory Democracy’. However, with the deterioration in 
relations with Conservatism in the period after 1900, the Protestant 
Democracy attempted to exercise its influence and power through both formal 
political agitation and modes of increasingly violent collective action on the 
streets, generating sustained sectarian violence.
The chapter has identified the key factors in Belfast which, with the 
advent of Home Rule, impacted upon the Episcopalian-Conservative 
establishment as the architects of Unionism and their established alliance with 
popular sectarianism in the form of the Orange Order. The permeation of 
Orange organisation and ideology throughout the local labour market and 
Labour movement had serious implications in terms of the development of 
potent forms of popular Protestant political dissent, influencing subsequent 
Unionist organisational initiatives. The chapter also highlights Unionism’s 
changing relationship to sectarian street mobilisation and the factors 
underlying its relative success in containing collective violence. Recognising 
the imperative of politics and propaganda in countering Home Rule, sectarian 
confrontation was seen as damaging to Unionism’s attempts to project an 
image of law-abiding ‘respectability’. Consequently, whereas Tory 
Democracy in Liverpool adopted an increasingly pragmatic attitude towards 
sectarian violence, Unionist political and organisational initiatives were 
concerned with exercising a degree of control over ‘grassroots’ Protestant 
organisations, in order to limit their ‘excesses’. Finally, the chapter outlines 
the problems posed by popular sectarianism in terms of efforts at successful 
coalition building within the fractious Protestant community. Particularly 
after 1905, Ulster Unionism proved far more effective at exercising 
increasingly sophisticated control over the principal vehicle of populist
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sectarianism, the Orange Order. The drive for centralised control after 1886 
was linked to the need to preserve the fragile ‘unity’ and ‘respectability’ of the 
coalition as part of the movement’s adaptation to national political culture and 
identity.
Despite both cities’ integration into the British economy plus their 
dependence upon both national and international markets, Liverpool did not 
face the severance of the ‘British link’ posed by Home Rule, with its 
perceived social, political, religious and economic consequences for the 
Protestant community in Belfast. This scenario had a profound impact upon 
existing political and organisational arrangements in Belfast, transforming the 
Episcopalian-Conservative relationship with popular sectarianism, particularly 
the Orange Order. In contrast, Liverpool Tory Democracy was a largely 
parochial movement, initially exploiting and harnessing popular sectarianism 
in order to construct its political hegemony. Subsequently it adopted a 
pragmatic attitude to sectarian disorder. Ulster Unionism could ill afford such 
a parochial attitude. It was confronted by the challenge of mobilising, 
retaining and controlling its ‘grassroots’ sectarian constituency, cementing the 
fractious elements constituting the Unionist coalition and endeavouring to 
project an image to the rest of Britain of ‘unity’ and ‘respectability’ in its 
nation-wide fight against Home Rule. The intrinsic character of a political 
movement, whether essentially local regional or national in outlook, could 
have a profound impact upon its attitude towards collective violence.
The next chapter examines the role played by religion in the emergence 
and evolution of the powerful ‘Protestant Democracy’ in Liverpool and upon 
the character and development of Ulster Unionism in Belfast. In both cities, 
religion played a vital part in the development of the dominant Conservative 
political movements whilst at the same time proving a source of bitter conflict 
and disunity.
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CHAPTER TWO-RELIGION.
Religion played a vital role in the emergence and evolution of the 
‘Protestant Democracy’1 and in the development of Ulster Unionism. In 
Liverpool the implicit sectarianism embodied by the anti-Ritualist agitation 
acted as a catalyst leading to the emergence of a respectable religious and 
political coalition. However, it also contained the seeds of future discord and 
fragmentation. Elements within the Tory-Anglican establishment exploited 
this crusade as a means of re-engaging the Protestant working class, but the 
agitation rapidly developed a populist, increasingly belligerent dynamic 
proving difficult to manage or contain. The crusade was appropriated by 
militant Protestants like George Wise2, who drove it in an aggressively anti- 
Catholic direction resulting in the fragmentation of the existing coalition. 
Under the leadership of personalities like Wise the ‘Protestant Democracy’ 
evolved into an autonomous ethno-nationalist movement directly countering 
Roman Catholic ‘aggression’ at street level, generating serious sectarian 
violence.
In Belfast the threat posed by Home Rule or ‘Rome Rule’ proved vital 
in transcending historic rivalries and suspicions amongst the Protestant 
denominations, with these contributing to the political, organisational and 
ideological development of Unionism. However, I argue that beneath this 
united facade, or rallying point, profound denominational tensions persisted. 
These manifested themselves particularly in the aftermath of the Second 
Home Rule Bill through the contentious struggle against Ritualism in the 
Episcopal Church. This controversy was pivotal in the emergence of a
1 Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 163,165,166 emphasises the central 
importance of religious beliefs to ‘everyday life’ in Nineteenth Century 
Britain.
2 see Taplin on Neal, ‘’Sectarian Violence” , 95; Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One 
Working Class” , 214; Neal, Sectarian Violence. 252 & Belchem, ‘’The 
Peculiarities of Liverpool” , 11-12 on the role of individuals like Wise.
3 see Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two. XX, XXXI1,1 & Stewart, The Narrow 
Ground, 166. David Hempton & Myrtle Hill, Evangelical Protestantism in 
Ulster Society. 1740-1890.180 identify the contribution of Irish 
Nonconformity to Unionist ideology.
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religious and political force akin to the ‘Protestant Democracy’. This 
movement, employing belligerent forms of collective action alongside 
independent politics, combined religious and class grievances, threatening the 
unravelling of Unionism as a ‘coherent’ force.4 The Unionist response was to 
assert increasingly centralised control over Ulster’s anti-Home Rule forces, 
conscious of the potential disaster to both the fragile coalition and its 
‘respectable’ image posed by widespread sectarian disorder. From 1904 
Ulster Unionism manipulated the threat of Home Rule to construct an 
elaborate political and organisational structure designed to integrate, harness, 
contain and ‘police’ its volatile sectarian support. This chapter involves an 
examination of three principal themes. The first looks at the character of 
religious observance in each city; the second highlights the main areas of 
religious conflict; and the third identifies the main exponents of sectarianism, 
analysing their role in generating serious collective violence.
LIVERPOOL
RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE.
Despite its association with serious sectarian strife, paradoxically the 
1851 religious census reveals that Liverpool had a below average level of 
religious attendance.5 The average index of attendance for all towns in 
England and Wales with over 10,000 inhabitants was 49.7.6 Liverpool 
recorded an index of 45.2, comparable to Leeds (47.4), but below towns like 
Bristol (56.7) and Leicester (62.3).7 From 1851 attendance’s continued to 
decline in Liverpool in proportion to population. They dropped by less than
4 see Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two. 22
5 As Philip Waller has stated Church attendance was not an ‘exact index of 
inner spirituality or of sectarian impulses in politics’. Waller, Democracy and 
Sectarianism. 286
6 Dennis, English Industrial Cities of the 19th Century. 32 The Religious 
Census of 1851 attempted to record the availability of sittings and the actual 
attendance, as calculated, estimated or invented by the ministers or 
churchwardens, at every Church or chapel in the country. Dennis (29) states 
that ‘In practise.. .returns were far from perfect’.
7 Dennis, English Industrial Cities of the 19th Century. 30-31
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8% in the six decades from 1851, whilst in the two decades from 1912 they 
declined a further 10%. Consequently, by 1916 less than one-fifth of 
Liverpudlians were active churchgoers.8
In 1851, Anglicans comprised the largest denomination with 41% of 
total attenders.9 However, despite its leading position, the newly created 
Diocese of Liverpool supported by 1880 only 179 beneficed clergy and 125 
curates to serve a population of 1,100, 000 people.10 Consequently, by the 
religious survey undertaken in 1881, whereas less than two-fifths of 
Liverpool’s Catholics attended any Sunday Service, this was twice the 
proportion for the majority Anglicans.11
The Nonconformist denominations accounted for only 27% of total 
attender’s in 1851 a characteristic shared with other Lancashire towns.12 
Despite this small total, the 1881 survey revealed that those frequenting the 
various Quaker, Unitarian, Baptist, Presbyterian and Methodist chapels 
attended Sunday service on a more regular basis than their Anglican and 
Catholic counterparts.13 However, whilst Catholic attendance at mass 
increased during 1891-1902, this coincided with Anglican and Nonconformist 
decline in the central city,14
Evangelical street preachers gradually filled this vacuum, 100,000 
looking to George Wise as a political and spiritual leader in the North End by 
1910.15 The Protestant Reformers Monthly Magazine claimed Wise’s Church 
boasted the largest Sunday services in Liverpool, over 1000 attending the 
morning and evening services.16 Albert Stones commanded significant support
8 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 286
9 Dennis, English Industrial Cities of the 19th Century. 30
10 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 173
11 David Fitzpatrick. ‘A Curious middle place: the Irish in Britain, 1871- 
1921’, in: R Swift and S Gilley, eds, The Irish in Britain 1815-1939. 30
12 Dennis, English Industrial Cities of the 19th Century. 30
13 Fitzpatrick, ‘A Curious middle place: the Irish in Britain, 1871-1921’, 30
14 John Bohstedt, ‘More than One Working Class: Protestant-Catholic Riots 
in Edwardian Liverpool’, in: Belchem, ed, Popular Politics. Riot and Labour: 
Essays in Liverpool History 1990-1940.208
15 Bohstedt, ‘More than One Working Class: Protestant-Catholic Riots in 
Edwardian Liverpool’, 189
16 Bohstedt, ‘More than One Working Class’, 207
131
in the South End, whilst Louis Ewart, leader of the Liverpool Kensitites, was 
active in Birkenhead and later Garston.
Unlike Belfast, where Presbyterianism was numerically the main rival to 
Episcopalianism, in Liverpool, the principal rival to Anglicanism came from 
the Roman Catholic Church, accounting for 33% of total attenders in 1851.17 
By the 1881 survey the Anglican authorities recorded the total number of 
Liverpool Catholics as 140,115.18 However, less than two-fifths of Catholics 
actually attended any form of Sunday service.19 Despite being significantly 
better than the Anglicans’, poor attendance amongst ‘nominal’ Catholics,
ongreatly concerned the Catholic authorities. In order to counter-act this trend 
the Church took ‘well-organised measures to retain members’ attendance at 
mass made a binding obligation sanctioned by penance. This led to Catholic 
attendance rising by 24% between 1891-1902.21
Both the Anglican and Catholic churches in Liverpool identified the 
decline in attendance amongst the ‘lower orders’ as a major area of concern. 
The question of mixed marriages and the fate of their offspring were 
highlighted by the Catholics, Thomas Burke declaring ‘no more significant 
proof of the decadence of the Faith amongst the lower orders can be adduced 
than the large number marrying inside the walls of the Protestant Churches’.22 
In an 1883 pamphlet John Charles Ryle, first Anglican Bishop of Liverpool 
declared ‘we cannot expect to prosper and hold our position without ‘the
17 Dennis, English Industrial Cities of the 19th Century. 30
18 Thomas Burke, Catholic History of Liverpool. Liverpool, 1910,234 The 
Catholics recorded the number as being 177,849 or 32% of the population.
19 Father T.E.Gibson recorded that 57,295 Catholics attended Easter precept in 
1881, up from 42,354 in 1871. He also calculated that 57,687 Catholics 
attended Sunday Mass in 1881, a slight increase from 51,250 in 1871. Burke, 
Catholic History of Liverpool. 235
20 ‘Nominal Catholics’ were classified by Burke as comprising the large 
number of Catholics ‘marrying inside the walls of the Protestant Churches’; 
Catholic History of Liverpool. 236
1 Bohstedt, ‘More than One Working Class: Protestant-Catholic Riots in 
Edwardian Liverpool’, 208
22 Burke, Catholic History of Liverpool. 236 referred to an examination in 
1896 of the register of an Anglican school located in the heart of the parish of 
Liverpool, revealing that 33% of names were of Celtic Irish origin.
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masses” . 23 To highlight the problem Ryle included an enumeration of 
attendance at 15 of the poorer parish churches on Trinity Sunday 1882. This 
showed that below 7% of professed Church of England inhabitants in these 
parishes attended any form of Sunday service 24 Out of a total Anglican 
population of 57,464 over the 15 parishes only 3,133 attended the Sunday 
morning service and 3, 877 the evening.25 Without urgent action Ryle asked 
'what else can be expected from human nature, if half-educated men and 
women are never visited and are left to themselves? What right have we to be 
surprised and indignant if many of them join some Nonconformist body or go 
over to the Church of Rome’.26
Evangelical street preachers, with their frequently violent forms of 
collective action, proved extremely successful at attracting a working class 
following. Wise, who initially received Ryle’s patronage established his 
territorial base in Kirkdale, the congregation of his Reformers (Memorial) 
Church consisting ‘solely of working people’. Revealingly, Wise wrote to 
the Head Constable of Liverpool in 1903 after being summonsed to be bound 
over to keep the peace. He declared ‘the only crime of which I am guilty is 
my popularity among Protestant working men and in order to ruin their 
influence, I am literally hounded to death by wicked and unrelenting police 
persecution’.28 Stones, Ewart and the Kensits also drew their principal support 
from amongst the Protestant working class.
The battle to secure, retain and consolidate support amongst the 
‘nominal’ Protestant and Catholic ‘masses’ constituted the principal arena of 
confrontation and struggle between the denominations in Liverpool. The 
‘crusade’ against Ritualism, or disguised Romanism within the Established 
Church was seen as a vital catalyst by elements within the Tory-Anglican
23 John Charles Ryle, D.D, Lord Bishop of Liverpool, Can They Be Brought 
In? Being Thoughts on the Absence from Church of the Working Classes. 
London, 1883,10
24 Ryle, Can They Be Brought In?. 6
25 Ryle, Can They Be Brought In?. 4
26 Ryle, Can They Be Brought In?. 15-16
27 Protestant Reformer’s Monthly Magazine of January 1910 quoted in 
Bohstedt, ‘More Than One Working Class’, 190
28 Quoted in Frank Neal, Sectarian Violence: The Liverpool Experience. 
1819-1914.216
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establishment in their attempts to re-engage with the Protestant ‘masses’.
This ostensibly ‘respectable’ campaign tapped into the latent xenophobia and 
‘No Popery’ sentiment amongst the Protestant working class dating back to 
the Reverend Hugh McNeile in the 1840’s and 1850’s. The struggle against 
Ritualism contributed to the emergence of a broad coalition, combining forms 
of direct Protestant collective action, legal recourse and political agitation. 
However, the ‘crusade’ culminated in the fragmentation of this coalition, and 
the emergence of the militant Protestant Democracy employing anti-Catholic 
violence as a medium of influence, leverage and power.
ANTI-RITUALISM.
With the growing sense of vulnerability within the Established Church, 
leading Liverpool Anglicans were prepared to enter into an expedient 
relationship with militant Evangelical Protestant organisations and 
personalities. By endorsing the active cultivation and exploitation of the 
popular anti-Ritualist agitation, leading Anglicans sought to re-engage with 
the ‘lower Orders’, exploiting their latent anti-Catholicism. However, in the 
long term the anti-Ritualist campaign proved of far greater benefit to 
Liverpool’s Evangelical street preachers, who harnessed this potent 
‘grassroots’ issue. In the process they built extensive ‘personal empires’ 
accruing considerable social and political influence. Ritualism was therefore 
a vital factor in securing Protestant working class support by exploiting their 
underlying fear of local and national Catholic expansion and self-assertion. 
The campaign also retained the support of ‘respectable' elements within the 
Tory-Anglican establishment, who despite outbursts of violence presented the 
campaign against internal ‘error’ as ‘constitutional’ and therefore legitimate in 
character. Additionally, the campaign provided a bridge to Evangelical 
Nonconformity, which also regarded Catholicism as the principal local threat 
and like their Evangelical Anglican counterparts feared the erosion of the 
Protestant character of the Nation through the spread of ‘error’ in the 
Established Church. However, in the hands of a figure like Wise anti- 
Ritualism developed into a source of fragmentation and ultimately breakdown, 
incorporating a ‘libertarian anti-establishment’ tenor utilised to attack the
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Anglican hierarchy. Additionally, from the late 1880’s onwards, through its 
growing equation of ‘Ritualists’ with ‘aristocrats’, the campaign developed a 
pronounced class complexion. The agitation was politically harnessed by 
local Conservative elements, as a vital corollary of the ‘democratisation’ 
process within the ‘political machine’, undermining the patrician Conservative 
establishment. As a result, Ritualism was transformed from an expedient 
catalyst for religious and political engagement with the Protestant working 
class into an increasingly dynamic medium of'grassroots' Protestant self- 
assertion, influence and power, increasingly exercised through collective 
action in Liverpool’s streets.
Ryle, Anglican Bishop of Liverpool from 1880 and acknowledged 
leader of the Evangelical Party within the Church, identified the growth of 
Ritualism as a major contributory factor leading to disenchantment with 
religion amongst the working classes.29 In his 1883 tract ‘Can They Be 
Brought In?’ Ryle declared that the working classes ‘have an instinctive 
horror of formalism, ceremonialism, priest-craft, hypocrisy and false
'J A
profession’, asserting that ‘our poorer brethren are very apt to judge the 
Church by the parson and if he is not a satisfactory persona ecclesiae, to take a 
dislike to the body which he represents’. If the pastor was one ‘who in his 
zeal for ceremonial does things which they think are Romanism, it is very 
likely they will forsake the Church and stay at home, or go to Chapel’.31 To 
remedy the many ills he had identified, Ryle formulated a number of 
recommendations, including a ‘system of aggressive evangelization’ to 
counteract his fear that the ‘working classes in many districts will never be 
brought into the Church of England and will live and die outside’.32 Ryle
29 Ryle was consecrated at York Minster on the 11th June 1880. Waller states 
that ‘Downrightness made Ryle, apart from Spurgeon, the most popular 
Victorian tract writer and the doyen of evangelicals’. Waller, Democracy and 
Sectarianism. 173
30 Ryle, Can They Be Brought In?. 18
31 Ryle, Can They Be Brought In?. 12
32 His four recommendations were (1) an increase in the number of living 
agents, who were seen as instrumental in attempts at engaging with the 
working classes. They were to operate in the ‘large overgrown parishes, 
where workingmen chiefly reside’; (2) the provision of an ‘organised system 
of aggressive evangelization’; (3) an increase in ‘direct lively preaching of the 
Gospel in all our pulpits’; (4) in relation to the working classes he proposed ‘a
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disclosed a key tenet of this strategy, proclaiming ‘if she (C of E) does not go 
down to the people, the people will not come up to her’.33
Ryle’s revitalisation strategy manifested itself on a number of different 
levels, including engagement with the leading organisations and exponents of 
militant anti-Ritualism in the city. During this initial phase the Church 
Association was pivotal as a conduit for cultivating a militant brand of 
‘Orange Christianity’. This process of engagement with the ‘masses’ 
witnessed the growing involvement of ‘rowdy’ Orange elements, the 
campaign developing a violent, direct-action complexion, which would prove 
increasingly difficult to contain and control. Ryle’s first sermon as Bishop of 
Liverpool was delivered at StPhilips, church of the Rev. T.K.Morrow, a 
leading Orange chaplain. The Liberal Review commented ‘Whether there is 
any connection between...Rev.T.K.Morrow’s being an Orangeman and the 
Bishop commencing his episcopal duties at St. Philips I cannot say, but the 
latter fact does not speak much for the Bishop’s discretion’.34 The Church 
Review (a High Church organ) openly accused Ryle of cultivating Orange 
Protestantism, analogous to the ‘rhiza piturias’.35 Although Ryle resigned 
from the militant Church Association (to avoid accusations of partisanship) 
upon accepting the Bishopric, prominent Evangelical Anglicans continued to 
endorse its anti-Ritualist activities.36 In 1890 Archdeacon Taylor, although he 
officially ‘played no part’ in its affairs, was commended by the Protestant 
Standard for his advocacy of the Association.37 Whilst still a Canon, Taylor 
delivered a lecture at a Church Association meeting arguing the ‘sapping and
great increase of sympathy and friendly, personal dealing with them on the 
part of the clergy’. Ryle, Can They Be Brought In?. 1-47 
3 Ryle, Can They Be Brought In?. 15
34 Liberal Review. 17 July 1880
35 Liberal Review. 20 December 1884 ‘Orange Protestantism in its relation to 
our church may.. .be well described as a rhiza piturias, a strong, bitter tap root 
like the horse radish, of little value in itself, but occupying useful soil, 
spreading in all directions, boring out worthier plants and arrogating to itself 
the whole garden. There is no quarter to be given to such a foe. The ‘bitter 
root’ cannot live side by side with the plants of the Lord. One must 
exterminate the other. The city of Liverpool is an illustration in point’.
36 Ryle later (circa-1890) entered into disagreement with the Association over 
‘What Diversities of Opinion, Practise, And Ritual Are Justly Tolerable 
Within The Pale Of The Established Church of England'.
37 Protestant Standard. 22 February 1890
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mining (of Ritualism) had gone on long enough and that a tremendous assault 
was now to be made in Liverpool, which used to be a bulwark of Protestant 
principles’.38 Throughout Ryle’s tenure (1880-1900) leading Evangelical 
Anglicans appeared on the platforms of explicitly anti-Ritualist organisations 
in a deliberate attempt to engage the ‘nominal’ Protestant working class.
Ryle also encouraged the participation of sympathetic Nonconformists 
in the ‘ crusade ’ 39predicated upon a common evangelicalism, a shared anti- 
Catholicism and political affiliation to a particular conception of 
‘Constitutional’ Conservatism as the ‘bulwark of the Reformation’. The 
immigrant Ulster Protestant Anglican Rev. C.H.H.Wright, appealed to 
Nonconformists to ‘rally round the Protestantism of the Church of England 
and support us as in the days when Rome and Ritual held sway’.40
Nonconformist sympathy for the campaign can be gauged from 
statements made by the Rev. J.K.Nutall, a Congregationalist who asserted 
‘evangelical Nonconformists were heart and soul with their brethren 
evangelical churchmen in this movement’.41 In 1936 Whittingham-Jones 
claimed that since 1870 the ‘vast majority’ of Liverpool’s militant Protestants 
had been Dissenters with a ‘sprinkling’ of Low Churchmen.42
In contrast to Ritualism’s vital symbolic and political function, exploited 
by elements within the Tory-Anglican establishment, the actual threat posed 
by ‘error’ was negligible. In 1902 the Church Association revealed that
38 Liberal Review. 17 January 1885 
Other elements were certainly not courted as the Protestant Standard’s
objectives testify. It was opposed to ‘Romanism, Ritualism, Unitarianism and 
Tractarianism’.
40 Protestant Standard. 8 May 1897
41 Protestant Standard. 30 July 1898
42 Everton, which was regarded as a militant Protestant and Orange area, was 
described by the Liberal Review as being ‘largely Nonconformist’ and ‘anti- 
Popish’ in character’. Liberal Review. 5 March 1881 & Barbara 
Whittingham-Jones, The Pedigree of Liverpool Politics: White. Orange and 
Green. Liverpool, 1936,46 claimed that the W.M.C.A was predominantly 
Nonconformist, with the ‘democratisation’ process within local Conservatism, 
being not only animated by class differences with the patrician Constitutional, 
but also embroiled with religious differences between the Low Church 
Anglicans of the Tory establishment and the Nonconformist W.M.C.A which 
emphasised religion before Establishment. These differences help to explain 
why the anti-Ritualist ‘crusade’ became a crucial corollary of the 
‘democratisation’ process.
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Liverpool contained 34 clerical members of the English Church Union, 9 
members of the Confraternity of the Blessed Sacrament, and 4 members of the 
Holy Cross. 63 clergymen used the eastward position, 35 used the mixed 
chalice, 3 used incense, 12 used vestments, and 24 used altar lights. 
Altogether, the Association listed 9,600 ‘Ritualist’ clergy nationally, 
Liverpool’s tally being ‘comparatively the fewest of any diocese’.43
The perception of ‘grass-roots’ Protestants, fuelled by Evangelical 
rhetoric equating ‘error’ with Roman Catholicism, and orchestrated by the 
Church Association and Orange Order, resulted in the participation of a 
growing core of ‘militant Protestants’ in direct action anti-ritualist activities. 
This ‘grassroots’ dynamic to the agitation, led by popular local leaders, 
mobilised by militant Protestant organisations and prosecuted in the volatile 
community of the street proved increasingly difficult for the Tory-Anglican 
establishment to manage and contain. The success of the campaign in 
attracting growing numbers of Protestant workingmen is illustrated by the 
case of St. Judes during 1882. The campaign against the incumbent 
‘Papistica’, Rev. Fitzroy was orchestrated by the ‘great Bailey’, Orangeman, 
fishmonger and ‘people’s church warden’. One of those involved was 
interviewed by the Liberal Review. He revealed, ‘Me and my pals don’t 
pretend to be extra religious, but we are Protestants to the backbone, and when 
we does come to church we like to be treated as Protestants and if we were left 
to ourselves we would soon put the copper on them as didn’t treat as proper’. 
The difficulty of containing the passions aroused by the ‘crusade’, which 
combined implicit anti-Catholicism with nascent class sentiment, was 
revealed by the comments of this Protestant workingman. He declared ‘Now, 
if old Fitzroy had all his windows broken, and if he got a couple of black eyes 
and a bloody nose, and his coat tored off his back, and a feast of good 
corporation mud into the bargain he’d soon see that he must alter his capers. 
But, there, our leaders is all right up to a certain point, but, arter aggravatin’ us
43 Neal, Sectarian Violence: The Liverpool Experience. 189 & Waller, 
Democracy and Sectarianism. 172-3
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and rousin’ us, they spoils all by stopping at that point. They’re so blessed 
afraid of the law’ I44
Events at StMargaret’s reveal the potency of Ritualism as a ‘grassroots’ 
Protestant issue and the struggle to harness and control the forces it unleashed. 
This struggle was a feature of the anti-Ritualist campaign in the religious and 
political sphere. The Tory-Anglican establishment’s gradual loss of control 
over anti-Ritualism and popular sectarianism culminated in a breakdown in 
established power relationships contributing to an upsurge in sectarian 
collective violence. The campaign at St. Margaret’s located in the 
‘aristocratic’ Prince’s Park area was orchestrated by the Church Association. 
Bishop Ryle reluctantly allowed the organisation’s leader, Dr. James Hakes, 
to bring a legal suit against the Rev. Bell-Cox under the Public Worship Act. 
In December 1885 Cox was suspended from priestly office for six months, 
Ryle coming in for ‘much personal criticism both from inside and outside the 
Church’. This campaign highlighted the growing tensions between the 
‘respectable’ anti-Ritualists and the militant Protestants. Ryle hoped the 
Church Association would relent upon Cox resuming his duties, but Hakes 
persisted. In May 1887 Bell-Cox was arrested and taken to Walton gaol 
where he remained for seventeen days, finally being released on a writ of 
Habeus Corpus. Ryle again became the centre of much criticism in the press, 
Hakes successfidly appealing against Cox’s release, but the clergyman 
successfully appealed to the House of Lords. Consequently, ‘life at 
StMargaret’s went on much as usual, further increasing the bitterness felt by 
the Evangelicals’ 45
‘Grassroots’ Protestant bitterness at the inability to effectively 
counteract Ritualism, increasingly focused upon the duplicity and impotence 
of the Episcopal authorities, including Ryle himself. As early as 1882 the 
‘Protestant party’ at St. Judes’ accused the Bishop o f‘doing the devils
44 Liberal Review. 19 August 1882 Subsequent to the interview Rev.Fitzroy 
was assaulted in Church, with the Review attributing events to both Bailey, 
‘the prime mover in these scandalous and intolerable outrages’, plus the 
complicity, ‘weakness and irresolution in action’ of other Church officials. 
Liberal Review. 23 September 1882 Fitzroy was eventually suspended. 
Liberal Review. 14 June 1884
45 Neal. Sectarian Violence: The Liverpool Experience. 192
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work’.46 Ryle further angered the militants when he consecrated St. Agnes in 
1885, the clergymen known to be Ritualists. In his defence Ryle argued he
A Ticould not refuse to consecrate in anticipation that services would be illegal. 
Praise from the Liberal Review illuminated and possibly inflamed the 
situation, proclaiming, many people ‘will be glad to find that his Low Church 
sympathies have not blinded him to the rights of other sections of the Church 
or to the value of their labours, and...will be still more glad to find that he is 
not inclined to make himself the obedient tool and instrument of the new 
Protestants of his diocese’ 48
George Wise’s arrival in Liverpool in 1888 heralded a more militant 
phase of the ‘crusade’, anti-Ritualism evolving into an increasingly 
autonomous vehicle of ‘grassroots’ Protestant self-assertion in both the 
religious and political spheres. Wise directly engaged the Protestant working 
class in the volatile community of the street. He drove the Protestant agitation 
in a direction that shattered the ‘respectable’ anti-Ritualist coalition, 
intensified Protestant-Catholic ‘communal strife’, exposed profound division 
and conflict within the Protestant community and witnessed the evolution of 
the Protestant Democracy into a powerful force employing violent forms of 
collective action. Wise had been invited to Liverpool by a group of 
Evangelicals, gaining notoriety during the 1890s as a militant Protestant 
lecturer with the Y.M.C.A and the Christian Evidence Society. His mentor 
during this early period was Ryle, whilst from 1891 he received material 
patronage from a local merchant and leading Conservative J.A.Bramley- 
Moore.49 However, Wise became increasingly critical of Ryle, writing to him 
in 1899 in reference to St. Agnes complaining of his ‘inaction’ and calling 
upon him to ‘prohibit the illegal practises in question’. The Review estimated 
two to three thousand Liverpool Protestants endorsed his attack. In response 
Ryle declared ‘you appear to suppose I have power to punish any Ritualist by
46 Liberal Review. 30 September 1882
47 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 192
48 Liberal Review. 24 January 1885
49 Wise was confirmed into the Church of England after reading Ryle’s tract 
‘What we owe to the Reformation’, and studying the Book of Common 
Prayer. Councillor RF.Henderson, George Wise of Liverpool. Protestant 
Stalwart Twice Imprisoned For the Gospel’s Sake, poss. 1917,5
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a long prosecution, a fine, and imprisonment...I believe you are quite 
mistaken’.50
In 1897, Wise inflamed the situation by launching his own anti-Ritualist 
campaign.51 Responding to an attack by a local Catholic priest on a pamphlet 
entitled ‘The Claims of the Church of Rome’, Wise delivered a course of 
lectures on the ‘Romish Controversy’ throughout February. During 1898 
‘ Wiseites’ demonstrated at a number of local churches. The nature of these 
protests can be gauged from the Protestant Standard, which highlighted 
activity at S t James-The-Less in the overwhelmingly Catholic Scotland road. 
The Standard related how a number of those present ‘hissed when the 
officiating clergyman appeared wearing the popish and illegal biretta and also 
showed signs of disapprobation when the incense was being swung before the 
congregation. A large crowd was gathered in front of the building and a 
number of policemen were present to enforce order’.
During 1898-99 the anti-Ritualist ‘crusade’ focused upon the Church 
Discipline Bill, which represented the high water mark of the ‘respectable’ 
anti-Ritualist coalition and combined belligerent Protestant collective action, 
alongside legal procedure, and political agitation and organisation. This 
agitation represented the culmination of the political alliance forged in the late 
1880s/ early1890s between the ‘democratic’ Conservative forces, embodied 
by Salvidge and the W.M.C.A, and the militant Protestant Democracy as a 
vital part of the ‘democratisation’ process within local Conservatism. The 
emergence of this force was to have long term implications for both political 
relations between Conservatism and popular sectarianism and ‘communal 
strife’.
The architect of the Church Discipline Bill was Austin Taylor, son of 
Archdeacon Taylor and founder of the Liverpool Layman’s League. The Bill 
sought to discipline Ritualist priests, extirpating the mass, confessional and 
other offences by abolishing the Bishops or Episcopal veto preventing laymen 
from bringing legal suits. It also aimed to substitute deprivation of a living for
50 Liberal Review. 4 March 1899
51 It was estimated that there were 30 Ritualist clergy in the Diocese by this 
date.
52 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 174
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the highly unpopular policy of imprisonment of ‘offending clergy’. The 
campaign drew together the three principal exponents of militant 
Protestantism, Wise, Austin Taylor and Sir Archibald ‘Tutton’ Salvidge, 
Chairman of the Liverpool Working Men’s Conservative Association. This 
campaign exposed profound divisions within Conservative political circles. 
These divisions were along both religious and class grounds, between those 
including most of official Conservatism, who believed in Erastianism and 
those, principally within the W.M.C.A who promoted a ‘democratised’ brand 
of Constitutional Conservatism stressing religion above Establishment. 
Despite widespread ‘grassroots’ Protestant support the Bill was defeated in
1899.
This defeat was a pivotal moment in the anti-Ritualist coalition, driving 
Wise and the Protestant Democracy, disenchanted with ‘constitutional’ anti- 
Ritualism and the limitations and constraints of formal politics and 
organisation, in an autonomous, increasingly belligerent anti-Catholic 
direction. The defeat also exposed tensions in the political alliance between 
Salvidge and the Protestant Democracy. Salvidge attempted to consolidate his 
attainment of local political power in 1900 by promoting Conservative ‘unity’ 
at the expense of the ‘Protestant agitation’. Protestant anxieties were further 
exacerbated by the growing power of the Irish Nationalists, who superseded 
the Liberals as the main opposition to the Conservatives on the city council in
1900, and by Francis J.Chevasse’s appointment to succeed Ryle as Anglican 
Bishop of Liverpool. Ryle had been seen in certain quarters as a 
‘disappointment’ in combating Ritualism, but expectations in regard to 
Chevasse appeared ‘equally futile’.54 Wise was initially optimistic that the 
new Bishop would eradicate ‘the blasphemous sacrifice of the Mass, and the 
abominable confessional’. Militancy was suspended whilst Chevasse settled 
in. The Bishop’s first address boded well, declaring ‘a lawless church will 
soon lead to a lawless state; and the swift Nemesis of lawlessness is ruin’.55 
Chevasse’s policy in regard to Ritualism was outlined in 1902, revealing
53 Protestant Standard. 20 August 1898
54 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 202
55 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 185
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‘where the Lambeth judgement is observed he shall support the clergy, but 
where it is ignored he shall treat them as Nonconformists’.56
Although Chevasse advocated greater representation for the laity in 
church government and proclaimed ‘the clergy exist for the church and not the 
church for the clergy’, hostilities with the militants resumed around Easter 
1901. The Wiseites opposed his tolerance of ‘Popish altars’ and advocacy of 
a Liverpool Cathedral: ‘did ever the drones of a cathedral hive assist in...slum 
work? Ritual-’Pharisiacal display, prayer and praise by etiquette’-would 
banish religion’.57 Chevasse’s attitude to the militants was revealed in his 
1902 letter. He wrote, ‘the methods which a small and extreme section of 
Protestants have thought fit to adopt, and the tone in which they have carried 
on a most unhappy controversy, have done as much harm not only to the true 
Protestant cause, but also to the cause of Christianity in England, as the 
disloyalty of any Ritualist’.58
The aggressive eradication of ‘error’ assumed centre stage again with 
the arrival of the Kensits during the summer of 1902. Their arrival generated 
an undercurrent of rivalry with Wise for leadership of Liverpool’s Evangelical 
Protestant forces. This struggle for leadership of the Protestant Democracy 
occurred in a vacuum caused by the disintegration of the anti-Ritualist 
coalition after 1900. Attempts to establish leadership devolved to rivalry at 
street level between charismatic Evangelical preachers and their attempts to 
establish territorial bases, or ‘personal empires’. With this growing 
fragmentation and devolution of power and leadership over the Protestant 
working class, and the erosion of residual restraint and control, the Protestant 
Democracy increasingly resorted to the ‘politics of the street’ to assert its 
influence and power. John Kensit Snr had launched his national anti-Ritualist 
campaign in London in 1898, his exploits feted within Evangelical circles. 
Orange Lodge 119 praised his ‘spirited action’ and the Deputy Grand Master 
declared ‘he was proud there were men like Mr Kensit and Mr George Wise 
who were not afraid to fight for our Protestantism’.59 The anti-Ritualist
56 Belfast News Letter. 7 October 1902
57 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 189
58 Belfast News Letter. 7 October 1902
59 Protestant Standard. 23 April 1898
143
‘crusade’ with its emphasis upon ‘Protestant principle’, was pivotal in forcing 
growing numbers of ‘grassroots’ Orangemen to challenge the legitimacy of 
their own leadership and to re-evaluate their uneasy relationship to 
contemporary Conservatism. Under the influence of figures like Wise and the 
Kensit’s growing numbers of Orangemen developed a close affinity with the 
militant Protestant Democracy. This erosion of support for Conservatism 
contributed to the development of an autonomous strand of Protestant politics 
culminating in the 1903-05 revolt and the primacy of sectarian violence in 
Liverpool.
From May 1901 the anti-Catholicism inherent within the struggle 
against Ritualism assumed a more strident, belligerent form orchestrated by 
Wise and the Kensit’s. This subsumed the crusade against internal ‘error’ 
placing the anti-Ritualist coalition under intense strain. Kensit Snr already 
enjoyed something akin to celebrity status within Evangelical circles when his 
son, John Kensit Jnr, arrived in the city in August 1902 to conduct an anti- 
Ritualist campaign. He was supported by prominent Anglican’s like 
Archdeacon Taylor60and from within ‘influential Conservative quarters’.61 
The campaign was fairly incident-free up until Friday 29th August, when 
Kensit Jnr held a meeting in Islington Square, a popular meeting area in the 
Catholic quarter of the North End on the subject of the ‘Ritualistic Conspiracy 
in the Church of England’.62 Despite Louis Ewart, a leading figure in the 
‘Crusade’, emphasising ‘we have got enough to do with the Ritualistic Party 
without touching Rome’, most Catholics were convinced that the campaign 
was intent on insulting their faith.63 Kensits’ anti-Ritualist campaign was 
perceived to be a masquerade for crude anti-Catholicism, provoking serious 
sectarian violence.
By 1906, although vestiges of the anti-Ritualist agitation remained, the 
movement was effectively obsolete. The Ecclesiastical Discipline 
Commission listed only one Liverpool Church (St. Thomas’, Toxteth) using
60 HQ144/659/V36777. Liverpool Courier. 09 September 1902
61 HQ144/659/V36777/110. The Rock. 29 September 1902
62 Islington Square was a popular venue for public meetings located in a 
strongly Catholic quarter of the North End of Liverpool where Wise had 
launched his anti-Catholic Crusade in May 1901.
63 HO144/659/V36777/90. P.C.Hughes 8 September 1902
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incense out of 559 national cases of Ritualism. Significantly, the Commission 
deemed the Anglican law of public worship ‘too narrow’ for contemporary 
tastes. The Convocations explored the possibility of Prayer Book revision for 
the first time since 1661 and politicians ceased to attempt to impose 
conformity in public worship.64
Militant anti-Ritualists had initially enjoyed the patronage of leading 
Anglicans like Ryle because of their capacity to engage with the ‘nominal’ 
Protestant masses as part of an effort to rejuvenate the Church of England. 
However, militant Protestant organisations and ‘community’ leaders like Wise 
and the increasingly powerful Protestant Democracy proved impossible to 
manage and contain. Militant Protestants aroused growing alarm over their 
frequently violent direct action methods and strident attacks upon the 
Anglican hierarchy and ‘upper classes’ for their complicity in the growth of 
‘error’. Ritualism was also a catalyst for developing political co-operation 
between elements within local Conservatism and the strategic Protestant 
Democracy as a component of internal power struggles and as a vital corollary 
of the protracted ‘democratisation’ process within the local ‘political 
machine’. However, this political alliance, forged in the late 1880s / early 
1890s, proved fragile and contradictory with an increasingly autonomous, 
militant Protestant strand, disaffected with contemporary Conservatism 
emerging in the period after 1900. Salvidge, via the W.M.C.A, endeavoured 
to retain the ‘Protestant power’ and to contain and mediate it within strict 
party political boundaries, in an attempt to preserve fragile Conservative 
‘unity’. Pivotal in exacerbating underlying religious, political and class 
tensions within the coalition was Wise’s adoption of explicit anti-Catholicism 
from May 1901.
This transition placed those who supported the ‘respectable’ anti- 
Ritualist campaign and who adhered to a ‘democratised’ brand of 
Constitutional Conservatism predicated upon the defence of ‘civil and 
religious liberty’ under increasing strain. Against a backdrop of growing 
Catholic self-assertion these tensions contributed to the Independent 
Protestant revolt of 1903-05, a breakdown in relations between Conservatism
64 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 227-8
145
and popular sectarianism, culminating in Wise’s promotion of the violent 
politics of the street during the ensuing period. In essence, from 1900 the 
Protestant Democracy was beyond the effective influence or control of the 
local Tory-Anglican establishment.
ANTI-CATHOLICISM.
The first phase of the anti-Catholic crusade (1901-04) was crucial in 
transforming the Protestant Democracy into a powerful, autonomous social 
and political force dictating, through its ‘community leaders’ and extensive 
associational networks, the principal manifestation of sectarian confrontation 
through to 1912. The following section analyses how Wise established his 
leadership credentials and through his growing influence over the Protestant 
Democracy exercised considerable power and influence in the community of 
the street, and the wider social and political sphere. In 1909 a Magistrate 
asserted, at times, Wise had ‘no just sense of the meaning of his words and no 
proper appreciation of their probable consequences’. However, I argue a 
crucial corollary of establishing leadership over the Protestant working class 
was the provocation and orchestration of serious sectarian violence.65
In order to establish his popular credentials Wise orchestrated a 
dramatic confrontation in a sensitive location designed to provoke maximum 
Catholic retaliation. The consequence of his actions would be popular 
Protestant acclaim and notoriety. A by-product of this was the expedient or 
sympathetic patronage and support of individual Tory-Anglican notables 
seeking to bask in Wise’s reflected glory. The Head Constable’s Report for 
1903 reveals that during May 1901 Wise held meetings in ‘open spaces and 
waste ground’ throughout the city. These were ostensibly to protest against 
Ritualism and yet, ‘as a rule his arguments seemed to be based upon abuse 
and ridicule of certain articles of the Roman Catholic faith’. These initial 
meetings were accompanied by ‘minor disorder’.66 However, ‘considerable’ 
disturbance, involving members of the Catholic community, accompanied
65 HO144/704. Liverpool Evening Express. 10 August 1909
66 Citv of Liverpool. Protestant Demonstration. Report of the Head 
Constable. Liverpool. 1903.1161
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Wise’s subsequent meetings at Islington Square on the 15th and 16th May 
190167 The subject of the first meeting was ‘Jesuits and the Coronation 
Oath’, whilst at the second Wise brandished a crucifix and wore rosary beads. 
Enquiring whether Catholics drank Holy Water, his supporters responded ‘No, 
they drink whiskey’. Wise described the Jesuits as liars and murderers.68
Throughout this anti-Catholic crusade Wise and other leading 
‘Demagogues’ came into frequent confrontation with and open defiance of the 
civil authorities, culminating in personal ‘martyrdom’ in the form of being 
bound over to keep the peace or preferably imprisonment. In September 1902 
the Secretary of State wrote regarding the Kensit ‘Crusade’. ‘It seems hard 
that the rate-payers should have to pay for such elaborate police protection for 
men who set themselves so deliberately to inflame popular feeling and are so 
evidently courting what they consider ‘martyrdom’.69 These brushes with the 
law not only affirmed their commitment to the Protestant cause through self- 
sacrifice, but also confirmed a prevailing sense of persecution. A customary 
defence, supporting John Bohstedt’s concept of a ‘higher law’, was that Wise 
was upholding ‘free speech’ against the combined tyranny of the civil 
authorities and Roman Catholicism. In 1902, Kensit Jnr proclaimed ‘We do 
claim the right and we mean to stand up for it to speak forth God’s truth in the 
open air. We have got to remember this. Many of the movement’s which 
have made for the welfare of this land have been started by speeches in the 
open air. Many of our greatest liberties have been secured by open air 
demonstrations’ .70
To avoid violence at a meeting scheduled by Wise for the 25th May 
1901 at Islington Square, the Assistant Head Constable, Leonard Dunning 
summonsed him on the 26th to appear before WJ.Stewart. However, upon 
him agreeing ‘not to go to Islington Square’ the summons was withdrawn and 
Wise relocated his demonstration to St. George’s Hall plateau. The 
demonstration involved a march past the entrance to the Square. The Head
67 Report of the Head Constable. Liverpool. 1903.1161 Islington Square was 
next to StFrancis Xavier’s Catholic Church, and it also contained Jesuit and 
Presbyterian Institution’s facing each other.
68 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 203
69 HO144/659/V36777/90
70 HO144/659/V36777/90
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Constable’s Report noted in relation to the demonstration on the plateau that 
without ‘the interference of the police a serious riot would have taken place’.71 
Subsequently, Wise was summonsed again and bound over to keep the peace 
for twelve months. His November 1901 appeal was rejected on grounds that 
in Liverpool the natural consequences of Wise’s anti-Catholic language would 
result in breach of the peace. The pivotal role of Wise and the Kensits in 
fomenting sectarian tension and violence was outlined by the Head Constable 
in a letter of October 1902 to the Home Office. He declared ‘though we have 
some 100,000 Irish Roman Catholics and a great number of Orangemen here, 
we have for years been free from party disturbances until recent angry feelings 
were stirred up first by Wise and then by Kensit’.72 It is no coincidence that 
this concerted upsurge in sectarian violence occurred during the power 
vacuum caused by the fragmentation of the anti-Ritualist coalition. 
Disenchanted with the limitations and constraints of formal Conservative 
politics and organisation, and the timidity and impotence of their traditional 
leaders in the Tory-Anglican establishment, the Protestant working class 
turned to ‘Demagogues’ like Wise who established their legitimacy and 
authority in the community of the street. A vital corollary of this process was 
the orchestration and manipulation of sectarian violence.
Wise’s struggle to secure the St.Domingo Pit in Everton highlights the 
importance of the community of the street and particularly ‘territory’ as a 
catalyst in provoking sectarian confrontation and as a litmus test for 
evaluating the Protestant credentials of the Conservative City Council 
responsible for the site. Upon expiry of his first duration of being bound over, 
Wise attempted to re-assert his leading position by holding meetings through­
out September and October 1902, many in a ‘markedly anti-Catholic spirit’.73 
The Head Constables Report stated it was at the Pit in early October that the 
‘police had the greatest difficulty in preventing an encounter between Mr 
Wise’s followers and a crowd of Roman Catholics’.74 The Catholics had 
assembled in response to handbills, urging them to ‘protest against the insults
71 Report of the Head Constable. Liverpool. 1903.1161
72 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 212
73 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 210
74 Report of the Head Constable. Liverpool. 1903.1162
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hurled at their religion and to march on the place of meeting’.75 Leonard 
Dunning, the Head Constable, had Wise and the Catholic Joseph Harrington 
arrested, both appearing in Court on the 8th October.76 It was proved that at 
meetings in September and October Wise ‘held up to ridicule various religious 
emblems’ and ’that he had spoken of Roman Catholics as ‘red-necks’.77
On the 27th February 1903 Wise notified the town clerk of his intent to 
hold a demonstration at St.Domingo Pit on the 8th April, urging the 
Conservative Council to allocate the site in the predominantly Protestant 
district of Everton, which was corporation property, for Protestant open-air 
meetings.78 The Head Constable stated, if the Council acceded to Wise’s 
request the ‘choice will be between such a withdrawal of the police from their 
ordinary duties as will mean depriving the city generally of one half of its 
present police protection, or an increase of the force by perhaps 200 men’. He 
added in Liverpool a Protestant lecturer cannot talk ‘on the fringe of a definite 
Roman Catholic quarter without danger to the public peace’.79 This statement 
illustrates the primacy of the street as the principal area of sectarian 
confrontation in Liverpool. This arena had a profound impact upon the 
establishment of leadership over the Protestant working class, and upon the 
exercising of the Protestant Democracy’s growing influence and power, 
through violent forms of collective action. ‘Territory’ was not only a 
backdrop but also a causal factor in sectarian confrontation with Wise’s 
activities demarcating, contesting and consolidating boundaries. From May 
1901 popular Protestant agitation shifted away from an amalgam of aggressive 
collective action, in tandem with formal politics and organisation, legislation, 
and legal recourse, to the direct countering of Roman Catholicism at street 
level, generating sustained sectarian violence.
Dunning summonsed Wise on the 14th March 1903 to be bound over to 
keep the peace for twelve months. However, Wise chose the ‘celebrity of
75 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 212
76 Harrington was responsible for organising an attempted march on the Pit on 
the 3rd October. HQ144/659/V36777/142. Dunning’s Report to Under 
Secretary of State, Home Office, 7 November 1902
77 Report of the Head Constable. Liverpool. 1903,1162
78 On 4 March 1903 the Council established a special committee to look into 
the allocation of sites for public meetings.
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martyrdom for free speech’, being imprisoned in Walton gaol for two months 
from the 8th April.80In a speech entitled ‘Why I go to prison’ Wise outlined 
the symbolism and significance of the Pit, declaring it is ‘situated in a 
Protestant centre which literally smells of Orangeism. I do not say the Battle 
of the Boyne was fought there, but I do say a battle for Protestantism is being 
fought there at this moment and we in the name of God intend to conquer’.81
Growing competition for the support of the Protestant Democracy 
encouraged a spirit of risk-taking and personal ‘martyrdom’ as a means of 
establishing popular legitimacy and authority, ratcheting up tension and 
sectarian confrontation. It also resulted in a growing fragmentation of 
leadership and control over the Protestant Democracy. During this period the 
George Wise Crusade, under the temporary leadership of Albert Stones, 
commenced regular outdoor meetings at the Pit. In April 1904, after Wise 
was released from gaol, an intense split developed between him and Stones 
with the latter establishing a rival organisation in the South End. This 
occasioned a shift, during 1904-5, in the location of sectarian clashes from the 
North End to Toxteth in the South End, the principal instigators being Stones 
and Louis Ewart, regional leader of the Kensit Crusade.
Whereas in Belfast, Ulster Unionism established increasingly 
centralised organisational and political control over popular sectarianism, in 
Liverpool, leadership and rival ‘personal empires’ arose through the 
fermentation of riots, disorder, disturbances and acts of ‘martyrdom’. Like 
Wise and Kensit Jnr, both Stones and Ewart clashed with the law. Stones was 
charged with inciting a riot in January 1905 and remanded on bail for the 
assizes, whilst Ewart, following a disturbance in Garston, was found guilty of 
‘unlawfully and wilfully obstructing the passage of a certain footpath’.82 The 
impact of Evangelical street preachers like Stones and Ewart can be gauged by 
the fact that during 1904 the Liverpool police prepared for trouble on 639
79 Report of the Head Constable. Liverpool. 1903.1165
80 Bohstedt, ‘More Than One Working Class: Protestant-Catholic Riots in 
Edwardian Liverpool’, 190
81 R.F.Henderson, George Wise of Liverpool. Protestant Stalwart. Twice 
Imprisoned for the Gospel’s Sake. 9
82 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 247, fill 7
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occasions in which force was necessary on 80. 18 incidents were designated 
‘riots’, several, mostly in the South End being serious.
Wise and Stones were heavily involved in the independent Protestant 
political revolt of 1903-5.84 This represented the last attempt to resolve 
militant Protestant aspirations and grievances through formal political 
channels. The revolt ultimately witnessed the unravelling of the democratic 
Conservative and militant ‘Wiseite’ strands, fused by the pre-1900 political 
alliance between Conservatism and popular sectarianism. Salvidge was able 
to exploit divisions within the revolt. He defined a respectable Protestantism 
and conception of Constitutional Conservatism emphasising civil and 
religious liberty. This conception of Conservatism encompassed the 
‘constitutional’ anti-Ritualist agitation, but rejected bigoted anti-Catholicism. 
In the aftermath of the revolt there occurred a pronounced divergence between 
the supporters of a ‘Salvidgeite’ brand of Protestantism and Conservatism, or 
‘respectable’ largely passive anti-Catholicism, and a Wiseite brand of 
belligerent anti-Catholicism epitomised by the Protestant Democracy. In 
1909, the Home Office Commissioner observed. ‘The distinction was marked 
throughout between the Protestants of Liverpool and the supporters of Mr. 
Wise; but it was said, not by priests only, but by working men, professional 
men, independent ladies, trades people and shopkeepers, that they could live 
with the Protestants but not with the followers of Pastor George Wise’.85
The large-scale sectarian confrontations during 1909 represented the 
culmination of the evolution of the Protestant Democracy, and the pinnacle of 
its influence, leverage and power. Sparked by the Roman Catholic 
Eucharistic Conference in London of September 1908, a sort of religious 
‘World’s Fair’,86 this was interpreted by many Evangelical Protestants as an
83 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 209 The number o f incidents fell 
between 1905-08 (Neal, sectarian Violence. 227).
84 Stones was a member of the N.P.E.F and ‘consented to contest a seat when 
eligible’. The Protestant Searchlight Vol.l, New Series (Liverpool), 110,184
85 HQ144/1050. Commissioner’s Report, 1909,67
86 Bohstedt, ‘More Than One Working Class’, in John Belchem, ed, Popular 
Politics. Riot and Labour 178 The Eucharist included the consecrated wafer, 
or the ‘Host’, the embodiment of the doctrine o f transubstantiation which was 
the main bone of doctrinal contention between Catholics and ultra-Protestants 
and HO144/1050. Commissioner’s Report, 1909,63
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act of aggression, a prelude to the re-conversion of Protestant England to the 
Papacy. The President of the Conference proclaimed in the Catholic Herald 
that the event was to be ‘the signal, nay even the first stage of the triumph of 
the Holy Church in the great English nation’.87 Such pronouncements fed into 
local Protestant anxieties and fears concerning the erosion of their marginal 
privilege by growing national and local Catholic self-confidence and self- 
assertion. Other exacerbating factors included high waterfront unemployment 
during 1909, and the influx of upwardly mobile, skilled Catholic’s into 
Protestant strongholds like Kirkdale and Everton. This interplay of local and 
national Protestant anxieties and fears was, once again, played out in a 
struggle for ascendancy in the community of the street, with formal politics 
and religion playing a marginal, subsidiary role.
In stark contrast to clerical participation in earlier anti-Ritualist 
agitation, there is strong evidence of divergence, even polarisation, between 
moderate elements within the Protestant community and extremist anti- 
Catholics. On the occasion of the Catholic Holy Cross procession, the 
Commissioner’s Report refers to the vicar and churchwardens of StStephen’s 
Protestant church allowing ‘a string of flags to be attached to their schools and 
other Protestants did the same for other buildings, or subscribed to the 
decorations fund’.88 In July 1909 the Protestant Bishop wrote to the Head 
Constable reporting a meeting of fifteen vicars in the North End affected by 
the disturbances. He reported it was ‘unanimous in condemning party 
processions with bands, banners, etc, and in expressing their willingness to do 
their utmost to prevent such processions on the part of Churchmen for the
O A
future’. The main protagonists during the disturbances were Wise, pre­
eminent Protestant community leader, and the Orange Order overlapping the 
Protestant Democracy at both a leadership and grassroots level. The Order, 
alongside the Protestant religious networks, provided the mechanism for 
mobilising the muscle of the Protestant Democracy for collective action in the 
street.
87 Bohstedt, ‘More Than One Working Class’, 178 & A.Shallice, ‘Orange and 
Green and Militancy: Sectarianism and Working Class politics in Liverpool, 
1900-1914’, Bulletin North West Labour History Document 6, (1979-80), 24
88 HO144/1050. Commissioner’s Report, 1909,9
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During 1909, the Protestant Democracy employed various forms of 
collective action to exert their influence and power. This action ranged from 
resolutions, correspondence,90 meetings, and petitions, through to the threat 
of, and use of collective violence at street level. Liverpool’s Catholics 
planned to hold a Jubilee anniversary procession on Sunday 9th May for Holy 
Cross parish in the heart of the city’s North End. Amongst the letters of 
protest sent to the Head Constable was one from Wise, seeking clarification 
that there would be no breaches of the Catholic Emancipation Act on the 9th. 
Despite Dunning’s assurances concerning the legality of the procession and 
testimony that Wise had ‘used his influence to keep Protestants away from the 
area’, evidence suggests ‘Wiseites’ were heavily involved in breaches of the 
peace on the Sunday.91 A section of the Protestant crowd, gathered at the 
junction of Dale Street and Byrom Street along the parade route, struck up a 
Protestant hymn, ‘Dare to be a Daniel’ associated with Wise’s ‘aggressive 
Protestant organisation’.92 Additionally, a section of the crowd attempted to 
rush an image of the Madonna and Child, rioting being averted by the 
intervention of mounted police.
There is clear evidence of debate, co-ordination, and strategy within the 
Protestant Democracy, as opposed to spontaneous anarchic rabble rousing. 
This collective action, exercised through leaders like Wise, the Orange Order, 
and the religious networks, is illustrated by preparations to counter the 
StJoseph’s Catholic procession of Sunday 20th June. In his capacity as Grand 
Chaplain of the Liverpool Institution Wise attended a meeting on the 17th 
June at which the Order resolved to hold a counter-demonstration at Juvenal 
Street on the 20th. Wise proposed an unsuccessful counter-resolution, asking 
Orangemen to ‘keep away’ as the demonstration was ‘indiscreet’,94 preferring 
a strategy of continued ‘correspondence with the Head Constable’. Violence 
erupted on the Sunday. The Assistant Head Constable reported that the
89 HO144/1050. Commissioner’s Report, 1909,35
90 see HQ144/1050. Commissioner’s Report, 1909,30
91 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909. 51
92 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.90,125
93 Interestingly, Wise’s Church Secretary, Richard Briggs proposed the 
resolution that ‘the Orangemen should go to Juvenal Street’. Police 
(Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.150
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‘rioting was so serious from the very beginning that I had to send for more 
men in addition to the 700, and it was absolutely necessary for the peace of 
the City to break up the mob by force and keep the upper hand from the 
start’.95 The following week ‘outrages by one party upon the other occurred 
every night’.96
Another characteristic of 1909 was the Protestant Democracy’s 
ambiguous relationship to law and order and the civil authorities, empowering 
them to take frequently violent collective action in order to suppress 
lawlessness in the name of Protestant rights and liberties. During the 
disturbances, the Protestant Democracy applied concerted pressure upon the 
civil authorities, primarily the Head Constable, to uphold the prohibitive 
provisions of the Catholic Emancipation Act. Simultaneously the Protestant 
Democracy threatened to enforce the law if the authorities were deemed to 
have neglected their obligations, or implemented its provisions contrary to 
their own interpretation. The impact of such pressure can be gauged by a 
letter from the Home Office to the Head Constable in June 1909. It stated that 
‘Mr.Gladstone concurs in the further opinion which has been expressed by the 
Attorney-General, that, having regard to the inflammable state of religious 
feeling in Liverpool, you should, when occasion requires, warn the Roman 
Catholic priesthood that the Act is not to be regarded as a dead letter, and that 
the conditions in that city are not favourable for treating it as such’. 97The 
Protestant Democracy questioned the partiality of the civil authorities, 
reinforcing a sense of persecution, and the need for a ‘higher law’ imposed by 
themselves. During the 1909 Inquiry, Wise’s supporters depicted him as a 
‘martyr for free speech and a victim of police tyranny’. This sense of 
persecution fed into the idea of personal ‘martyrdom’, not only as a means of 
validating popular leadership, but as a catalyst in arousing and mobilising 
Protestant indignation and collective action. During the summer phase of the 
riots sectarian violence was concentrated during two periods. The first, from 
the 10-14th August, coincided with Wise’s trial and imprisonment for four
94 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.69, 92
95 HQ45/11138. H.P.Lane to Watch Committee, 21 June 1909
96 HQ144/1050. Commissioner’s Report, 1909,29
97 HO144/1050 Commissioner’s Report, 1909,26
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months for refusing to cancel his Men’s Bible Class parade of Sunday 27th 
June. The second, from the 10-24th October, coincided with his unsuccessful 
appeal and return to Walton gaol on Saturday 23rd October. August 
witnessed 98 convictions for crimes against property, 60 in the week 
following Wise’s imprisonment. Trouble accompanied his return to gaol on 
the 23rd with an attempt to attack StAlphonsus’ Catholic Church.98 Once 
again, in a report to the Home Office in August, Dunning highlighted Wise’s 
culpability emphasising ‘by his attacks on the Roman Catholic religion he 
attracts the lower sort of Protestants whose motive is mere opposition to 
Roman Catholicism’.99 As part of the establishment of the Police (Liverpool 
Inquiry) Act in November 1909, Wise was released on the 26th by the Home 
Secretary.100
For a contest primarily prosecuted in the community of the street, 
territory was a vital factor in the disturbances. Not only were processions and 
parades the focus of much confrontation, but strategic locations along the 
route were frequently the flash point. Additionally, the disturbances were 
characterised by the consolidation and reinforcement of territorial boundaries, 
with the expulsion of ‘interlopers’ or ‘outsiders’ from Protestant and Catholic 
areas. An ‘Orange’ stronghold like the Pit was the source of repeated attacks 
upon surrounding Catholic institutions, shops and employers houses. In a 
report submitted to the Council in November 1909, Father Fitzgerald of Our 
Lady the Immaculate parish in StDomingo requested action to stop Wise’s 
meetings at the Pit. By February 1910 he claimed a total of 3,200 Catholics 
had left the three Everton parishes of Our Lady, StAnthony’s and All Soul’s. 
Local territorial battles were part of a struggle for practical and symbolic 
control of the city, epitomised by the Protestant desire to prevent ‘illegal’ 
Catholic processions and refusal to cancel their parades.
The Home Office Inquiry, established by the Police (Liverpool Inquiry) 
Act of 1909, sat in StGeorges Hall throughout most of February 1910, 
presided over by Arthur J.Ashton. The Inquiry Commissioner apportioned a
98 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 235
99 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 236
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substantial amount of blame for the sectarian disturbances dating back to 1901 
to101‘the manner in which Pastor George Wise has in the past conducted his 
propaganda against Roman Catholicism’.102
The Commissioner’s conclusions were embodied in the 
recommendations of the Inquiry, proposing a representative Conciliation 
Board and official controls over outdoor religious meetings and processions. 
However, the local Conservative leadership, unwilling or unable to tackle 
Wise and the powerful Protestant Democracy rejected these measures. This 
inaction reflected the pragmatic co-existence developing between local 
Conservatism and popular Protestant street mobilisation. Wise refused to 
abandon meetings at the Pit, accusing the Commissioner of bias. He rejected 
the Conciliation Board, exclaiming he would continue to expose ‘the 
aggression of the Roman Catholic Church’.103 Sporadic sectarian violence 
continued through to the outbreak of the Transport Strike in June 1911 *
The events of 1909 emphasise the power of the Protestant Democracy as 
a grassroots force. This growing power can be traced back to the 
disintegration of the respectable anti-Ritualist coalition after 1900. This 
resulted in the divergence between formal Conservative politics and the 
belligerent anti-Catholic politics of the street climaxing during the 1903-05 
revolt By 1909, the Protestant Democracy was a powerful force, largely 
independent of the Tory-Anglican establishment, capable of exercising 
considerable social and political influence through collective action in the 
street. In 1909 Austin Harford, a leading Irish Nationalist, testified that ‘as a 
public man, who has respect for those who differ from me politically and in 
religion, and who has respect from these people to myself, that this Inquiry 
will be perfectly futile unless this campaign against Catholics and their beliefs 
is stopped in the City of Liverpool’.104 A number of subsequent events of 
local, national, and international significance impacted upon, and undermined,
100 The Act was empowered to enquire into the ‘conduct of the police’ during 
the preceding twelve months and to look into the ‘circumstances’ which 
caused the disturbances. Neal. Sectarian Violence. 237
101 Bohstedt, ‘More Than One Working Class’, 187
102 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 239
103 Bohstedt, ‘More Than One Working Class’, 188
104 HO144/1050. Commissioner’s Report, 1909,67
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Liverpool's parochialism, or ‘exceptionalism’, contributing to the decline of 
popular sectarianism. These events forced Tory-Democracy to re-evaluate its 
relationship to sectarian collective violence in light of new political 
imperatives and considerations.
Despite Syndicalist assertions during the 1911 Transport Strike, that 
‘sectarianism disappeared in cathartic strikes’, sectarian enmity and violence 
co-existed alongside temporary socio-economic co-operation and limited 
forms of reconciliation.105 With limited working class co-operation, 
accompanied by widespread violence, the strike raised the spectre of ‘social 
revolution’.106 This fear prompted concerted external intervention 
transforming the pragmatic attitude of local Conservatism towards Protestant 
working class street mobilisation and collective violence. In the strike’s 
aftermath a conciliation conference was convened, consisting of 13 prominent 
citizens including Bishops Chevasse and Whiteside, to resolve sectarian 
feuding. The conference was chaired by Lord Derby and resolved to 
empower the Watch Committee to regulate the location of meetings. It also 
resulted in Council endorsement of a Special Act of Parliament, the Liverpool 
Corporation Act of 1912, enabling the Corporation to pass by-laws 
empowering the Watch Committee to regulate meetings, processions and 
emblems, music and weapons.
The national calamity of the First World War further shattered 
Liverpool’s parochialism, accelerating the secularisation process within wider 
society. These factors progressively undermined the foundation of the 
Protestant Democracy and Tory-Democracy’s relationship to it. Wise 
confessed ‘our battleground, StDomingo Pit, is not doing so well’, reminding 
Protestants that ‘the mission of the Roman Church is just the same today as it 
was when we, for conscience sake, suffered unjust and wicked 
imprisonment’.107By 1916 Wise’s Church work had become ‘progressively 
more difficult’ and he was in rapidly declining health,108 dying on 29 
November 1917.
105 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 251
106 see Bohstedt, ‘More Than One Working Class’, 213
107 Henderson, George Wise of Liverpool. 24
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After Wise’s death and the dislocation caused by the War, Liverpool’s 
Evangelical Protestant’s regrouped. However, local and national 
developments accelerated the decline of the Protestant Democracy. These 
included rapid secularisation, the growing encroachment of national political 
culture and organisation, the resolution of the Irish Question in 1921 and local 
developments like extensive inter-war slum clearance dismantling the 
‘cultural and community’ infrastructure of sectarianism. In August 1919, 
Alderman Pastor H.D.Longbottom was appointed by the Reformers 
Church109to maintain its ‘militant Protestantism’. He proclaimed at the Pit, 
‘we are becoming so respectable that all the aggressive spirit is lying down, 
and nonconformity is losing its old militancy. May the Reformers never 
compromise with their spiritual principles’.110 Despite Waller’s assertion that 
by 1921 the Church’s activities ‘evoked shades of the pre-war Wiseite 
dynamism’, in reality the heyday of popular sectarianism with its large-scale 
clashes was over.111 Between 1918 and 1958 street clashes continued to occur, 
but tended to involve a small number of people, numbering perhaps a few 
hundred.112
Although primarily involving confrontations between Wise’s 
successors, Longbottom’s ‘Ironsides’, and Catholics, these clashes reflected 
the new political and social realities of inter-war Liverpool. Violence was 
increasingly directed against the local Labour Party113 with its strong Catholic 
associations.114 In 1938, the Chief Constable outlined the role of the 
Liverpool Corporation Act in containing sectarian disturbances. It provided 
the police with ‘limited powers in connection with meetings and processions 
of certain bodies in particular’.115 Although ‘limited’ these powers had been
1 AO According to Whittingham-Jones, Longbottom was also Vice-President of 
the L.W.M.C.A. Barbara Whittingham-Jones, The Pedigree of Liverpool 
Politics. 49
110 Henderson, George Wise of Liverpool. 30
111 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 285
112 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 244
113 HQ144/21037. Daily Worker 1 October 1936
114 HQ144/21037. letter Chief Constable of Liverpool to Norman Brook,
Home Office, 27 June 1938 & Barbara Whittingham-Jones, More about 
Liverpool Politics: Red Flag. Rome and Shamrock (Liverpool, October 
1936), 51
115 HQ144/21037. Home Office 22 June & 28 June 1938
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unavailable to Dunning in 1909, similar proposals having been rejected by the 
Conservatives in the aftermath of the Home Office Inquiry.
BELFAST
In contrast to the coherence of Liverpool’s Evangelical caucus Belfast’s 
Protestant community was riven by denominational, class, and political 
antagonisms. Confronted in 1886 with the imperative of presenting a 
respectable and united Ulster Protestant front as part of the battle of politics 
and propaganda, the principal area of co-operation between the fractious 
denominations became the likely consequences of Home Rule, ‘Rome Rule’ 
for the Protestants of Ireland. However, underlying tensions and suspicions 
were never far from the surface, the main source of conflict, particularly in the 
aftermath of the defeat of the Second Home Rule Bill being the disputed issue 
of Ritualism in the English and Irish Episcopal Churches. These 
denominational tensions and rivalries were to have a profound impact upon 
the political, ideological and organisational development of Ulster Unionism, 
particularly its relationship to popular sectarianism. Because of these 
divisions, and their threat to Unionism’s unity and respectability, the 
movement exerted increasingly centralised political and organisational control 
over Ulster’s anti-Home Rule forces through out the period. The movement 
was conscious that a breakdown in the coalition, with an accompanying 
upsurge in sectarian violence, would seriously damage the cause.
RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE.
During the period 1880-1921, the major denominations in Belfast 
experienced sustained growth and competition. The three principal Protestant 
denominations comprised the Church of Ireland, the Presbyterians, and the 
Methodists. In a book published by the Archdeacon of Killaloe Belfast was 
described as ‘the most fruitful and enterprising sphere of work in the whole
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Church of Ireland’.116 The 1901 Census revealed Episcopalianism had 
increased in Belfast by 22,000 in a decade to 102,980,117but that this 
population was significantly below that of the Presbyterians. In 1926 
Episcopalians stood at 133,100 or 32.1% of Belfast’s population. This 
numerical increase was reflected in the number of Churches built to cater for 
an expanding congregation, there being only two Episcopalian Churches in 
Belfast in 1827, expanding to 37 parish churches by the end of the Nineteenth 
Century. Additionally, there were over 17,500 children enrolled at Church of
Ireland Sunday Schools and a Cathedral accommodating over 2000 was under
118construction.
By 1881 Presbyterians numbered 71,521 in Belfast, an increase from 
60,249 a decade earlier.119 Presbyterianism expanded throughout the period, 
comprising 47 congregations connected with the General Assembly and a 
population of 120,235 by 1901.120 In relation to the 1901 Census The Witness 
declared, ‘These returns show that the Presbyterian Church has multiplied 
very creditably in the city since the previous census’, nine new congregations 
having been organised. 121The paper revelled in the ‘healthy state of 
Presbyterianism in Ireland’. It attributed this to a ‘revival of Evangelical life’, 
contrasting this with the declining fortunes of ‘Romanism and a Ritualising 
Protestant Episcopacy’. These comments illustrate the continued struggle for 
ascendancy within the Protestant community, a struggle temporarily 
suspended during periodic Home Rule crises and the pivotal role of Ritualism 
in this contest. This struggle for ascendancy was not only prosecuted in the 
religious sphere, but also impacted upon the political, ideological, social and 
organisational realms. The struggle over Ritualism eventually contributed to a 
profound breakdown in the fragile Unionist coalition, with an upsurge in 
damaging sectarian violence. The Witness concluded, when ‘the census
116 Henry.E.Patton (Archdeacon of Killalo), Fifty years of Disestablishment:
A Sketch. Dublin, 1922, 81
117 The Witness. 31 May 1901 & 24 May 1901; Patton, Fifty Years of 
Disestablishment 211
118 Phillips, History of the Church of Ireland 419 & Patton, Fifty Years of 
Disestablishment 24
119 RevJ.M’Connell, Presbyterianism in Belfast. Belfast 1912,40-41
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121 The Witness. 24 May 1901 & M’Connell, Presbyterianism in Belfast 43
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returns are carefully examined it will be found that the line of stability follows 
the line of Evangelical religion, and the line of decay follows the line of 
Ritualism and Romanism’.122 By 1911 the Presbyterian population of Belfast 
numbered 129,109 or 33.74% of the population, comprising 52 congregations 
and a fully equipped Presbyterian College. These congregations contained a 
quarter of the total number of families associated with the General Assembly,
193Presbyterians worshipping in a total of 33 Churches by 1920.
Methodism was the smallest of the three principal denominations, 
numbering 21,779 by 1901.124 However, by 1900 the Belfast Methodist 
District comprised a quarter of Irish Methodism, an increase from one-eighth 
in 1844. The Witness observed in 1901, ‘Methodism, which is intensely
196Evangelical, has increased in a very marked way’ throughout Ireland. A 
small, increasingly influential Evangelical caucus, comprising Evangelical 
Episcopalians and Nonconformists, emerged in the early 1880’s. Both
197factions shared a proselytising zeal, primarily amongst the working class, 
and a concern at the growth of Ritualism. Evangelicalism and anti-Ritualism 
gradually permeated the principal proletarian idiom, and agency of belligerent 
sectarianism, the Orange Order. This process found expression, during the 
early Edwardian period, in the militant Belfast Protestant Association, which 
employed violent collective action on the streets of Belfast. This organisation
122 The Witness. 31 May 1901
M’Connell, Presbyterianism in Belfast. 48 & H.S.Morrison, Modem 
Ulster: Its Character. Customs. Politics and Industries. London, 1920, 81
124 The Witness. 24 May 1901
19S •F.Jeffrey, Irish Methodism: An Historical Account of its Traditions. 
Theology and Influence. Belfast, 1964, 88-9 These figures should be seen 
against the backdrop of Belfast’s rapid population growth and the decline in 
Ireland’s total population.
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127 W.A. Maguire, Belfast. (Town and City Histories), Rybum Publishing, 
Keele Univ.Press, 1993, 81 states that during 1861-1901, ‘all denomination’s 
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cites an incident in 1888, when Methodist lay missionaries surveyed the 
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clergyman had ever called’.
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generated intense conflict within the Protestant community, threatening the 
stability of the Unionist coalition.
By 1901 there were 15 Catholic Churches, 73 clergymen, 34 monks and 
114 nuns catering for a Belfast community of 85,049 or 24% of the 
population.128 The Church grew in the city throughout the period, with 17 
Churches and 75 clergymen by 1926.129Levels of Catholic attendance in 
Belfast, as elsewhere in Ireland, tended to be very high from the late- 
Nineteenth Century onwards. Education was of ‘central interest’ to the 
Catholic Church, 42 o f275 national schools in the city prior to 1914 being 
Catholic controlled, whilst five Catholic schools provided secondary 
education for 468 pupils. At an estimated 23% of all pupils in superior 
education, this represented parity with the Catholic proportion of the total
11ftpopulation. As A.C.Hepbum pointed out, ‘Relations between the Catholic 
clergy and the Protestant elite of the town were cordial until about 1850’.
Two factors transformed this situation. The growth of ‘ethnic competition’ 
between Catholic and Protestant working classes was exacerbated by the 
influx of a very poor rural population following the Famine; and secondly, 
this coincided with the ‘international revival of a spirit of religious enthusiasm 
in the Catholic Church and also in the major Protestant churches. In Ireland, 
including Belfast, this made the Protestant Churches more aggressive and 
proselytising, and the Catholic Church more insular and bureaucratic’.131 
From 1865 successive Catholic Bishops of Down and Connor insisted on the 
‘separation of Catholics in education, an aloofness from the activities of the 
‘Protestant’ government, and on development of the ancillary institutions of 
the Church so that they filled and dominated the lives of Catholics’. 
Consequently, under Bishop Dorrian (1865-85) and his successors, the Church
128 Hepburn, A Past Apart. 129; The Witness. 24 May 1901 & A.C.Hepbum 
& B.Collins, ‘Industrial Society: The Structure of Belfast, 1901’, in: Peter 
Roebuck, ed, Plantation to Partition: Essavs in Ulster History in Honour of 
J.L.McCraken. 211
129 Hepburn, A Past Apart. 129
130 Hepburn, A Past Apart. 129
131 Hepburn, A Past Apart. 128
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‘played a central role in the social and political life of the Catholic 
community’.132
HOME RULE.
Despite constant Unionist exhortations for unity, especially during the 
Home Rule crises pre-existing tensions, grievances, and competition, 
particularly between the pre-eminent Episcopalians and Presbyterians, were 
still very much in evidence. This mutual suspicion and competition was 
embodied in the city’s Protestant associational culture and had a profound 
impact upon the political, ideological and organisational development of 
Ulster Unionism. The principal tensions and suspicions between 
Episcopalians and Presbyterians revolved around a number of key factors. 
These included the differing social composition of the two denominations, the 
Episcopalians being according to the Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette ‘largely 
dependent on the aristocracy’.133 In reality, the Episcopal Church had the 
‘most eclectic membership of any of the Churches’, but also had a higher 
percentage of the gentry and landed aristocracy. In contrast, Presbyterianism 
was the voice of the professions, trade and commerce, with the nucleus of its
1 1 4support in Belfast. There were continual insinuations throughout the 
period, emanating from Episcopalian ranks, as to the extent of Presbyterian 
loyalty to the Union. These suspicions were embroiled in the conflicting 
political allegiances of the two denominations, Presbyterianism being 
historically associated with Liberalism, and consequently tainted by links with 
Gladstone, the architect of Irish Home Rule. A significant number of 
Presbyterian ministers continued to support Home Rule until the fall of 
Parnell in 1890. In February 1886, the Episcopalian Gazette pointedly 
declared in relation to Presbyterianism, ‘our loyalty in this Union has never 
been questioned’.135 On the other hand, many Presbyterians, primarily 
ministers, elders and members of the Liberal-Presbyterian bourgeoisie,
132 Hepburn, A Past Apart. 128
133 Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette. 27 February 1886
134 David Hempton & Myrtle Hill, Evangelical Protestantism in Ulster Society 
1740-1890.170,173
expressed deep unease concerning the close relationship between 
Episcopalianism, Conservatism and ‘bigoted Orangeism’, particularly the 
latter’s association with sectarian violence. Liberal-Presbyterian attitudes 
towards the Order profoundly influenced the emerging Unionist movement’s 
relationship to popular sectarianism. There was also anger about perceived 
Episcopalian-Conservative domination of parliamentary representation in 
Belfast and of key Irish administrative posts. This tension was embodied by 
organisations like the Presbyterian Unionist Voters Association. In 1901, the 
Rev.John MacDermott declared Presbyterians ‘had been fighting a battle 
against sectarianism; they had been fighting against a rooted sectarianism, a 
rooted monopoly and supremacy on the part of the now Disestablished 
Church’.136 This bitter struggle, in the aftermath of the Second Home Rule 
Bill, resurfaced around the highly divisive issue of Ritualism within the 
Episcopal Church, threatening the unravelling of Unionism as a coherent force 
and witnessed a resurgence of sectarian action on the street. Efforts to 
reconcile the fractious denominations profoundly influenced Unionism as a 
political and organisational construct, particularly its relationship to the 
sectarian Orange Order.
The threat of Home Rule brought the Protestant denominations together 
under the umbrella of Unionism. The First Home Rule Bill was introduced by 
Gladstone on the 8th April 1886, being eventually defeated by 30 votes on the 
8th June 1886. Like the emerging Unionist movement the response of the 
Protestant denominations was less comprehensive and efficiently co-ordinated 
than subsequent mobilisations. Many clergymen denounced Home Rule from 
the pulpitI37and organised special services, lectures and prayer meetings.138 
Many churches drafted resolutions and organised petitions, the Episcopalian 
Gazette noting the emergence in the diocese of ‘a tolerably unanimous protest 
against the mischievous bill’. The Bishop decided ‘to take charge of petitions 
or resolutions adopted at vestries against Home Rule’.139 Leading clerical 
representatives from the diocese were actively involved in local and mainland
135 Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette. 27 February 1886
136 The Witness. 15 March 1901
137 Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette. 19 June 1886
138 Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette. 17 April 1886
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anti-Home Rule campaigns. The clergy performed a vital propaganda role 
during the campaign, bestowing legitimacy and respectability upon the 
emerging Unionist coalition, symbolising the unity of Ulster Protestant 
opposition. In a practical sense they helped mobilise their co-religionists 
locally and throughout Britain. Referring to Loyalist demonstrations in the 
diocese, the Gazette observed, the Episcopal Church ‘has come well to the 
front at most of these gatherings, the clergy taking an active part side by side 
with the loyalists of other denominations’.140 Much clerical rhetoric employed 
during 1886 was explicitly sectarian in character, contrasting sharply with 
public Unionist pronouncements in subsequent campaigns. The Rev.Dr Kane, 
Belfast Orange Grand Master and leading figure within the ‘Evangelical 
party’ in the Church of Ireland, declared at the Maze racecourse that ‘Irish 
Protestants, Irish Loyalists, would not be dragooned by moonlighters and 
murderers into a surrender of their liberties and into treachery to their Queen 
and to the glorious empire which they had done so much to build up and to 
render illustrious’.141 An explicit anti-Catholic dimension to the agitation was 
evident, a Presbyterian Minister proclaiming in a letter to the Editor of the 
Conservative Belfast News Letter that in reality Home Rule ‘just means Rome 
Rule’, with the ‘crushing of Protestantism as far as possible’.142 Additionally, 
the Presbyterian Moderator, Rev.Dr Lynd asserted that most Presbyterians 
believed Home Rule would place them ‘under the heel of a majority that hates 
them and would do everything in its powers to humiliate and dispossess 
them’. From 1892 explicit sectarianism was superceded by a 
Nonconformist inspired ‘liberal-humanitarian’ strand within public Unionist 
pronouncements. This strand emphasised the social, economic, political, as 
well as religious consequences of Home Rule and coincided with efforts to 
downplay the role and profile of popular sectarianism, principally the Orange 
Order, within the Unionist coalition.
139 Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette. 1 May 1886
140 Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette. 27 February 1886
141 Belfast News Letter. 27 April 1886
142 Belfast News Letter. 23 April 1886
David.W.Miller, Queen’s Rebels: Ulster Lovalism in Historical 
Perspective. 90
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In certain quarters during 1886, a more strident opposition to Home 
Rule was envisaged, one Presbyterian Minister writing ‘I quite agree with Dr 
Kane (Belfast Grand Master) that it will require something stronger than paper 
petitions to save us from Home Rule’. Whilst the Presbyterian Minister 
advocated ‘a great demonstration of all the Protestants of Ireland’, the Order 
was seen by prominent Episcopalian-Conservative Unionists as the potential 
framework for a ‘private army’.144These contrasting approaches reveal two 
strands within Ulster Unionism to be accommodated and reconciled. A 
primarily Nonconformist ‘liberal-humanitarian’ strand, emphasising 
Protestant unity and respectability, and an Orange, primarily Episcopalian- 
Conservative strand, which was more belligerent and explicitly sectarian.
Denominational attitudes towards the Orange Order, the principal 
proletarian idiom and exponent of belligerent Protestant collective action 
throughout the period, influenced not only Ulster Unionism’s political 
relationship to the Institution, but also the character of subsequent Unionist 
organisational initiatives. These initiatives sought to harness and integrate the 
Order, and to contain and ‘police’ its volatile sectarian support, with the aim 
of preserving the coalition, and in order to minimise perceptions of ‘Ulster 
bigotry’ on the mainland. There was significant Episcopalian clerical 
sympathy for and involvement in the Orange Order. At an institutional level 
not only was the Rev.Dr Kane Belfast Grand Master from 1884, but each 
Orange District had a District Chaplain.145 The degree of Episcopalian 
clerical support is provided by Canon Crosthwaite. He referred to the fact that 
Orange flags were planted on Church steeples and that clergymen marched 
along the roads ‘on certain anniversaries holding Orange flags’.146 Discretion 
regarding the erection of Orange banners on a parish church rested with the 
Select Vestry.
By 1886 many working class Presbyterians were either members of the 
Institution or sympathisers with Orange ideology. Circa 1885 it appears to
144 A.T.Q.Stewart, The Narrow Ground: Aspects of Ulster 1609-1969.167
145 Additionally, certain Orange lodges were associated with specific 
Churches. For instance, in 1880 there was StMatthews (Episcopalian)
Church Defenders (No. 1903) in Belfast. Loyal Orange Institution of Ireland, 
Report of the Grand Lodge of Belfast 1879-80. Belfast, 1880,6
146 Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette. 26 June 1886
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have become ‘socially acceptable’ for well-to-do Presbyterians to join the 
Order.147 However, serious reservations continued to be voiced concerning the 
Order, particularly its association with sectarian bigotry and outbreaks of 
‘mob violence’, and whether these would compromise the Unionist cause. In 
the aftermath of the 1886 riots, which killed approximately 86 people, the 
Order was seen by many respectable Protestants, both Episcopalian and 
Presbyterian, as a potential liability, both in terms of constructing a 
‘representative’ Ulster Protestant coalition and in projecting a respectable 
image on the mainland. The Presbyterian Minister stated in his letter to the 
Belfast News Letter that his proposed demonstration should be ‘a Protestant 
and not merely an Orange demonstration; if there were Orange sashes and 
banners many Protestants would not go’.148Another letter to the Gazette 
referred to the hoisting of Orange flags on church steeples. An Episcopalian 
stated, ‘at the present time, when the very existence of the Empire is at stake, I 
believe it expedient to forego displays which, as a matter of fact, many Liberal 
Unionists object to, in order to show that Conservatives are ready to meet 
them half way and unite with them hand and glove in defence of the Loyalist 
cause’. 149Episcopalians also condemned the violence in the aftermath of the 
defeat of Home Rule. The Gazette stated the ‘Ulster riots...are simply 
deplorable’, declaring ‘we have no words strong enough with which to 
express our disapprobation of the Loyalists who may have had any share in 
these disgraceful emeutes, and disgust at their proceedings’.150The experience 
of the 1886 riots contributed to subsequent Unionist efforts to contain the 
Orange Order’s excesses and to exercise a semblance of control over the 
Institution.
Organised religion was seen as an integral component of the Ulster 
Unionist coalition from its inception. It played a vital role in projecting a 
respectable united Ulster Protestant front, mobilising Protestant support at 
home and on the mainland. It was also crucial in establishing control over 
local organisations and as a response to the Catholic clergy’s close association
147 Miller, Queen’s Rebels. 92
148 Belfast News Letter. 23 April 1886
149 Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette. 10 July 1886
150 Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette. 12 June 1886
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with Irish Nationalism. Clerical antipathy to Home Rule extended to active 
involvement in the emerging political structures and organisations of Ulster 
Unionism. Shortly after the inception of the Ulster Loyalist anti-repeal 
Committee (U.L.a.r.C.) in Belfast, it granted honourary membership to 
Protestant clergy of all denominations throughout Ulster on the 16th February, 
subsequently establishing a sub-committee to solicit money from the 
Protestant churches. Many clergymen later joined the Ulster Loyal anti-repeal 
Union (U.L.a.r.U), the new political organisation founded by the Loyalist 
Committee on the 15th of May.
The Second Home Rule Crisis saw the emergence of Unionism as a 
coherent political and organisational force, geared towards combating Home 
Rule through politics and propaganda. The movement was increasingly 
preoccupied with its unity and respectability, exercising restraint and control 
over popular sectarianism and its frequently violent forms of collective action. 
A far more centralised co-ordinated strategy of resistance was evident, 
organised religion remaining an integral component of Unionist initiatives. 
Recognising the imperative of a united front against Home Rule, 
accommodating Unionists of ‘every creed, class and party through out Ulster’ 
and of conducting an effective propaganda campaign aimed at mainland 
public opinion, Nonconformist ‘liberal humanitarian’ objections gradually 
superceded explicitly sectarian ‘Orange’ objections at the forefront of 
Unionist rhetoric.151 In an effort to present itself as a united, representative, 
constitutional movement, this transition mirrored Unionism’s progressive 
distancing of itself, at least publicly, from explicit sectarianism and the 
organisations that embodied it. This increasingly influential ‘liberal 
humanitarian’ strand was clearly in evidence by 1892.
The Presbyterian Moderator, Rev.Dr.Lynd, declared at the Ulster 
Unionist Convention in June 1892, ‘there is but one thing under the sun can 
give us...security - security for our religious rights, for our land interests, for 
our commercial and manufacturing interests, for our educational interests, 
security for our liberty, and what is dearer than all, security for our religion -
151 Extract from the principal resolution of the Ulster Unionist Convention, in 
John.F.Harbinson, Hie Ulster Unionist Party. 1882-1973. Its Development 
and Organisation. 18.
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and that is the broad aegis of the British Constitution\152Behind this ‘liberal 
humanitarian’ fa9ade, the sectarian character of much opposition to Home 
Rule, both Episcopalian and Nonconformist, was still evident. In March 
1893, the Presbyterian Rev.George Magill preached ‘the outcome of 
concession would be a Papal Parliament, with all the evils of rampant 
ecclesiasticism in its train’. 153These two statements epitomise Ulster 
Unionism’s dilemma, appeasing and containing its sectarian grassroots whilst 
simultaneously projecting a respectable, united front to mainland public 
opinion.
The vital propaganda role of organised religion, providing a respectable 
facade to Unionist opposition to Home Rule, is revealed by the Belfast News 
Letter. In relation to the Balfour demonstration on Easter Tuesday 1893, it 
observed ‘the appearance of these religious organisations in a political 
procession...is a sufficient proof...that it is not bigoted political partisans alone 
who feel strongly on this question’. 154The projection of a respectable, united 
front was crucial to Unionist efforts to mobilise mainland opposition to Home 
Rule, organised religion being enlisted in this process. As part of its 
resolution against Home Rule, the Central Presbyterian Association appealed 
to its co-religionists in Great Britain ‘to aid us in our resistance to the passing 
of a measure which, if carried into effect, would postpone the much-needed 
settlement of the land question, would drive capital out of the country, cripple 
and impoverish trade, render all property in Ireland insecure, and enkindle the 
flames of civil war’.155
As in 1886, there was significant clerical support for, and active 
involvement in, Loyalist and Unionist organisations. However, profound 
denominational tensions persisted, particularly in relation to the role and 
prominence of the Orange Order within the coalition. Much tension centred 
upon continued Orange and Episcopalian-Conservative perceptions of the 
Order as the ‘elite’ of the Protestant working class, at the vanguard of 
resistance to Home Rule. Episcopalian clergy were much in evidence at the
152 Belfast News Letter. 18 June 1892
153 Belfast News Letter. 14 March 1893
154 Belfast News Letter. 5 April 1893
155 Belfast News Letter. 18 March 1893
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mass meeting of Belfast Orangemen at the Ulster Hall on the 2nd March. 
Br.Rev.Dr.Kelly stated, ‘They looked to the Orangemen of Belfast and they 
expected them to lead, and they would follow’.156
Many clergymen were sympathetic towards and actively engaged in the 
Ulster Unionist Clubs movement initiated in 1893. A Club was inaugurated at 
an Ulster Convention League meeting in Ballymacarrett, Rev. William 
M’Kean calling for a ‘definite organisation and enrolment of men of some 
kind’. He praised Lord Templetown, founder of the first Club and soon-to-be 
Chairman of the Ulster Unionist Clubs Council, commending the Clubs which 
‘band together the manhood of Ulster’. 157In commenting on Balfour’s visit to 
Belfast, the News Letter observed that prominent clergymen like Rev.Dr.Lynd 
and Rev. W.J. Jackson were to be found amongst the ranks of the Clubs.158 
The movement provided a representative organisational underpinning of 
Unionism, embodying inclusive ‘secular’ Unionist values. It also constituted 
a mechanism for exerting centralised political and organisational control over 
Ulster’s anti-Home Rule forces, a means of integrating and ‘policing’ their 
sectarian grassroots Orange support. Many Ulster Protestants, including the 
bulk of the Unionist leadership and many Liberal-Presbyterians, regarded the 
Clubs as an acceptable alternative to the Order at the vanguard of Unionist 
mobilisation. This reality generated suspicion and a growing sense of 
‘abandonment’ amongst elements within the Order. This was to have 
profound consequences for the Unionist coalition in the period after the defeat 
of Home Rule.
With its relaxation of organisational and political initiatives the 
aftermath of Home Rule witnessed the re-emergence of profound 
denominational, political and class tensions within the coalition, ultimately 
threatening the unravelling of Unionism as a political construct accompanied 
by an upsurge in sectarian violence. The highly contentious question of 
Ritualism encompassed a range of rivalries, suspicions, grievances and 
enmities. These included conflict and rivalry between Liberal-Presbyterians 
and the dominant Episcopalian-Conservative establishment. It also
156 Belfast News Letter. 3 March 1893
157 Belfast News Letter. 13 March 1893
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incorporated a struggle over the fundamental character, role and affiliation of 
the Orange Order and growing religious and class tensions within the 
Protestant community. These expressed themselves through a contest 
between a grassroots ‘Independent’ Orange strand and the bourgeois ‘clique’ 
dominating the Belfast Conservative Association and the Belfast Grand 
Orange Lodge. This Independent, or ‘democratic’ Protestant strand, alongside 
militant Evangelicalism was personified by Sloan’s successful candidacy in 
the 1902 South Belfast by-election and the subsequent formation of the I.O.O. 
This revolt represented a profound breakdown in the Unionist coalition, 
accompanied by renewed violence.
As a consequence of the revolt and the revival of the spectre of Home 
Rule from 1904, Ulster Unionism developed a far more centralised political 
and organisational strategy from 1905, embodied by the Ulster Unionist Party 
and the Ulster Unionist Council. This permanent, seemingly democratic 
structure, not only co-ordinated Ulster resistance, but sought to contain and 
exercise a semblance of control over Unionism’s volatile sectarian 
constituency. By the Third Home Rule crisis of 1912, Ulster Unionism was a 
highly centralised movement, organised religion comprising an integral 
component of an overall strategy of resistance. As in 1893, many of the 
established economic, social and political objections to Home Rule were 
reprised by the leading Protestant denominations, illustrating the pre­
eminence of the ‘liberal humanitarian’ strand within public Unionist rhetoric 
and the increasingly centralised control over Ulster resistance. The following 
resolution was passed at a Special Meeting of the General Synod of the 
Church of Ireland in April 1912. ‘Recognising the increase of prosperity and 
industry in Ireland during recent years, and considering this improvement to 
be largely due to the beneficent legislation of the Imperial Parliament...we 
protest against the passing of any measure which would arrest our advance, 
place the progressive elements of the community at the mercy of the 
unprogressive, strengthen those forces of disorder still existing among us, and 
render life and property insecure’.159
159 Ulster Unionist Council Year Book. 1913.58
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In contrast to the pragmatism adopted by Tory Democracy towards 
sectarian street mobilisation and Protestant violence, Ulster Unionism, via 
increased concentration of political and organisational control, sought to 
distance itself from overt expressions of sectarianism and to minimise the risk 
of violence. However, beneath this expedient facade, the clear implication 
was that for many Protestants Home Rule still meant ‘Rome Rule’. The 
President of Assembly’s College Belfast proclaimed at the Presbyterian 
Convention: ‘If the Union was repealed an Irish Parliament with a large 
majority of Roman Catholics would persecute Protestants. There were 
hundreds of ways in which an Irish Parliament, dominated by a majority who 
dare not resist the demands of their clergy, would be able to pursue a 
systematic policy of unfair treatment of Protestants, penalise their religion, 
and inflict such disabilities as would gradually squeeze them out of 
Ireland’.160
Organised religion continued to play a vital propaganda role. By far the 
largest denominational expressions of opposition to Home Rule were the 
Presbyterian and Methodist Conventions held in Belfast during February and 
March of 1912. The Presbyterian Convention comprised nine meetings the 
News Letter noting that applications were received for 47,000 tickets with 
those attending limited almost exclusively to ‘Parliamentary electors’. The 
News Letter declared the sole purpose of the Convention was to ‘demonstrate 
to those people of England and Scotland who appreciate the heritage of civil 
and religious liberty which has been bequeathed to them that their co­
religionists in Ireland are equally jealous and proud of the privileges which 
have been handed down to them’.161 Organised religion was also heavily 
involved in the large symbolic Unionist demonstrations of the period, 
particularly Ulster Day, Saturday 28th September 1912.162 Throughout Ulster 
the day opened with religious services, the most important held in Belfast. At 
the Ulster Hall the preacher was the Rev.Dr.M’Kean, ex-Moderator of the 
General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. At Belfast Cathedral was the
160 Belfast News Letter. 2 February 1912
161 Belfast News Letter. 2 February 1912
162 David W.Miller states that prior to its publication the Covenant was 
submitted to the main Protestant Churches. Miller, Queen’s Rebels. 97
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RtRev.Dr.d’ Arcy, Lord Bishop of the diocese, whilst 
Rt.Rev.Dr.Montgomery, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, presided at 
the Assembly Hall.163 The rector of StMary Magdalene declared it was a 
‘historic day in the province of Ulster, since there was seen for the first time in 
the experience of any of them the magnificent and inspiring and encouraging 
spectacle of men forgetting differences of every kind in the great and helpful 
purpose of prayer and worship’.164
The highly co-ordinated character of Unionist resistance is further 
illustrated by religious involvement in the extensive Unionist political and 
organisational network. The Methodist Convention pledged to ‘provide the 
necessary funds’ for the diffusion of literature deemed ‘advisable’ by the 
Standing Committee of the Ulster Unionist Council, with evidence of strong 
religious links with the Ulster Unionist Clubs. Members of the local Orange 
Order and Unionist Clubs walked in procession to the various places of 
worship on Ulster Day.165
ANTI-RITUALISM
In Liverpool anti-Ritualism proved to be a source of co-operation 
between evangelical Anglicans and the bulk of Nonconformity, providing a 
catalyst for political co-operation between this evangelical Protestant caucus 
and the influential democratic Conservative forces embodied by the 
W.M.C.A. In contrast, Ritualism was a highly divisive religious, class and 
political issue in Belfast. Rivalries within the Protestant community were 
generally subsumed during the periodic Home Rule crises. However, when 
this cement had receded the question of Ritualism exposed tensions between 
Evangelical’s and Ritualists within the Episcopal Church and exacerbated 
underlying rivalry between Liberal Presbyterians and the dominant 
Episcopalian-Conservative establishment. Most significantly, in terms of 
sectarian violence it was a catalyst in the emergence of a ‘grassroots’
163 There were also prominent representatives of the Methodist and the Irish 
Congregational Union.
164 Belfast News Letter. 30 September 1912
165 Belfast News Letter. 30 September 1912
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Protestant movement, which attacked the local Episcopalian-Conservative 
establishment on class and religious grounds, employing both political 
agitation and belligerent forms of collective action on the streets of Belfast.
The length of this controversy over ‘innovation’ within the Episcopal 
Church is illustrated by the case of Canon Macllwaine in Belfast. The Rector 
of StGeorge’s outlined ‘the opposition, and at times persecution’ Macllwaine 
received from ‘fellow-Churchmen in the North of Ireland’. He was initially 
accused of being a ‘Puseyite’ for discarding the practise of changing his robes 
in the middle of the service and instead praying and preaching in the 
surplice.166 Next he was dubbed a ‘High Churchman’ for chanting the Psalms 
of David and finally a ‘Ritualist’ for openly inviting his congregation to 
assemble to ‘thank God for the blessings of harvest’. Murphy noted 
opposition to ‘innovation’ was ‘served up too often with hot sauce’. He stated 
in relation to Macllwaine’s introduction of an early communion service that 
‘public feeling was so strong against it in this town that the communicants 
dare not enter by the regular gate...but had to creep in by stealth’.167
Despite many of these ‘innovations’ becoming acceptable practises by 
1886 the Ritualist controversy continued. The principal source of opposition 
within the Church of Ireland was the ‘Evangelical Party’ centred upon the 
Belfast Grand Master, Rev.Dr.Kane. This acrimonious debate was seen in 
certain quarters as a potential source of schism within the Church. The rector 
of Ballymoney attacked the anti-Ritualist’s ‘mistaken way of opposing Rome 
by going as far as possible into the opposite extreme’. He proclaimed ‘the 
remedy for Romanism is not Puritanism, that the remedy for superstition is 
not irreverence; that the remedy for ultra-ritualism is not sacrilege’.168
Another increasingly significant factor in the ‘controversy’ was growing 
co-operation between the Evangelical party and Nonconformity producing a 
small Evangelical caucus. Elements within Episcopalianism interpreted this 
growing alliance as a partisan, primarily Presbyterian, attempt to undermine 
their Chinch and as a naked Nonconformist attempt at ‘poaching’ members.
166 A follower of Edward Bouverie Pusey, a leading member of the Oxford 
Movement.
167 Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette. 8 May 1886
168 Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette. 26 June 1886
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Additionally the first Home Rule crisis witnessed growing interaction between 
working class Presbyterians and Episcopalians within the Orange Order, with 
anti-Ritualism assuming a pivotal role in the struggle for denominational and 
political influence and control. Although peripheral, the struggle against 
Ritualism was still in progress during the mobilisations against the Second 
Home Rule Bill. In February 1893, the Protestant Defence Association of the 
Church of Ireland despatched a petition to the General Synod protesting 
against a ‘brazen cross’ at StBartholomew’s. This was placed in a 
‘conspicuous place in front o f the (Communion) table’ appearing to ‘give the 
character of an altar to the holy table of the Lord’. This was deemed to be a 
‘scandalous evasion of the law and a direct violation of the spirit of the 
Canons Ecclesiastical of the Church’, warning if it was ‘permitted to remain it 
may give rise to other and more serious changes in the services of the 
Church’.169
In the aftermath of the defeat of Home Rule Ritualism assumed central 
religious and political significance within the Protestant community, 
threatening the unravelling of the fragile Unionist coalition and witnessing the 
resurgence of Protestant collective action in the street. The Episcopalian- 
Conservative establishment maintained that Home Rule and the growing 
threat posed by the United Irish League remained of central political 
importance. However, the Liberal Presbyterians, in conjunction with the 
Evangelical party, identified Ritualism as the ‘danger’ of the hour, attempting 
to position themselves at the vanguard of resistance to this threat. The 
following example is typical of the rhetoric found in the pages of The 
Witness. In April 1901 ‘Cloughmacsimon’ commented in relation to Cardinal 
Vaughan’s letter to the King, proposing alterations to the Accession 
Declaration that ‘the nation hardly needed an awakening as to what 
Romanism is and aims at. The secession of Newman, Manning, and the other 
perverts from the Church of England; the appeals of Lord Halifax and his 
dishonest gang to Anglicans and others to reunite with Rome; and the spread 
of the fashions of Ritualism...had and have done much to bewilder the slow 
English mind as to the character and doings of the Papacy. And so it is that
169 Belfast News Letter. 13 February 1893
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multitudes have utterly forgotten that Rome is essentially and professedly an 
intolerant and persecuting system’.170
This conflict intensified the struggle for influence within the Orange 
Order, a bridge to the strategic Protestant working class, with a growing band 
of Presbyterians attempting to engage with the Institution and its traditions.
By emphasising the record of the Episcopalian-Conservative (‘E.C.’) 
Unionists on Ritualism and the formula of ‘principle before politics’, the 
Presbyterians hoped to engineer a reconfiguration in the Order’s traditional 
religious and political allegiance.
Within this growing power vacuum, popular Protestant Evangelical 
street-preachers like Arthur Trew and Thomas Henry Sloan emerged. Anti- 
Ritualism, alongside rabid anti-Catholicism the bedrock of their grassroots 
appeal. Their fusing of religious and class antagonisms and their 
politicisation proved a serious threat to Unionism as a political construct and 
to the continued legitimacy of the local religious and political establishment. 
Consequently, the degree of grassroots Protestant support enjoyed by Trew 
and Sloan and the manner in which they promoted popular Protestant issues 
and concerns, precipitated a breakdown in the Unionist caucus. Despite the 
collapse of the Protestant revolts in Liverpool and Belfast, the consequences 
in each city were quite different. In Belfast, Ulster Unionism exploited the 
‘unifying’ factor of Home Rule, asserting increasingly centralised control over 
their volatile grassroots support. If Ulster Unionism had adopted the 
pragmatic strategy of Tory Democracy, allowing a powerful autonomous 
force akin to the Protestant Democracy to develop a situation similar to that 
prevailing in Edwardian Liverpool might have developed. This would have 
had profound consequences for the struggle against Home Rule.
The aggressive tactics employed by Trew and Sloan, their strong class 
appeal, and injection of explicit sectarianism back into the public sphere, 
elicited an outpouring of indignation from the local Protestant establishment. 
The ‘respectable’ portion of the Protestant community repudiated Trew’s 
pretence to ‘voice their opinions and regard with repugnance the violence of 
language to which he has over and over again resorted’. The Witness
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described the majority of the crowd at the Custom House Steps as 
‘unmistakably non Church-goers-the idle, careless, curious throng, easily 
attracted and in the main irresponsible’.171 This overwhelmingly working 
class movement directly threatened the image of unity and respectability 
cultivated by Unionism and undermined the legitimacy of the local 
Episcopalian-Conservative establishment. Trew had been a linen lapper and 
later a shipyard worker turned Evangelical street-preacher. He founded the 
Belfast Protestant Association (B.P.A) at the end of the nineteenth Century.172 
The B.P.A was actively engaged in anti-Ritualist activities in the city, finding 
fault with the ‘reading desk’ in StAidan’s, because it was not ‘in the right 
position’.173 The organisation was also explicitly anti-Catholic. In reference 
to the Catholic Bishop of Belfast, described as a ‘ribald and blasphemous 
hypocrite’, Trew described Dr.Henry as a ‘businessman in the best-paying 
business in the world (Laughter). He sold scapulars to prevent contagious 
diseases and took coppers to get people out of purgatory, things for which an 
ordinary man would be liable to find himself in prison on the charge of 
obtaining money under false pretences. He pitied Roman Catholics from his 
heart, and he hoped the day would soon dawn when they would come to 
believe in the glorious principle of the Reformation’.174
As in Liverpool these verbal assaults inevitably translated into violence, 
The Witness lamenting the ‘too frequent disturbances which degrade our 
city’.175 The most serious of these occurred on Sunday 9th June 1901 in 
connection with the Catholic Corpus Christi procession. Four people were 
admitted to hospital and in total nineteen arrests made.176 Head Constable 
Sargent commented in relation to the hostile Protestant crowd, that he heard 
‘filthy names called and insulting remarks passed about their (Catholic) 
religion’. Sargent testified he heard members of the Protestant crowd ‘calling 
out to put them (Catholics) off the streets at once, as they were Fenians and
171 The Witness. 28 June 1901
172 Trew was also the chaplain of Belfast Loyal Orange Lodge 1028.
173 Belfast News Letter. 14 August 1902 letter from ‘A Churchman’ to the 
editor.
174 Belfast News Letter. 18 August 1902
175 The Witness. 21 June 1901
176 The Witness. 11 June 1901
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blackguards'. He concluded ‘the general conduct of the opposing crowd was 
very bad, as they did their best to create a disturbance there’.177 Amongst 
those arrested was Arthur Trew, charged with incitement to riot,178 and 
sentenced to twelve months with hard labour.
With Trew’s imprisonment Sloan and his supporters (‘Sloanites’) 
assumed control of the B.P.A and in his capacity as lecturer recommenced 
Sunday afternoon anti-Catholic sermons at the Steps. Sloan was a shipyard 
cement worker and Master of an Orange lodge. A major consequence of this 
transition was the politicisation of grassroots Protestant grievances, directed 
against the bourgeois clique, or ‘Deadheads’, concentrated in the Belfast 
Conservative Association and the Belfast Grand Orange Lodge. These 
grievances incorporated anger over the perceived political manipulation and 
‘dictation’ exercised over the local Order by the Belfast Conservative 
Association. Many Orangemen also felt a sense of ‘abandonment’ dating 
back to the Second Home Rule crisis. The ‘Deadheads’ were perceived to 
have underestimated the threat posed by Ritualism and Romanism coupled 
with growing disenchantment at the record of local and national 
Conservatism. Other factors included temperance reform, class and labour 
grievances, denominational tensions, and the desire amongst a section of the 
Protestant working class for increased representation and recognition within 
the Unionist coalition.
Sloan was soon at the vanguard of Independent Protestant politics in the 
city, successfully contesting the South Belfast by-election in August 1902. 
Sloan declared the contest ‘was largely a question of whether the forces of 
Protestantism or of Ritualism and Romanism would win’. In a similar vein 
Alex Boyd, Sloan’s principal Trade Union speaker, proclaimed victory would 
‘convince Arthur James Balfour, who was contaminated and saturated with 
Ritualistic tendencies, that Belfast would support nothing in the shape of 
Popery’.179 In essence, the contest was a struggle for political legitimacy and 
control over the strategic Protestant working class and the Orange Order. It 
was a struggle between a popular Protestant movement which sought to re­
177 The Witness. 28 June 1901
178 The Witness. 28 June 1901
179 Belfast News Letter. 18 August 1902
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assert fundamental sectarian grassroots issues and concerns, free from the 
‘dictation’ of the Belfast Grand Orange Lodge and its ‘political masters’ in the 
Belfast Conservative Association. This establishment sought to preserve its 
hegemony, preventing the unravelling of Unionism, by using its traditional 
but increasingly impotent appeal for ‘unity’ to defeat the ‘common enemy’.
Sloan was instrumental in the formation of the dissident Independent 
Orange Order (I.O.O) in 1903, symbolising the breakdown in established 
relations within Belfast’s Protestant community. Anti Ritualism and anti- 
Catholicism were prominent concerns, alongside a more progressive 
’democratic’ strand, epitomised by Lindsay Crawford, first Grand Master of 
the new order. Growing tension between these strands was a major cause of 
the ultimate failure of the I.O.O. On the 12th July, the Rev.D.D.Boyle, Grand 
Chaplain of the Independent Order, delivered a sermon on the ‘split’ within 
the old Order. He declared, ‘when I see insidious attempts made to establish 
and endow Papal propagandism in our land, when I see England becoming the 
dumping ground of the Popish dross of the Continent, I say it is high time that 
we, as a nation, asked for men with a quickened conscience in high places.
We need a revival of Protestantism in this land’.180
However, with the revival of Home Rule the divisive issue of Ritualism 
diminished in importance. In 1904 the President of the Irish Reform 
Association outlined his local devolution proposals, dubbed Home Rule by 
instalments, at a Unionist conference in Belfast. From 1905, the 
representative Ulster Unionist Council placed Unionism on a permanent 
institutional footing, providing increasingly centralised political and 
organisational control over the Unionist coalition. This control lasted until the 
serious sectarian rioting of 1920-22 convulsed Belfast during the Anglo-Irish 
war.
CONCLUSION
The principal contrast between the two cities revolved around the 
primary source of religious conflict. Within Liverpool’s Evangelical
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Protestant community the interrelated struggle against the ‘scourge’ of 
Ritualism in the Church of England and the general threat of Romanism 
eclipsed all other preoccupations. This struggle provided a bridge between the 
influential Anglican Evangelical party and the bulk of Nonconformity, 
interacting within the city’s overwhelmingly working class Evangelical 
culture. During the late 1880’s/90’s Ritualism was also a vital catalyst in the 
political alliance forged between the increasingly strident ‘democratic’ 
Conservative forces and the emerging Protestant Democracy, part of a 
protracted power-struggle within the local Conservative political machine. 
From this point on the increasingly politicised anti-Ritualist campaign fused 
religious and class grievances and aspirations, a combination which 
profoundly impacted upon the character and development of Liverpool Tory 
Democracy and upon future grassroots political dissent and self-expression. 
The spread of insidious ‘error’ both locally and nationally was seen as a 
component of an overarching struggle for ascendancy between Reformation 
Protestantism, a ‘core’ component of British national identity, and Roman 
Catholicism, excacerbated by an uneven and contradictory secularisation 
process. However, in Belfast the divisive issue of Ritualism and explicit anti- 
Catholicism were largely subsumed within the overriding struggle against 
Home Rule, a reality transcending historic denominational class and political 
rivalries within the Ulster Protestant community. For long periods the 
imminent possibility of ‘Papal rule’ with all its implications for Irish 
Protestants rendered the insidious and contentious threat posed by Ritualism 
within the Episcopal Church a subsidiary concern. In Liverpool, the 
campaign against Ritualism in the Church of England was initially seen by 
prominent Evangelical Anglican figures like Ryle as part of a national strategy 
to rejuvenate the Established Church by re-engaging with the ‘masses’. 
However, this crusade was soon co-opted by more militant elements adopting 
belligerent, direct-action methods and, from the early Edwardian period, drove 
it in an explicitly anti-Catholic direction. Evangelical street-preachers were 
highly effective at exploiting local anxieties and concerns at the perceived 
erosion of Protestant ‘marginal privileges’ and growing Catholic self- 
confidence, both locally and nationally, manipulating their mass followings 
for religious and political ends. Eventually, the methods, and growing power
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of these community leaders generated conflict within the Protestant 
community. Concerns were directed at the crude anti-Catholicism and 
escalating violence associated with the emergence of the Protestant 
Democracy. This alternative ‘power bloc’, particularly after 1900, was 
beyond the influence and control of Tory Democracy. In contrast to the 
spontaneity and disorder associated with sectarian street mobilisation in 
Liverpool, in Belfast organised religion was integrated into an increasingly 
co-ordinated and centralised political strategy of resistance to Home Rule. 
This strategy sought to avoid acts of spontaneous violence and disorder like 
those in 1886.
The issue of Ritualism bound together the Evangelical forces within 
Liverpool’s Protestant community. However, in Belfast Ritualism exposed 
underlying fault lines within Ulster Protestant society and threatened to 
compromise Unionism as a viable political construct. The complex question 
of Ritualism not only generated tension within Episcopalianism, it also 
constituted a basis of growing co-operation between the influential 
Evangelical party and Nonconformity. Consequently, Ritualism fed into 
continued rivalry and struggle for dominance between the Episcopalian- 
Conservative establishment and the aspiring Liberal-Presbyterians, who 
endeavoured to position them-selves at the vanguard of resistance to this 
threat. In the early Edwardian period this rivalry spilled over into a struggle 
for influence and control within the Orange Order, which not only remained 
the principal proletarian idiom, but was also an arena for growing inter­
denominational working class co-operation. The anti-Ritualist campaign in 
Belfast also assumed a pronounced class complexion, the new grassroots 
movement personified by Trew and Sloan fusing an established ‘Independent’ 
Orange and a militant Protestant strand. This movement attacked the 
legitimacy of the local political establishment, or ‘Deadheads’, concentrated 
in the B.C.A and the B.G.O.L on religious and class grounds. This struggle 
was caricatured as a contest between ‘Rowdyism and Respectability’, with the 
local political establishment (primarily Episcopalian-Conservative, but 
including Liberal-Presbyterians) fighting to preserve their political hegemony 
and Unionism as a viable political construct.
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Similarly, whilst the anti-Ritualist campaign in Liverpool was initially a 
basis of co-operation and unity, it ultimately proved to be a source of conflict, 
particularly when Wise drove it in an explicitly anti-Catholic direction from 
1901. Through the political alliance forged with Liverpool’s Evangelical 
forces, vital to the ‘democratisation’ process within the local Conservative 
political machine, Salvidge empowered a potentially volatile new power bloc, 
the Protestant Democracy. After his attainment of political power in 1900, 
Salvidge attempted to reign in the Protestant agitation and consolidate party 
unity, Tory Democracy losing much of its radical edge. Within the context of 
this political vacuum and a Conservative Government deemed soft on 
Ritualism and Romanism, a new Protestant political force emerged 
threatening to undermine local Tory Democracy by deploying grassroots 
electoral strength upon the basis of ‘Protestant principle’.
Consequently, during the early Edwardian period, when a political 
vacuum occurred in both cities and disaffection with the Conservative 
Government was growing grassroots Protestant ethno-nationalist movements 
emerged. Both employed the rhetoric of Ritualism/Romanism in order to 
attack the dominant political culture and heralded the possibility of a ‘new 
politics’. This period witnessed considerable interaction between the 
Evangelical forces in both cities. Militant Protestants like Wise, Stones and 
the Kensits had developed close links with Belfast. John Kensit Snr visited 
the city in March 1901 and delivered an address at the Albert Hall, Shankill 
Rd, entitled ‘An Evening with Ritualists’.181 Later in July 1902 he travelled to 
the city with the intention of running as a candidate in the South Belfast by- 
election, eventually contested by Sloan.182 A year later Wise was in 
attendance at the inaugural meeting of the I.O.O on the 12th July 1903, where 
he moved a resolution. Additionally, Albert Stones visited the city in 
September 1903, apparently at the behest of the B.P.A.184 From Belfast came 
Arthur Trew who on Sunday 7th September 1902, in conjunction with Wise,
181 The Witness. 22 March 1901
182 The Protestant Searchlight. Vol.l. New Series. Liverpool. 1904.30
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led a large Orange demonstration from Islington Square to Seaforth.185 Sloan, 
as the recently elected Independent M.P for South Belfast, was also associated 
with the N.P.E.F in Liverpool, appearing on its inaugural platform on the 23rd 
May 1903.186 Thomas Galbraith, the B.P.A’s Treasurer, accompanied by a 
‘large contingent of Belfast Orangemen’, was present at Wise’s release from 
Walton gaol on 5th June 1903.187
In each context these dissident movements were fatally undermined by 
their own internal contradictions and by the continued fidelity of the bulk of 
the Protestant working class to the dominant political culture. The response of 
Ulster Unionism to the revolt was to assert increasingly centralised 
organisational and political control over the anti-Home Rule coalition, whilst 
Liverpool Tory Democracy explored alternative issues, like Tariff Reform, 
anti-Socialism and defence of the Union upon which to secure Protestant 
workers allegiance. This strategy left militant ‘Wiseite’ Protestants free to 
exercise more disruptive methods of influence and control, via the 
manipulation of large-scale sectarian street mobilisations, facilitated by 
extensive local associational networks. The following chapter will examine 
the various organisations and networks which underpinned the Protestant 
Democracy in Liverpool and the various structures and organisations created 
by Ulster Unionism in order to harness, contain and control their volatile 
support.
185 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 209
186 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 219
187 Belfast News Letter. 8 June 1903
183
CHAPTERTHREE - PROTESTANT ASSOCIATIONS CULTURE IN 
BELFAST AND LIVERPOOL.
Religion played a pivotal role in the breakdown in relations within 
Liverpool’s Protestant community accompanied by the evolution of the 
militant Protestant Democracy as the principal agency of belligerent sectarian 
collective action on the city’s streets. In Belfast, it had a profound influence 
upon the development of Ulster Unionism, constituting both a galvanising 
source of communal co-operation and unity and of profound disunity and 
dissent. Protestant associational culture in Liverpool and Belfast reflected, and 
profoundly influenced, the principal manifestation of sectarian conflict in the 
two cities, whether through collective violence in the street or politics and 
propaganda. In Liverpool, the diverse, yet inter-connected, character of 
Protestant culture embodied the fragmentation of power and leadership over 
the Protestant working class and the growing divergence between formal 
Conservative politics and organisation and the belligerent politics of the street. 
Far from Protestant culture being integrated into an efficient Conservative 
political machine, in reality it reflected the fragmented and devolved nature of 
power and leadership over the Protestant working class.1 Initially enlisted 
through the anti-Ritualist ‘crusade’ by elements within the Tory-Anglican 
establishment, as a medium for engaging with the Protestant working class, the 
activities of popular Protestant organisations proved difficult to manage.2 With 
the decomposition of the anti-Ritualist coalition, which employed legal and 
political recourse alongside direct-action, the community of the street became 
the primary arena for the assertion of the Protestant Democracy’s influence. 
Community leaders like Wise built extensive networks, the bedrock of their 
empires, with these overlapping existing bodies like the Orange Order.3
1 For an alternative view see Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities o f Liverpool” , 11
2 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 251 & P.J.Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism1 
1983 have outlined the difficulty in controlling the Order in Liverpool.
3 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 250-51 & Taplin on Neal, ‘’Sectarian Violence” , 
94-5 concentrates upon, and over-emphasises, the role of the Orange Order in 
‘promoting and sustaining Protestant fears’, and in provoking violence.
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Protestant culture contributed to the demarcation of territory,4 provided a social 
service for the Protestant working class and was the mechanism for mobilising 
the Protestant Democracy’s social and political muscle.5
In contrast to Liverpool, I argue associational culture in Belfast reflected 
Unionism’s drive for centralisation and control. With Protestant religious 
culture largely divided along denominational lines and preoccupied with 
parochial and missionary work, the Orange Order remained the dominant ‘local 
proletarian idiom’, the primary vehicle of Protestant assertion in the social, 
economic and political spheres. With the introduction of Home Rule the 
Episcopalian-Conservative establishment’s relationship to popular sectarianism 
was transformed, with subsequent Unionist initiatives reflecting new political 
imperatives. Unionist organisations fulfilled a vital propaganda function, 
embodying ideals of unity and respectability.6 They also provided political and 
organisational stability, an efficient mobilisational mechanism and a means of 
integrating and emasculating alternative sources of social and political power.7 
Crucially, they were also instrumental in harnessing, containing and ultimately 
controlling popular sectarianism, in the process distancing Unionism from 
perceptions of ‘Ulster bigotry’.8 Fundamental to this strategy was Unionism’s 
ability to harness and integrate the strategic Orange Order, whilst 
simultaneously circumscribing its role and influence within the coalition, 
‘policing’ its supporters and nullifying the Institution as a source of potential 
dissent and disunity.9 Apart from one critical period, Unionism proved
4 see Smith, ‘’Labour Tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool” , 49
5 Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class” , 175,214 refers to ‘ethnic 
cocoons’ of values and organisations which ‘comprehensively answered the 
needs of working class life and created the mentalities and regiments for 
combat’.
6 See historians like Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party. 21 & Buckland,
Irish Unionism: Two. 17,63
7 see Bell, The Protestants of Ulster. 139
8 see Stewart, The Narrow Ground. 167 & Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two. 63 
on this containment strategy and Berresford-Ellis, A History of the Irish 
Working Class. 204 & Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism. 140 for an 
alternative view.
9 see Patterson, Class Conflict and Sectarianism. IX & Gibbon, The Oripins Of 
Ulster Unionism. 103,138 on the threat posed by Orangeism, particularly 
Independent Orangeism, to the Unionist establishment and for an alternative 
view, Bell, The Protestants of Ulster. 88 who argues that the Order, controlled
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remarkably successful at managing the Order, and through it, popular 
sectarianism. Consequently, whereas Unionist infrastructure proved to be a 
remarkably effective medium for exercising central political control, its 
Protestant counterpart in Liverpool became the principal mechanism for 
mobilising the muscle of the Protestant Democracy.
LIVERPOOL.
EVANGELICAL PROTESTANT CULTURE.
Liverpool’s Protestant culture can be divided into three distinct, yet inter­
connected components. The first constituted the bedrock of the increasingly 
powerful Protestant Democracy, which although relatively distinct, nonetheless 
overlapped with the Orange Order and the W.M.C.A. Liverpool’s Evangelical 
Protestant culture, galvanised by the issue of Ritualism within the Established 
Church, was seen as a vital catalyst by elements within the Tory-Anglican 
establishment for engaging with and harnessing the Protestant working class. 
This culture was instrumental in efforts to revive Anglicanism amongst the 
‘nominal’ Protestant masses, and in internal power-struggles and the wider 
‘democratisation’ process within the local Conservative political machine. 
However, this engagement empowered an increasingly autonomous force the 
Protestant Democracy. Organised within, and mobilised by this culture the 
Protestant Democracy was provided with an identity, a means of collective 
expression and action, a source of communal protection and a social service. 
Unlike Belfast, the Protestant Democracy and its culture primarily operated in 
the community of the street, employing amongst other means collective 
violence to exert its influence and power. The following section will look at 
the principal organisations, and networks, that comprised this culture.
The Treasurer of the Liverpool Church Association enunciated its 
determination ‘not to rest until they had accomplished the task of purging the 
Protestant Church from the plague of ritualism’, its ultimate goal being the
by the Unionist establishment, was integral to the construction of a Unionist 
‘all-class alliance’.
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preservation of ‘the nation to which the Church belongs’.10 The Association 
sought to counteract the activity of the English Church Union11 and to function 
as the conscience of J.C.Ryle, Bishop of Liverpool, ensuring he disciplined 
‘offending clergy’ through the special court established by the Public Worship 
Regulation Act of 1875.12 A strong anti-Catholic under-current was evident, 
Canon Woodward proclaiming ‘They (the Evangelicals) must in all their 
doings give an emphatic protest against the pretensions of the Pope’.13
The Association confronted the local spread of Ritualism. The Liverpool 
Honorary Secretary recalled an instance when its supporters expostulated with 
a Ritualist clergyman.14 The Liberal Review commented upon the populism of 
Evangelical organisations. It stated, ‘The energy of the Ritualists has spurred 
the Evangelicals on to vigorous efforts to secure the adhesion of the masses 
formerly neglected...so that now High and Low may be said to be running a 
race for popularity with the people, in which the odds may be said to be pretty 
evenly balanced’.15 Along with the Orange Order, the Association was at the 
vanguard of Ryle’s ‘evangelisation’ strategy, exploiting anti-Ritualism as a 
medium for re-engaging the ‘nominal’ Protestant masses with the Established 
Church. However, this campaign quickly developed a grassroots dynamic, 
impossible to manage or contain on a coherent basis.
The British Protestant Union, founded in 1898, was a key component of 
Pastor George Wises’ network. It fought a ‘trinity of evils’ identified as 
‘Romanism, Ritualism, and Infidelity’,16 the Rev. John Woods describing it as 
an ‘Undenominational Protestant Army’ engaged in a ‘fight for their liberties’. 
He believed its role was to ‘bring about a union of all Protestant men and
1 7women’, upholding the principles of the Reformation, purging those, who in 
Wise’s words promoted an ‘apostate and tyrannical Church’.18 A precondition
10 Protestant Standard, 15 February 1890
11 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 189 The Union was formed in 1850, with the 
object of protecting the interests of local ritualist clergy.
12 Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 167
13 Protestant Standard 8 May 1897
14 Protestant Standard, 15 February 1890
15 The Liberal Review. 1885. vol. 16 .17 January 1885
16 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 201
17 Protestant Standard. 16 April 1898
18 Protestant Standard. 23 April 1898
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for the defeat of ‘error’ was a campaign of education, particularly of the 
Protestant working class laity, demonstrating that anybody in the Church of 
England who ‘dared to call a common table an altar was a traitor’.19 The B.P.U 
was to take ‘a scrubbing brush’ and wash ‘the dirty face of Popery’ John Kensit 
Senior declaring they had to ‘wash away priestcraft, sacerdotalism, the mass, 
the confessional, purgatory and all the other abominations’ introduced into the 
Church. This was to be achieved by the inauguration of a ‘Second
Reformation’ a return to ‘primitive Catholic and Apostolic truth’ revealed in
0\the Bible texts. The Evangelicals sought to ensure ‘enlightenment, freedom of 
the press, manhood, the privacy of home life, and the innocence and purity of 
English childhood’ threatened by the ‘alien’ doctrines and practises of Roman 
Catholicism, propagated by the ‘mock Papists’22 within the Established 
Church.23
The direct action component o f B.P.U strategy, involved picketing 
offending churches. In relation to StAgnes, Wise stated ‘I would like to give 
that clergyman a box on the ears...and I hope I shall soon be able to give a 
lecture entitled ‘The confessional in StAgnes exposed’ and I guess there will 
be a mighty row in that quarter’.24 Such pronouncements were coupled with 
incitements that ‘the laity ought to do it’,25 actively assisting in the crushing of 
‘traitors’ within the Church. It is not surprising that B.P.U activity culminated 
in frequent confrontation and violence. Evangelical rhetoric emphasised the 
struggle constituted a form of ‘divine warfare’ conducted upon the basis of the
Of*slogan ‘No Compromise and No Surrender’. This warfare was to employ 
‘Christian weapons’, Rev.J.A.Bramley Moore stressing ‘their weapons were 
not carnal, but mighty through God, to the pulling down of strongholds’.27 This 
call for ‘spiritual’ warfare was accompanied by appeals to avoid ‘all that 
savours of rioting and tumult’, depriving their ‘enemies’ of ammunition with
19 Comments of John Kensit Senior in Protestant Standard, 6 August 1898
20 Protestant Standard, 16 April & 6 August 1898
21 Protestant Standard, 30 July 1898
22 Protestant Standard, 6 August 1898
23 Protestant Standard, 30 July 1898
24 Protestant Standard, 12 February 1898
25 Protestant Standard 12 February 1898
26 see Protestant Standard, 2 April 1898
27 Protestant Standard, 6 August 1898
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which to bring ‘reproach’ upon the movement.28 However, as frequent 
violence testified, the distinction between spiritual and physical was often 
‘misconstrued’ by the ‘soldiers’ in the conflict and pleas for ‘cool heads’ 
invariably ignored. These direct-action methods illustrate the primacy of the 
community of the street in prosecuting the crusade. Despite this ‘rowdyism’, 
anti-Ritualism retained a veneer of constitutional respectability, ensuring the 
continued support of establishment figures like Ryle and Salvidge. In contrast, 
Ulster Unionism became increasingly wary of the ‘excesses’ associated with 
sectarian street mobilisation in Belfast, clearly differentiating between 
legitimate and ‘illegitimate private’ violence, developing effective methods of 
integration and social control to contain its volatile support
Wise’s Men’s Bible Class was also formed in 1898 to propagate the 
Bible texts. Through marching it sought to demonstrate and instil in its 
members self-discipline, sobriety and respectability.29 These marches 
functioned as an assertion of territoriality. Shallice described them as akin to 
‘the outings of a skunk’, a symbol o f Protestant supremacy. These five 
annual parades to and from Wise’s Church on Netherfield-rd-North permitted 
‘no party tunes of a provocative nature’, ‘no singing’, wearing of ‘sashes...or 
colours’, or other identification, but were accompanied by bands playing 
hymns like ‘Lead, Kindly Light’. The 1909 Inquiry claimed no disturbances 
during the six years and thirty processions preceding 1910, yet these parades 
were highly provocative, sectarian expressions, provoking violent reaction at 
times of heightened tension. In June 1909, ‘one small disturbance’31 caused 
‘breach of the peace, riot and damage to property’, when an Irish Catholic 
woman on Fountains Rd waved a green flag,32 prompting Orange bands to stop 
and circle in the street whilst two Catholic homes were attacked prior to police 
intervention. This capacity to provoke violence can be attributed to the Class’ 
association with the leading sectarian demagogue, a large proportion of its 
number were Orangemen and that parades passed through areas like Everton
28 Protestant Standard 30 July 1898
29 Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class” , 199-200
30 Shallice, ‘’Orange and Green and Militancy” , 24
31 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.43
32 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909. 76
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Valley containing Catholic institutions.33 Protestant culture was instrumental in 
the physical, and symbolic, demarcation, consolidation and contestation of 
territory. Through processions and parades, the assertion of rites over 
symbolic locations like the Pit, or the expulsion of ‘incomers’ from exclusive 
areas, Protestant organisations contributed to the delineation of distinct 
territorial enclaves. The spatial patterning of the city, with it’s contested 
territory, or ‘shatter zones’, was a crucial catalyst in the manifestation of the 
Protestant Democracy’s growing power. This was increasingly exercised 
through the mobilisation and deployment of frequently violent collective action 
in the street, a means of directly countering the ‘enemy’ and a mode of 
grassroots leverage and influence or ‘social protest’.
From the late 1880’s, the expedient alliance forged between Forwood, 
leader of Liverpool Conservatism, Salvidge and the W.M.C.A resulted in the 
converging of two strands under the umbrella of the anti-Ritualist crusade. The 
first, a ‘democratic movement instinct’ within Conservatism, harnessed anti- 
Ritualism as part of a power struggle with the patrician Conservative 
Constitutional Association for ascendancy within the political machine. The 
second, militant Protestant strand was legitimised, politicised and empowered 
by this crusade. These two strands unravelled after 1900. This breakdown 
within the local system of power relations contributed to the primacy of 
sectarian collective violence in Liverpool. From May 1901, disillusioned with 
legal recourse and the limitations and constraints of formal politics, Wise drove 
the Protestant agitation in a belligerent, explicitly anti-Catholic direction. This 
strategy alienated respectable anti-Ritualist’s and proved incompatible with 
Salvidge’s efforts to promote Conservative unity. However, it was remarkably 
successful at attracting the disenchanted Protestant working class.
The George Wise Crusade emerged in 1903 to ‘oppose the aggression of 
the Church of Rome’. It constituted the ‘outdoor work’ of the Reformers 
Memorial Church,35 being co-host of the St.Domingo Pit, within ‘pointing,
33 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909. 74
34 Testimony of Wise’s Church Secretary, Richard Brigg’s, at the 1909 Inquiry 
in Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class” , 196
35 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.42
190
shouting and attacking distance’36 of Catholic schools, Churches, Convents and
^*7
the Bishops residence. Meetings were held ‘every week, sometimes as often 
as three to five times’. A Chairman, appointed by the Reformers Church 
Committee, presided over the discussion of religious, social and political 
questions.38 Despite assertions that, nobody had ‘ever been arrested for any 
disturbance’, meetings at the Pit generated an intimidating atmosphere, 
including the singing of sectarian hymns like ‘Dare to be a Daniel’. Witnesses 
testified that Wise used language ‘calculated to provoke breaches of the peace 
by those who profess the Roman Catholic religion’. Highly provocative 
language was also employed by figures like Samuel George Thomas, the 
Orders spokesman at the Inquiry. He declared ‘we are surrounded by Roman 
Catholic institutions and by the convent in Everton Valley and Beacon Lane 
Orphanage and who ever heard they ever had a single pane of glass broken’. 
That evening, each institution was attacked and damaged.40 The symbolism 
and significance of the Pit, located in the Orange stronghold of Everton, 
highlights the importance of territory and the ritualised character of much 
sectarian conflict in Liverpool. The community of the street, was the principal 
arena of Protestant identity formation, expression and increasingly aggressive 
collective action. Particularly after 1900 street mobilisation became the 
primary mechanism of asserting grassroots Protestant influence and power.
Protestant culture also offered a social service, the numerous 
associations affiliated to Wise’s Church, comprising ‘all the societies usually 
connected with a Church’.41 In the case of the Reformers Church, these 
included Endeavour Societies, the Boys Guild and Women’s Pleasant 
Evenings, offering social interaction, Bible Study classes, three Women’s Bible 
Classes and Sunday Schools, inculcating a theological education.42 Wise 
boasted cycling clubs, the largest in Liverpool,43 Athletic Leagues, and
36 Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class” , 190
37 Gallagher, ‘’A Tale of Two Cities” , 114
38 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.44
39 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.76 Testimony of Leonard Dunning, 
Head Constable.
40 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.165
41 Police (Liverpool Inquiry! A ct 1909.43
42 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 225
43 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 225
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Swimming Clubs. There was also the George Wise Tontine Society of 1000 
members offering sickness, unemployment and death insurance, Temperance 
Societies and the Kirkdale Social Institute, recruiting from the slums, replacing 
gambling and drink with draughts and cocoa.44 This rich culture illustrates 
Smith’s assertion, that ‘it was often the churches which played a key role in 
organising all aspects of a working life’.45
However, the community o f the street remained the principal domain of 
the Protestant Democracy, Liverpool’s Protestant culture reflecting this reality. 
Through preaching, picketing, parades or demonstrations, the street was the 
primary location for attracting, recruiting and mobilising the Protestant 
Democracy. However, the importance attached to particular types of collective 
activity, at particular times, reflected the shifting distribution and location of 
power and leadership over the Protestant working class. During the respectable 
anti-Ritualist coalition, recourse to legal and political action co-existed 
alongside grassroots direct-action. With the breakdown of this broad coalition, 
and the accompanying erosion of residual restraint and control over the 
Protestant working class, strident anti-Catholic direct-action and autonomous 
Protestant politics merged in the 1903-05 revolt. The revolt witnessed the 
unravelling of the ‘democratic’ Conservative and ‘ Wiseite’ strands. Under 
Wise’s leadership, the Protestant Democracy asserted its influence and power 
through large-scale mobilisation and violence in the street. This type of 
collective action upholding Protestant rights and countering Catholic 
‘aggression’, epitomised by the 1909 riots, characterised the Protestant 
Democracy up until the Liverpool Corporation Act of 1912.
Over time, the Protestant Democracy evolved into a powerful, 
increasingly autonomous force. The Protestant working class, radicalised by 
the anti-Ritualist crusade, fermented and manipulated by the Tory-Anglican 
establishment, could not be managed and contained within an instrumental 
power relationship. The rising ‘Protestant power’, legitimised and empowered 
by this crusade, with a growing political and class awareness, was after 1900 
directed by militant Protestant organisations and rival community leaders. With 
their personal empires these leaders directly engaged Roman Catholicism at
44 Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class” , 207
192
street level, orchestrating confrontation and disorder as a means of 
counteracting the ‘enemy’ and as a form of ‘social protest’.
The following section identifies who constituted this force through an 
examination of the membership and adherents of the principal bodies that 
organised and mobilised the Protestant Democracy. The Church Association 
was influential and numerically strong, being the principal anti-Ritualist body, 
locally and nationally, until 1890. Despite a decline in its national fortunes 
during the early 1890’s, its 1897 annual meeting reported a revival of local 
activity.46 This revival may have been related to the launch of Wise’s anti­
ritualist campaign that year, Wise attending the Association’s November 
meeting.47
The Association represented the Evangelical section of the Church of 
England, referred to as ‘sound members’ or ‘true sons of the Reformation’.48 In 
1890 the Earl of Lichfield declared it deserved the support of ‘all Evangelical 
Protestants’, irrespective of denomination, Canon (later Bishop) Ryle outlining 
the ultimate aspiration as ‘the voluntary union of all Protestant Churchmen’ 49 
This was spelt out by the Rev. C.H.H Wright as ‘union with our Nonconformist 
churches’.50 Evangelicalism united the bulk of Liverpool’s Protestant culture, 
embracing Anglicans and Nonconformists, ‘Christian, Protestant Orangemen’51 
and the W.M.C A , alongside prominent members of the Tory-Anglican 
establishment. This broad constituency was initially galvanised by the anti- 
Ritualist crusade, but profound tensions emerged after 1900. Wise’s adoption 
of explicit anti-Catholicism in May 1901 exposed class and religious divisions, 
whilst a growing core of grassroots Protestants began to question the continued 
legitimacy of Conservatism as the ‘bulwark of the Reformation’.
The Liberal Review revealed the Church Association’s core constituency, 
referring to it in conjunction with proletarian Orangeism. It identified 
‘professors o f Orange Christianity’, under the Association’s ‘protecting
45 Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 175
46 Protestant Standard, 8 May 1897
47 see Protestant Standard. 6 November 1897
48 Protestant Standard. 6 November 1897
49 Protestant Standard. 15 February 1890
50 Protestant Standard, 22 January 1898
51 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 96
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patronage’, whose ‘peculiar habit it is to prefer the public house to the churches 
where service is conducted in the fashion they approve, and who, except on 
ceremonial occasions, very rarely enter a place of worship, unless attracted by 
the prospect of a ‘row” .52
At the inauguration of the Kirkdale branch of the British Protestant 
Union, in January 1898, Wise proclaimed its membership should be confined 
to those ‘willing to work in the Protestant cause’,53 uniting ‘all evangelical 
Christians, to whatever denomination they may belong, in the noble work of 
Protestant defence’.54 This ‘Undenominational Protestant Army’ incorporated 
Protestant men and ‘sensible’ Protestant women. The chair of a B.P.U meeting 
declared women could do ‘more to crush Ritualism than men could do’. He 
advised them to resist the overtures of Ritualist clergy creeping into houses 
‘leading silly women to the Confessional stool’. On the other hand, no 
‘sensible woman’ would ‘confess her sins to any man, or go to early 
celebrations fasting’.55
Women played an active role within existing organisations and networks, 
and through societies like the Women’s Protestant Union, boasting a national 
membership of over 10,000 by October 1897. The Protestant Standard 
declared, ‘we know of no more active, or greater, or more irresistible power for 
good on behalf of the cause of Protestantism than the ‘Women’s Protestant 
Union” .56 Women performed many similar activities to their male 
counterparts, whilst remaining largely detached from the more aggressive 
aspects of the crusade.
Wise, the B.P.U’s President, closely identified with the Protestant 
working class, proclaiming ‘workingmen were Protestants to the backbone’.58 
Protestant workingmen were invariably involved in disturbances, with 
admonishments at B.P.U meetings of potential ‘rioting and tumult’, ‘rash
52 The Liberal Review. 1885. Vol. 16 .17 January 1885
53 Protestant Standard, 8 January 1898
54 Protestant Standard, 16 April 1898
55 Protestant Standard, 16 April 1898
56 Protestant Standard 30 October 1897
57 see Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.279
58 Protestant Standard, 20 August 1898
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action’,59 or ‘letting our zeal overrun our discretion’.60 Another indication of 
the Union’s proletarian character was the presence of William Dennison 
Junior, Vice-Chair of the L.W.M.C.A, and by 1910 Grand Master of the 
Liverpool Province of the Orange Institution.61 The anti-Ritualist campaign 
had a pronounced class complexion, with a growing equation of Ritualists with 
‘aristocrats’, or the ‘upper classes’. This class dynamic explains why anti- 
Ritualism was a vital corollary of the ‘democratisation’ process within the 
Conservative political machine, the ‘currant jelly’ element, or ‘upper tenth’, 
concentrated in the Constitutional, being attacked for displaying an ‘anti- 
Protestant’ spirit. This class sentiment fed into a more general ‘anti­
establishment tenor’.
The B.P.U had branches in Everton, Kirkdale, Walton, and Toxteth, the 
latter representing ‘Protestant Churchmen’ resident in Toxteth Park.62 This 
Orange stronghold also boasted the Toxteth Auxiliary Protestant Alliance with 
approximately 115 members by July 1890,63 'whilst Walton contained a branch 
of the Church Association’s political offshoot the National Protestant League.64 
There was also a B.P.U branch in Wavertree, described by Wise as ‘sadly 
neglected in reference to downright Protestant lectures’.65 Other elements of 
Protestant culture were active beyond the core Protestant areas of Kirkdale, 
Everton and Toxteth. Kensit’s Wycliffe Preachers operated in Bootle, the 
constituency of the Conservative M.P Colonel Sandys, Grand Master of the 
Loyal Orange Institution o f England since 1910,66 and Southport and 
Birkenhead.67 Wycliffe activity in Birkenhead was orchestrated by J Major 
Thompson and Louis Ewart. The latter became Secretary of the Liverpool 
Kensitites68 based in the docking and railway centre of Garston. Territory was
59 see Samuel Smith, M.P & John Kensit Senior in the Protestant Standard. 30 
July 1898
60 see Rev.J.A.Bramley-Moore in Protestant Standard. 6 August 1898
61 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.45 & see Protestant Standard 6 
August 1898,20 August 1898
62 Protestant Standard, 20 August 1898
63 Protestant Standard, 26 July 1890
64 see Protestant Standard, 9 April 1898
65 Protestant Standard, 12 February 1898
66 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.45
67 The Protestant Searchlight 1902-04.14
68 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 224
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significant in terms of the demarcation of distinct Protestant and Catholic areas 
and in the establishment of local power bases or ‘personal empires’ by rival 
community leaders. After 1900 a power vacuum occurred within the Protestant 
community exploited by ‘Demagogues’ like Wise. They earned popular 
legitimacy through their anti-Catholic exploits and ‘martyrdom’ at street level, 
consolidating leadership through the construction of extensive personal 
empires. Under their leadership the Protestant Democracy evolved into a 
volatile sectarian force.
Wise’s Men’s Bible Class had a membership of 350 by 1903,69 rising to 
between 1500 and 1700 by 1909-10.70 Despite parading around the Protestant 
strongholds of Everton and Kirkdale, the majority lived some ‘distance away’, 
in areas like Bootle.71 Wise’s Class was composed ‘almost entirely’ of working 
men72, who emphasised their ‘respectability’, but also attracted a considerable 
number of ‘hangers-on’. The Head Constable testified that Wise’s parade of 
Sunday 27 June 1909 would have attracted large numbers, resulting in ‘breach 
of the peace, riot and disorder’.73 Wise’s North-End base and the congregation 
of his Memorial Church overwhelmingly comprised working people. Given 
the proletarian character o f the Orange Order, Wise, later Grand Chaplain of 
the Province, asked in relation to his class, ‘Is not my own flourishing and go- 
a-head Bible Class...composed of many who are good, honourable and sober 
members of the various lodges in the district?’74
The best indication as to the ‘aggressive Protestants’75 constituting the 
George Wise Crusade is provided by accounts of the Pit, where meetings were 
attended by ‘300 to 2000 people’, and considerably more during periods of 
‘active’ feeling. The Head Constable described those attending as the 
‘Extreme Protestant Party’, comprising ‘Evangelical Churchmen’ who ‘assert 
their Protestantism’.76 These came from ‘all over the city’: from areas like 
Birkenhead and Waterloo, originating amongst the congregations of
69 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.43
70 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 224
71 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.163
72 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 224
73 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.77
74 The Protestant Searchlight new series. Vol.l. 1902-04.28
75 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.125
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‘surrounding Churches’ as opposed to the ‘surrounding population’. Some 
came from the residential districts and ‘although not of considerable position’, 
they were regarded as persons of ‘considerable respect’. Samuel George 
Thomas stated the audience was ‘not wholly’ of the ‘artizan’ class, and 
responded to a question whether Wise’s Mission was broadly working class, 
answering ‘yes, but he has many sympathisers amongst the high class’.77
The broadly working class composition of Wise’s ‘Mission’ was 
applicable to the associations attached to his Church, the Protestant Reformers 
Monthly Magazine proclaiming the congregation consisted ‘solely of working 
people’. Soon after its inception, the Church boasted the largest Sunday 
attendance in Liverpool, over 1000 attending morning and evening services.78 
Protestant spokesmen at the Inquiry claimed about 100,000 looked to Wise ‘as 
a political and spiritual leader’.79 Although strongly based in Kirkdale, the 
Memorial Church drew its congregation from across the city. Affiliated 
Church associations invariably mirrored the theological stance of resident 
clergymen, attracting congregations on the basis of voluntary social and 
theological differentiation rather than simple territorial proximity. This is 
illustrated by the secession of the men and women’s Bible classes, and Sunday 
school teachers from St. Matthews Church on the Catholic Scotland road.
After the death of Rev.Dr Hyde, who attracted a large congregation through 
‘earnest and Evangelical teaching’, the congregation felt, there was ‘not likely 
to be a continuation of the views’ expounded by him, resolving to leave the 
church. The men’s Bible class was subsequently received at S t Polycarp’s, on 
the staunchly Orange, Netherfield -Rd-North.81
76 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.194-5
77 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.162-3 & HO144/1050. 
Commissioner’s Report, 1909, 30
78 Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class” , 207
79 Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class” , 189
80 Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class” , 206-7 citing J.A.Klapas, 
‘’Geographical Aspects of Religious Change in Victorian Liverpool, 1837- 
1901” , unpub. MA. Univ. of Liverpool, 1977.
81 Protestant Standard. 17 April 1897
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THE ORANGE ORDER.
The Orange Order was the dominant ‘local proletarian’ idiom in 
Liverpool, but was increasingly marginalised by local Conservatism. This 
prolonged breakdown in relations contributed to the growing ascendancy of the 
Protestant Democracy, including large numbers o f grassroots Orangemen. An 
Orangeman’s primary objective decreed he ‘should love, uphold, and defend 
the Protestant Religion, and sincerely desire and endeavour to propagate its 
doctrines and precepts’. He was instructed to ‘strenuously oppose the fatal 
errors and doctrines of the Church of Rome, and scrupulously avoid 
countenancing (by his presence or otherwise), any act of ceremony of Popish 
Worship; he should, by all lawful means, resist the ascendancy of that Church, 
its encroachments, and the extension of its power’.82
‘Patriotic’ Orangemen saw themselves as ‘pillars of the Constitution’, 
loudly professed ‘guardians of civil and religious liberty’, protecting their 
hard-won ‘libertarian Protestant heritage’. This heritage was embodied by 
long-established Protestant institutions, encapsulated by the slogan ‘Church, 
Crown and Constitution’, ensuring the equilibrium and security of the British 
Protestant Nation and its Empire.
In order to defend these institutions, and through them the Protestant 
religion, Orangemen saw themselves as upholders of the law in the 
ecclesiastical and civil sphere, suppressing all forms of lawlessness. This 
resolve arose when the ecclesiastical or civil authorities were deemed incapable 
or unwilling to perform this task. In Belfast, the Order’s self-appointed 
policing role, with its associated excesses, was successfully managed and 
contained. In contrast, Tory-Democracy adopted a largely pragmatic attitude 
towards Orange and Protestant attempts at imposing law and order. In contrast 
to Unionism’s restraint and control, this pragmatism or impotence illustrates
82 Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland. Report of the Proceedings of the Grand 
Orange Lodge of Ireland at the Special Meeting Held on Wednesday 3 
November and the General Half Yearly Meeting on Wednesday 1 and 
Thursday 2 December. 1880.14, ‘Qualifications of Candidates for Admission 
into the Orange Institution’.
83 The ‘Orange Admirer’ in The Liberal Review. 1884. Vol. 1 5 .19 July 1884
84 see The Liberal Review. 1884. Vol. 15 .19 July 1884
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the contrasting location and distribution of power and leadership within the 
relationship between the two political movements and popular sectarianism.
Many Liverpool Orangemen saw the principal manifestation of their role 
as upholders of the ‘true Religion’, guardians of ‘Church, Crown and 
Constitution’ and defenders of civil and religious liberty, as suppressing the 
‘illegality’ of Ritualism, or manifestations of ‘Popery’, within the Established 
Church and Nation at large. The ‘great Bailey’, Orangeman, fishmonger and 
‘people’s churchwarden’ outlined his obligations when confronted with 
Ritualism. He declared ‘if I don’t put a stop to that Popish processioning and 
that twisting and turning, my name aint Bailey, and I aint an Orangeman’.85 An 
Orangeman’s role in educating himself and his fellow citizens was seen as 
pivotal in combating this threat, spreading the ‘light of the Bible which brought 
about the Reformation’.86 The Rev.C.H.H.Wright addressed Orangemen in 
1898, urging them to become ‘missionaries’. He stated ‘if you know how to 
refute the new and false doctrines re-introduced into your Church you could do 
much to stay the plague’.87 His comments reveal the common evangelicalism 
and preoccupation with Ritualism and Romanism, initially cementing 
Liverpool’s Protestant forces.
Alongside this missionary zeal, Orangemen participated in the direct 
countering of local Ritualism with frequently violent consequences. During 
1882, the ‘Orange rowdies’ or ‘Protestant party’88 targeted St Judes, the 
campaign orchestrated by Bailey. The Review described how ‘Orange rowdies 
leaped onto the backs of the pews, and many of them stood in church with their 
hats on, while others yelled and hissed as the incumbent read the prayer of
O Q
consecration’. The Reverend Fitzroy was assaulted after a similar
Q A
disturbance. Disorder also occurred outside, where ‘hundreds of rowdies 
congregated...after both morning and evening service to receive the incumbent 
on emerging from the building with groans and hisses’. Two of those involved 
recounted how figure’s like Bailey, were accomplished at ‘aggravatin’ us and
85 The Liberal Review. 1882. Vol. 13 .19 August 1882
86 Protestant Standard, 19 July 1890
87 Protestant Standard 19 March 1898
88 The Liberal Review. 1882. Vol. 13.30 September 1882
89 The Liberal Review. 1882. Vol. 13 .12 August 1882
90 The Liberal Review. 1882. Vol. 13.23 September 1882
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rousin’ us’, culminating in an ‘altercation’ with Fitzroy. They confessed ‘they 
had never heard of such a not blessed bit of fun in all their not blessed lives’. 
These demonstrations offered the potential for martyrdom, an Orangeman 
declaring ‘I’ve often thought I’d like to many a six months in the glorious 
cause of Protestantism. That’s the sort of martyrdom which would just suit
91me .
These protests were accompanied by Sunday afternoon Orange 
demonstrations at Kensington-fields, attended by about 300. The Review 
declared the scenes at St.Judes were ‘the direct and immediate outcome of 
these gatherings’.92 The crowd was addressed by Bailey and by Mr Smith, a 
fishmonger. Proceedings opened with ‘feeble attempts’ at hymn singing, 
followed by Smith’s prayers and the preaching of ‘his gospel of peace, in a 
stem and threatening manner, and in violent language suggestive of wholesale 
excommunication’. His discourse displayed a ‘pugnacious spirit’, indicating a 
desire to ‘fight everybody all round’.93 At the height of the crusade in 1898, 
John Carr, Deputy Grand Master of Lodge 119, recounted how he had presided 
at one of Wise’s meetings at the Pit. He hoped ‘every member of the lodge 
would attend at Mr George Wise’s Open Air meeting near S t John the 
Baptist’s, Tuebrook, on Sunday next’. Orangemen regularly attended the Pit, 
participating in anti-ritualist demonstrations.94
The Order’s role extended to exposing all those complicit in the spread 
of false doctrine, Carr lambasting the ‘Anti-Protestant spirit’ of the patrician 
Conservative Constitutional Association in 1898 declaring ‘they are all 
Ritualists, and Protestantism is obnoxious to them’.95 There was a pronounced 
class dimension to the struggle against Ritualism. The Loyal Orangeman 
declared ‘the Ritualist’s are mainly supported by the upper and wealthy classes, 
who concentrate all their worship of God on the greatest display of images, 
fanfare of trumpets, the screeching and twisting of intoned white-sheeted 
service; not so with the middle and working classes, who remain true to the 
ancient Protestant worship of Almighty God, pure and undefiled, such as was
91 The Liberal Review. 1882. Vol. 13 .19 August 1882
92 The Liberal Review. 1882. Vol. 13.23 September 1882
93 The Liberal Review. 1882. Vol. 13 .16 September 1882
94 Protestant Standard. 25 June 1898
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proclaimed to the world by Wycliffe and Luther’.96 In 1898 Carr proclaimed 
‘at last the intelligent workingman has taken up the question and has taken it up 
with the determination to crush it’.97 With the growing politicisation of the 
crusade as a vital corollary o f the ‘ democratisation’ process within local 
Conservatism, anti-Ritualism became a potent medium of grassroots Protestant 
leverage and power. This was based upon a judgement of a candidate or 
party’s Protestant credentials and embodied by the slogan ‘principle before 
politics’. Growing Protestant self-confidence culminated in the Independent 
Protestant political revolt of 1903-05.
The Order had always enjoyed a complex, often uneasy alliance with 
Conservatism. Initially, this was a largely instrumental relationship. Local 
Conservatives regarded the Institution as an expedient mechanism for 
mobilising the Protestant working class, or ‘Orange’ vote, whilst the majority 
of Orangemen continued to look to Constitutional Conservatism for the 
‘maintenance of Protestantism’. Speeches by Orange and Conservative 
luminaries were a feature of the ‘Glorious Twelfth’ gatherings, their number 
and calibre dependent upon the prevailing political climate and relations 
between Conservatism and the Orange body. In 1886 the Review noted the 
Conservative stars ‘were-not, being conspicuous principally, in fact, mainly, by
Ofitheir entire absence’. This was attributed to the ‘currant-jelly’ section of the 
Tories becoming ‘ashamed and disgusted with its rowdy Orange supporters’, 
and to a potential Conservative alliance with the Liberal Unionists in the 
aftermath of Home Rule, rendering Orange support virtually redundant.99 In 
1885 Tory notables like A.B.Forwood, Sir Edward Whitley, Lord Claud John 
Hamilton and Lord Sandon were touting for the Orange vote ahead of the 
November General Election. Despite the deference to authority and hierarchy 
highlighted by an Orange ‘Admirer’ in 1884, many grassroots Orangemen did 
not share his assertion that they preferred to leave Government ‘in the hands of 
those best fitted by rank and wealth for the honourable occupation’.100 Many
95 Protestant Standard 23 July 1898
96 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 96
97 Protestant Standard, 20 August 1898
98 The Liverpool Review. 1886. Vol. 17 .17 July 1886
"  The Liverpool Review. 1886. Vol. 17 .17 July 1886
100 The Liberal Review. 1884. Vol. 15 .19 July 1884
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recognised they were manipulated as an expedient political instrument by the 
Tory ‘swells’. Two remarked at the ‘Twelfth in 1882, ‘these swells don’t care 
a cuss for us. They’re only fightin for their own interests’. ‘Ay...It’s our votes 
they want, and when they’ve got ‘em we may go to the devil’. 101This 
instrumental relationship was to change dramatically, with a subsequent 
breakdown in relations contributing greatly to the later upsurge in sectarian 
violence. From the mid-to-late 1880s leading Orangemen were at the vanguard 
of the nascent anti-Ritualist agitation and early ‘democratisation’ initiatives 
within the Conservative political machine. The alliance forged between the 
Conservative leader, Forwood, with Salvidge and the W.M.C.A in the late 
1880’s, early 1890’s, effectively marginalised the Order. The W.M.C.A 
assumed leadership of the combined ‘democratisation’ and anti-Ritualist 
agitation within the official fold. After 1900, growing Protestant working class 
disenchantment with formal politics and particularly Conservatism saw 
Orangemen again at the forefront of attempts at both the ‘reformation’ of the 
Conservative party and of a dissident strain of independent Protestant politics. 
Despite the breakdown in relations with Conservatism, large numbers of 
Orangemen remained attached to a particular ideal of Constitutional, or 
‘Church and State’ Conservatism as the ‘bulwark of the Reformation’. 
However, the erosion of traditional mechanisms of influence and restraint 
exercised by Conservatism over the Order greatly contributed to the emergence 
of the Protestant Democracy as the principal agency of belligerent popular 
sectarianism. As a consequence of this fragmentation and devolution of power 
and leadership over the Protestant working class, the Protestant Democracy, 
including vast numbers of Orangemen, sought to defend their ‘marginal 
privilege’ and counter Catholic self-assertion through violent collective action 
in the city’s streets.
During summer 1909 Liverpool Orangemen focused upon the prohibitive 
provisions of the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1829102 in order to counter 
Catholic ‘aggression’. The Inquiry outlined how within days of the Catholic 
Holy Cross procession correspondence ensued between Orange bodies and the 
Head Constable. Half a dozen letters were sent on the 11 and 12 May asserting
101 The Liberal Review. 1882. Vol.13.15 July 1882
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the ‘Protestant party’ had been ‘tricked’ by the police.103 This was an example 
of co-ordinated mass Protestant collective action, involving the Orange 
Institution, members of the Wiseite ‘Extreme Protestant Party’,104 and 
organisations like the Protestant Labour Club.105 Joseph’s Integrity Lodge, part 
of the Royal Black Preceptory, sent a letter on the 19th It declared, ‘we had 
your promise...that, at the Roman Catholic demonstration...nothing of a 
religious character should be carried through the streets, but we find...a few 
aliens can break the law without any hindrance from police, or public, even 
armed with knives at their belts, and a guard of police to line the way...Should 
the like be attempted again, I tell you, that we shall take what steps we think 
proper, to prevent it going forth’.106 Protestant community leaders like Wise 
and the Kensit’s persistently questioned the conduct and partiality of the civil 
authorities.107 When summonsed to be bound over in 1901 for breach of the 
peace Wise accused Stewart, the local Stipendiary Magistrate, of being anti- 
Protestant and partial to the Catholics, (because he worshipped at a Ritualist 
Church, St.Lukes in Southport). 108Dunning, the Head Constable, was accused 
of ‘High church’ views. During the Summer of 1909 the Wiseites and Orange 
elements launched a campaign o f demonstrations demanding the Head 
Constable resign on account of his breach of promise regarding the Holy Cross 
procession, police favouritism towards Catholics and brutality towards 
Protestants associated with the St.Joseph’s procession. Additionally, Wise 
claimed the mounted police were ‘almost all Roman Catholics’. At the 
Inquiry, demanded by the G.W.C, the Orange Order, and sympathetic sections 
of the Tory party, the Evangelical’s played upon the theme that ‘Wise was a 
martyr for free speech and a victim of police tyranny’.109
The Evangelicals depicted the civil authorities’ interventions in the name 
of public order as partisan infringements of fundamental Protestant rights and 
liberties or dangerous concessions to Roman Catholicism. Bohstedt asserted
102 see Neal, Sectarian Violence. 227
103 Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909.144
104 Police (Liverpool Inquiry! A ct 1909.63
105 see Police (Liverpool Inquiry) A ct 1909. 50,60
106 Police (Liverpool Inauirvl A ct 1909.62
107 see HQ144/1050 Commissioner’s Report, 1909,30
108 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 205
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such accusations were symptomatic of sentiments embodied in the Protestant 
formula of ‘No compromise and No surrender’. They represented a belief in a 
‘higher law’ transcending the ‘imperfections of earthly order and 
authority’110empowering Protestants to take collective action on behalf o f the 
wider Protestant community. In May 1909 the Head Constable wrote to Star of 
Kirkdale Orange Lodge proclaiming, ‘It is your duty as loyal citizens to uphold 
the law by lawful means and not to enforce your own interpretation of it by 
violence’.111
The Order played a pivotal role in Protestant collective action during 
1909, organising the ‘monster demonstration’ at Juvenal Street, aimed at 
‘preventing any illegal processions taking place in the City of Liverpool’.112 
This referred to the Catholic StJoseph’s parish procession o f Sunday 20 June, 
the Orange counter-demonstration attracting a crowd of between 3000-4000113 
Orangemen and their ‘hangers-on’. Despite assertions that the Orange 
demonstration was designed ‘to watch what illegalities took place, with a view 
to legal action in the future’ the event degenerated into serious violence.114 
The Inquiry also identified Orange bands as instrumental in attracting a 
‘promiscuous’ audience to the Pit at the height of the disturbances,115 parading 
around the neighbourhood, playing tunes such as ‘Paddy is a Bastard’. The 
Home Office Commissioner’s report concluded one of the causal factors in the 
Summer disorder were these bands attracting crowds out for ‘any kind of 
devilment at all’.116 Additionally, Dunning testified the disturbances were 
‘mainly due to the practise of demonstrating adherence to or opposition to this 
or that form of religious belief by parades or processions through the public 
streets’.117 The Institution subsequently agreed to reduce its official 
processions to four and to consult with the police concerning routes. However, 
upon a lodge repudiating such promises, the Provincial Grand Lodge
109 Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class” , 186-7
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sanctioned bands to parade monthly, without regalia for any Protestant 
organisation. Prior to 1886, under an agreement with the Council dating back 
to 1842, ‘aimless’ processions had largely ceased. Formal marches on key 
dates were permitted from club headquarters to points of departure from 
Liverpool, conditional upon bands remaining silent and insignia concealed.118 
The Home Rule riots of 1886 witnessed the disintegration of this agreement.
An article entitled ‘Police Paralysis’ identified ‘riotous processions of Orange 
or Green blackguards’ as a major source of trouble.119 In the early Edwardian 
period, Wise observed that much was still written about the ‘disorderly conduct 
and unseemly behaviour of Orange processions and demonstrations’.120 The 
Institution held thirty formal annual parades by this period121, the most 
significant commemorating key symbolic dates. The 1909 Inquiry described 
the procedure and character of these parades, outlining how the Institution 
would call ‘out their adherents and notify them when processions are to take 
place and what they want them to agitate for or petition for’.122 Only on 
‘special occasions’, when the Lord Major presided and large crowds were 
anticipated, did the Order notify the Head Constable of the route.123 However, 
the Order’s spokesman emphasised processions ‘would not’ pass through 
Catholic streets. The Bible was the only ‘regalia’, with the exception of the 
Twelfth, when a banner depicting an ‘historical event’ was carried. In all cases 
the tylers carried their swords, each lodge preceded by a staff-bearer and 
‘ordinary’ costume worn with the adornment of an orange or purple sash.124
In terms of their social service, Orange lodges held regular monthly 
meetings, whilst at times of heightened tension, like 1909, they met every 
night. On such occasions between eight to ten lodges and some districts met 
on the same night highlighting the co-ordinated character of Orange collective 
action.125 The monthly meetings of Pride of the Village lodge opened with 
prayer and the reading of scripture, followed by an address by a lodge official,
118 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 92
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the reading of correspondence and the passing of resolutions.126 Lodges also 
organised social functions, Star of the North holding concerts in the 
Oddfellow’s Hall127, and offered practical assistance in the form of funeral and 
benefit club facilities.128 During June 1909 the Province formed the Orange 
Defence Committee to prepare the defence of incarcerated Orangemen in the 
aftermath of the St. Joseph’s procession. It also set up an emergency fond to 
cover the cost of their defence. Another committee was formed to relieve the
10O‘necessities of those families whose bread-winners had got into trouble’. 
Additionally, the Defence Committee recorded Protestant families evicted from 
their homes, tabulating 550 instances by October 1909.130
Unlike Belfast, the Liverpool Order was neither the sole or even 
dominant ‘local proletarian idiom’. Liverpool’s Protestant working class, 
including large numbers of Orangemen, also identified with and actively 
participated in militant Protestant organisations, the personal empires of figures 
like Wise and the Kensit’s and the ‘power-sharing’ W.M.C.A. This diverse yet 
inter-connected Protestant culture reflected the fragmented nature of power and 
leadership over the Protestant working class.
During the last quarter of the Nineteenth Century the Liverpool Order 
experienced an increase. There were an estimated 8000 Orangemen by 1885, 
concentrated in eight principal districts and comprising 75 to 78 lodges. By the 
1909 Inquiry estimates of the Province’s strength ranged from 100131 to 150 
lodges132 and between 15,000 to 20,000 Orangemen.133 The unskilled were 
heavily represented amongst the membership and supporters of the Order.
They participated in street violence, but rarely attained positions of authority.
1 1 4The Liberal Review disparagingly referred to Orangemen as ‘rowdies’,
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‘roughs’135 and ‘brawling ruffians’,136 declaring in 1884 that Orange parades 
attracted the ‘scum of the city’, comprising ‘converted comer men and 
miscellaneous loafers’.137 Even an Orange ‘Admirer’ confessed that the Order 
was generally confined to the ‘rag-tag and bob-tail of society’, consisting of 
‘enthusiastic chimney-sweeps, broad-minded carters and intellectual 
washerwomen’. Orangemen were referred to in a more flattering light by 
Brother John Carr. He highlighted the role o f the ‘intelligent workingman’ in 
combating Ritualism. Leading Conservatives were prepared, as expediency 
dictated, to praise and flatter the proletarian Orangeman. During the 1870s, the 
future and current leaders o f Liverpool Conservatism lauded the Orangeman.
A.B.Forwood described them, as the ‘best, the most sober, the most temperate, 
the most thoughtful, and the most religious of the workingmen’, whilst Whitley 
eulogised them as model citizens, ‘better educated in the main than any other 
body of workingmen’.139 This instrumental relationship to the Order changed 
dramatically from the late 1880s. With relations becoming increasingly 
strained, Forwood sought to draw the democratic Conservative forces and the 
anti-Ritualist agitation into the official fold, marginalising the Order.
The Order also functioned as a bridge between different layers of 
workers, the majority of officials being skilled workmen. It enabled working 
class brethren to mix with members of the petty bourgeoisie, a significant 
number of tradesmen and shopkeepers belonging to the organisation by 1885, 
including the Provincial Grand Master and District Master, John William 
Ballard, a tin/iron trunk maker and shopkeeper. There were also a small 
number o f businessmen associated with the Institution; a Manager, a Brewer 
and a Coal Merchant listed amongst the Provincial officials in 1885.140
Despite being overwhelmingly male, women comprised a substantial 
component of the membership. There were three exclusively Female Lodges 
listed in 1885. In 1890 the first national congress of Orange women was held
135 see The Liberal Review, 1882. Vol. 13 .16 September 1882
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in the city.141 Membership also encompassed a wide age-range, with over 300 
youths connected with the Juvenile Orange Lodge and bands by 1898.142 An 
Orange tyler at the Juvenal St counter-demonstration in June 1909, was ‘an old
I  j o
man, sixty-three years of age’.
The Order appears to have been predominantly Evangelical, Anglican 
and Nonconformist. An 1898 letter referred to the members of Lodge 119 as 
‘Protestants and members o f the Church of England’, whilst many Orangemen 
were connected with Wise’s network. The Inquiry outlined how Orangemen 
were ‘distributed among all the churches’ in the Diocese,144 describing them as 
the ‘strongest Protestants you can find’.145 This sentiment did not necessarily 
translate into conscientious church attendance. The Orange ‘Admirer’ 
admitted that Orangemen ‘seldom grace the inside of a church., .and know as 
much about the contents of the Bible as the dusky warriors of Zululand’.146 
Unlike Belfast there was no apparent struggle for denominational or party 
political influence and control within the Liverpool Order. Instead, Orangemen 
were gradually absorbed into the city’s diverse Evangelical caucus, united by a 
common evangelicalism expressed through growing antipathy towards 
Ritualism and Romanism, and fidelity to a particular conception of 
Constitutional Conservatism. However, profound tensions later arose within 
the Order, and the wider caucus. These concerned the continued legitimacy of 
Constitutional Conservatism as the ‘bulwark of the Reformation’, compounded 
by Wise’s adoption of a militant, anti-Catholic strand of Protestantism.
In 1885 the majority o f lodges and secretaries were located in the 
Protestant strongholds of Toxteth, Everton and Kirkdale, with Group 6 situated 
in Kensington and Garston. The most partisan Orange area towards the end of 
the Nineteenth Century was the Everton district to the North of Netherfield 
Rd,147 extending to Breckfield Rd. Wise described the location of the Pit, in 
Everton (at the end of Mere Lane off the St.Domingo Rd), as ‘a Protestant
41 Protestant Standard 7 June 1890
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centre which literally smells of Orangeism’.148 This statement illustrates the 
role of Protestant organisations in defining and demarcating territorial 
boundaries. Toxteth was also acknowledged as an area of Orange strength, 
Whittingham Jones describing its two wards as a ‘stronghold of Irish and 
English Orangemen’. Outside these core areas, the Inquiry referred to ‘over 
1,100’ Orangemen in Bootle.149 Commenting upon Joseph’s Integrity Lodge, 
part of the ‘aristocratic’ Black Institution, the Inquiry stated its membership 
might be drawn from surrounding ‘towns’ as far as Wigan.150
In addition to its active members, the Order attracted a considerable 
number of ‘hangers-on’ with ‘slum dwellers’ blamed for much violence. 
During the summer of 1909, the Liverpool Courier chronicled the prosecution 
of an Orange bandleader. The Chairman of the Magistrates Court proclaimed 
‘it is extremely undesirable at the present time, when passions are heated, that 
these bands should parade the streets attracting large crowds over which they 
have no control and no one else has any control’.151
THE LIVERPOOL WORKING MEN’S CONSERVATIVE 
ASSOCIATION.
Whilst the Order, the Protestant Democracy and the L.W.M.C.A 
overlapped in terms of membership and a shared commitment to the 
maintenance of Protestantism, the latter performed a narrower, explicitly 
political remit and function. Initially, all these organisations envisaged the 
defence and preservation of Reformation Protestantism within the context of a 
particular brand of Constitutional or Church and State Conservatism. 
Continued fidelity to a particular political creed, as the main bulwark of 
Protestant principle proved increasingly problematical in terms of the 
L.W.M.C.A’s long-term relationship to both the Orange Order and the 
Protestant Democracy. As Protestant working class disenchantment with
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politics and contemporary Conservatism grew, the militant Protestant clarion 
call of ‘principle before politics’ generated tensions within the Order and the 
W.M.C.A. During the Independent Protestant revolt, the majority of the 
Association and many Orangemen chose Salvidge’s brand of Tory Democracy 
to defend their principles. However, for many grassroots Protestants and 
Orangemen unconditional bonds to Conservatism had been undermined or 
broken. Many gravitated towards Wise and the militant Protestant 
Democracy’s violent politics of the street.
The Liverpool Working Men’s Conservative Association (L.W.M.C.A) 
was conceived in May 1867 to secure Orange electoral support and 
simultaneously distance Conservatives from the Institution. With the alliance 
forged between Forwood and Salvidge in the late 1880s, the Association’s role 
was transformed, assuming centre stage in the ‘democratisation’ process within 
the local political machine and the concomitant anti-Ritualist agitation. As part 
of this combined agitation, the Association fostered an alliance with 
organisations and personalities associated with the emerging Protestant 
Democracy, fusing militant Protestantism and class sentiment in a struggle for 
ascendancy with the patrician Constitutional. Despite the tensions produced by 
this alliance, the organisation remained an agency of Salvidge’s brand of Tory 
Democracy, harnessing and mediating the Protestant power within the official 
fold.152 Due to growing Protestant working class disillusionment with 
contemporary Conservatism, after 1900 this power-sharing role proved 
increasingly contradictory, resulting in a diminution in the Association’s 
influence and ability to restrain Liverpool’s militant Protestant forces.
The L.W.M.C.A emphasised the progressive, reforming character of 
Conservatism, embracing in Salvidge’s words the ‘great democratic movement 
instinct’ known as Tory Democracy.153 This ‘instinct’ incorporated demands 
for internal party ‘democratisation’ and certain practical ‘interests of the 
workingman’. These ranged from the inclusion of a fair wages clause in 
Corporation contracts in 1899154, part of a local social reform agenda155,
152 see Stanley Salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool-Behind the Political Scene. 
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through to the adoption of the temperance cause and the courting of 
‘respectable’ Trades Unionism.156 This theme was intimately linked with the 
Association’s assertions of relative autonomy within the Conservative political 
machine, juxtaposed with attacks on the ‘destructive’ character of Radicalism, 
‘iniquitous’ Liberalism and the ‘curse’ of Socialism. In a 1902 article ‘The 
Strength of Liverpool Working Men’s Conservatism’, Salvidge argued its 
founders had discovered ‘the Radical was more a destructive than a 
constructive politician, and was devoted mainly to pulling down churches, 
uprooting old institutions, and hurriedly appeasing noisy agitators without 
finding out the real cause of the trouble’. In contrast, ‘the Conservative or 
Tory, whenever he had the chance, endeavoured quietly to improve the social
|  M
conditions of the working classes by factory acts and housing acts’.
From the late 1880s Salvidge and the W.M.C.A developed an alliance 
with the emerging Protestant Democracy as part of the internal 
‘democratisation’ process. This was facilitated by the first of the ‘fundamental 
objects’ of the W.M.C.A, to ‘unite the friends of Conservative principles in 
maintaining Protestantism’. Protestantism and the Bible were of paramount 
concern, transcending traditional allegiance to the ‘Establishment’ embodied 
by the ‘Constitution in Church and State’. This overriding concern with 
Protestantism manifested itself through frequent criticism of the local and 
national Conservative leadership. Despite the rhetoric of class 
interdependence, inherent within Tory Democracy, there was considerable 
grassroots resistance to the perceived dictation exercised by the currant-jelly 
section concentrated in the patrician Constitutional, known as the ‘upper ten’ or 
wealthy element. This was primarily a struggle for increased representation 
and recognition of the Protestant working men’s contribution to the 
Conservative cause. In 1902 Salvidge declared that Conservative working men 
were not content ‘to be manipulated by the ordinary wire-pullers, as part of the 
political machine’. The Association had been formed to ‘promote the 
principles which the members believed to be right, whatever other
155 see Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 181
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Conservatives might say, and to that position they have stuck. It is that fact 
which makes them powerful’.158 Salvidge argued the Association constituted 
the ‘party parliament of the proletariat’, a ‘mighty lever for all working men in 
the political life of Liverpool’.159 Despite emphasising the principled autonomy 
of the Association within the political machine, growing tensions emerged with 
the Protestant Democracy. After 1900, Salvidge sought to consolidate his 
dominant position within local Conservatism, attempting to engineer party 
unity by reigning in the Protestant agitation. Simultaneously, radicalised 
elements within the Protestant Democracy began to question the legitimacy of 
Conservatism as the bulwark of the Reformation, exploring alternative avenues 
to express Protestant interests.
The principal manifestation of the Association’s role in maintaining 
Protestantism was its active involvement in the anti-Ritualist crusade. A letter 
of 1898, from William Dennison Jnr, Vice-Chair of the Association, advocated 
a Second Reformation, declaring the Conservative democracy is ‘sick of the 
Ritualistic burlesque of Rome’.160 Salvidge was soon the ‘leading political 
figure’161 in the ‘crusade’. Dennison Jnr praised and encouraged Wise’s 
activities, describing him as ‘wise in more than name’. Members of the 
association regularly participated at his meetings.162 The pinnacle of the 
campaign was the unsuccessful struggle to secure the Church Discipline Bill, 
the Association asserting ‘the chief cause of recent ritualistic excesses has been 
the episcopal veto, and that there can be no security for the laity unless they 
have proper access to the Courts’.163
Despite its anti-Catholicism, the W.M.C.A, as part of the political 
machine, sought to retain a veneer of constitutional respectability. Salvidge 
consciously differentiated his conception of Constitutional Conservatism from 
anti-Catholic ‘Wiseite’ Protestantism. During the Protestant revolt Salvidge 
defined a brand of Conservatism predicated upon the defence of ‘civil and 
religious liberty’, embracing the constitutional anti-Ritualist agitation whilst
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rejecting bigoted anti-Catholicism.164 In the aftermath of the revolt, Salvidge 
explored alternative issues upon which to build political solidarity with the 
Protestant working class.165
The L.W.M.C.A also provided a social service. Each branch or club held 
weekly meetings at which ‘Imperial and local politics’ were discussed,166 
speeches were delivered and resolutions passed. Conservative club’s rooms, 
open every weeknight, catered for ‘innocent amusements’. Salvidge recounted 
how they were the most ‘teetotal political institutions in the city’, liquor being 
kept at only one.167 The Clubs were important ‘social as well as political’ 
centres, governed by their own members and providing affiliated libraries and 
tontines.168 Innocent amusements included dances, concerts, picnics and garden 
parties, one branch boasting a Canary Club. In 1894 Salvidge pointed out how 
these ‘intellectual and entertaining pursuits’ were designed ‘to keep our men, 
our workers, together and at fighting pitch’.169
The L.W.M.C.A became the strongest Conservative Working Men’s 
organisation in the country, with eighteen branches and 5000-6000 members 
by 1893. The Liverpool Review noted a dramatic increase in branch 
membership of ‘as much as 200%’.170 By 1902 it boasted 23 branches over 
nine parliamentary divisions,171 membership peaking at over 8000 in the early 
1900’s. In total Salvidge founded 26 branches172 with the Association
17^expanding in every decade prior to 1914. However, by 1916 it had 
experienced a dramatic reversal with only 3000-4000 subscribing members, the 
25 branches regarded as ‘skeletons’. This reversal coincided with a decline in 
church attendance, whilst ‘Tory jingoism died on the battlefield’ and many of 
the young joined Trade Unions.174 The Associations influence effectively 
came to an end with the settlement of the Irish Question in 1921.
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The Scotland branch referred to the ‘British artisan class’ as comprising 
the bedrock of the vaunted Conservative ‘democracy’.175 Salvidge explained in 
1902 that the ‘intelligent workingman’ was the foundation of ‘the most
17Aimportant political organisation of workingmen in this country’. He claimed 
the Association enlisted only ‘purely bona-fide workingmen officials’, his 
chosen stalwarts including ‘Sandy’ Barton, a one-legged railwayman, Tom 
Austin, a cabinet-maker, Billy Coslett, a butcher, and Tom Atkinson, a 
shipyard foreman.177 Salvidge described the working class branch officers as 
the ‘Conservative political leaders’ o f their districts.178 When he became 
Chairman in 1892, he promised the workingmen ‘I will make you J.P’s and 
city councillors. Follow me and you shall gain a majority on most of the Tory 
Parliamentary Divisional Councils in Liverpool, and become divisional 
secretaries and even chairmen. Follow me and Cabinet Ministers will court 
you, Lord Major’s be elected at your behest and members of Parliament 
tremble at your displeasure’.179
In 1891 Salvidge, then vice-chairman, stipulated a member must also be 
‘a sound Protestant’, Barbara Whittingham-Jones stating that until 1935 it 
‘absolutely declined to admit Catholics’, being referred to as the Protestant 
Working Men’s Association. However, the organisation was not a bastion of 
Anglicanism, Whittingham-Jones describing it as the ‘Non-Conformist 
Working Men’s Conservative Association’, frequently in conflict with the Low 
Church Anglicans of the patrician Constitutional Association. She argued that 
the Association chose ‘Non-Conformist Protestantism’ over ‘Anglican 
Protestantism’. In this transition lay much of the tension and conflict within 
Liverpool Conservatism.180 The Association, in conjunction with the 
‘Protestant Democracy’, was at the vanguard of the ‘democratisation’ process 
within the political machine. Circa 1898-99, Jones stated that not more than 
200 of the 8000 members of the Association were communicants of the C of
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Brother John Carr proclaimed in 1898 that ‘it has been the lot of the 
Orangemen, side by side with that excellent Protestant body the Workingmen’s 
Conservative Association (which is in fact mainly Orangemen), to fight and 
win all election’s for the Conservative party’.182 In the aftermath of the 
Protestant revolt, the principal contrast between the two organisations was the 
continued fidelity o f the majority of the W.M.C.A to a democratised brand of 
Constitutional Conservatism as the bulwark of the Reformation. The growing 
contradiction in the Association’s dual role, maintaining Protestantism and 
upholding Conservative principles, generated considerable tension within its 
own membership and the wider Evangelical Protestant caucus. This 
culminated in the eventual divergence between formal Conservative politics 
and organisation, and the belligerent politics of the street as practised by the 
Protestant Democracy.
BELFAST
RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONAL CULTURE.
Whereas Liverpool’s Protestant culture reflected the fragmentation and 
devolution of social and political power, Belfast’s Protestant culture embodied 
Unionism’s drive for increasing centralisation and control. In light of the 
critical battle of politics in relation to Home Rule, Unionist culture papered 
over the profound divisions within the Protestant community. It endeavoured 
to integrate, restrain and control the forces of popular sectarianism, minimising 
the risk of damaging sectarian violence by policing its volatile support. A 
common evangelicalism and preoccupation with Ritualism initially bound 
together the bulk of Liverpool’s Protestant community. In contrast, the 
majority of Protestant religious organisations in Belfast continued to be 
organised along denominational lines, their ostensible role not being directly
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sectarian in character. As in Liverpool, evangelicalism provided a catalyst, via 
a shared concern at the growth of Ritualism and Romanism, for limited co­
operation between the Evangelical party in the Church of Ireland and 
Protestant Nonconformity, arousing suspicion and hostility within Episcopalian 
circles. This limited co-operation witnessed the emergence of a small 
Evangelical caucus which although significantly smaller than its Liverpool 
counterpart had profound long-term ramifications. These included growing 
working class inter-denominational interaction within the Orange Order and 
intensified denominational, class and political rivalries within the Protestant 
community. These rivalries, expressed through anti-Ritualism, ultimately 
threatened a breakdown in the Unionist coalition accompanied by a resurgence 
of collective action in the streets of Belfast.
In light of these divisions and rivalries, resistance to Home Rule or 
’Rome Rule’ constituted an obligation uniting virtually all the fractious 
Protestant denominations. However, this co-operation proved transitory, 
confronting Ulster Unionism with the problem of constructing a permanent 
foundation of political and organisational unity, one of the principal functions 
of ‘representative’ Unionist culture. Whereas the crusade against Ritualism 
galvanised Liverpool’s Evangelical Protestant culture, in Belfast it exposed 
intense rivalries within the Protestant community. Elements within Unionism 
feared this issue would compromise the movement’s carefully cultivated image 
of unity and respectability, exacerbated by perceptions amongst Belfast’s 
Episcopalian-Conservative establishment that Ritualism constituted a tool for 
Liberal-Presbyterian attacks upon their pre-eminent position. Comparable to 
Liverpool’s Protestant Democracy, anti-Ritualism was a catalyst in the 
emergence of an overwhelmingly working class movement attacking the 
legitimacy of the local Orange and Conservative leadership on religious and 
class grounds. Consequently, Ritualism exposed the fragility of the Unionist 
coalition and the social and political arrangements that underpinned it.
The Belfast Protestant Association, the most strident anti-ritualist and 
anti-Catholic organisation of the early Edwardian period, highlighted the 
profound denominational, political and class tensions within the Ulster 
Protestant community. The organisation was established in 1894 to counter
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Socialists at the Custom House Steps.183 However, by 1902, the B.P.A saw 
itself as the ‘Church’s custodian’, at the vanguard of counteracting Ritualism 
and Romanism in the Church of Ireland. It held regular Sunday afternoon 
meetings at the Steps. Arthur Trew attracted large audiences with incendiary 
speeches on religious, secular and political issues. The Presbyterian Witness 
proclaimed that Trew ‘professed to preach the Gospel, but his principal
|  Qy|
business seemed to be attacking Popery in violent and vulgar language’.
These meetings resulted in ‘rowdyism’ that blighted the city. Many 
Presbyterians, although sympathetic towards the anti-Ritualist cause, objected 
to the organisation’s violence and bigotry. Its campaign also generated 
considerable opposition within Episcopalianism. ‘A Churchman’ declared that 
‘molehills have been made into mountains, and Ritualism has been talked of 
where no Ritualism really exists’. With the approach of the 1902 South Belfast 
by-election, he warned Episcopalians to ‘be true to your Church, and don’t be 
misled by outside influences which are against your religion’.185 This reveals 
the perception amongst certain Episcopalians that an internal controversy was 
being exploited and politicised in order to undermine their Church. Whilst the 
Episcopalian-Conservative establishment asserted that the growth of the United 
Irish League and the spectre of Home Rule remained of paramount political 
importance, Trew interpreted the national threat of Ritualism and Romanism as 
comparable to that ‘which rent Ireland in 1886 and 1893’.186
The B.P.A generated more violence than any other Protestant religious 
organisation. Like the Orange Order and its Liverpool Evangelical 
counterparts, it directly confronted ‘error’ on the streets. However, this focus 
upon the community of the street generated intense criticism within Belfast’s 
religious and political establishment, resulting in a growing consensus of 
indignation amongst ‘respectable’ Protestants. The Catholic Corpus Christi 
procession of June 1901 resulted in nineteen arrests. Three members o f the
B.P.A, including Trew and Richard Braithwaite, its Secretary, were charged 
with ‘illegally conspiring together to incite to riot and illegal assembly’. The
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reaction of the Witness reflected the antipathy of ‘respectable’ Protestants to 
the B.P.A’s methods: ‘we object to Romanism, whether in an avowedly 
Romanist or an avowedly Protestant Church, but we do not believe that 
Protestantism can or should be served by ignorant talk at street comers, or by 
ruffianly attacks on Roman Catholics as individuals’. 187Unlike the pragmatism 
evident in Liverpool, the majority of Belfast’s Unionist establishment regarded 
sectarian violence as profoundly damaging to the cause of the Union. During 
the 1902 by-election the Belfast News Letter accused the B.P.A of ‘smirching 
the character of our city, and dragging the names of Orangeism and 
Protestantism in the gutter’.188 Such fears impacted profoundly upon 
subsequent Unionist political and organisational initiatives.
With the transition from Trew to Thomas Henry Sloan the B.P.A shifted 
from the direct countering of Ritualism and Romanism to a broader political 
remit, culminating in the 1902 by-election. The pro-Unionist Belfast News 
Letter ascribed the B.P.A’s objective as attempting to ‘dominate local politics’, 
to ‘speak and act in the name of the Orangeism and Protestantism of the 
city’.189 The B.P.A presented itself as the ‘real voice’ of Orange and Protestant 
sentiment, opposed to the industrial bourgeois ‘Deadheads’, who controlled the 
Belfast Grand Orange Lodge and the Belfast Conservative Association. This 
contest represented a critical struggle for political legitimacy and control over 
the Orange Order. This was a battle for leadership within Belfast’s Protestant 
community, which would determine the fate of Ulster Unionism as a coherent 
political force. The outcome would determine whether the Home Rule struggle 
would be conducted through politics and propaganda or through violent forms 
of grassroots collective action in Belfast’s streets.
A substantial portion of Belfast’s Protestant culture continued to be 
organised along denominational lines and divided by deep-rooted bitterness 
and suspicion. Limited attempts at inter-denominational co-operation 
generated hostility, particularly within the Church of Ireland. Denominational 
feuding was curtailed, or at least diminished, during the periodic Home Rule 
crises. However, this unity was temporary and limited, tensions resurfacing
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when Home Rule receded and Unionist political and organisational initiatives 
were relaxed.
The B.P.A included substantial numbers of disaffected working class 
Presbyterians and Episcopalians over whom the religious and political 
establishment had little or no control. Consequently, because of its 
associations with bigotry and sectarian violence, this establishment painted the 
organisation as a taint upon Protestantism, the Witness referring to the B.P.A’s 
followers as ‘Protestant Hooligans’, who rarely ‘enter a church door from one
i onyears end to the other*. Concerning Trew, an Episcopalian wrote ‘never in 
the history of the district was there seen such a gathering of the scum of the 
city as that gathered to hear the imbecile discourse of this twaddler’.191 The 
Witness revealed an underlying class dimension to this antipathy, 
differentiating between church-going ‘respectable’ Protestants, and the B.P.A’s 
supporters, whose religion was ‘acquired at the Custom House Steps and street 
comers’.192 Trew described speakers at the Steps as ‘common workingmen’,193 
recurring street violence attributed to the Association’s working class 
constituency, described as ‘irresponsible roughs and rowdies, mostly mere 
boys or lads’.194 However, it is too convenient to dismiss this constituency as 
marginal and irreligious. This was a conscious effort by the local 
establishment to distance Unionism from accusations of Ulster bigotry, 
preserving its carefully cultivated image of unity and respectability. In reality, 
the B.P.A was intimately linked to a dissident strand of grassroots Independent 
Orange ideology, Trew being a Belfast District Chaplain, whilst Sloan was a 
local lodge Master. This movement posed a critical threat to the legitimacy 
and authority of the local Orange and Conservative establishment, generating 
fears of schism within the fragile Unionist coalition. During the 1902 by- 
election, Colonel Saunderson, Belfast Grand Master and leader of Irish 
Unionism, declared that Sloan represented a movement refusing ‘to accept the 
authority of the heads of the Institution, and practically breaks adrift from the
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o 195organisation.
The severity of the breakdown between the local Episcopalian- 
Conservative establishment and the ‘grassroots’ is revealed by the breadth of 
support for Sloan and the B.P.A. He was assisted by the temperance 
movement and Independent Orange elements within the Belfast Labour 
movement. Sloan was a shipyard cement worker with a following amongst 
shipyard workers, Belfast’s ‘labour aristocracy’. He claimed to be a member 
of Belfast’s largest Union, the N.A.U.L, Alex Boyd organiser of the Municipal 
Employees Association, being his principal Trade Union speaker. Sloan held 
meetings at Queen’s Island, emphasising he was a workingman representing 
the interests o f ‘labour’ and highlighted his continuity with the Independent 
principles embodied by William Johnston, the Orange ‘champion’. This 
‘grassroots’ Protestant movement, disaffected with the leadership o f the local 
Orange Order, the Belfast Conservative Association, and the Conservative 
Government represented a potent amalgam of religious and class grievances. It 
constituted the principal challenge to the viability of the Unionist political 
project during the period. The response of the local political establishment 
would not only determine the fate of the Unionist project, but the strategy and 
potential outcome of the anti-Home Rule struggle.
THE ORANGE ORDER.
The Orange Order played a pivotal role in the evolution of Ulster 
Unionism. It remained the perennial Protestant ‘local proletarian idiom’ and 
agency of popular sectarianism. Its influence extended into the social, 
religious, political, economic and ideological arenas. The Institution generated 
intense loyalty amongst its adherents, whilst arousing profound 
denominational, political and class tensions within the Protestant community.
It was the primary influence upon the political and ideological outlook of a 
substantial cross-section, or ‘elite’, of the Protestant working class. Bound 
together by a set of values and obligations, this ‘elite’ discovered in the Order a 
sense of camaraderie, a mechanism for defending their local and national
195 Belfast News Letter. 14 August 1902
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interests, a source of political and economic influence and power, and a range 
of social and recreational services. This strategic section of the Protestant 
working class regarded the Order as the one organisation that genuinely 
represented their social, political and ideological interests. With the 
introduction of the first Home Rule bill in 1886, Belfast’s Episcopalian- 
Conservative establishment was confronted with the imperative of constructing 
a representative Ulster Protestant coalition, or umbrella movement, projecting 
an image of unity and law-abiding respectability. The new Unionist movement 
sought to harness and integrate the sectarian Order, whilst simultaneously 
containing its excesses, circumscribing its role and prominence and exercising 
increasingly centralised political and organisational control over its activities. 
The Unionist establishment needed to integrate the Order as a bridge to the 
strategic Protestant working class, as an effective mobilisational mechanism, 
and in order to ensure the movement’s long-term stability by emasculating the 
main source of local Protestant dissent. On the other hand, it needed to contain 
and control the Order as part of the process of Ulster coalition building and in 
order to project a respectable front in mainland Britain. The dilemma posed by 
the Order profoundly influenced the political, ideological and organisational 
development of Ulster Unionism. The movement’s approach would determine 
the prevalence and effectiveness of collective violence in the city. Its 
relationship to the Order would not only determine the manifestation of 
popular sectarianism, whether through politics and propaganda or collective 
violence, but would be crucial in deciding the outcome of the Home Rule 
struggle.
The Orangemen’s role as the elite, or vanguard of the Protestant working 
class, defending the lives and liberties of the Protestant community, conflicted 
with Unionist political imperatives after 1886. The Unionist establishment 
needed to appease hostile elements within the Protestant community and win 
over British public opinion, both suspicious of the Order’s associations with 
sectarian bigotry and violence.
Through self-education the ideal Orangeman embodied the ‘superiority 
of Protestantism’ over Catholicism. The Order constituted the ‘advance guard 
of Protestantism’, God’s ‘chosen ones’, or ‘soldiers of Christ’ engaged in a 
‘Holy War’ in defence of Protestant principles. During the Second Home Rule
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crisis Brother Wellington-Young addressed Belfast Orangemen declaring ‘if  it 
(Home Rule) became law, what were they (the Orangemen of Ulster) going to 
do? (Voices-” Fight” ). yes; fight. What were they going to fight with? 
(Voices-”  Guns” )’.196 The retiring Grand Secretary of the Belfast Grand 
Lodge, Thomas M’Cormick, declared in relation to this struggle that ‘the 
Orangemen of the North, and of Belfast especially, had to take the van in the
|  Q 7
fight, and were depended upon to make great exertions’. Orangemen saw 
themselves as the pre-eminent defenders of the ‘lives and liberties of the 
Protestants of Ireland’. The Belfast Grand Master, Colonel Saunderson, 
proclaimed in 1901 that ‘the Protestants of Ireland looked up to the great 
organisation as the one organisation which only could cope with our 
Nationalist opponents’.198 In reality, by the Second Home Rule Crisis, the 
Unionist leadership had effectively usurped the Order at the vanguard of 
resistance to Home Rule.
The Belfast Order also saw its role as counteracting the forces of 
‘lawlessness’, acting as a parallel or alternative police force when the civil 
authorities were deemed incapable of preserving fundamental Protestant rights. 
Grassroots Orangemen believed in intervention to protect the rights and 
liberties of the entire Protestant community through frequently violent 
collective action. In the aftermath of the 1886 disturbances the Catholic’s chief 
spokesman at the Commission of Inquiry observed that the Order ‘tends to put
|  Q Q
itself in the place of law’. The Orange leadership saw this ‘policing’ role in a
more limited constitutional sense, and in terms of Orange self-restraint, 
‘civilising’ the grassroots away from their worst excesses. The latter 
conception tallied with Ulster Unionism’s preoccupation with law and order. 
Unionism was preoccupied with projecting a respectable constitutional front 
and in appeasing elements within the coalition who objected to the Order’s 
violence and bigotry. The Unionist establishment saw certain Orange practises 
as a liability. Its conception of law and order was equally concerned with
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suppressing Nationalist ‘lawlessness’ and containing ‘rowdy’ Orange elements 
within the Protestant community. Despite the efforts of the Orange leadership 
to project a respectable front, the Institution was closely identified with 
‘rowdyism’. The Belfast Riots Commission of 1886 was highly critical of the 
Orange Order’s ‘intolerance and incitement’.200 These disturbances profoundly 
impacted upon the Unionist movement’s relationship to the Orange Order. 
During the Second Home Rule crisis serious disturbances were avoided. This 
coincided with the emergence of Unionism as a political and organisational 
force, exercising a semblance of restraint and control over the Institution and 
channelling popular Protestant agitation away from collective action in the 
street into disciplined organisations. The ‘Manifesto to the Orangemen and 
Loyalists of Belfast’ issued by the Belfast Grand Lodge in February 1893 
urged Orangemen ‘to be very jealous of the maintenance of order and peace so 
far as in your power lies. Give no offence, be slow to take offence’.201 Many 
Orangemen were organised and ‘policed’ within the Unionist Clubs movement. 
In April the Belfast Grand Lodge challenged Nationalists ‘to prove a single 
case where any member has in the least, or in any way, been guilty of conduct, 
of, or at all tending to, riot, or riotous conduct’.202
Unlike its Liverpool counterpart, Ulster Unionism clearly differentiated 
between legitimate and illegitimate private violence, integrating the Order into 
an overarching political and organisational strategy. The Belfast Order 
actively prepared for armed resistance to Home Rule. In 1886, when Unionism 
was an embryonic movement, Orange initiatives were largely autonomous, 
reflecting its status as the pre-eminent vehicle of popular Protestant 
mobilisation. However, by the Third Home Rule crisis, the Order was fully 
integrated into a centralised Unionist strategy, comprising a fundamental 
component alongside the Clubs movement of the U.V.F. At a meeting in 
Belfast on 15 December 1911 the Institution formed a temporary Grand Lodge, 
referred to as both the U.A.G.L (possibly the Ulster Amalgamated Grand 
Lodge) and Ulster Provincial Grand Orange Lodge. Its role was to ‘resist in 
every way the passing of Home Rule’ and to take ‘every necessary step for the
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protection of the Loyalist population’.203 Unlike earlier initiatives, the U.V.F 
integrated and harnessed the strength of the Order, containing Orange 
volunteers within a disciplined force under central Unionist leadership.
Another imperative underlying Ulster Unionism’s efforts at integration 
was to emasculate the Order as the principal source of Protestant dissent. The 
Order saw one of its obligations as exposing all those complicit in the 
undermining of Protestant rights and safeguards. Who constituted a ‘rotten 
Protestant’ could be a contentious affair, attacks being made from Orange 
platforms during 1901 on Salisbury’s Conservative Government The Belfast 
Grand Master, Colonel Edward Saunderson, warned that ‘a Government 
without backbone was not qualified to govern this country’, attacking the 
administration’s failure to ‘choke’ the United Irish League and its attempt to 
introduce a Roman Catholic University Bill for Ireland. He predicted this 
would ‘ensure their own destruction’, proclaiming ‘he would fifty times rather 
have an avowed Nationalist opponent than a rotten Protestant’. Shortly after, 
Saunderson, as part of the local Orange and Episcopalian-Conservative 
establishment, was attacked by Independent Orange elements for his perceived 
complicity in the growth o f Ritualism/Romanism.204 In the aftermath of the 
defeat o f the Second Home Rule Bill factions within the Institution, primarily 
Evangelical Episcopalians and Presbyterians, sought to expose the danger 
posed by Ritualism within the Irish and English Episcopal Churches. The 
emerging anti-ritualist coalition provoked growing opposition, principally 
amongst Episcopalian-Conservative elements within the Institution, who feared 
a Presbyterian attempt to undermine the Order’s historic ties to Conservatism. 
Alarm was intensified by the convergence between the dissident Independent 
strand within the Order and the militant Protestant B.P.A.
From the 1892 Ulster Unionist Convention elaborate methods were 
devised by the Unionist establishment to integrate the Order, alongside 
Unionist organisations, into a progressively more centralised political and 
organisational strategy. The vital mobilisational capacity of the Order, which 
Ulster Unionism sought to harness and deploy, is illustrated by the Balfour
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demonstration of April 1893. In March the Belfast Grand Lodge created a sub­
committee for the anticipated visit of Lord Salisbury, leader of the 
Conservative opposition.205A circular instructed ‘each lodge, each officer, and 
each man to turn out on the occasion, and emphatically demonstrate their 
unswerving allegiance to the Legislative Union’. The Grand Lodge reported 
that the procession, preceding the Balfour demonstration, was ‘the largest 
demonstration of the kind ever held in this country’.207The Belfast Newsletter
A A A
estimated that at least 50, 000 Orangemen participated. One benign way of 
integrating the Order was by emphasising its symbolic role as guardian of 
Protestant tradition and heritage. At times of crisis this role was utilised to 
mobilise Orangemen and the wider Protestant community, reminding them of 
their historic obligations. At the ‘Great Belfast Demonstration’ preceding 
Ulster Day in September 1912 Colonel Wallace, Belfast Grand Master, 
presented the Unionist leader, Sir Edward Carson, with the ‘ancient orange 
coloured flag’: ‘This flag has lain in the peaceful possession of the lineal 
descendants of that gallant officer, Lieutenant Watson, who carried it in front 
of King William at the battle o f the Boyne. His descendants have thought that 
now is the time that it should come forth from its rest and should take once 
more its place in the van o f freedom’. Significantly, Carson subsequently 
returned the flag to Wallace and the Orange Institution’s safekeeping.209
In terms of a social service, the Order offered practical assistance to its 
members and the wider Protestant community. It provided a ‘primitive set of
A1 A
friendly society provisions’ in case of unemployment, injury or death, 
functions later performed by the Orange and Protestant Friendly Society. The 
Belfast Grand Lodge provided charitable assistance to Protestant Orphan 
societies and a to number of evangelical religious organisations. They 
organised collections in aid of the Evangelical Willow St.Mission Hall, an 
undenominational organisation, seeking to ‘benefit the working classes of the
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district’.211 Many lodges inculcated temperance principles, membership 
providing a degree of economic security and employment opportunities 
(discussed earlier) 212
In contrast to Liverpool, Orangeism was a pronounced presence within 
Belfast’s industrial labour market. It declined, in an organisational as opposed 
to ideological sense, as the expanding labour movement began to accommodate 
many of the aims of skilled male Protestant workers. Within this Labour 
movement, an influential strand of Independent Orange ideology cross­
fertilised with forms of labourism, providing an ideological and political 
platform for the articulation of Protestant labour grievances and aspirations. 
This Independent Orange strand would have a profound political impact. It 
contributed to the coalition which attacked the local Orange and Conservative 
establishment on religious and class grounds during the early Edwardian 
period. In 1918 the Unionist establishment created the U.U.L.A. in an effort to 
emasculate this Independent Orange strand as a potential source of disunity and 
dissent.
William Johnston observed that ‘Orangemen are simply Protestants in 
organisation’,213 whilst the Belfast Newsletter declared they constituted ‘the 
bone and sinew of Belfast and o f the ‘North-East Comer’.214Rev.Dr.Kane 
described the city as the ‘metropolis of Orangeism’ 215In reality, the Order was 
neither as representative nor as universally admired within the Protestant 
community as these statements imply. Attitudes towards the Order were 
determined by denominational, political and class loyalties and antipathies.
The Belfast Grand Lodge recorded a total of 127 lodges and 4,696 Orangemen 
across the city’s nine districts in 1879-80;^membership increasing only 
slightly to 5,316 Orangemen in 144 lodges a decade later.217 During the Second 
Home Rule crisis the Belfast Grand Master initiated a mass recruitment drive
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to strengthen ‘the cause which all Protestants and loyalists had at heart’.218 
However, in its aftermath, membership stood at only 6,837 organised in 157 
lodges.219 During the late Victorian period membership continued to grow, 
rising to 9,515 in 183 lodges across ten districts by 1901-02.220 However, the 
Order’s ideological and political influence far exceeded its numerical size.
The importance of the artisanate as the backbone of the Belfast 
Institution is highlighted by the fact that masters of general labourer’s lodges 
tended to be of foreman status. The Belfast Newsletter reported the presence 
o f‘a large contingent of artisans’ at the 1886 Maze demonstration 221 There 
were conflicting opinions as to the character of Orangemen. These were 
motivated by denominational, political, and class sentiment. These sentiments 
were magnified by the political imperatives confronting the Protestant 
community with the advent of Home Rule. During the rioting of 1886, the 
Episcopalian Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette encouraged the ‘better class of 
Protestants’ to enrol as special constables to assist the police in suppressing 
‘civil strife’ attributed to ‘Orange mobs’.222 Such strife was increasingly seen 
by many within the Protestant community as damaging to the Unionist cause. 
In contrast, the Catholic author M.J.F.M’Carthy stated in relation to the 
Twelfth’ celebrations of 1901 that ‘I am quite satisfied that 99 out of every 100 
of the processionists were industrious, respectable people’.223 This flattering 
view, reported by The Witness, coincided with Presbyterian efforts to engage 
with the Order in an attempt to influence large numbers of their working class 
co-religionists and as a continuation of their struggle with the dominant 
Episcopalian-Conservative establishment.
Those who perpetrated violence were often portrayed as marginal 
‘hangers-on’ over whom the Order had no control. ‘Rowdyism’ in the 
aftermath of the Maze Demonstration was attributed to ‘irrepressible ‘’comer 
boys’ ’ of the slums’. Another article attacked the habit of ‘Nationalists and
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Romanists’ of 'calling every rowdy who may describe himself as a Protestant 
as an Orangeman, and in this way the recognised and respectable members of 
the Order are abused and lampooned’.225 The Order’s association with violence 
was of constant concern to respectable elements within the Protestant 
community and to the emerging Unionist movement, conscious of accusations 
o f ‘Ulster bigotry’.
In December 1881 the Deputy Grand Secretary of the Grand Orange 
Lodge of Ireland identified the Orange lodge as a forum for fostering co­
operation and understanding between the ‘peer and peasant’. In industrial 
Belfast this envisaged class co-operation was highlighted by William 
Johnston’s (small landowner from South Down) declaration in 1893 that, if 
Home Rule passed, ‘it would be his privilege to lead the Belfast gas workmen 
against those infamous men of Home Rule’. This theme of unity, where ‘all 
Unionists’ would band together as ‘one large and loyal army’, was particularly 
emphasised during periods of crisis.226 However, as the formation of the 
Unionist Clubs movement testified, not all within the Protestant community 
envisaged the Order as the foundation of a representative Ulster opposition to 
Home Rule.
Prior to the emergence of the dissident Independent O.P.W.M.A in 1868, 
the Belfast County Grand Lodge was effectively controlled by the 
Episcopalian-Conservative bourgeoisie, ‘prominent urban patrons’ 
concentrated in their own lodges and exercising control via an elaborate system 
of patronage and brokerage. Prior to 1886, relations between the 
Conservatives and the Order had been extremely fractious; but with the advent 
of Home Rule a new source of political influence and control emerged. The 
embryonic, Episcopalian-Conservative dominated Unionist movement 
exploited the threat of ‘Rome Rule’, engineering co-operation and unity with 
the Order. A.T.Q.Stewart argued that the Order was ‘reinvigorated and made 
respectable’ with the return of aristocratic, clerical, and middle class support, 
who regarded the Institution as the most practical framework for mobilising 
Ulster opposition.227 However, many amongst the influential Liberal-
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Presbyterian bourgeoisie remained hostile to Orangeism’s associations with 
sectarian violence and bigotry, regarding it as a partisan Episcopalian- 
Conservative vehicle. This section envisaged the best case against Home Rule 
coming from ‘a united Protestant community of all classes untainted by the 
traditional practises of working class Protestants’. Consequently, for many
Ulster Protestants the Order represented a liability both in terms of coalition 
building and their conception of a respectable Unionist movement This view 
contributed to the transformation in the new movement’s relationship to the 
Orange Order.
Despite inter-denominational working class co-operation within the 
Institution and the growing desire of a number of influential Presbyterians to 
engage with it, denominational and political tensions continued to inform 
attitudes towards and the struggle for influence within the Orange Institution. 
The contentious issue of Ritualism represented the primary manifestation of the 
developing struggle for influence over the Institution, and through it, the 
strategic Protestant working class. In 1901, The Witness emphasised the link 
between Episcopalianism (Irish High Church Party) and the growth of 
Ritualism, criticising ‘Protestant statesmen who are Unionist in name and 
Conservative in political principle. These men are deeply imbued with High 
Church principles’. The paper insinuated that the Order was a tool o f this 
section of the Unionist party, which they had been accustomed to ‘cheer and 
support as the saviours and defenders of Protestantism’.229
This struggle surfaced on Orange platforms. Presbyterians, in 
conjunction with Evangelical Episcopalian’s, presented themselves as at the 
vanguard of the anti-Ritualist campaign. The Witness commented in relation 
to the ‘Twelfth’ 1901: ‘We know that some Episcopalians think Presbyterians 
should not refer to this subject at all’. It recounted an incident where a 
Presbyterian clergyman had the ‘temerity’ to allude to Ritualism at the 1900 
‘Twelfth’. He was ‘called to account by a local rector or curate, who declared 
that he would not listen to his Church being insulted’. The Episcopalian- 
Conservative establishment re-iterated that Home Rule remained the political
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issue and expressed doubts over Presbyterian commitment to the Union. The 
Witness countered, pointing out William 111 was a ‘great Presbyterian’ and 
that they were ‘deeply interested’ in the commemoration of the Boyne.230 
These denominational and political tensions reveal the fragility of the Unionist 
coalition, bereft of the cement of Home Rule, and illustrate the strategic 
importance of the Orange Order as a bridge to the Protestant working class.
The possible erosion of control and restraint over the Institution, accompanied 
by an upsurge in sectarian violence, threatened Unionism’s carefully cultivated 
image of unity and respectability.
UNIONIST CULTURE.
In contrast to the Order and Protestant religious networks, Unionist 
organisations performed a vital political, organisational and propaganda 
function. Whereas pre-existing associational culture reflected and exposed 
underlying social, denominational and political tensions within Ulster 
Protestant society, Unionist organisations symbolised the unity o f Ulster 
resistance. These organisations sought not only to integrate all sections of 
Ulster Protestant society, but also, with mainland public opinion in mind, to 
distance the movement from perceptions of ‘Ulster bigotry’, minimising 
explicit sectarianism and policing the worst excesses of the Protestant 
community. At times of crises these bodies provided a popular foundation for 
Ulster Unionism. Additionally, as a crucial component of an increasingly 
centralised political strategy, Unionist organisations harnessed and integrated 
existing and strategic new constituencies, whilst simultaneously emasculating 
them as alternative sources o f power and leadership.
The Ulster Unionist Clubs.
The Clubs movement, founded in 1893, constituted an institutional 
projection of the ideal of Ulster Unionism as an inclusive national movement, 
presenting ‘Liberal-humanitarian’, as opposed to explicitly sectarian objections
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to Home Rule. Their sole objective was to 'maintain the legislative Union 
between Great Britain and Ireland as at present existing, and to assist all those 
who have the same end in view’.231 The Clubs embodied the unity of ‘strong 
feeling’ prevailing amongst the Unionist community in Ireland, with this 
display principally directed at the people of Great Britain. The Belfast 
Newsletter observed ‘when such an example of union - unparalleled in the 
history of Ireland - is witnessed by the people o f Great Britain, it will force 
home a right conclusion’.232 Consequently, the Clubs sought to draw all 
factions together in one organisation under the Unionist banner, the ‘Laws and 
Constitution’ stating they were to form a ‘complete Roll and Organisation of 
Unionists and to promote sympathy and brotherhood among all sections of the 
Unionist party’. Membership was presented as a declaration of loyalty. The 
Liberal-Unionist Thomas Sinclair declared that ‘the first duty devolving upon 
every Unionist now was to declare on which side he was, and no better way 
could be devised of making this declaration than by joining a Unionist 
Club’.234
The Clubs also symbolised the legitimate ‘constitutional’ character of 
Unionist opposition to Home Rule. Sinclair distanced the movement from 
anything savouring of ‘a secret society business’ or acts of illegitimate 
violence. The Clubs were depicted as respectable projections of Unionist 
objectives, moderating the behaviour of elements within their ranks and 
channelling popular enthusiasm away from collective action in the street into 
constructive activities. Lord Templetown remarked that the Club system ‘had 
made weak people strong, and strong people moderate’. In 1893, the 
Honorary Secretary of the Clubs Executive Committee, B.W.D.Montgomery, 
expressed concern that the movement, composed of ‘bodies of anxious, earnest 
men’, should be allocated constructive ‘objects’ upon which to ‘expend their 
energies’. This was motivated by a fear of growing impatience within the
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ranks. Montgomery outlined how the Clubs organised ‘meetings, excursions, 
and athletic sports’.236
Despite its stated intentions of collaboration, the implication was that the 
Clubs were to supersede the Orange Order at the vanguard of opposition to 
Home Rule. They were referred to as ‘outposts’ or rallying points at the 
forefront of Unionist organisation. This role was instrumental in Unionist
efforts at presenting a respectable and united front, excising explicit 
sectarianism and divisive denominational, political and class differences from 
the Unionist facade. There were frequent references to Roman Catholics being 
able to join the Clubs under the Unionist banner, a President of the Fortwilliam 
Club declaring ‘what he liked about those Unionist clubs was that all Unionists 
could join them, Protestant and Roman Catholic’.238 Consequently, the Clubs 
were portrayed as an inclusive, non-political, secular alternative to the Orange 
Institution, recruiting and mobilising recalcitrant or unorganised elements 
within the Unionist community. The Belfast Newsletter commented, ‘the 
claim of the system of clubs to organise those not previously organised, is 
amply indicated by the fact that many of such men have joined the clubs’.239 
Consequently, the Clubs movement reflected the ambiguous relationship 
between Ulster Unionism and the Orange Order, seeking to both integrate and 
contain the Institution. To many Ulster Protestants, the Clubs were an 
acceptable alternative to the Institution, despite their endorsement by the 
leadership of the Belfast Order and the active participation of many 
Orangemen. The movement represented a respectable front for popular 
Unionist resistance and a mechanism for containing and controlling the worst 
excesses of grassroots Orangemen. The dilemma of appeasing and integrating 
the Order, whilst simultaneously containing and managing its role and 
practises, informed Unionism’s drive towards increasingly centralised political 
and organisational control. Montgomery described the Club’s movement as a
235 Minutes of the Meetings of the Unionist Clubs Council. P.R.O.N.1,28 
February 1894
236 Minutes of the Meetings of the Unionist Clubs Council. Executive
Committee Report P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 2 May 1893
237 Belfast News Letter. 14 March 1893
238 Belfast News Letter. 14 March 1893
239 Belfast News Letter. 15 March 1893
232
system facilitating the central control and deployment of the ‘whole of the 
Unionist forces in Ireland’240 and Lord Templetown proclaimed it was ‘in fact 
if not in name an Irish Unionist Defence Union’.241
The Clubs movement performed a vital propaganda role within Unionist 
strategy, not only persuading elements within the Ulster Protestant community 
to actively participate in the cause, but enlightening mainland sympathisers to 
their ‘dangers and requirements’. Lord Templetown proclaimed, ‘the problem 
of the hour is shall we have time to convert sufficient o f the electors between 
this and the next General Election to secure the return of a Unionist 
Government to power’. After the resounding Unionist General Election 
victory in July 1895, the U.U.C.C. reported that many Clubs were ‘content to 
rest upon their oars, there having been no occasion to call for renewed 
activity’.243 Their utility and effectiveness ended as the prospect of Home Rule 
receded. In the ensuing vacuum, with no effective organisational structure to 
underpin the fragile Unionist coalition, the previous consensus dissolved 
exposing underlying tensions and rivalries within the Protestant community.
In the aftermath of the Liberal Election victory in December 1910 and 
the renewed prospect of Home Rule the Unionist Clubs were reactivated in 
Belfast on the 11 January 1911 as part of a centralised strategy, orchestrated by 
the Ulster Unionist Council. A resolution proposed that the Clubs should be to 
‘a considerable extent an educational institution to spread the knowledge of 
Irish affairs across the Channel’ .244This propaganda role, as opposed to its 
‘policing’ function, was the Clubs’ primary responsibility from 1911 onwards. 
By this stage the Orange Order was effectively integrated into Unionist 
strategy and its volatile support managed within the U.V.F. Unlike its 
Liverpool counterpart, Ulster Unionism clearly differentiated between 
legitimate violence in defence of the Union and illegitimate private violence 
damaging to the cause. Although sources claimed the Clubs were armed
240 Belfast News Letter. 14 March 1893
241 Minutes of the Meetings of the Unionist Clubs Council. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast,
5 March 1913
242 Minutes of the Meetings of the Unionist Clubs Council. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 
24 August 1893
243 Unionist Clubs Council. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 19 May 1896
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during the Second Home Rule Crisis there is no doubt that co-ordinated 
preparations were undertaken, during the subsequent Crisis. At a Special 
Meeting of Club Presidents in Belfast on the 15 December 1911 ‘instructions’ 
(most likely emanating from the Ulster Unionist Council) were issued. These 
were similar to those given to the Order, and by July 1912 Club’s began to 
report the ‘strength of enrolled membership and number of members 
drilling’.245 Patrick Buckland argued that the U.U.C.C. dissuaded local Club’s 
from ‘taking action that might provoke disturbances or expose Ulster Unionists 
to charges of sectarianism’. In 1913 the Cliftonville Unionist Club 
unsuccessfully moved a resolution urging the Council ‘to use its influence with 
all Protestant employers of labour in Ulster, to get them to dismiss as occasion 
offers their Home Rule employees’.246 It is difficult to determine how 
widespread this grassroots desire for direct action was and whether the 
Council’s suppression of it explains its uneasy relationship with the Orange 
Order. At the behest of Sir Edward Carson the movement was revived in 1919 
to counter the Fourth Home Rule Bill, with emphasis again placed upon its 
propaganda work.247 After the passage of the Government o f Ireland Act in 
1920 most of the Clubs re-organised themselves as Unionist Associations, 
serving constituencies in the new Northern Ireland Parliament.
The ideal o f a unified Ulster opposition to Home Rule was encapsulated 
in a resolution passed by the Fortwilliam Unionist Club, stating ‘all who hold 
Unionist principles are eligible as members, irrespective of creed or party and 
whether voters or non-voters’. Lord Templetown declared that the 
organisation incorporated ‘Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Roman Catholics, 
Orangemen, Conservatives, Liberal Unionists, landlords, tenants, shopkeepers, 
artisans and labourers’. In reality, the movement primarily sought to capture 
‘those not previously organised’, whether due to apathy, suspicion or hostility
244 Minutes of the Meetings of the Unionist Clubs Council. P.RO.N.I, Belfast, 
5 April 1911
245 Unionist Clubs Council. Special Meeting. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 23 August 
1912
246 Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two. 57-58
247 Ulster Unionist Council Year Book. 1920. 7
248 Belfast News Letter. 14 March 1893
249 Belfast News Letter. 20 February 1893
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towards the Orange Institution.250 The passion aroused by the Order is
highlighted by Colonel Hall, organiser of the Club’s from 1911, who recalled
that Carson ‘advised me not to join the Orange Order as I was needed to bring
1in the staunch Unionists who would not join the Orange Order’. Unionism’s 
differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate violence was part of its 
effort to distance itself from politically damaging violence and Ulster bigotry. 
Thomas Sinclair, the Liberal Unionist Chairman of the Fortwilliam Club, 
differentiated the Clubs from armed secret organisations like Young Ulster, 
emphasising ‘any man who conceived an act of violence in connection with 
this question was an enemy of the Unionist cause’.252 By May 1893 there were 
12 Belfast Clubs out of a total of over 100,253whilst 341 Clubs had been formed 
by 1912-13, 80 more than in the previous history of the movement.254 By the 
time of the movement’s third revival, in 1919, the U.U.C Year Book recorded 
the existence of about 200 Clubs. The clubs sought to accommodate all strata 
of Ulster Protestant society. Rev.Dr.Kane, Belfast Grand Master, declared that 
95% of the nearly 300 Clubs and over 100,000 of its members nationally were 
‘merchants, manufacturers, tenant farmers, shopkeepers, artisans, labourers and 
wage-eamers generally’.256 The Belfast Newsletter observed, in relation to the 
Balfour procession, that membership also included lawyers and other 
professionals.257 Peter Gibbon argued ‘by and large, the clubs were led at the 
local level by the new stratum of activists created in the Convention 
campaign’, reflecting the centralised character of the emerging Unionist 
movement. In 1893 the Executive of the U.U.C.C. consisted of six capitalists,
250 Belfast News Letter. 15 March 1893
251 Report of Visit to Colonel Hall of Spinningfield. Hambledon. P.R.O.N.I, 
Belfast, 14 April 1964
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253 Minutes of the Meetings of the Unionist Club’s Council. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 
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254 Minutes of the Meetings of the Unionist Club’s Council. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 
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two landowners, a clergyman, a solicitor, and a private gentleman,258the Belfast 
bourgeoisie being the driving force behind the Unionist movement.
Many Irish Nonconformists, particularly respectable Liberal- 
Presbyterian’s saw the Clubs as an alternative basis of Unionist organisation to 
the Orange Order, with its historic denominational and political associations. 
The movement embodied Nonconformist ‘liberal humanitarian" ideals 
increasingly influential within Unionism. Sir George Hayter Chubb, Chairman 
of the Nonconformist Unionist Association, believed the clubs ‘should be 
accepted as an indication of the strong feeling that prevails among the masses 
in Ireland-chiefly Nonconformists-on the subject of Home Rule’. However, 
Templetown emphasised ‘every Unionist, irrespective of religious creed...is 
eligible for membership’ .259In stark contrast to the Order this was to include 
sympathetic Roman Catholics. However, this was a symbolic gesture designed 
to distance Unionism from perceptions of Ulster bigotry with little evidence 
suggesting Roman Catholics joined in any significant numbers.
Ulster Volunteer Force.
The U.V.F, formed in 1912, provided Ulster Unionism with an effective 
mobilisational structure, or Ulster army. Like the majority of Unionist culture, 
it performed a vital political and ideological role, simultaneously defending 
Ulster Protestant’s and ‘policing’ this community. This dual role highlights 
Unionism’s clear differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate private 
violence. This was central to their image as the ‘law-abiding’ section of the 
community, avoiding a pretext, in the form of widespread violence, for British 
military intervention. This latter role was particularly important in light of 
preparations for an Ulster Provisional Government in the eventuality o f Home 
Rule and was to be achieved by drawing popular Protestant agitation away 
from the streets into formal, disciplined structures.
The fundamental object of the UVF was to ‘raise and enrol a Force of 
men at once for self-preservation and mutual protection of all Loyalists, and
258 Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism. 137-8
259 Belfast News Letter. 20 February 1893
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generally to keep the peace’.260 By February 1914, with the threat of Home 
Rule imminent, the Chief Staff Officer instructed Divisional and Regimental 
Commanders to ‘take steps to have Mobilization Schemes for their Counties or 
Regiments prepared’.261 In an effort to stay on the right side of the law, a form 
was drafted to be signed by two County Magistrates. Volunteers sought 
‘lawful authority for them to hold meetings for the purpose of training and 
drilling themselves, and of being trained and drilled to the use o f arms for the 
purpose of practising Military exercises, movements and evolutions’.262 In 
contrast to this legitimate use of force, fear of widespread Orange violence, is 
illustrated by the UVF’s efforts to maintain internal ‘discipline’ and law and 
order throughout Ulster in ‘any emergency’. A scheme was formulated for the 
creation of a ‘special flying column’ consisting of 5000 men to undertake 
‘police work’ in and around Belfast, protecting the city against ‘rioting or 
destruction or incendiarism from the Nationalist inhabitants, or from the 
irresponsible youths and unenlisted men of the Orange side’. This scheme 
laid the foundations for the ‘Special Service Force*, raised during December 
1913, consisting o f3000 armed men from the Belfast Battalions. By May 
1914,4000 rifles had been distributed to the Belfast UVF, plus 3000 to the 
Special Service Force.264
Upon the outbreak of war in August 1914, the Belfast UVF became an 
ancillary arm of the British 36th Ulster Division. The force’s G.O.C outlined 
‘we have been straining every nerve to get every available man to join 
Kitchener’s Army’ 265 Its role was seen as contributing to UK ‘Home Defence’ 
and ‘support of the Empire’. At the time of the fourth Home Rule crisis in 
1920, the Unionist leadership attempted to reactivate the UVF to meet ‘a real 
need for security’ and to ‘get their supporters under responsible control’ at a 
time of serious sectarian rioting.267
A 1914 document listed the strength of the Belfast Division of the UVF
260 Ulster Volunteer Force Booklet P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 1
261 D/1327/4/21. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 7 February 1914
262 U.V.F. Confidential. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 16 or 18 February 1914
263 D/1327/4/21. ‘Number One Scheme’. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast
264 D/1327/4/13. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 4 May 1914
265 Letter Richardson (G.O.C.U.V.FI to Carson. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 5 July 1915
266 U.V.F.O.33.1915. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast.
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as 29,752 organised in four Regiments, plus the Young Citizen Volunteers 
Battalion.268Volunteers had to be between 18 and 60 and sign ‘The Covenant’ 
and a declaration to ‘act under and obey the orders of their Superior 
Officer’.269This was part of the concerted Unionist effort to restrain ‘hotheads’ 
and ‘extremists’ within the ranks. The West Belfast Regiment clearly 
illustrates how grassroots Protestant territorial allegiances were harnessed and 
contained within the disciplined structure of the U.V.F. Unlike its Liverpool 
counterparts, this force channelled sectarian fervour away from action in the 
street into rifle practise and drilling. The West Belfast Regiment, despite being 
the smallest, was the most militant of the Belfast units. Its Special Service 
Section regarded itself as the ‘cream’ of the Belfast UVF, its members 
originating from the ‘fervently Orange and loyal Shankill’.270
The broad social composition of the U.V.F embodied the representative 
ideal of Ulster Unionism, damaging tensions and divisions within the 
community being effectively managed within these structures. Some Belfast 
Battalions, like Victoria and Avoniel (East Belfast Regiment), were ‘purely 
working class’.271 A letter from J.Milne Barbour of the Linen Thread Company 
revealed the extent of membership within particular workplaces and the 
economic impact of mobilisation. In its Belfast works, ‘a good many of the 
Volunteers are in groups in different departments, and in some small 
departments of great importance, such as the Boiler House and Engine Drivers, 
possibly the whole staff are in the Volunteers, so any extended scheme of 
mobilisation would have a very disturbing effect’ 272 Other branches of the 
UVF were effectively restricted to those of a certain social class, a Motor Car 
Corps formed in 1914 comprising ‘owners of Motor Cars’ in the Belfast 
area.273 The leadership of the UVF is revealed in the composition of the County 
Committees and official representatives of the Belfast Regiments. The five
267 Miller, Queen’s Rebels. 126
268 D/1327/4/20. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast
269 Ulster Volunteer Force Booklet P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 1
270 Buckland, Irish Unionism:Two. 64
271 Letter Hon.Sec.East Belfast U.V.F to McCammon. 8 January 1914. 
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County representatives for each of three of the four Regiments were 
predominantly members of the Belfast bourgeoisie. The South Belfast 
representatives included an Architect, Linen and Iron Merchant, and two 
manufacturers. By 1913, the County Committees of three of the four 
Regiments comprised a relatively broad social mix, the 19 strong North Belfast 
Committee including three merchants, two builders, a warehouseman, a 
confectioner, two directors, an Estate Agent and an auctioneer, two engineers, 
a plasterer, a Grocer and a spinning master.274
The Belfast UVF incorporated the principal Protestant denominations. 
Special services commemorating Ulster Day ini 914 were held at the Ulster 
Hall, the Episcopalian Cathedral, and the Presbyterian Assembly Hall275 whilst 
Churches ‘of all denominations’ contributed to the UVF Patriotic Fund in 
1916 276 However, incidents expose an undercurrent of suspicion within the 
Unionist coalition and, beneath the respectable fa9ade, a strong seam of 
sectarianism within the U.V.F.’s ranks. In October 1913 William Cavan, a 
Belfast Orangeman and Black Knight, wrote to his fellow Orangeman 
Lt.Col.McCammon concerning the employment of a Roman Catholic typist in 
the office of the U.V.F.’s Despatch Riders and Signallers Department. He 
stated ‘I am writing to you as an Orangeman and Black...Knight because I 
don’t want to write to Captain Hall (organiser of the U.U. Clubs) or any of that 
Party’. Cavan urged McCammon to give the head of the Department the 
‘position he deserves’ for employing ‘traitors who would sell their nearest 
friends for money or position’. 277 The success of Unionist organisations was 
their ability to control and contain volatile internecine and sectarian sentiments 
within the ranks, avoiding their expression on Belfast’s streets.
Ulster Unionist Labour Association
Like other Unionist organisations, the U.U.L.A performed a vital 
political, ideological and organisational role within Unionist strategy. With the 
introduction of universal adult male suffrage in 1918, the increase in Belfast’s
274 D/1327/4/18. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast
275 U.V.F.O.113.1914. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast
276 U.U.C. Year Book. 1917.54
277 fetter William Cavan to McCammon. 8 October 1913. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast
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parliamentary representation to nine seats and the rise of political Labour, the 
Unionist establishment recognised the strategic position of the organised 
Protestant working class. The U.U.L.A embodied a complex set of roles, 
providing a nominally independent vehicle for the limited expression of 
Protestant labour issues, whilst emasculating an alternative source of power 
and countering the politicisation of class and labour grievances by the 
‘Socialistic’ Labour Party. The Association fostered a sense of class co­
operation and unity within the Unionist coalition, circumscribing the 
emergence of divisive forms of Independent Protestant working class political 
expression. These forces had contributed to the previous breakdown of the 
Unionist coalition with its attendant violence. In propaganda terms, the 
organisation sought to counter ‘misrepresentations’ as to the loyalty of 
Protestant workers, demonstrating the benefits, in terms of social legislation, of 
remaining within the Legislative Union. Additionally, through the exploitation 
of the ‘British link’, the U.U.L.A endeavoured to educate the influential British 
Labour movement as to the dangers of Home Rule and benefits of retaining the 
Union.
The U.U.L.A first met on the 1 June 1918, emerging from the Trades 
Unionist Watch Committee, formed in Belfast in November 1917. In 
conjunction with the Ulster Unionist Council, the Committee sought to secure 
the return of three ‘Unionist Labour’ candidates for Belfast in the December 
1918 General Election. The U.U.L.A emphasised that it was ‘purely political’ 
and did not ‘interfere in industrial matters’, avoiding antagonising the 
overwhelmingly Protestant Trade Union movement.278 Municipal and 
parliamentary representation was integral to the Association’s aim of 
representing the ‘Unionist democracy of Ulster’, comprising the ‘Trade 
Unionists of Belfast and District’ or ‘real voice of Labour’.279 It sought to 
provide a Protestant ‘Labour’ voice within the Unionist caucus, demonstrating 
Protestant working class support for the Union. The Association described 
itself as ‘the accredited representatives of Labour in the Province of Ulster’, 
emphasising its attachment to the Union in contrast with the Labour Party and
278 Ulster Unionist Labour Association Monthly Meeting. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 3 
July 1920 & U.U.L.A Executive Committee. 1 July 1920
279 Unionist Watch Committee. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 26 February 1918
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T.U.C’s endorsement of Home Rule. The U.U.L.A exploited the historic links 
between the Belfast Labour Movement and its British counterpart in an effort 
to rectify ‘their ignorance of the real facts in reference to the problem’.280 
Whilst appealing to ‘our fellow Trade Unionists in Great Britain to maintain 
the unity of our joint labour movement’,281elements within the organisation 
sought to counteract the influence of the Labour Party within the Belfast labour 
movement.
A vital part of the U.U.L.A’s role was championing the ‘welfare o f the 
masses’ within the Legislative Union, ensuring ‘Ulster shall in future share 
fully in all legislation passed for the benefit of the people of Great Britain’.
The organisation discussed the need for better housing, transportation and 
schooling, and supported such bodies as the Joint Committee for Mothers’ 
Pensions, the Women’s Political League, the Ulster Temperance Council and 
the movement for shorter hours. In essence, it was a pressure group on behalf 
of the ‘Loyal Democracy’ within the Unionist coalition. A 1919 resolution 
drew attention to the ‘unsanitary conditions of the ash bins and back passages 
in the City’, calling upon the Unionist Belfast Corporation ‘to take immediate 
steps to have the present regrettable conditions redeemed’ 283
The U.U.L.A also offered practical assistance to Protestant workers, 
ranging from an ‘Out-of-Work’ donation for the unemployed,284 through to a 
fortnightly Educational Class. During the serious disturbances of 1920-22, a 
Sub-Committee was appointed to raise funds and adopt the legal cases of 
‘Unionists who had been driven from their houses’.285 Significantly, claims 
were not to be considered ‘if it has been found that the applicant was in any 
way involved in looting’.286
A U.U.L.A obligation was the preservation of law and order. It 
volunteered the ‘loyal democracy of Ulster’ to assist the authorities in the
280U.U.L.A. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 3 August 1918
281 U.U.L.A. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 7 September 1918
282 U.U.L.A. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 18 January 1919
283 U.U.L.A. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 1 March 1919
284 U.U.L.A. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 20 November 1919
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'discharge of their onerous duties’ during the 1920 disturbances.287 In 
November 1920, the organisation endorsed the U.U.C’s decision to create 
'Special Constables’ as an ancillary arm of the British State. It proclaimed, 
‘We strongly recommend our Members to support the Force in every possible 
way’ 288 Geoffrey Bell argued this Special Constabulary was in reality 
established to deal with ‘Catholic opponents to Unionism’ as the ‘para-military 
wing’ of the Northern Irish State from May 1921.289 The organisation was also 
implicated in the Industrial expulsions commencing in July 1920, holding 
meetings during Spring and Summer pledging support for the security forces 
and demanding vigorous counter-emergency measures. With the passage of 
the Fourth Home Rule Bill, Unionism was neither as willing nor as able to 
exercise restraint over its sectarian support or overly preoccupied with 
projecting a respectable fa$ade. This helps to explain the upsurge in sectarian 
collective violence during this period.
The U.U.LA comprised the ‘Unionist democracy of Ulster’ with its 
precursor, the Trades Unionist Watch Committee, claiming to represent the 
‘Unionist majority’ o f Belfast’s Trade Unionists. The Committee was 
composed of Trades Unionists concentrated amongst the overwhelmingly 
Protestant ‘artisan elite’. Fourteen of the 21 representatives on the Committee 
were associated with shipbuilding, engineering and iron, including two 
representatives of the N.A.U.L comprising semi-skilled and unskilled 
Protestant shipyard workers. This Protestant artisan elite, Belfast’s ‘labour 
aristocracy’, not only constituted the foundation of the Belfast Trade Union 
movement, but, crucially, was the bedrock of the Orange Order. Consequently, 
the U.U.LA played a vital role in integrating and managing this elite, 
emasculating it as an alternative source of power and exercising restraint over 
its activities. There were also four representatives from amongst the linen and 
textile trades, and one each from the Cabinet-makers, Amalgamated Plumbers, 
and House Painters.290
By 1919 attempts were made to broaden the U.U.LA’s appeal beyond its
287 U.U.L.A. Monthly Meeting. P.R.O.N.I, Belfest, 27 March 1920
288 U.U.L.A. P.R.O.N.I, Belfest, 6 November 1920
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Trade Union roots. The Association claimed to speak on behalf of the 
‘workers of Ulster’,291 calling upon ‘our fellow Unionist working men and 
women’ to support Unionist candidates in the 1920 Municipal elections.292 
There were four branches in Belfast, one each in the North, South, East and 
West of the city.293 The increasingly integrated character of Unionist 
organisation is illustrated by the fact that members were encouraged to take 
forms to their Orange lodges and Unionist Clubs, and to ‘endeavour to obtain 
as many Members as were qualified by our Rules’.
CONCLUSION
Protestant associational culture played fundamentally different roles in 
Tory-Democracy and Ulster Unionism’s relationship to popular sectarianism 
and collective violence. Liverpool’s diverse, yet inter-connected, sectarian 
culture became the organisational foundation and mobilisational mechanism of 
the Protestant Democracy, the primary agency of belligerent collective action 
in the city. In contrast, Belfast’s Unionist culture was a highly effective 
vehicle of increasingly centralised political control, embodying ideals of unity 
and respectability, and proving highly successful at managing the forces of 
popular sectarianism.
Liverpool’s Protestant culture was geared towards direct-action in the 
community of the street, the principal arena of sectarian conflict in the city. It 
contributed to the demarcation, contestation and defence of ‘territory’. The 
city’s distinctive spatial patterning was a vital factor in this culture’s collective 
action. Mobilisation in the street, including picketing, parades, demonstrations 
and preaching, was a causal factor in sectarian violence. Comprising three 
distinct, yet overlapping elements (the Evangelical, the Orange Order and the 
L.W.M.C.A), the diversity of this culture reflected the fragmented nature of 
power and leadership over the Protestant working class. Initially seen by 
elements within the Tory-Anglican establishment as a medium for engaging 
this class, Protestant culture proved impossible to harness and contain on a
291 U.U.L.A. Special Meeting. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 8 November 1919
292 U.U.L.A. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 3 January 1920
293 U.U.L.A. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 7 December 1918
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coherent and sustained basis. Unlike Belfast there was no dominant local 
proletarian idiom over which to exercise central control. The anti-ritualist 
crusade witnessed the marginalisation of the Order and the legitimisation, 
politicisation and empowerment of militant Protestant organisations and 
personalities. From 1900 there occurred a breakdown in established power 
relations within the Protestant community, precipitated by the opportunities 
and constraints exposed by a traumatic democratisation process within the local 
Conservative political machine. This process contributed to a growing 
disillusionment amongst the Protestant working class with the limitations and 
constraints of formal politics and organisation, and with contemporary 
Conservatism. The ensuing protest cycle resulted in the fragmentation and 
devolution of local power, the erosion of restraint and control and the 
divergence between formal Conservative politics and the belligerent politics of 
the street Consequently, Liverpool’s Protestant culture provided a social 
service, contributed to the demarcation of ‘territory’ and, particularly after 
1900, constituted the primary mechanism for mobilising the muscle of the 
Protestant Democracy. This force employed frequently violent forms of 
collective action to defend their marginal privilege and to counter perceived 
Catholic ‘aggression’ or as a component of cultural defence and resistance to 
cultural transition.
In stark contrast, Belfast’s Unionist culture was politically conceived and 
centrally organised, proving remarkably successful at managing popular 
sectarianism and containing its collective violence. With its emphasis upon 
politics and propaganda the struggle against Home Rule transformed Protestant 
organisational initiatives in Belfast The emerging Unionist movement realised 
that in order to integrate the Protestant working class they needed to exercise 
control over one dominant organisation, the Orange Order. It needed to 
integrate this local idiom as a bridge to the Protestant working class, as a 
popular mobilisational mechanism and to ensure its own long-term stability by 
emasculating a potent source of dissent within the Protestant community. The 
Institution represented a liability in terms of forging a representative Ulster 
Protestant coalition and projecting a respectable front in mainland Britain. 
Consequently, a major goal of Unionist organisation was to integrate the Order, 
controlling or ‘policing’ its volatile support. Unionism clearly differentiated
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between legitimate and illegitimate private violence, drawing Protestant 
agitation away from collective action in the street into formal disciplined 
organisations and structures.
In contrast to pre-existing Protestant culture, the overarching function of 
Unionist culture was to embody a set of political and ideological aspirations, 
symbolising the new movement’s ideals of unity and respectability. It also 
performed a crucial mobilisational function, distanced Unionism from 
perceptions of ‘Ulster bigotry’, and emasculated alternative sources of power 
and leadership within the Protestant community. Whereas Liverpool’s culture 
reflected the fragmentation and devolution of social and political power, 
Belfast’s culture mirrored Unionism’s drive for centralisation and control. By 
facilitating the integration of popular sectarianism into representative, 
seemingly democratic structures Unionism succeeded in transforming and 
reducing the prevalence and effectiveness of collective violence.
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CHAPTER FOUR - POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR IN LIVERPOOL AND 
BELFAST.
Protestant associational culture in Liverpool and Belfast reflected the 
contrasting location and distribution of power and leadership in the political 
relationship between Tory-Democracy, Ulster Unionism and popular 
sectarianism. This chapter examines that political relationship. I argue that in 
Liverpool during the course of a sustained multi-layered protest cycle the 
Conservatives’ relationship to popular sectarianism was transformed with this 
process contributing to the evolution of the Protestant Democracy and the 
ascendancy of belligerent sectarianism.1 I identify four key phases in this 
relationship. The first (1880-89) was characterised by an expedient, often 
uneasy, alliance between local Conservatives and the Orange Order. The 
second phase (1889-1900) witnessed the marginalisation of the Order and the 
forging of an alliance between democratic Conservative forces, personified by 
Salvidge and the W.M.C.A, and militant Protestantism through the anti- 
Ritualist crusade. This alliance culminated in the triumph of Salvidge’s Tory- 
Democracy and the empowerment of a strident brand of militant 
Protestantism. The third phase (1900-05) witnessed the unravelling of these 
strands during the Independent Protestant revolt, with Salvidge exploring 
alternative issues upon which to retain Protestant working class support. The 
final phase (1905-21) saw the continued divergence and interaction between 
formal politics and the belligerent politics of the street practised by the 
Protestant Democracy epitomised by the riots of 1909.2 However, an
1 see Taplin on Neal ‘’Sectarian Violence” , 94; Smith, ‘’Labour Tradition in 
Glasgow and Liverpool” , 33,39 & Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 
163 on the ‘Orange-Tory bloc’, & Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of 
Liverpool” , 11 on class interaction through Liverpool’s associational 
network. See also Belchem and Shallice, ‘’Orange and Green and 
Militancy” , 17,30 on the fact that that the Protestant working class were not 
‘passive instruments’.
2 Bohstedt, ‘’More Than One Working Class” , 175,176,214 has 
convincingly argued that the riots of 1909 were ‘deeply rooted in the 
structures and processes of Liverpool community politics. They resulted, not
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expedient co-existence persisted between Tory-Democracy and popular 
sectarianism. This was attributable to the absence of effective alternatives for 
Protestant political expression and Tory-Democracy’s pragmatic approach to 
sectarian street mobilisation. A key factor was the relative ‘exceptionalism’ 
of Liverpool politics in relation to national political culture and identity, 
which was gradually eroded during the later period.
I argue in Belfast the Episcopalian-Conservative relationship to popular 
sectarianism was also transformed but with completely different 
consequences. In the early period, the Episcopalian-Conservatives enjoyed a 
relationship to sectarianism akin to that in Liverpool an intimate, yet strained, 
alliance with the Orange Order. This arrangement was transformed by Home 
Rule with its imperative for engaging with national political culture and 
identity. Confronted by the necessity of winning the ‘battle of politics’ and 
propaganda,3 whilst simultaneously mobilising and integrating their working 
class constituency, the dilemma posed by popular sectarianism proved a 
considerable challenge. The existing Conservative relationship to the Order 
was an impediment in terms of coalition-building and influencing national 
perceptions4 but crucial in terms of accommodating the strategic Protestant 
working class and of ensuring Unionism’s long-term political stability.5 
Unionism’s response was to exert increasingly centralised control over 
Ulster’s anti-Home Rule forces through the creation of elaborate political and 
organisational structures designed to integrate, contain and police its volatile 
support, whilst simultaneously minimising the role and influence of popular 
sectarianism.6 Whereas, the Protestant revolt in Liverpool resulted in 
continued fragmentation and devolution of power, in Belfast Unionism 
responded to a similar alliance of Independent Orangeism and militant 
Protestantism with an intensification of political and organisational initiatives. 
By the Third Home Rule crisis of 1912, this drive had resulted in a highly
from spontaneous explosions, but from sustained campaigns and deliberate 
political choices’, 
see Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two. 8
4 see Buckland, Irish Unionism: Two. 3
5 see Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism. 124 & Harbinson, The Ulster
Unionist Party. 8-10
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centralised movement. Unionism’s ultimate success proved to be its ability to 
present itself as a national movement predicated upon ideals of unity and 
respectability, whilst simultaneously integrating and containing its core 
support which remained fundamentally sectarian in character and outlook.
LIVERPOOL.
1880-1889
During this initial phase Liverpool’s Conservative establishment 
enjoyed an expedient, often uneasy alliance with the Orange Order, the 
principal agency of popular sectarianism and perpetrator of collective 
violence. With the burgeoning anti-Ritualist crusade, elements within local 
Conservatism sought to harness this agitation as a means of re-engaging with 
the Protestant working class. As a vital part of this process, the nascent 
democratic Conservative forces tacitly encouraged the frequently violent 
activities of popular Protestant organisations like the Order and the Church 
Association. Consequently, in light of the extension of the franchise in 1884, 
a degree of sectarian violence was seen as an acceptable by-product or 
corollary of the process of political re-engagement with the Protestant 
working class.
From a Liberal perspective, the Review provided a good summation of 
the sources of allegiance binding the Tory constituency at the beginning of the 
period. In an imaginary interview with A.B.Forwood, the new leader of 
Liverpool Conservatism, the paper attributed the traditional strength of local 
Toryism to a combination of religious and economic factors, resulting from 
the presence of the large Irish Roman Catholic community. It proclaimed the 
Protestant working class hates ‘the Irish for coming to this country and 
lowering the rate of wages’. A unionised group like the Shipwrights were 
‘Tories to a man’, believing this would ‘benefit their trade’ in the form of 
protectionism. The paper emphasised the emotive power of ‘Popery’ and its 
role in securing the ‘Nonconformist vote’, which shunned Liberalism as it was
6 see Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party. 18 on Unionist concerns for the
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‘generally supported by Roman Catholics’. Anglican Churchmen supported 
the Tories because they associated Liberalism with Charles Bradlaugh’s 
atheistic Liberation Society.
A resolution of the Liverpool Province of the Orange Institution 
endorsing the candidature of the Liverpool Conservative leader Edward 
Whitley during the 1880 General Election, shows that Orangemen still 
regarded the Conservatives as defenders of ‘civil and religious liberty’. 
Protestantism and Conservatism were seen as virtually synonymous with 
Orangemen called upon to ‘rally round the Protestant and Conservative
a
banner’. This relationship grew increasingly strained over time, culminating 
in a severe rupturing in relations, contributing to the ascendancy of sectarian 
violence in Liverpool. In 1882 the Review noted the Tories, ‘instrumental’ 
relationship to the Order, particularly at election times, describing them as 
‘convenient tools’, whilst on occasions they gave the Order the ‘cold shoulder 
as allies’.9 This uneasy relationship was reflected in the attendance of Tory 
‘notables’ at the Glorious Twelfth. In 1885, the Review insinuated that 
certain Tories employed threats, alongside the argument of ‘moral necessity’ 
to secure the Orange vote in the November General Election, whilst others 
employed flattery.10 The reality of this relationship was recognised by many 
grassroots Orangemen who realised they were exploited by the Tory ‘swells’ 
for electoral purposes.11 However, Orange allegiance was neither passive nor 
unconditional. In 1884, the Orange ‘champion’ Lord Claud John Hamilton 
M.P was attacked by the Orange rank and file for attending a meeting 
organised by the prominent Catholic, Father Nugent, and for praising 
Gladstone’s Government.12 Motivated by common cause and political 
expediency, the courting by Conservative M.P’s and Councillors of 
Liverpool’s Protestant culture continued throughout the period.
defence of civil and religious liberty.
7 The Liberal Review. 5 March 1881
8 The Liberal Review. 31 January 1880
9 The Liberal Review. 15 July 1882
10 The Liberal Review. 18 July 1885
11 The Liberal Review. 15 July 1882
12 The Liberal Review. 6 December 1884
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Early anti-Ritualist agitation in the city was politically manipulated and 
fomented by elements within the Tory establishment. This crusade proved 
instrumental in the ‘ democratisation’ process within the local political 
machine. This culminated in Tory-Democracy and the empowerment of the 
militant Protestant Democracy. In 1884 the Liberal Review implied that 
Orange involvement in the anti-Ritualist agitation was politically motivated, 
condemning those in the background ‘responsible for encouraging them’. The 
Review accused Orangemen of making the ‘Bible a party badge, and turning 
religion into an election cry’.13
By 1885, a close institutional relationship had developed between the 
Liverpool Constitutional Association and the Orange Order and L.W.M.C.A. 
Each constituency had a council drawn from its ward committees, each 
comprising the chairman, secretary and ten representatives from each branch 
of the L.W.M.C.A, the Orange Institution, the Conservative Temperance 
Association and affiliated societies containing over fifty paying members. 
Despite its democratic appearance, ‘before taking definite steps in matters of 
primary importance’, constituency councils had to consult with the 
Constitutional’s executive. This dependence on the Constitutional was 
reinforced by the absence of separate constituency agents.14
In 1886 the Liverpool Review highlighted growing fault lines in the 
relationship between the patrician Constitutional, concerned about its 
‘gentility’, and the proletarian Orange Order. The paper observed that the 
‘currant jelly’ section of the Conservatives were ‘heartily ashamed and 
disgusted with its rowdy Orange supporters’.15 Frank Neal argued that the 
Constitutional’s collection of ship-owners brokers and merchants had ‘wider 
horizons’ than Church issues16 generating religious and class friction with the 
Orangemen. In the aftermath of the Conservative Election victory in July 
1886, elements within Liverpool Conservatism sought to sideline the Order, 
attempting to forge an alliance with the Liberal-Unionists.17
13 The Liberal Review. 14 June 1884
14 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 62
15 The Liverpool Review. 17 July 1886
16 Neal, Sectarian Violence. 200
17 The Liverpool Review. 17 July 1886
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A concerted power-struggle within Liverpool Conservatism, symbolised 
by ‘grassroots’ Orange political self-assertion, emerged afterl886. In 
Abercromby ward Tom McCracken was quashed by the ‘currant jelly 
clique’.18 In 1888, Forwood, confronted by growing dissent, accepted fifteen 
Orange representatives on to the Constitutional’s General Council as well as 
proportionate representation on the Executive.19 However, in November 1889 
the appearance of rival Conservative candidates in South Toxteth ward was 
interpreted by the Review as evidence of a new ‘spirit of democracy, the spirit 
of equality’. Harry Thomas, Orange leader and dissident Conservative 
candidate was described as ‘consciously or unconsciously, the instrument of 
democracy’, whilst the official Conservative represented the ‘old, corrupt, and 
high-handed party policy of the Tommy Atkins days’. This revolt embraced 
the ‘Orange body’ and the L.W.M.C.A, described as ‘seething with 
discontent’. This was directed against the ‘swells’ or ‘currant jelly’ section, 
who believed, ‘because they have money they have a right to place and 
power’. Thomas was described as ‘practically a workingman in lull sympathy 
with the working classes’. The Review noted a ‘strong under swell of 
opposition to the policy of the powers that be in the Conservative Party’ 
expressed through widespread sympathy if not support for Thomas. At this 
stage there remained a strong fidelity to Conservatism amongst the party rank 
and file including many Orangemen. The revolt failed to unseat the 
Conservative candidate. The Review remarked that due to a ‘belief that it is 
their duty to the party to obey orders they are holding aloof and taking neutral 
ground’.20
The Review believed the 1889 revolt was not on a question of principle, 
but had arisen because of the ‘bad treatment which the Orangemen have 
received from the Conservative Party’. It was primarily over recognition and 
representation, the Review proclaiming the ‘Conservative swells have been 
taking all the honours, while the rank and file, like dumb cattle, have been 
doing all the work’.21
18 The Liverpool Review. 23 November 1889
19 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 94
20 The Liverpool Review. 23 November 1889
21 The Liverpool Review. 30 November 1889
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When principle did enter the equation in the guise of anti-Ritualism, the 
fissures within Conservatism became more serious and prolonged, with 
profound consequences for Liverpool’s communal strife. The Loval 
Orangeman warned, 'Conservatism is Popery of the deepest stain, when it is 
‘’ritualistic” in the Church’.^The Protestant Standard identified two classes 
of Orangemen. ‘Christian Protestant Orangemen’ who embraced independent 
representation on class and sectarian grounds (being preoccupied with 
Ritualism) and ‘nominal Protestant, political Orangemen’ waiving everything 
to preserve the Legislative Union.23Over time, the Conservatives would face 
growing difficulty in retaining the support of ‘Christian Protestant 
Orangemen’.
1889-1900
MaCraild argues that by the 1890’s Home Rule had given the Orange 
Order ‘a position of near respectability on the Unionist wing of British 
politics. Orangeism was also at the forefront of the renewed campaign against 
Ritualism which came to the surface in the 1890’s’.24 In Liverpool, this 
campaign exacerbated growing fissures within local Conservatism, between 
the democratic forces and the swells. During the 1890’s this popular 
Protestant crusade was harnessed as a vital corollary of the democratisation 
process, the swells being attacked on religious and class grounds. 
Consequently, this period witnessed the convergence of two strands; the 
democratic Conservative and the militant Protestant. The first represented a 
prolonged ‘democratisation’ process within Liverpool Conservatism. This 
was a struggle for ascendancy within the political machine between the 
grassroots and the Constitutional Association dominated by the currant jelly 
element or ‘upper tenth’. This struggle had a pronounced class dimension, 
articulated through the medium of anti-Ritualism. The convergence between 
these strands can be traced to the alliance forged between Forwood and 
Salvidge in the late 1880s/early 1890s. Liverpool Tory Democracy evolved as
22 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 96
23 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 96
24 MaCraild, Irish Migrants in Modem Britain, 1750-1922.180
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a result of this alliance with the democratic Conservative forces unleashed by 
the November 1889 revolt. The Liberal Review observed ‘that the faithful 
and submissive Conservative workingman should rebel against the spirit of 
monopoly and exclusiveness - of the classes against the masses - is a certain 
presage that the ‘old order changeth” . Harry Thomas had been described as 
an ‘instrument of democracy’, a role subsequently embodied by the 
L.W.M.C.A under Salvidge.25 This expedient accommodation was Forwood’s 
method of heading off an autonomous ‘national Protestant campaign’; of 
retaining disaffected Protestant elements within the Conservative caucus and 
outflanking the Order.26 From 1892 Forwood made Salvidge his ‘chief 
political confidant’ drawing the organisation into the ‘official fold’.27 This 
relationship was characterised by a large measure of self-interest. The 
Liverpool Review remarked, Forwood was ‘not in accord with his party. 
Friction existed among them, both in the Council and at the Constitutional 
Association’. He resolved to have a ‘power at his back’ to ensure his 
supremacy.28 In Salvidge he found someone capable of deploying popular 
Protestant strength in support of the party. As a result of this ‘power-sharing’ 
arrangement, Salvidge and the L.W.M.C.A asserted grassroots Protestant 
demands within the Conservative fold, anti-Ritualism becoming a vital 
corollary of the democratisation process.
The anti-Ritualist crusade appealed to a particular conception of English 
nationality prevalent amongst the Protestant working class. William 
Dennison Junior, Vice-Chair of the L.W.M.C.A, proclaimed ‘England owed 
its progress to the Reformation and dated her prosperity from the day when an 
open Bible was introduced into the Church’.29 Constitutional Conservatism 
was presented as the main bulwark of the Reformation. The Protestant 
Standard stated ‘true Conservatism is Protestantism; and that which does not 
conserve and defend Protestantism against Papal aggression is not 
Constitutional Conservatism, but is a political tumble down rotten system, 
which, if it was allowed to be persevered in, would eventuate in England’s
25 The Liverpool Review. 23 November 1889
26 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 95
27 Salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool. 22
28 The Liverpool Review. 20 May 1899
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ruin’.30 After the Conservative General Election victory of July 1895 anti- 
Ritualism became the principal mechanism for articulating Protestant 
disenchantment with conventional politics and local and national 
Conservatism.
The W.M.C.A had become the principal medium for engaging with and 
harnessing Liverpool’s Evangelical Protestant forces, developing into the 
primary agency of Tory Democracy. Salvidge, ‘one of the local crutches of 
this Tory Democracy’, used the W.M.C.A to obtain supremacy within 
Liverpool Conservatism. Tory Democracy was the culmination of the process 
of democratisation within the local Tory political machine, whereby the 
Conservative workingmen practically controlled the Constitutional, having 
‘elbowed’ aside the currant jelly element. The Liverpool Review related local 
developments to wider democratisation of the working classes, this process 
taking a particular form within Liverpool Conservatism.32 In 1902 Salvidge 
asserted that the Liverpool W.M.C.A had been at the vanguard of the ‘great 
democratic movement instinct with Conservatism’, a response to the Third 
Reform Act. Salvidge believed that in order ‘to meet the changing conditions 
the Party must broaden its basis, and advocate causes that stirred the bulk of 
the new electorate’. The idiosyncratic character of Liverpool ‘workingman 
Conservatism’, constituted the relationship between this democratic ‘instinct’ 
and ‘Protestant principle’.
Salvidge openly defied the leadership of the party in the interests of the 
Protestant Democracy. This defiance strengthened his position within local 
Conservatism. In 1899, he expressed regret at failing to support the 
Conservative candidate in Southport, who was lukewarm on the Church 
question. He proclaimed his determination ‘not to sacrifice principle to party 
and would stop at nothing to bring the Conservative Government to a proper 
realisation of the people’s wishes on the Church question’. The Political
29 Protestant Standard. 29 May 1897
30 Protestant Standard. 5 March 1898
31 The Liverpool Review. 20 May 1899
32 The Liverpool Review. 20 May 1899
33 Salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool. 36
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Committee of the Liverpool Conservative Club displayed its impotence, 
considering Salvidge’s expulsion, but settling upon a ‘politic’ reprimand.34
In 1936 Barbara Whittingham-Jones argued that from its inception the 
W.M.C.A had been the vehicle for weaving Protestantism into the fabric of 
Conservatism. Through its close links with Liverpool’s Evangelical forces it 
became a vehicle for Protestant interests within the ‘official fold’; whilst, in 
Waller’s words, ‘accredited political agencies’ began ‘’aping ‘popular’ 
Protestant organisations in direct action’ .35The anti-Ritualist crusade was the 
catalyst in legitimising, politicising and empowering Liverpool’s Evangelical 
Protestant culture. During 1898 the B.P.U and Layman’s League applied 
pressure upon local Conservative M.P.S to support the Church Discipline 
Bill.36 Salvidge’s willingness to defy the local leadership and his alliance with 
Liverpool’s Evangelical forces during this unsuccessful agitation temporarily 
averted a large-scale break from the party. However, this alliance weakened 
his long-term position by empowering an alternative power-bloc. The 
Protestant Democracy was prepared to take to the streets to achieve its goals.
The W.M.C.A attempted to channel disaffection with Conservatism 
into efforts at the ‘reformation’ of the party. However, a growing number of 
Evangelical Protestant’s advocated a complete break, the Protestant Standard 
arguing in 1898 that by failing to resist ‘Papal aggression’ contemporary 
Conservatism had compromised Protestantism, and consequently deserved not 
their support, but opposition.37
A far more critical stance developed amongst grassroots Orangemen. 
Brother John Carr, Deputy Grand Master of L.O.L 119, proclaimed it was a 
shame they should be ‘tacked on to such a party; a party that would grant 
Home Rule if they dare’. He referred to Balfour’s Conservative 
administration as ‘our present Anti-Protestant Government and their Popish 
ways’. He no longer regarded Orangemen as ‘passive’ tools of Conservative 
political hegemony, but as increasingly active and conditional political
34 Salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool. 33-34
35 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 176
36 see Protestant Standard. 28 May 1898
37 Protestant Standard. 5 March 1898
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participants. At local and parliamentary elections he demanded them to ‘be 
firm, and they would gain a glorious victory for Protestantism’.
Prominent Orangemen warned that ‘continual truckling to Romanism 
will sooner or later wreck the party’. Orangemen with fidelity to 
Constitutional Conservatism, held out for a ‘reformation’ of the party. A 
resolution to Balfour declared, ‘let the Government act right as a Protestant 
Government ought and they will have no more loyal supporters than the 
Orangemen’.39 By June 1898 disaffection amongst many Orangemen had 
reached breaking point. Carr declared ‘our Conservative Party are not the 
party we must look to for the maintenance of the Protestant Constitution of 
this country’.40
There were three inter-connected strands within popular Protestant 
political rhetoric. The first was ‘principle before politics’, or autonomous 
political decision-making; secondly, there were those who advocated a 
complete break with Conservatism, forging an independent Protestant political 
bloc; and, thirdly, those, primarily within the L.W.M.C.A and the Orange 
Order, who envisaged the reformation of the party, restoring its fundamental 
Constitutional principles.
It was soon apparent that the majority of the L.W.M.C.A, although 
prepared to criticise and rebel, retained a fundamental allegiance to a 
particular conception of Conservatism. The emerging Protestant Democracy 
evolved beyond these constraints. In the Anfield bye-election of 1903 the 
dissident National Protestant Electoral Federation (N.P.E.F) discovered that, 
even in the case of a sympathiser like Charles Rutherford, the allegiance of 
many Tory Democrats was to party rather than Protestant principles. On the 
other hand, Independent Protestants believed, by abandoning a traditional 
conception of Constitutional Conservatism the party had sacrificed their 
allegiance. They believed their differences were virtually irreconcilable.41
38 Protestant Standard 19 March 1898
39 Protestant Standard. 23 April 1898
40 Protestant Standard. 4 June 1898
41 The Protestant Searchlight Vol.l New Series. Liverpool. 109-111
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1900-05
This period witnessed the unravelling of the democratic Conservative 
and militant Protestant strands with strident anti-Catholic collective action 
merging with independent Protestant politics during the 1903-05 revolt. 
Salvidge’s attempts to engineer party unity during 1900-1903 necessitated a 
slowing in the Protestant agitation and a shift away from extremism. This 
transformed the relationship between the L.W.M.C.A and the strident 
Protestant Democracy. Tory Democracy had lost much of its pre-1900 
‘radical’ edge, providing an opportunity for more militant elements within 
Liverpool’s Evangelical culture to seize the initiative.
In the aftermath of the 1900 General Election Salvidge was acclaimed 
the ‘arbiter of Tory fortunes in Liverpool’42, the W.M.C.A functioning as a 
semi-autonomous vehicle promoting the interests of the Protestant Democracy 
within the political machine. Salvidge now believed its power should be 
‘directed in such a way as to secure the unity of the Conservative Party in this 
city, and at the same time to uphold the fundamental principles of the 
Association’.43 This dual role generated growing tensions and contradictions. 
Salvidge’s brother noted calls from the usual quarters to ‘curb the ever­
growing ascendancy of Salvidge’.44 In the aftermath of the Boer war, Lord 
Stanley became local Conservative leader, in order to bring ‘complete 
harmony to a party where fear and distrust of a too rapid democratisation still 
lingered’.45 In 1902 Salvidge emphasised the ‘heartiest co-operation’ existing 
between the Association and the local party leadership,^distancing the 
organisation from the divisions exposed by the Church Discipline Bill. In 
Philip Waller’s words, Salvidge endeavoured to slow the pace of the 
‘Protestant agitation’,47engineering a move away from extreme Protestantism 
synonymous with this ‘too rapid democratisation’. Additionally, Brian 
M. White argued that, having previously championed working class interests it
An Salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool. 38
43 The Liverpool Review. 18 January 1902
44 Salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool. 43
45 Salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool. 44
46 The Liverpool Review. 25 January 1902
47 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 191
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is ‘difficult to discover any new and concrete proposal in the working class 
interest sponsored by Salvidge after 1900’.48 These developments translated 
into growing Protestant working class disaffection with Conservatism and 
support for Protestant political alternatives and modes of popular collective 
action. The L.W.M.C.A came to be seen less as a vehicle for promoting 
grassroots Protestant rights and interests, and more as an agency of mediation 
and control within the political machine.
The 1903-05 revolt witnessed the unravelling of the democratic 
Conservative and militant Protestant strands. This resulted in a divergence 
between those Protestants retaining fidelity to Conservatism as the ‘bulwark 
of the Reformation’, and those, who envisaged a genuinely autonomous 
Protestant politics unconstrained by traditional political allegiance. Salvidge’s 
instinct was to confront this ‘political hybrid’ and destroy it at the ‘street 
comers and in the open spaces’.49 The revolt witnessed the fragmentation and 
devolution of power and leadership over popular sectarianism. This loss of 
restraint and control resulted in the growing divergence between formal 
Conservative politics and organisation and the increasingly violent politics of 
the street practised by the Protestant Democracy.
The Protestant Searchlight described the National Protestant Electoral 
Federation (N.P.E.F.), inaugurated in Liverpool on the 23 May 1903, as a 
‘crystalization’ of the agitation caused by the ‘indignities heaped upon 
Protestants by the City Council and police in regard to open air meetings’.50 
The catalyst for the revolt was Wise’s agitation during 1903 to secure the 
StDomingo Pit as a Protestant meeting area. The Federation sought to 
marshal and deploy the Protestant vote in all elections (select vestry, 
municipal and parliamentary) according to the strategy of ‘principle before 
politics’. The Rev. J.M’Kinney proclaimed that the Federation was ‘destined 
to strike at the root of all anti-Protestant humbug in municipal affairs, and 
clear vestries and councils of time-servers and Roman intriguers, and send to 
the House of Commons honest and decided Protestants who know their own
48 White, A History of the Corporation of Liverpool 1835-1914.190
49 Salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool. 47
50 The Protestant Searchlight Vol.l. New Series. 1904.109
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minds on Protestant questions’.51 The key to this strategy was the list of 
questions submitted to candidates of which ‘Will you on every occasion place 
Protestantism before Politics?’ was the most important. The N.P.E.F’s first 
involvement was in the Anfield Municipal bye-election of 1903 where it 
helped defeat the Conservative Charles Rutherford.52 In contrast it was active 
on behalf of the Conservative, George J.Smith, opposed by a Roman Catholic, 
in Sandhills bye-election. Smith was an Evangelical, standing on a platform 
of ‘Free Speech and police protection for Protestant speakers’.53 As both the 
Liberals and Conservatives made ‘frantic efforts’ to secure their vote, the 
Federation’s objective was to employ Protestant political muscle as the 
balance of power, thereby securing Protestant objectives.54 A number of 
factors contributed to the growth of the N.P.E.F. The first was mounting 
Protestant indignation at the perceived Ritualistic aims and intentions of the 
majority of local councillors and M.P.s.55This was exacerbated by the 
treatment of Protestant speakers, particularly their new ‘noble leader’ George 
Wise, by the civil authorities and the Conservative Council.56 Secondly, 
Protestant alarm at growing Catholic self-assertion symbolised by the strength 
of Irish Nationalism on the Council, and the perceived inadequacy of the 
traditional parties to counter this threat M’Kinney conspiratorially lumped
51 The Protestant Searchlight Vol. 1. New Series. 1904.110
52 The Protestant Searchlight Vol. 1. New Series. 1904.109 The other 
questions were:
1 .Will you do all in your power to obtain the allocation of suitable sites for 
open-air meetings?
2. Will you on every possible occasion protect and serve the interests of 
Protestants in the City Council by discountenancing and resisting any undue 
attempt to put into employment, place or power Romanists to the exclusion of 
Protestant candidates?
3. Will you resist every attempt by municipal and official authorities to fetter 
or put down free speech in the city by enforcement of any harassing or 
vexatious by-laws and secure for Protestant, Christian lecturers and speakers 
the protection to which they are entitled from mob violence?
4. Will you use every effort to have the provisions of the Education Act 
carried out in such a way that Protestants will not be compelled to send their 
children to Roman Catholic or Ritualistic schools? Protestant Searchlight. 1 
August 1903
53 The Protestant Searchlight 1904.128
54 The Protestant Searchlight 1904.109
55 The Protestant Searchlight 1904.110
56 The Protestant Searchlight 1904.128
259
the Conservative Council majority and the Irish Nationalists together, 
describing them as the ‘Ritualistic and Roman authorities of the City’.57 
Thirdly, there was mounting disgust at the national Conservative 
administration, and its perceived inaction and complicity in the growth of 
Ritualism and Romanism. Finally, the N.P.E.F exploited Salvidge’s failure 
since 1900 to sponsor any ‘new and concrete proposal’ in the working class
CO
interest. Wise’s municipal programme for Kirkdale in 1903 included cheap 
transport and council housing, whilst in Garston, Maddocks proposed an eight 
hour day for Corporation employees. 59The Federation provided a context 
within which the Protestant denominations, could ‘sink all minor differences’, 
and ‘cast their politics to the winds’, in order to unite in defence of the ‘great 
fundamental principles of Protestantism’.60
In essence, the N.P.E.F was borne out of a profound sense of alienation 
amongst the Protestant working class with Conservatism. The Searchlight 
emphasised the rank and file character of the revolt, M’kinney proclaiming the 
‘working classes of the City.. .are rallying round its standard with an 
allegiance and fervour and enthusiasm and in such numbers as gives 
unbounded promise for the future’. However, many Protestant workers 
remained loyal to a conception of Constitutional Conservatism, as the bulwark 
of the Reformation, entertaining the possibility of reconciliation upon the 
basis of Protestant principle. The Searchlight invited the Conservative 
leadership to ‘quickly drop invective and insult and the Government to take us 
into its confidence, otherwise the ‘Fourth Party’ will drive a wedge into every 
constituency and unseat not only every Conservative in this city, but every 
Tory representative in the Kingdom’.61 The revolt exposed profound internal 
divisions within the Tory Democratic political machine including potential
57 The Protestant Searchlight 1904.110
58 White, A History of the Corporation of Liverpool. 1835-1914. 190
59 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 203 In November 1903, the N.P.E.F 
won 3 Council seats in Kirkdale, Garston and StDomingo, missing Breckfield 
by one vote out o f2400 polled. A.Shallice, ‘Orange and Green and 
Militancy’, Bulletin. North West Labour History Documents. 6, (1979-80), 18
60 The Protestant Searchlight 1904.150 Waller has argued that Protestant 
candidates in November 1903 profited significantly from Nonconformist 
discontent with the 1902 Education Act. Waller, Democracy and 
Sectarianism. 203
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schism within the L.W.M.C.A with some expelled for supporting the 
Independents. Additionally, accommodations were made between local 
Conservative Associations and the Federation, the latter having ‘conferred’ 
with the Bootle Conservative Association during the 1904 Municipal 
Elections.62
Shallice hints at the divisions exposed within the Orange Order.63 There 
had been strong rank and file criticism preceding the revolt of the Institution’s 
national leadership, local and national Conservatism and the Bench of Bishops 
concerning Ritualism and Romanism. Leading local Orangemen like 
M’Kinney and Massey were at the forefront of the N.P.E.F. However, 
divisions within the Order reflected the wider fault line within the Protestant 
revolt. This was between those who retained fidelity to a particular 
conception of Conservatism as maintaining Protestantism, and those who 
envisaged a break with this tradition and the exploration of alternative modes 
of Protestant political expression and collective action. In 1905, Wise, future 
Grand Chaplain of the Province, delivered a lecture entitled ‘How the Tory 
party tried to strangle the Orange Order’.^Bitter animosity developed between 
leading Orange personalities in the revolt.
The revolt’s demise was attributable to the contradiction in its two 
principal strands. When Wise attacked Salvidge, flirted with Labour and 
supported the Liberal against the Conservative in Everton, many independents 
were confronted with a choice between Wise’s strategy and an underlying 
allegiance to Conservatism. Salvidge exploited these divisions, outlining the 
parameters of Conservatism. He emphasised that ‘Protestantism did not mean 
insulting and ridiculing other people’s religion. This new movement was 
lashing out indiscriminately and its candidates had no aim except blind 
bigotry, and could achieve nothing but grave injury to the Conservative party, 
the main bulwark of the Reformation’. Salvidge emphasised the 
constitutional character of the L.W.M.C.A’s anti-Ritualist agitation, in
61 The Protestant Searclight 1904.156
62 The Protestant Searchlight 1904.188
63 Shallice, ‘Orange and Green and militancy: Sectarianism and Working 
Class politics in Liverpool, 1900-1914’, Bulletin North West Labour History 
Documents. 6, (1979-80), 18
^Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 212
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contrast to the bigoted extremism of Wiseite anti-Catholicism. He stressed 
they had ‘no desire to interfere with any man’s faith’, a central tenet of 
Conservatism being ‘civil and religious liberty’.65Salvidge characterised the 
revolt as anarchy versus ‘law-abiding citizenship’,66with Wise’s violent 
methods attracting growing criticism from Protestants like Austin Taylor and 
Archdeacon Madden. The Protestant Standard declared Wiseite rowdies were 
‘no more Christians than the dogs that run the streets’.67
With the Conservative victory in Everton, in February 1905, Salvidge 
‘finally crushed the ‘Protestant revolt”  three Independent candidates being 
defeated in the November municipal elections.68 In his May 1905 Manifesto 
Salvidge criticised the Conservative Governments failure to recognise the 
nations Protestantism re-asserting the W.M.C.A’s position as the pre-eminent 
vehicle of grassroots interests.69He sought to draw agitation back into the 
official fold by deflecting Protestant criticism onto the Conservative 
Government. Simultaneously, he sought to reduce Tory Democracy’s 
dependence upon militant Protestantism by exploring alternative issues with a 
strong populist dimension attractive to the working class.
In the aftermath of defeat, Wise promised a ‘re-organisation of 
forces’,70exploring political alternatives to Conservatism. In 1903 he had 
proclaimed himself a workers’ candidate, a Socialist, but of a type superior to 
‘atheistic Socialism’, whilst in 1905 he declared ‘every Protestant should be a 
Labour man’.71 This flirtation with Labour was in response to the November 
1905 municipal elections, which were dominated by socio-economic 
preoccupations. It was also borne out of a realisation that this emergent fifth 
Council party represented the best opportunity to undermine Conservatism. 
Wise asserted that as democrats they could not endorse Conservative 
extravagance, whilst as Unionists they could not support Liberal-Nationalists.
65 Salvidge, Salvidge of Liverpool. 47
66 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 205
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Consequently, to preserve their independence, Protestants should be Labour 
men.72 There is some evidence of co-operation between Protestant and 
Catholic workers in Breckfield ward and the involvement of two Orangemen, 
James Taylor and James Quick, in organising the Liverpool Right to Work 
Committee against the 1905 Unemployed Workmen’s Act. However, in 
reality co-operation was extremely limited.
1905-21.
The period 1905-21 witnessed a growing divergence between formal 
Conservative politics and the belligerent politics of the street. Salvidge 
explored alternative issues upon which to build political solidarity with the 
Protestant working class, whilst the Protestant Democracy mobilised at street 
level to defend their interests. Consequently, a pragmatic co-existence 
developed between Tory-Democracy and the forces of popular sectarianism.
In the aftermath of the ‘Protestant Revolt’, Joseph Chamberlain’s Tariff 
Reform Scheme was seized upon by Salvidge as a more stable basis to 
construct political solidarity. It reduced Tory Democracy’s dependence upon 
overt Protestantism as a bridge to the Protestant working class. Liverpool 
Conservatism consistently promoted Protectionism. This ‘patriotic’ measure 
cast free trade and the Liberals as ‘unpatriotic’, as a ‘conspiracy against the 
British Nation’.74Additionally, the anti-Ritualist movement was rendered 
obsolete with the report of the Ecclesiastical Discipline Commission in 1906. 
From this point politicians tacitly ceased to enforce conformity in public 
worship.75 Anti-Socialism became a dominant Tory Democratic theme after 
1906, characterised as a contest between the ‘Constitution and Revolution’. 
Socialism could undermine two key planks of Liverpool Tory Democracy, 
sectarian division and the pragmatic co-existence between Conservatism and 
the forces of popular sectarianism. Familiar rhetorical themes were deployed. 
Tory Democracy was portrayed as preserving ‘Church, Crown and
72 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 113
73 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 216
74 Smith, ‘Class, skill and sectarianism’, 180
75 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 228-9
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Constitution’ against the twin threats of Roman Catholicism and Socialism.76 
The Kirkdale bye-election of 1910 was between the Labour candidate
A.G.Cameron and Colonel Kyffin-Taylor. The latter was Austin Taylor’s 
brother and a potentate of the Church Association and Protestant Reformation 
Society. The campaign merged explicit sectarianism and anti-Labour 
rhetoric. Salvidge proclaimed, ‘we stand on this platform to prevent the 
people of Ireland from ruling Kirkdale’. Cameron was accused of designing 
the ‘abolition of religion.. .the abolition of the Monarchy.. .and tyranny and 
slavery for the working classes’. The Conservative strategy was to couch this 
new threat in recognisable sectarian rhetoric, cementing their fragile 
relationship with the Protestant Democracy by identifying an additional threat 
to Protestant principles and institutions. It became a struggle between the 
‘Constitution and Revolution’.77
This struggle was exacerbated by the Transport Strike of 1911, which 
produced limited co-operation between Protestant and Catholic workers. The 
Protestant Standard responded by attacking Trades Unionism as a ‘system of 
secular Popery’. During the November municipal elections, Wise argued that 
Tom Mann’s writings represented the ‘worst possible gospel’ and threw his 
support behind the ‘Salvidgeite Conservatives’.78
Opposition to Home Rule assumed increased prominence in Tory 
Democratic rhetoric in the period after the revolt. This was a largely 
uncontentious issue around which all the components of Liverpool’s 
Protestant community were prepared to rally. In September 1912, Salvidge 
highlighted Liverpool’s special affinity with Ulster, Whittingham-Jones 
stating ‘the Protestant workingman identified Irish rebellion with Catholic 
conspiracy, and, in resisting one, resisted both’.79 With Protestantism and 
Unionism generally united, and anti-Ritualism in decline, the slogan ‘No 
Surrender for Ulster’ gradually superceded ‘No Popery’ within Conservative 
rhetoric.80 Unionism was seen as a more stable platform upon which to retain 
Conservative hegemony than the volatile ‘Protestant ticket’. As part of his
76 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism. 216
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Covenant campaign in 1912, Sir Edward Carson attended a demonstration at 
Liverpool’s Sheil Park, attracting 100,000, organised by the L.W.M.C.A and 
the Orange Order, and addressed by Carson, Salvidge and F.E.Smith.81
Dan Jackson argues this demonstration illustrates that the 'importance 
of violence as an articulation of communal identity in Liverpool has been 
overplayed' and the Orange half of the city regarded Home Rule as 'a  threat to 
their own supremacy’. It is debatable to what extent one can extrapolate 
general observations about Liverpool’s 'communal identity’ and ‘political 
culture’ from this demonstration. In reality it was an atypical reflection of 
Liverpool’s Protestant community or inter-communal relations, with Home 
Rule far from representing a direct threat to local Orange supremacy. It stood 
in stark contrast to the perceived threat posed by Ritualism (disguised 
Romanism) within their own community and local Catholic self-assertion, 
epitomised by the contested parades and riots of 1909. These episodes tell us 
far more about Liverpool’s complex political culture and Protestant communal 
identity.
Jackson focuses uncritically upon Home Rule, and the ‘combined forces 
of Unionism and Orangeism’, without emphasising that Unionism was a 
largely uncontroversial issue within the Protestant community. The 
Conservatives frequently played the Unionist card to unite a community riven 
by class and religious divisions. As Jackson points out, the ‘Conservatives 
could not control the Orangemen’ and the events of September 1912 should 
not be seen ‘as simply a demonstration in support of the Tory Party’. Internal 
divisions epitomised by the local struggle against Ritualism and Romanism 
fed directly into the endemic violence on Liverpool’s streets.
September 1912 was overwhelmingly peaceful, not because of cross- 
class ‘social integration’, but because it was unrepresentative of inter- 
communal interaction in Liverpool during 1880-1921 characterised by 
mobilisation in the community of the street. Unlike Jackson’s assertion that it 
was ‘largely’ for the ‘consumption of Liverpool and Belfast’, this 
demonstration was typical of the highly organised mass spectacles perfected
80 Whittingham-Jones, The Pedigree of Liverpool Politics. 49
81 Smith, ‘Class, skill and sectarianism in Glasgow and Liverpool, 1880- 
1914’, 201
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by Ulster Unionism in Belfast. It was part of a national propaganda 
campaign, or in Jackson’s words beyond Liverpool’s ‘parochial turf wars’, 
primarily aimed at British public opinion. As part of a national political and 
constitutional issue the Unionist desire to project a respectable law-abiding 
front was critical to this campaign.
Although Jackson is correct in asserting the continued importance of 
religion and locality as local political determinants, it is wrong to 
underestimate the increasing national dimension in relation to September 1912
DA
and longer-term changes in local political culture and identity. As the 
‘religious bogey’ decreased, in the period after the First World War, anti- 
Socialism gradually superceded Protestantism as the central plank of Tory 
Democratic rhetoric. With the progressive secularisation of society Liverpool 
Tory Democracy was forced to explore alternative sources of allegiance upon 
which to construct a basis of enduring popular political support. In 1919, 
Salvidge became Chairman of the Constitutional Association and leader of the 
Council. F.E.Smith proclaimed that Salvidge and the W.M.C.A were still 
‘pivotal. The Tory Party cannot refuse what they endorse’.83 In reality, 
popular sectarianism and the L.W.M.C.A were in decline as potent factors in 
local politics. Waller attributed this to the death of ‘Tory jingoism’ on the 
battlefields o f the First World War, a pronounced drop in Church attendance 
and the young joining Trade Unions.84 These factors contributed to the 
erosion of Liverpool’s relative ‘exceptionalism’.
With the trauma of the Transport Strike in 1911, Tory-Democracy had 
been forced to re-evaluate its relationship to popular sectarianism. This re- 
evaluation occurred in the light of concerted external intervention in 
Liverpool’s affairs. In order to preserve Conservative hegemony, Salvidge 
embraced more secular national issues in an attempt to expand beyond the 
Party’s declining Protestant base. In the successful January 1920 Municipal 
Elections, Salvidge, as part of the Conservative and Liberal anti-Socialist 
Coalition, emphasised ‘Constitutionalism versus Revolution and Anarchy and
82 see Jackson, ‘’Friends of the Union’: Liverpool, Ulster and Home Rule, 
1910-14” , 101-32
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Labour Extremists’. From the Transport Strike onwards Liverpool 
Conservatism gradually assumed a more national political complexion, 
influenced by a number of key local and national developments. This erosion 
of parochialism transformed the Conservatives relationship to popular 
sectarianism and collective violence.
During the inter-war era influential Conservatives continued to exploit 
popular sectarianism, Sir Thomas White courting Longbottom ‘The Orange 
Pope of Netherfield’. However, there was growing intolerance of the 
‘sectarian zeal’ of these Protestant ‘antedeluvian Mummers’. In 1936, 
Whittingham-Jones proclaimed the ‘Tory-Protestant alliance, however useful 
in the past, has now become a liability to the party which it used to sustain’. 
With the growth of the Labour Party, equated locally with Catholicism, 
Conservatives like Jones sought to integrate the Protestant party into a ‘broad 
church’ as long as this did not ‘involve the adoption of sectarian prejudices by 
Conservatives’. She envisaged a day ‘when our party in Liverpool will 
provide a big umbrella under which Conservatives of every religious faith 
may find shelter’. This expedient desire to detach Conservatism from militant 
sectarianism can be traced to the Protestant revolt when Salvidge ‘bust’ 
Wise.85
However, despite occasional expressions of abhorrence at outbreaks of 
street violence associated with popular Protestant mobilisation, local 
Conservatism took no effective measures until after the ‘social revolution’ 
represented by the 1911 Transport Strike. Concerted external intervention by 
DJ.Shackelton, the Liberal Home Office Labour Adviser, resulted in a 
conciliation conference, comprising thirteen prominent citizens. They 
formulated a number of recommendations including legislation regarding 
processions, the allocation of space for meetings and rigid enforcement of the 
law regarding unlawful assemblies. It also proposed adapting the St.Helens 
Corporation Act of 1911 enabling ‘the prohibition of the use of emblems or 
weapons or the playing of music likely to create a disturbance’. This was 
incorporated into the Liverpool Corporation Bill, which became law in
85 Whittingham-Jones, More about Liverpool Politics. 51-53
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October 1911.86 The Tories’ previous relationship to popular sectarian 
collective violence can be attributed to political expediency, recognition that a 
certain degree of ‘rowdyism’, was an inevitable corollary of popular street 
mobilisation. Despite their loss of control and restraint over the Protestant 
Democracy, Liverpool’s Conservatives continued to capitalise, being 
politically dependent upon the Protestant working class. This scenario is 
illustrated by the Conservative response to the 1909 Inquiry, a letter to the 
Secretary of State observing ‘The leaders of the Conservative Party in the 
Council are not really anxious that the inquiry should take place. They cannot 
oppose it because Mr Wise and his followers, who control many votes, are in 
favour of it’.87 The prevalence and effectiveness of sectarian violence in 
Liverpool highlights the location of power and leadership in the relationship 
between Tory Democracy and the Protestant Democracy. The ascendancy of 
collective violence symbolised a loss of control and restraint by the dominant 
political establishment over the Protestant working class who asserted their 
growing power and influence through increasingly belligerent forms of 
sectarian collective action.
By the inter-war period popular Protestantism was often seen as a 
problematical facet in local Conservatism’s struggle with the emerging 
Labour Party. Belligerent sectarianism was increasingly regarded as 
anachronistic and obsolete. Whittingham-Jones observed in 1936 that the 
‘vast majority of our citizens dislike and reject intolerant sectarian heresy- 
hunters’. With franchise extension in 1918 Longbottom employed both 
political action, primarily against the Conservatives, and violence directed at 
Catholics and Labour activists. In comparison with earlier violence it was 
increasingly marginal and impotent in its power and scope. Jones described 
Longbottom as a ‘nobody and his party negligible’, whilst Wise had been ‘a 
far bigger man at the head of a far greater following’.88
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BELFAST
THE FIRST HOME RULE CRISIS.
Ulster Unionism emerged in 1886 out of the necessity of presenting a 
united Ulster Protestant front in light of the crucial battle of politics and 
propaganda in relation to Home Rule. Unionism constituted an expedient 
propaganda exercise, a rallying cry around which the fractious elements of 
Ulster Protestant society could temporarily reconcile and transcend their 
differences in defence of their lives and liberties. However, beneath this 
facade, denominational, class and political rivalries persisted. The spectre of 
schism was exploited by the Unionist establishment to preserve the coalition’s 
fragile unity.
The first effective Ulster Unionist organisation was established on the 
8th January 1886. The Ulster Loyalist anti-Repeal Committee (U.l.a.r.C) was 
formed at the centre of Belfast and Ulster Conservatism the Belfast 
Constitutional Club. It was created to organise two large demonstrations at 
the Ulster Hall. On the 18th January, the first affirmed the Committee’s 
opposition to Home Rule or local self-government, demanding firm rule and 
the suppression of disloyalty. At the second ‘monster meeting of 
Conservatives and Orangemen’89on the 22nd February, Lord Randolph 
Churchill urged the crowd to ‘wait and watch and organise and prepare, so 
that the catastrophe of Home Rule might not come on them ‘ ’as a thief in the 
night” . Churchill’s phrase ‘Ulster will fight, and Ulster will be right’ became 
the ‘watchword of the North’.90
The main imperatives confronting the Episcopalian-Conservative 
establishment, the architects of the new movement, were to inform Ulster 
Protestant society of the threat posed by Home Rule and to mobilise popular 
resistance. Secondly, they needed to construct a representative Ulster 
Protestant coalition, pacifying and integrating the Orange Order, the dominant 
‘local proletarian idiom’ and agency of belligerent popular sectarianism. It 
was essential to integrate the Order, as a mechanism for accommodating and
89 Belfast News Letter. 20 February 1886
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mobilising the strategic Protestant working class and ensuring the new 
movement’s political stability by emasculating the principal source of local 
Protestant dissent Upon formation of the Committee, the Belfast 
Conservative Association (B.C.A) persuaded the Belfast Grand Orange Lodge 
(B.G.O.L) to co-operate in anti-Home Rule agitation. This included the two 
mass meetings at the Ulster Hall, and a series of thirty-one meetings 
throughout Ulster in March, many held under Orange auspices. Despite this 
close co-operation, non-Orange Conservatives retained control of the 
Committee. The Committee also needed to secure the participation of the 
fractious Protestant denominations, honourary membership being offered to 
all Protestant clergy throughout Ulster in February. They also sought to win 
over the Liberal Presbyterians. For Ulster’s Liberals Gladstone’s introduction 
of Home Rule resulted in permanent schism. The Ulster Liberal Society split 
into two factions in March with the Unionist, Belfast-based majority, forming 
in conjunction with local Conservatives the Ulster Liberal Unionist 
Committee on the 4th June. The imperative of constructing a representative 
coalition provided Ulster’s Liberals with political leverage and influence. 
Prior to 1884, the Belfast Liberal Association had made little headway, 
seeking to establish an infrastructure of electoral and registration societies in 
the main districts and to organise at ward level. The first Liberal Working 
Men’s Association appeared in October 1885. Despite these initiatives, the 
Ulster Liberals failed to win a single seat in the 1885 General Election. 
However, once in the Unionist coalition, Liberal-Presbyterian views had to be 
taken into consideration. Of particular importance was their attitude towards 
the Orange Order and its associations with sectarian violence and bigotry.
In order to cement this representative coalition, the Loyalist Committee 
created a new ‘umbrella’ movement and organisational structure, designed to 
transcend old party labels. By the end of February 1886 it had established 
twenty local Unionist associations, the political and electoral wing of Ulster 
Unionism. On the 15th May, the Committee created a new political 
organisation, the Ulster Loyal anti-Repeal Union (U.L.axU) under the 
chairmanship of James Henderson, editor of the Conservative Belfast News
Auckland, Irish Unionism: Two. 9
270
Letter. These initiatives were instrumental in presenting a coherent Ulster 
Unionist case. They represented part of a propaganda campaign primarily 
designed to influence British public opinion. A crucial part of this strategy 
involved distancing the movement from perceptions of ‘Ulster bigotry’. 
Consequently, the Orange Order posed a serious dilemma to the new 
movement. The Unionist response was to exert restraint and increasingly 
centralised control over its activities and practises, whilst simultaneously 
minimising its role and influence within the coalition.
The dominant Episcopalian-Conservative establishment’s relationship to 
popular sectarianism was transformed during the period. Its intimate, yet 
strained, alliance with the Orange Order was re-evaluated in light of new 
political imperatives posed by the struggle against Home Rule. Despite the 
Orange Institution’s pivotal role in the struggle, strains were still evident in its 
relationship with local Conservatism. These tensions dated back to before the 
November 1885 General Election. They revolved around issues of Orange 
representation and recognition of their contribution to the Conservative cause. 
Prior to the introduction of Home Rule in April 1886, a contest arose over the 
vacant aldermanship in Cromac ward, highlighting the complexity of the 
relationship between the Order and the B.C.A. A member of the Belfast 
Grand Orange Lodge (B.G.O.L) criticised his fellow brethren for supporting 
Dr. Graham, a gentleman of the ‘milk and water politics’, who opposed John 
Browne, a landlord, former Major and Chief Magistrate of Belfast, a ‘staunch 
and sterling Conservative’. In all likelihood there was a residue of 
Independent Orange sentiment in the contest, the election caused by the death 
of William Seeds, who had been closely associated with the O.P.W.M.A up 
until 1885. The contest also illustrated the role of ‘defending the Union’ in 
the political equation. The member of the B.G.O.L enquired as to what 
‘action is Dr. Graham taking in the present crisis in our country? I answer 
nothing, so far as is known; whilst.. .Mr Browne attends all the meetings of 
the Loyalist Campaign Committee’. Another factor was the influence of the 
leading ‘Orange’ champion William Johnston in determining political 
behaviour. The member of the Grand Lodge highlighted Browne’s ‘weighty’ 
support for William Johnston in November 1885, in contrast to Dr. Graham, 
although Johnston had stood as an Independent against the Conservatives.
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Opposition to the Conservative appears to have been based upon socio­
economic factors, Graham standing as a ‘sanitary reformer’. This was inter­
linked with Orange criticism of their treatment by the Conservative dominated 
Council and Browne’s lack of Orange credentials, particularly his failure to 
subscribe to the Clifton Street and Ballynafeigh Orange halls. It is highly 
probable that Ulster Unionism, through the connections established by the 
B.C.A, continued to exploit forms of patronage, like subscriptions to Orange 
Halls, in an attempt to secure and retain Orange support.91 However, Graham 
topped the poll in Cromac, illustrating the fractious and conditional nature of 
the political relationship between Conservatism and Orangeism in 
Belfast.92This defeat, on the eve of Home Rule, illustrates the imperative of 
winning over the Order, ensuring Ulster Unionism’s long-term stability.
Early in 1885 a new generation of minor gentry, epitomised by the 
Deputy Grand Master, Colonel Edward Saunderson assumed control of the 
Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland. They sought to position themselves at the 
vanguard of opposition to Home Rule. This faction fomented opposition to 
the B.C.A, supporting the successful Belfast Independents, Johnston and 
Edward Samuel Wesley de Cobain, during the 1885 General Election.93 The 
dissident supporters of the two M.P.s continued to oppose the B.C.A’s role at 
the vanguard of opposition to Home Rule. They launched a pre-emptive 
attempt to take over the U.L.a.r.C in April 1886,94 whilst Saunderson 
encouraged Somerset Maxwell’s Independent candidacy in North Belfast in 
June 1886. After a series of clashes, Maxwell was forced to step down in 
favour of the Conservative nominee, Sir William Quartus Ewart95 Although 
defeated, the desire for the Institution to be at the vanguard of opposition to 
Home Rule was echoed in the rhetoric of William Johnston. Despite criticism 
of the Order, Johnston continued to emphasise that it represented ‘the 
principles of the Protestants of Ireland, with very few and insignificant
91 Belfast News Letter. 1 April 1886
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exceptions’ ,%arguing that the cause of Irish Unionism and Orangeism were 
synonymous.
By ceding the B.G.O.L a prominent role in the anti-Home Rule 
agitation, the B.C.A sought to appease Orangemen, isolate the dissident 
elements, and consolidate its leading position within Ulster. At the February 
demonstration, Lord Randolph Churchill emphasised that Ulster Orangemen 
were to ‘form the first line of defence, the second line of defence, and the last 
line of defence’ against a Dublin parliament.97 In April, the U.L.a.r.C invited 
the Belfast Grand Master, Dr. Kane, to act as honourary-secretary, and to 
appeal for Orange subscriptions to the cause.98 Kane was subsequently praised 
by James Henderson, Chairman of the U.l.a.r.U, for his ‘valuable services’ to 
the Unionist cause.99
During1886, sympathetic Episcopalian-Conservative politicians saw the 
Order as the principal mechanism for mobilising popular resistance to Home 
Rule. These were prominent at large-scale Orange demonstrations, like that at 
the Maze racecourse on the 26th April. Here allusions were made to ‘civil 
war’, and ‘bloodshed’, associations that many moderate Unionists objected 
to.100Due to its close links with the dominant Episcopalian-Conservative 
establishment and associations with sectarian bigotry, the Order proved highly 
problematical in terms of Ulster coalition building. At the Maze 
demonstration, Kane, Belfast Grand Master made a conciliatory gesture 
praising Ulster’s Liberals for demonstrating they were for ‘country first and 
party afterwards’. Defence of the Union was presented as a catalyst for 
reconciliation of the historic antipathy between Liberal-Presbyterians and the 
Order. Kane conceded that Liberals were as ‘patriotic and loyal as any other 
Protestants’.101 Efforts were facilitated by the role of prominent Liberals like 
Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Harrington in defeating Home Rule. The latter 
was praised in an Orange resolution of 1888 as a ‘great leader, who has done
96 Canadian Daily Witness. 29 August 1891
97 E. P. S. Counsel, Our Orange Opponents. Dublin, 1886,2
98 Belfast News Letter. 17 April 1886
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100 Belfast News Letter. 27 April 1886 Also in attendance were Lord Arthur 
Hill, M.P, Grand Master of County Down, and Edward Samuel Wesley De 
Cobain, M.P for East Belfast, and previously Grand Master of Belfast.
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great service to the cause of the Union’.102 However, influential elements 
within the Unionist caucus, both Liberal-Presbyterian and Episcopalian- 
Conservative, were less enthusiastic about the prominent role of the Orange 
Order. PAX, in the Irish Ecclesiastical Gazette, believed the close 
relationship between Episcopalianism, Conservatism, and the Order, posed an 
impediment to efforts at reconciling Conservatism and Liberal Unionism in 
defence of the ‘Loyalist cause’.103 Others believed the Order’s associations 
with sectarian bigotry and violence would seriously undermine the cause on 
the mainland. Commenting on disorder in the aftermath of the defeat of 
Home Rule, the Gazette stated that ‘these Ulster riots will be made a handle of 
in England to misrepresent Protestant loyalty, and we shall not be surprised if 
more than one seat is lost to the Unionists thereby’.104 Growing fear amongst 
leading Unionists of mainland perceptions of ‘Ulster bigotry’ reinforced the 
view that the Order was a potential liability, requiring restraint and control.
THE SECOND HOME RULE CRISIS.
By the Second Home Rule crisis, Ulster Unionism presented itself as a 
representative and respectable movement, advocating ‘liberal-humanitarian’ 
as opposed to explicitly sectarian objections to Home Rule. To underpin this 
ideal, Unionist initiatives sought to integrate and harness the Protestant 
working class, whilst simultaneously containing and ‘policing’ this 
constituency. Once again, Unionism’s relationship to the Orange Order was 
critical.
Ulster Unionism as a political, ideological, and organisational force was 
far more evident during the Second Home Rule crisis. In light of the 
relatively ad-hoc response to Home Rule in 1886 the Unionist leadership 
recognised the imperative of winning the battle of politics and propaganda by 
presenting a representative, respectable Ulster opposition. The rhetoric at 
Unionist, as opposed to Orange meetings, tended to be more moderate and
101 Belfast News Letter. 27 April 1886
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less explicitly sectarian, incorporating ‘liberal humanitarian’ objections. The 
Unionist leadership created an increasingly centralised political and 
organisational structure, to co-ordinate Ulster’s mobilisation against Home 
Rule. This period witnessed the emergence of the Ulster Convention League, 
the Ulster Unionist Club’s movement and the Ulster Defence Union (UDU).
A characteristic of these organisations was their desire to present themselves 
as broadly representative of Ulster opinion and society. At a meeting in 
Ballynafeigh inaugurating a Unionist Club, the chairman proclaimed they ‘did 
not represent Conservatives, Orangemen, Liberals, or Radicals; neither was it 
wholly composed of Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Methodists, or any other 
denomination; but if he mistook not there was not a man who was not a 
Unionist’.105 The Ulster Convention League emerged out of the 1892 Unionist 
Convention. It organised meetings and petitions against Home Rule, 
establishing a network of clubs and branches in Ulster polling districts. The 
U.D.U was initiated in March 1893 to convene a representative Ulster 
assembly, comprising 600 delegates and a council of 40. This was to direct 
policy and ‘allay undue excitement and to check any disorderly outbreak of 
popular feeling’ in the eventuality of Home Rule.106 Like most Unionist 
organisations, the U.D.U had a large propaganda dimension. It communicated 
Ulster’s willingness to resist whilst also projecting Unionists as the law- 
abiding section of the community. This emphasis upon the representative 
character of Ulster Unionism was designed to bestow popular legitimacy upon 
the movement demonstrating it was not ‘bigoted political partisans alone who 
feel strongly on this question’.107 Unionism’s representative character was 
symbolised by the Ulster Unionist Convention of the 17th June 1892 and the 
Balfour demonstration of April 1893. The Convention met in a pavilion in 
Belfast’s Botanic Gardens, consisting of 11,897 delegates representing 
‘Unionists of every creed, class and party throughout Ulster, appointed at 
public meetings held in every electoral division of the province’. Belfast’s 
four divisions each sent 600 delegates, whilst an estimated 120,000 mobilised
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outside the pavilion.108 The Belfast News Letter observed in relation to the 
Balfour demonstration: ‘No ordinary occasion and no unrighteous cause was 
that which could bring together such a magnificent gathering of men, that 
could see the Bishop of the Church of Ireland and the clergymen of the 
General Assembly walking alongside in that great procession’.109
Another significant component of this strategy, was Unionism’s effort to 
distance itself from explicit sectarianism and its attempts to minimise 
damaging sectarian violence. To counter perceptions of ‘Ulster bigotry’ on 
the mainland, Unionism emphasised broader social, economic and political 
arguments against Home Rule with Nonconformists adding the ‘liberal 
humanitarian’ dimension. However, these continued to sit alongside more 
extreme sentiments. The Chairman of the Unionist meeting at Ballynafeigh 
proclaimed that the ‘Romish clergy terrorised over their ignorant and illiterate 
people’. If Home Rule passed ‘they would be under a Roman hierarchy, and 
history spoke of their despotism and cruelties’.110
Prior to the inauguration of the Clubs movement, Unionism was 
dependent upon the Order for its grassroots organisation. There was an 
intimate relationship between the emerging Unionist network and Orange 
Institution. The Sandy Row Orange Hall, re-opened in February 1893, served 
as a Unionist working men’s club for South Belfast,111 whilst the West Belfast 
Unionist association held an anti-Home Rule demonstration at the Agnes 
Street Orange Hall.112 In March, the Belfast Grand Master declared, in 
relation to a proposed Unionist Hall for West Belfast, that it would be ‘useful 
not only for Orange purposes, but for the Unionist and Loyalist cause 
generally’.113
The process of distancing Ulster Unionism from Orangeism, was largely 
a cosmetic exercise, aimed at appeasing suspicious elements within Ulster and 
influencing British public perceptions. In terms of organisation, Unionists 
recognised the Institution remained the perennial mainstay of popular Loyalist
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mobilisation. Despite its role within the Unionist coalition being vigorously 
contested, a growing consensus emerged over the need to control the Order’s 
volatile sectarian support. To integrate the Belfast Order, into a co-ordinated 
political and organisational strategy, it was requested to participate in the 
Ulster Defence Union and the Club’s Council.114
The advent of the Unionist Club’s movement in 1893 provided those 
hostile to Orangeism, with an alternative structure for mobilising opposition to 
Home Rule. This organisation was also conceived to contain the excesses 
associated with the Order, placing Ulster resistance on a respectable footing. 
However, the Belfast Grand Master still saw the Institution as the vanguard of 
opposition to Home Rule. This attitude must have generated tension within 
the Unionist caucus, and probably indicated suspicion within Orangeism, 
concerning the role of the Club’s movement and the intentions of its 
promoters.115 These suspicions may have fed into the Orange revolt of 1903.
Unionism was an ‘umbrella’ movement, beneath which denominational, 
political, and class rivalries persisted and established networks remained 
intact. Belfast Conservatism retained its local political network, the B.C.A 
administering the North, South and East Belfast Parliamentary divisions until 
1910.116 Consequently, Ulster Unionism was until 1910, an essentially 
Belfast Conservative dominated political construct.
THE PROTESTANT REVOLT. 1895-1905.
The diminution of the threat of Home Rule, with the resounding 
Unionist victory in the July 1895 General Election, witnessed the relaxation of 
Unionist political and organisational initiatives and the resurgence of latent 
divisions within Ulster Protestant society. The Presbyterian Unionist Voters 
Association attacked the ‘rooted monopoly and supremacy’ of the 
Episcopalian Church, campaigning upon highly controversial political issues, 
ranging from education to land reform. As a consequence it was accused of
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'endangering the Union’.117 Unlike Home Rule Ritualism was seen by many 
Conservatives as a divisive party political issue, as a vehicle for Liberal- 
Presbyterian attacks upon Episcopalian-Conservative Unionists (E. C. 
Unionist’s). In 1901, the Presbyterian Witness condemned ‘E. C. Unionist’s’, 
for 'coquetting with the Vatican’. Realising their vulnerability, Conservatives 
emphasised that for them Home Rule remained ‘the most serious political 
question’. Denominational and political antagonisms were exposed at a 
meeting of the South Belfast Parliamentary Division of the B.C.A in May 
1901, the Liberal-Unionist M.P. for South Tyrone, T.W. Russell, being 
criticised for making the land question ‘superior to that of the Union’.118 Such 
accusations were employed by the B.C.A as a method of stifling political 
dissent. Controversial issues like the Conservative Government’s attempt to 
create a Roman Catholic University for Ireland and changes to the King’s 
Oath, were addressed by local Conservatives. However, they were addressed 
within the context of Protestant-Catholic relations in Ireland and their impact 
upon the constitutional status of the Union.119
Whilst the Conservatives approached Ritualism within the context of the 
defence of the Union, certain Liberal Presbyterians and Evangelical 
Episcopalians regarded this contemporary threat as equal to that posed by 
Home Rule. In 1901 the Witness declared that Ritualism ‘is a real danger; 
indeed, the real danger of the hour’,120providing Liberal Presbyterians with an 
opportunity to present themselves as at the forefront of the defence of 
Protestant civil and religious liberties.
The growing Ritualist controversy exacerbated tensions within the 
strategic Orange Order, undermining traditional relations between the 
Episcopalian-Conservative establishment and grassroots Orangemen. This 
erosion of restraint and control witnessed an upsurge in sectarian violence 
alongside independent Protestant political expression. This breakdown in 
relations within the coalition, was not only caused by a resurgence of political 
and denominational antagonisms, but also by a growing divergence over
117 The Witness. 15 March 1901
118 The Witness. 31 May 1901
119 The Witness. 31 May 1901 see Gustav Wilhelm Wolff, M.P for East 
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principles, aims, and methods between the Orange rank and file and the 
bourgeois ‘Deadheads’ in the Belfast Grand Orange Lodge and the B.C.A. 
Struggle for control over the Order and the Protestant working class would not 
only determine the fate of Ulster Unionism but also the prosecution of the 
campaign against Home Rule. It would determine whether this campaign 
would be primarily conducted through politics and propaganda, or through 
popular collective action on the streets of Belfast. Despite significant 
numbers of working class Presbyterians belonging to the Order, the Reverend 
Irwin’s observations inl901 reveal the continued ambivalence and suspicion 
amongst the Presbyterian leadership towards ‘outside brotherhoods and 
organisations’. Many leading Presbyterians still regarded the Order as the 
partisan vehicle of ‘party politicians and persons of a different order’ 
deploring its sectarian violence and bigotry. However, Presbyterians, like 
Irwin, argued for engagement, influencing the estimated 25-30,000 
Presbyterian Orangemen and in order to ‘reform’ the Institution. These 
attitudes within Presbyterianism reflected continued conflict within the wider 
Protestant community over the role and influence of the Institution. It is 
probable that Presbyterian efforts at reforming the Institution contributed to 
the formation of the ‘Rebel’ Independent Orange Order in 1903. In 1907 the 
Unionist M.P W. Moore recalled in relation to the 1.0.0 that it ‘attracted the 
sympathy and support, though not the actual membership, of the Liberal-
177Presbyterians who always hated the old Order’. Ritualism enabled the 
Presbyterians to undermine historic Episcopalian-Conservative-Orange ties, 
highlighting the Cecil’s, Balfour’s and Cadagon’s attempts to ‘conciliate 
Romanism’. On the Twelfth 1901, the Witness advocated a strategy akin to 
‘principle before politics’ to govern future relations between the Orange Order 
and the ‘E. C. Unionists’.
The willingness, amongst Presbyterians, to actively engage with the 
Order generated growing anxiety amongst Episcopalian-Conservatives. The 
preoccupation with Ritualism and Romanism and associated issues like the
120 The Witness. 12 July 1901
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King’s Oath, was highlighted by Colonel Saunderson, at his installation as 
Belfast Grand Master in July 1901. He proclaimed, ‘if he might judge by the 
enormous communications he had received from Scotland, England and 
Ireland, nothing to his mind would be more injurious to the political prospects
1 9 1of the Unionist party than to attempt to tamper with the oath’. In his
capacity as Belfast Grand Master and Chairman of the Irish Unionist 
Parliamentary Party, Saunderson sought to deflect Orange criticism onto the 
Unionist Government, and in line with Episcopalian-Conservative’s, 
emphasised the primacy of defence of the Union. The King’s Oath and 
proposed Roman Catholic University were addressed in this context, whilst 
the maverick T. W. Russell was dubbed a ‘rotten Protestant’ owing to his 
preoccupation with compulsory land purchase, an attempt to ‘break up the 
unity’ of the Irish Unionist M.P’s.124 Saunderson soon discovered that 
‘principle before politics’ in relation to Ritualism left the Episcopalian- 
Conservative establishment vulnerable to a popular judgement of their 
‘Protestant credentials’.
As with the Protestant revolt in Liverpool, grassroots disaffection in 
Belfast translated into a potent combination of independent politics and 
increasingly violent collective action on the streets. Thomas Henry Sloan’s 
victory in South Belfast in August 1902 and the subsequent formation of the 
Independent Orange Order witnessed the coalescence of contemporary 
grievances and two dominant strands within Belfast’s Protestant community. 
The first was Independent Orangeism, emerging in 1868 with the election of 
William Johnston and the formation of the O.P.W.M.A. This predominantly 
proletarian strand within Belfast Orangeism was periodically utilised to 
articulate grievances against the ‘Moneyocracy’, or ‘Deadheads’, concentrated 
in the Belfast Grand Orange Lodge and the Belfast Conservative Association. 
Prior to 1902 such demands can be characterised as a desire for 
democratisation within Belfast Conservatism and, subsequently, the Unionist 
coalition. Like its democratic Conservative counterpart in Liverpool, it 
contained a pronounced class dimension, symbolised by the struggle between 
‘true blue’ working class Orangemen and their ‘instrumental’ bourgeois
123 The Witness. 12 July 1901
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counterparts manipulating the Order for their own political ends. Unlike 
Liverpool, Independent ideology had permeated the Belfast Labour 
Movement with influential advocates on the Trades Council.
The second, Evangelical Protestant strand, overlapped, and converged 
with the first, particularly after the defeat of the Second Home Rule Bill. 
Employing violent forms of collective action, this strand was personified by 
street preachers like Arthur Trew and Thomas Henry Sloan. The Belfast 
Protestant Association was preoccupied with the national threat posed by 
Ritualism and Romanism, directly countering instances of Ritualism and 
Roman Catholic self-assertion in the city. With the rise of the ‘Sloanites’ 
from 1901 this campaign became politicised, focusing upon the Protestant 
credentials of the Conservative Government, and the ‘clique’ dominating the
B.G.O.L and the B.C.A perceived to be saturated with Ritualism and 
Romanism. The campaign evolved into a mechanism for articulating a range 
of local Protestant grievances, fears and aspirations.
These strands coalesced, posing a direct challenge to the legitimacy of 
the dominant Episcopalian-Conservative and Orange establishment as 
representatives of grassroots Protestant opinion. Unlike Liverpool, the Belfast 
revolt threatened to transcend its sectarian limitations and in Lindsay 
Crawford’s ‘democratic Protestant’ vision endeavoured to construct a 
platform for the evolution of a ‘new politics’ based upon a radical conception 
of nationality and citizenship embracing Protestants and Roman Catholics.
The Conservative candidate, Charles William Dunbar-Buller, 
characterised the 1902 contest as a struggle between ‘rowdyism and 
respectability’ proclaiming the conduct of Sloan’s supporters, or ‘physical 
force’ party, as ‘degrading our common religion, the Orange Order, and our 
city’.125 However, there was growing grassroots cynicism and resentment at 
emotive appeals by the Episcopalian-Conservative establishment to Protestant 
unity, respectability, patriotism, civic pride and law and order. These were 
seen as a method of stifling popular political dissent. The local establishment, 
directly or indirectly, raised the spectre of Fenianism and Home Rule. Buller 
declared Sloan’s return would ‘rejoice every Nationalist in Ireland’ accusing
124 The Witness. 19 July 1901
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his supporters o f‘terrorism and tyranny’, tactics equated with the United Irish 
League.126 The election symbolised the failure, in the absence of the cement 
of Home Rule, of Episcopalian Conservative appeals to unity and 
respectability to secure grassroots Protestant support on a sustained basis. It 
also threatened to undermine Unionism’s carefully constructed fa9ade of 
respectability and heralded the potential unravelling of the movement as a 
coherent political construct. Buller challenged South Belfast electors ‘will 
you put a premium on tactics which may well imperil the cause of the Union 
itself?’ and lost by over 800 votes.127
Sloan’s victory highlighted the growing disparity between the ‘E.C 
Unionist’s preoccupation with projecting a united, respectable front as a 
means of combating Home Rule and the more parochial, sectarian concerns of 
their grassroots support. The latter were prepared to employ violent collective 
action to achieve their aims. Sloan accused Buller of posing as a ‘temperance 
reformer’, and of being a ‘Ritualist’,128 describing the B.C.A as the ‘greatest 
evil that had ever existed in the City of Belfast’. 129A crucial facet of this 
struggle was over the fundamental role and character of the Orange Order. 
Would the Belfast Order remain loyal to the ‘E. C. Unionist’ establishment 
symbolised by Buller and the B.G.O.L, or would it re-assert its fundamental 
Protestant principles, free from political dictation?
From the Independent Orange Order’s inception in 1903, two strands 
were discernible, one essentially progressive, the other reactionary. These 
became increasingly contradictory over time. Lindsay Crawford’s paper, The 
Irish Protestant, depicted the 1.0.0 as the embodiment o f‘democratic 
Protestantism’, opposing the official tyranny practised by the Belfast Grand 
Orange Lodge. The new Order sought to re-assert the vital principles of 
Orangeism subordinated to a preoccupation with organisation and control 
exercised by the Belfast Grand Lodge and its political masters in the Belfast 
Conservative Association. Consequently, an important objective of the new 
Order was the establishment of political ‘privileges’ free from ‘any other
125 Belfast News Letter. 11 August 1902
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political organisation’. 130Their ultimate objective was an Independent 
Protestant Parliamentary Party.
On the other hand, in August 1903, Reverend Boyle, Grand Chaplain of 
the I.O.O, characterised the split in the Order as the ‘Reformation being 
refought’, the new Order championing explicitly sectarian goals neglected by 
the old Institution. At Dundonald on the ‘Twelfth’ 1903, Sloan declared 
‘though they were peaceable men, they would face powder and ball rather 
than see a surrender to Roman dictation consummated’. A sermon delivered 
by Boyle called for the re-insertion of a Reformed Protestant ‘conscience’ into 
social and national affairs. He outlined how those present were to act as a 
‘holy band of consecrated men’, equipped to ‘Christianise’ the new Order at 
the vanguard of a ‘revival of Protestantism in this land’.131 Sloan emphasised 
the return of political representatives committed to Protestant principles and 
the election of a Government determined to implement Protestant legislation. 
He also questioned the ‘loyalty’ of Roman Catholics to the British State. 
Whilst Boyle declared the ‘essence’ of Protestantism to be ‘No priesthood, no 
Pontiff, no persecution’, Crawford defined the vital principles of Orangeism 
as ‘liberty of conscience, of thought and action’.132 These outlooks would 
become increasingly difficult to reconcile.
The Irish Protestant referred to over 6000 attending the inaugural 
meeting of the 1.0.0 on the 11th July 1903.133 The procession on the 
following day’s ‘Twelfth’ grew to 20,000 including a number of Belfast 
Lodges.134 Two thousand attended the 1904 Independent Twelfth' at the 
Giant’s Ring Belfast. The Institution boasted 55 lodges by this date135the 
majority confined to East Ulster particularly Belfast and Antrim (especially 
North Antrim).136 With Crawford’s expulsion, in May 1908, and Sloan’s
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accession as Imperial Grand Master, the 1.0.0 experienced a prolonged 
decline in membership.137
Dissidents were initially referred to as ‘Sloanites’. They comprised a 
heterogeneous coalition of disaffected working class Orangemen, including 
Belfast’s ‘labour aristocracy’, the shipyard workers. Also involved were 
supporters of the militant B.P.A, and temperance reformers. Opponents 
described them as ‘organised ruffians’,138 the ‘Rebel Association’,139 and even 
as a ‘Radical Socialist section who wanted the Orange body split up’.140 In 
contrast, Crawford referred to those at Dundonald, as the ‘type of men who 
had built up the greatness and prosperity of Belfast’, the Protestant artisanate 
or backbone of the old Institution. The Irish Protestant claimed considerable 
sympathy amongst the Orange rank and file for their aim of ending the 
‘official tyranny’ practised by the B.G.O.L.141 John Boyle referred to the
I.O.O’s ‘few middle class allies’, including Crawford, and W .J. Pinie. 
Crawford was a Dublin gentleman, bom in Lisburn, who had been a member 
of the Grand Lodge of Ireland. After experience in business and journalism, 
he had founded the Irish Protestant in 1901. Pirrie, controlling partner at 
Harland and Wolff and member of the Liberal-Unionist Ulster Reform Club142 
was an ally of Sloan’s during his 1902 campaign, described by Arthur Trew as 
a ‘good man’143 and by Buller’s supporters as the ‘cloven foot’ behind 
Sloan. 144Sloan and the 1.0.0 also received support from (Independent) Orange 
elements within the Belfast Labour Movement, being assisted by a number of 
Trades Council delegates in 1902, including John Keown, a plasterer, and 
Alex Boyd, organiser of the Municipal Employees Association. Boyd 
became Sloan’s principal Trade Union speaker, Sloan endorsing Trades
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Unionism and progressive labour legislation.145 The new Order participated in 
labour disputes, seen by Crawford as a catalyst for cementing the common 
interests of Protestant and Catholic workers, upon which to construct his ideas 
of nationality and citizenship. During the Belfast Dockers and Carters Strike 
of 1907, Alex Boyd declared, ‘if the strike did nothing other than bring the 
working classes together it would not have been in vain’.146Collections were 
made on behalf of the strikers at the new Order’s ‘Twelfth’ celebrations, 
whilst at the old Order’s Belfast demonstration, permission to collect was 
denied. A shared concern for workingmen’s issues was also a catalyst for 
implicit political co-operation between the Independent’s, Labour and Irish 
Nationalism, during the January 1906 General Election.147 Unlike ‘Wiseite’ 
attempts in Liverpool, there was greater potential for co-operation between the 
Independent’s and Labour in Belfast; Independent ideology and organisation 
having permeated the Labour Movement.
Limited co-operation, described by Buckland as the ‘democratic anti- 
Unionist front’,148developed during die election between Sloan, receiving 
Trades Council endorsement, William Walker, the Labour Representation 
Committee candidate and Joseph Devlin, the Irish Nationalist. However, this 
fragile co-operation rapidly dissolved. This reflected unease within the 1.0.0 
at any form of accommodation with Irish Nationalism or ‘atheistic’ Socialism. 
Crawford’s overall strategy was fatally undermined by ‘sectional, sectarian 
and personal interests’, with Sloan’s sectarian views ultimately prevailing in 
Belfast149
Many followers of the B.P.A had joined the I.O.O. This coalition of 
predominantly working class, Evangelical Episcopalians and 
Nonconformist’s, was at the forefront of the new movement. Sloan was
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described as a ‘red-hot Methodist’150 whilst Rev.D.D.Boyle, first Grand 
Chaplain was a Presbyterian. This faction constituted the reactionary wing of 
the I.O.O, preoccupied with Ritualism and Romanism and suspicious of 
Crawford’s more progressive agenda. After the Liberal Northern Whig 
dubbed Crawford’s 1905 Magheramome Manifesto o f‘nationalist character’, 
Sloan wrote a personal apologia ‘reaffirming his Unionism and 
Protestantism’. At a subsequent B.P.A meeting he asserted that Crawford 
‘had not thrown the mantle of mesmerism over him’.151Relations deteriorated 
dramatically during the 1906 election culminating in Crawford’s expulsion. 
Upon becoming Imperial Grand Master, Sloan resorted to his earlier sectarian 
strategy. The 1.0.0 declined as Home Rule re-surfaced and official Unionism 
reasserted its control.
The Belfast Protestant revolt of 1902 occurred in a vacuum when the 
cement of Home Rule receded and Unionist political and organisational 
initiatives had been relaxed. This vacuum enabled underlying grievances and 
aspirations within the Protestant community to come to the fore. Articulated 
through anti-Ritualism these manifested themselves through both violent 
collective action on Belfast’s streets and independent Protestant politics. Like 
Ulster Unionism, the revolt consisted of a coalition of diverse interests, 
producing internal contradictions; the two principal strands within the new 
Order became increasingly difficult to reconcile. The dominant, sectarian 
wing, personified by Sloan, was akin to previous expressions of 
independence, seeking an accommodation within the Unionist coalition. On 
the other hand, Crawford’s ‘democratic Protestantism’ envisaged the 1.0.0 as 
a catalyst for constructing his radical vision of nationality and citizenship 
forging a ‘new politics’, embracing Protestants and Catholics. His flirtations 
with Home Rule, Irish Nationalism and ‘atheistic’ Socialism coupled with the 
renewed spectre of Home Rule exposed the irreconcilable divisions within the
I.O.O.
The Protestant revolt in Liverpool culminated in the growing divergence 
between formal Conservative politics and organisation and the belligerent 
politics of the street. Ulster Unionism responded in a completely different
150 Belfast News Letter. 14 August 1902
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fashion to a similar trauma. The Unionist establishment revived the spectre of 
Home Rule, appealing for unity to defeat the ‘common enemy’ underpinned 
by an intensification of political and organisational initiatives. Ulster 
Unionism succeeded in creating a seemingly democratic structure which 
harnessed and mobilised popular sectarianism, whilst containing and policing 
its worst excesses, thereby preserving the movement’s image of ‘unity’ and 
respectability. This had been severely threatened by the revolt of 1902.
THE THIRD HOME RULE CRISIS.
In light of the profound divisions exposed by the revolt, the Southern 
Unionist Irish Reform Association’s devolution proposals of September 1904 
provided a pretext, via a revival of the spectre of Home Rule ‘through the 
back door’, for the Unionist establishment to re-engineer unity. The 
resumption of Unionist political and organisational activity culminated in the 
formation in 1905 of the Ulster Unionist Party (U.U.P) and a permanent 
representative institution, the Ulster Unionist Council (U.U.C.). The Council 
drew together the constituent components of Ulster Unionism co-ordinating 
and controlling a centralised political and organisational strategy of resistance. 
The Council rendered division less likely by providing a forum for democratic 
debate and conflict resolution, and by providing a seemingly accountable, 
popular leadership. Prior to 1905, there had been no over-arching structure 
underpinning the fragile Unionist coalition, mediating and resolving internal 
conflicts. The principal recourse for the dominant ‘E. C. Unionist’ 
establishment during the early Edwardian period, had been impotent appeals 
for unity accompanied by warnings that division would ‘endanger the Union’. 
The U.U.C provided institutional cement placing Ulster Unionism on a 
permanent, political and organisational footing. By integrating popular 
sectarianism into representative structures Unionism minimised the risk of 
fragmentation which had contributed to a resurgence of sectarian violence.
The U.U.C consisted o f200 members in 1905,100 nominated by the 
local Unionist Associations, 50 by the Orange Order and not more than 50 co-
151 Boyle, ‘The Belfast Protestant Association’, 136,137
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opted as distinguished Unionists. It was served by a Standing Committee,
comprising ten members, nominated by the Chairman of the Parliamentary
Unionist Party, Colonel Edward Saunderson and twenty elected by the
Council. This Committee comprising a few landowners, business and
1 <0professional men would direct Unionist strategy. An imperative confronting 
the Unionist leadership after the revolt was the need to re-integrate and retain 
the support of the Orange Order. The Unionist leadership hoped to nullify 
any sense of alienation and abandonment amongst the strategic Protestant 
working class and exercise effective influence and control over the Institution. 
It also sought to mediate tensions within the coalition over the Order’s role 
and prominence. This was accomplished by integrating the Order into the 
representative structures of Ulster Unionism. By 1907, the Belfast Grand 
Lodge elected eight delegates to the Council and appointed six of the twenty- 
one delegates for the North, South and East Belfast Parliamentary 
Divisions.153 By 1912, the four Belfast constituencies were each represented 
by eight local Unionist Association nominees and four Orange.154 
Additionally, the Order was granted 25% formal representation on all 
committees of the Unionist Party.155
In order to successfully prosecute the critical battle of politics and 
propaganda in relation to Home Rule it was essential for the Unionist 
leadership to integrate the Orange Order. Unionism needed to project a 
respectable front. It sought to achieve this by minimising perceptions of 
‘Ulster bigotry’ epitomised by the Orange Order and by reducing the risk of 
spontaneous illegitimate violence. Consequently, the Unionist Clubs, the 
U.V.F and U.U.L.A, played a vital propaganda role, minimising the role and 
prominence of popular sectarianism and maintaining law and order.
Colonel Hall illustrated the degree of centralised control over Ulster 
Unionist resistance by the Third Home Rule crisis. He identified a 
‘triumvirate secretariat’ working ‘collectively and individually’ to Sir Edward 
Carson, leader of Ulster Unionism from February 1910. This secretariat, also
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constituting the core staff of the U.V.F, comprised Hall, representing the 
Unionist Clubs, Pat McCammon representing the Orange Order and Richard 
Dawson Bates, secretary of the U.U.C.156 By February 1912, the Old Town 
Hall, Belfast, was the de-facto Head Quarters of Unionist resistance. It was 
the location of the offices of the U.U.C and the meeting place for the Clubs 
Council. The latter was revived at the offices of the U.U.C on the 11th 
January 1911.157 However, it was decided in conjunction with the U.U.C that 
the Clubs should be seen as ‘independent’,158 avoiding the taint o f‘party 
politics’ deterring potential sympathisers. Despite Hall describing them as the 
‘Militia’ to the Orange Order’s ‘Standing Army’,159many, including Carson, 
continued to regard one of the Club’s functions as a respectable alternative to 
the Order. It was to fulfil this role both in terms of Ulster organisation and 
maintaining a distance between Orange and Unionist initiatives on the 
mainland. The Unionist leadership placed a great deal of emphasis upon 
educating mainland opinion to the dangers posed by Home Rule. 
Consequently, they deemed that an explicit political relationship between the 
Clubs and the U.U.C or associations with the Order would compromise the 
objectivity of their message. The movement was regarded as one of the 
principal mechanisms for presenting ‘liberal humanitarian’ objections to 
Home Rule throughout Britain. Despite this purported ‘distance’ the U.U.C 
continued to co-ordinate the Club’s activities. In order to prevent 
‘overlapping’, the U.U.C issued vital instructions, like that in December 1911, 
arming the Clubs in conjunction with the Order.160 By February 1912, the 
Unionist Clubs were represented by fifty delegates on the U.U.C, whilst three 
representatives of the U.U.C sat on the Unionist Clubs Council.161 The
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organisation constituted a vital component of the Unionists election strategy 
with the Clubs Council in 1914 assembling ‘a good body of trained speakers 
and canvassers’.162
The formation of the U.V.F in 1912 fulfilled a number of political 
objectives. It had a significant propaganda value representing a concrete 
underpinning of Ulster’s determination to resist Home Rule. Secondly, to 
preserve Unionism’s image as the law-abiding section of the community, the 
U.V.F symbolised a clear differentiation between legitimate and illegitimate 
private violence. Despite Carson’s pronouncement that the proposed Ulster 
Provisional Government and the U.V.F were ‘illegal’,163 attempts were made 
to retain a veneer of constitutional legitimacy, authorisation being sought from 
County Magistrates for ‘training and drilling’.164 In justification these 
preparations were designed to maintain the ‘Constitution of the United 
Kingdom as now established’. 165This was coupled with the argument that by 
introducing Home Rule, Asquith’s Liberal Government was acting in an 
‘unconstitutional’ fashion. The U.V.F’s Special Service Force was also 
conceived to contain, and police the Protestant community, particularly rowdy 
Orange elements, in conjunction with and independent of the civil authorities. 
By forming a disciplined, centrally controlled force incorporating both the 
Orange Order and the Unionist Clubs, the Unionists channelled Protestant 
agitation away from Belfast’s streets into alternative forms of activity. The 
U.V.F played a vital role in avoiding a pretext, in the form of widespread 
violence, for British intervention to restore law and order. It also provided 
credibility to Ulster’s aspirations for self-government, demonstrating 
Unionism’s capability to maintain law and order. Consequently, increased 
centralisation of control accompanied preparations, outlined by Carson at the 
Craigavon demonstration in September 1911 for Ulster Provisional 
Government in the event of Home Rule. The U.U.C was to be the basis for 
the administration of Ulster until the Province resumed ‘unimpaired her
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164 U.V.F. Conference. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 16-18 February 1914
165 D/1327/4/21. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast
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citizenship in the United Kingdom and her high position in the Great British 
Empire’.166
THE FOURTH HOME RULE CRISIS.
Another drive for centralisation and control occurred during the Fourth 
Home Rule Bill with the creation of a Central Council in 1919. This 
represented the local Unionist Parliamentary Associations, the U.U.L.A, and 
the U.U.C. This Central Council was designed to promote ‘closer co­
operation’ between Unionist organisations and the Standing Committee of the 
U.U.C. 167The struggle witnessed the revival of the Unionist Clubs movement 
and attempts to re-form the U.V.F. The U.U.L.A was the most significant 
Unionist organisation during this period. Universal adult male suffrage was 
introduced in 1918 with Belfast’s parliamentary representation increased to 
nine seats. Conscious of the growing threat posed by Labour, the Unionist 
leadership recognised the strategic importance of the Protestant working class. 
By co-opting the Belfast Trades Unionist Watch Committee, subsequently the 
U.U.L.A, they realised they could contain Protestant labour aspirations within 
a Unionist political, ideological and organisational framework, denying the 
Labour party the opportunity to politicise divisions within the Protestant 
community. Such divisions had contributed to the previous breakdown in 
relations within the coalition accompanied by an upsurge in violent forms of 
popular Protestant collective action. The Watch Committee nominated, in 
conjunction with the U.U.C, three Unionist Labour candidates for Belfast 
constituencies. These Unionist Labour M.P.s, elected in 1918, were to vote 
with the Unionist Party on ‘all questions affecting the Union’, but were 
theoretically independent to act in their ‘sole discretion’ on ‘all other matters 
brought before the House’.168 In reality, the Unionist Party kept a tight reign
166 Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party. 1882-1973.28
167 Ulster Unionist Council Year Book. 1919.55
168 Trades Unionist Watch Committee. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 8 November 1917 
The three Unionist Labour M.P.’s were Thompson Donald (Honourary 
Secretary of the U.U.L.A) in Victoria; Samuel McGuffin in Shankill; and T.H. 
Bums in St. Anne’s. They each served one term at Westminster (1918-22) 
and one at Stormont (1921-25).
291
on the U.U.L.A, integrating it into political and organisational structures. In 
May 1918, it was agreed that the Watch Committee would be represented by 
twelve members on the U.U.C and entitled to nominate three members for 
election to the Standing Committee.169 By October 1919, U.U.L.A 
representatives were invited to sit on the Committees of the local Unionist 
Associations: 170the President, Sir Edward Carson, playing an active role in 
formulating U.U.L.A. policy. The organisation retained a semblance of 
nominal autonomy, a U.U.L.A representative reprimanded in 1919 for 
‘discussing the business’ of the Executive at the U.U.C Standing 
Committee. 171However, its role was largely determined and proscribed by 
overarching Unionist political strategy. The Association performed a vital 
propaganda role symbolising a unity of purpose between Protestant Trades’ 
Unionists and the Unionist establishment, between employer and employee. 
In 1919, the organisation congratulated leading Unionists, including the 
Marquis of Londonderry and Sir James Craig, upon their appointment to the 
Government, proclaiming ‘we remember with gratitude that these gentlemen 
have at all times undauntedly upheld the Union, and have always supported 
legislation for the welfare of the masses’.172Additionally, the U.U.L.A was 
actively involved in attempts at maintaining ‘law and order’ during the 
disturbances associated with the Anglo-Irish war of January 1919-November 
1921. Despite its ostensible ‘policing’ role, evidence suggests U.U.L.A 
members actively colluded in these disturbances.
CONCLUSION.
The Conservative political establishments in Liverpool and Belfast 
experienced a profound transformation in their relationship to popular 
sectarianism during 1880-1921, with different consequences in terms of the 
prevalence and effectiveness of popular collective violence. Liverpool’s 
Tory-Anglican establishment experienced a dramatic and prolonged rupturing
169 Trades Unionist Watch Committee. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 18 May 1918
170 U.U.L.A. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 23 October 1919
171 U.U.L.A. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 21 August 1919
172 U.U.L.A. P.R.O.N.I, Belfast, 18 January 1919
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in relations with popular sectarianism accompanied by the emergence of the 
militant Protestant Democracy and ascendancy of sectarian violence. In 
contrast, with the advent of Home Rule, Belfast’s Episcopalian-Conservative 
establishment was confronted with new political imperatives forcing it to re­
evaluate its relationship to the dominant ‘local proletarian idiom’ and agency 
of belligerent sectarianism the Orange Order. This transformation in relations 
with the Order resulted in a diminution in the prevalence and effectiveness of 
sectarian violence in Belfast.
In Liverpool, there were four key phases in the breakdown in relations 
between Conservatism and popular sectarianism. The first (1880-89) 
witnessed a transformation in the Conservative’s expedient, uneasy alliance 
with the Orange Order. This was caused by the politicisation of the anti- 
Ritualist agitation, as a medium for engaging the Protestant working class, and 
by the stirring of a ‘democratic’ instinct within the Conservative political 
machine culminating in the unsuccessful November 1889 Orange revolt. 
During this phase, a degree of collective violence, integral to the anti-Ritualist 
agitation, was seen by elements within Conservatism as an acceptable by­
product or corollary of political engagement with the Protestant working class. 
The second phase (1889-1900) witnessed the marginalisation of the Order and 
the convergence within the official fold of the ‘democratic’ Conservative 
forces and militant Protestantism as part of the democratisation process within 
local Conservatism. This process, prosecuted through the anti-Ritualist 
crusade, resulted in the triumph of Salvidge’s Tory-Democracy and the 
empowerment of a militant Protestant caucus. This phase witnessed the 
overlapping of political agitation and frequently violent forms of Protestant 
collective action on Liverpool’s streets. The third phase (1900-05) culminated 
in a severe fracturing in relations between Conservatism and militant 
sectarianism with the unravelling of the ‘democratic’ Conservative and 
militant Protestant strands which encompassed conflicting conceptions of 
British national identity. In the aftermath of the Protestant revolt, a core of 
militant Protestants, alienated from contemporary Conservatism and 
disenchanted with the limitations of formal politics asserted their influence at 
street level. During the fourth phase (1905-21), in the absence of effective 
Protestant political alternatives, a pragmatic co-existence developed between
293
Liverpool Tory-Democracy and popular sectarian violence, sustained by 
Liverpool’s enduring parochialism. This relative ‘exceptionalism’, meant the 
local Conservative establishment was neither preoccupied with local political 
repercussions or wider national perceptions arising from its association with 
popular sectarianism. This ‘local state’ mentality was gradually eroded during 
the later period (1911-21) by the insidious nationalisation of politics and 
identity contributing to the undermining of popular sectarianism and 
Conservative toleration of its excesses.
Belfast’s Episcopalian-Conservative establishment’s relationship to 
popular sectarianism and collective violence was also transformed during the 
period. From 1886, this establishment re-evaluated its intimate, yet strained, 
alliance with the Orange Order, in light of new political imperatives arising 
from the necessity of engaging with national political culture and identity as 
part of the battle of politics and propaganda in relation to Home Rule. This 
establishment needed to construct a representative umbrella movement 
predicated upon ideals of unity and respectability. The Orange Order posed a 
profound dilemma for the new movement. It was essential to integrate the 
Order as a bridge to the strategic Protestant working class and to ensure Ulster 
Unionism’s long-term stability by emasculating this potent source of 
Protestant dissent On the other hand its excesses were seen as a liability in 
terms of Ulster coalition-building and influencing British public opinion. 
Ulster Unionism’s response to this dilemma was to exert centralised control 
over Ulster’s anti-Home Rule forces through representative political and 
organisational structures designed to integrate, contain and ‘police’ its volatile 
sectarian support whilst differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate 
violence. These Unionist structures, whilst integrating the Orange Order, 
simultaneously minimised the public role and influence of popular 
sectarianism. The breakdown that occurred in the Unionist coalition after the 
defeat of the Second Home Rule Bill reinforced this strategy. The 1902 
Protestant revolt occurred when the unifying cement of Home Rule had 
receded and Unionist initiatives had been relaxed. This led to a resurgence of 
suspicions and rivalries within the Protestant community culminating in a 
generalised protest cycle. Grassroots grievances expressed through 
belligerent action on Belfast’s streets and independent politics undermined the
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Episcopalian-Conservative establishment’s legitimacy, threatening the 
unravelling of Unionism as a coherent force.
With the revival of the spectre of Home Rule, Ulster Unionism 
responded with an intensification of political and organisational initiatives, 
resulting in a highly centralised movement by the Third Home Rule crisis. 
This movement was capable of integrating and mobilising the Protestant 
working class whilst simultaneously containing and ‘policing’ its support. 
Ulster Unionism’s ultimate success in the battle of politics and propaganda 
was its ability to present itself as a national movement predicated upon ideals 
of unity and respectability whilst simultaneously integrating and containing its 
core sectarian support. However, following the passage of the Fourth Home 
Rule Bill in 1920, Ulster Unionism could no longer rely upon the 
unconditional unity of its support, nor was it preoccupied with respectability. 
Consequently, Unionism developed a far more pragmatic approach towards 
popular sectarianism and collective violence on Belfast’s streets. In essence, 
Belfast became the capital of a sectarian 'local state1 increasingly marginal to 
British political culture and identity, coinciding with an upsurge of serious 
and prolonged sectarian violence.
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CONCLUSIONS.
Through a comparative analysis of the contrasting paradigms of 
Liverpool and Belfast, in terms of their experience of popular sectarianism, 
we can learn a great deal about the historical relationship between political 
movements and popular collective violence. Liverpool’s experience teaches 
us that violence, a contingent mode of collective action employed by modem 
social movement’s as part of their repertoire of contention, can be triggered 
and ultimately reshaped by democratisation. In multi-ethnic environments 
this process with its potential conflation of the ethnos and demos may lead to 
ethnic conflict. Consequently, within certain contexts particular types of 
movement may regard a degree of collective violence as a corollary or by­
product of the process of political engagement Such engagement could be 
with a strategic, potentially volatile, newly enfranchised constituency or re­
engagement with a core constituency upon a new political basis. This act of 
engagement integral to the political process, could be based upon a 
combination of factors. These could include the cultivation of a sense of 
common cause whether religious, ethnic, national, or class in character, 
flattery and patronage, or mutual ‘utilisation’. They could also include the 
promise of social reform plus partial integration of a new constituency 
through the creation of power-sharing structures and organisations. This 
process of political engagement can lead to the legitimisation, politicisation 
and empowerment of new or existing constituencies. However, 
democratisation not only highlights opportunities for collective action but 
also, if resulting in only partial access, can highlight the inadequacies of 
established avenues of power and leadership and the constraints and 
limitations of formal politics and organisation. Under such circumstances a 
growing disjunctive between expectation and delivery may occur. This can 
result in the attenuation of traditional social and political relations between the 
so-called ‘swells’ and the ‘masses’, precipitating a sustained and multi-layered 
protest cycle. A contingent outcome may be the fragmentation and devolution 
of social and political power and erosion of existing mechanisms of restraint 
and control resulting in a growing divergence between formal politics and 
organisation and the frequently belligerent politics of the street. Increasingly
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frustrated and marginalised constituencies may look to alternative grassroots 
leaders and modes of collective action in order to articulate their interests. 
Sustained contention leads to the formation of durable social movements 
employing violence, alongside other forms of action (including the political 
campaign, the demonstration and the strike),1 as a highly effective means of 
escalating social protest. Consequently collective violence, when deployed by 
modem social movements, can constitute an effective form of grassroots 
influence, leverage and crucially power generated by the opportunities and 
constraints exposed by a democratising political system. Employed by ethno- 
nationalist movements collective violence can constitute a form of cultural 
defence, preserving marginal privilege or perceived ascendancy against an 
internal and/or external ‘Other’, or as protection against cultural transition, 
forcefully reminding traditional leaders of their historic obligations.
On the other hand, Belfast’s experience of popular sectarianism tells us 
that endemic collective violence can be effectively contained and controlled, 
with this success again highlighting profound transformations within existing 
power relations. The case of Ulster Unionism proves it is possible for a 
political movement operating in a multi-ethnic society to fundamentally re­
evaluate its relationship to collective violence and to the popular forces 
perpetrating it. Such a fundamental re-evaluation may occur in the light of 
new overarching political circumstances and imperatives. These may include 
the necessity for representative coalition-formation with those of strongly 
differing outlooks and perspectives and the need to engage with national 
political culture and conceptions of identity. By directly intervening in the 
name of a common cause or internal and/or external threat it is possible for a 
political movement to integrate or co-opt the principal agencies and 
personalities representative of a constituency responsible for perpetrating 
collective violence. By incorporating this constituency into a national political 
strategy, underpinned by seemingly democratic organisations and structures, it 
is possible to draw popular agitation away from collective action in the street 
into more conventional avenues of managed expression and resolution. By 
providing alternative avenues of legitimate power, leadership and
1 Graham & Gurr, The History of Violence in America. 789
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accountability, in Tilly’s words the ‘prevalence’ and ‘effectiveness’2 of 
violence as a form of ‘collective bargaining by riot’ can and does diminish.3 
Through the institutionalisation of forms of protected consultation it is 
possible for a political movement to channel and reshape volatile popular 
contention. Via reform and facilitative strategies the movement can mobilise 
popular sentiment, as part of the legitimate democratic process, in the pursuit 
of political aims and constructing political hegemony whilst simultaneously 
circumscribing the role and prominence of popular forces, restraining and 
‘policing’ their excesses. Integral to this process of integration is a political 
movement’s clear differentiation between what constitutes legitimate and 
‘illegitimate private’ violence.4 This can be bolstered by the emergence of an 
influential consensus emphasising the serious liability posed by widespread 
violence in terms of the movement’s wider political legitimacy and influence. 
The same movement, under certain circumstances, may encourage and 
endorse other forms of popular collective action including the threat, and even 
use of, ‘legitimate’ violence in defence of the wider cause. However, the 
ability of such political movements to contain and control popular violence on 
a sustained basis is largely dependent upon the continued currency and 
immediacy of the initial unifying cause or threat. To a large extent, this factor 
determines the perceived legitimacy and authority of the acknowledged 
leadership of the movement and the maintenance of popular enthusiasm 
underpinning political and organisational initiatives. The contingent outcome 
of a power vacuum may be a generalised protest cycle accompanied by an 
erosion of established mechanisms of restraint and control, with underlying 
grievances and aspirations finding expression through radical social 
movements, employing alternative forms of collective action including 
violence on the streets. Confronted by such a challenge, political elite’s can 
facilitate a new phase of political and organisational reform and integration, 
implement repression or adopt a pragmatic approach. The latter may result in 
the development of an expedient co-existence and interaction between formal
2 Tilly, The Rebellious Century. 287
3 see Tilly, The Rebellious Century. 289 quoting Eric Hobsbawm.
4 see Haupt, ‘’The History of Violence” , 16197 on Lindenberger and Ludtke’s 
hallmark of ‘modernity’.
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political action and organisation and legitimate and illegitimate modes of 
popular collective action.
Consequently, in order to comprehend the complex interaction between 
political movements and popular collective violence it is necessary to 
understand the location and distribution of power and leadership within these 
relationships. Religious sectarianism, the principal dynamic behind collective 
violence in Liverpool and Belfast, was a complex force operating in the social, 
economic, political and ideological spheres. Crucially, it constituted both a 
fundamental, and contingent, component of evolving, unifying, competing 
and conflicting local, communal, regional and national identities.
Sectarianism constituted a perennial blight upon inter-communal relations 
(Protestant-Catholic) whilst acting as both a galvanising source of collective 
action and a highly divisive force within the dominant Protestant 
communities. Both cities shared many similar characteristics in terms of their 
experiences of sectarianism but differed dramatically in the principal 
manifestation of their ‘communal strife’ during the period 1880-1921. I have 
identified the following key factors which help to explain the prevalence and 
effectiveness of sectarian collective violence in Liverpool and the capacity of 
Ulster Unionism to contain and control popular sectarianism’s worst excesses 
in Belfast. These factors helped to determine the primary manifestation that 
sectarian conflict took in the two cities.
(l)Fundamental in determining the attitude and approach of Liverpool 
Tory-Democracy and Ulster Unionism to popular sectarianism and in 
ultimately sustaining or reducing sectarian violence was the intrinsic character 
of the two political movements. Throughout much of the period Liverpool 
remained a Conservative ‘local state’5, a relative exception in terms of 
developments in national political culture and conceptions of British identity. 
Due to this exceptionalism, Tory Democracy experienced little or no internal 
or external pressure to fundamentally re-evaluate its relationship to popular 
sectarianism. The movement was largely untroubled by concerns over its 
wider national image or possible local political repercussions arising from its 
association with sectarian violence. In contrast, from 1886 Belfast’s
5 Smith, ‘’Class, Skill and Sectarianism” , 202
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Episcopalian-Conservative establishment was forced to fundamentally re­
evaluate its established relationship to popular sectarianism in light of the 
critical battle of politics and propaganda in relation to the national struggle 
over Home Rule. Conscious of the need to respond to developments in 
national political culture and identity, this establishment set about 
constructing a national movement predicated upon the principles of unity and 
respectability. In the process it clearly differentiated between legitimate and 
‘illegitimate private’ violence, subordinated the role and prominence of 
explicit sectarianism and reigned in the worst excesses of its volatile sectarian 
support.
(2) During the period Liverpool experienced a sustained multi-layered 
protest cycle witnessing a profound fragmentation and devolution of social 
and political power, a rupturing in established relations between the dominant 
Tory-Anglican establishment and the Protestant working class. This cycle 
arose out of the political opportunities and constraints exposed by 
democratisation, and the local stresses and strains induced by a complex and 
uneven national modernisation process. An important facet of this process 
was the contradictory secularisation dynamic, generating both local and 
national religious decline and renewal and in Liverpool religious and ethnic 
conflict. With Protestantism central to local ethnic and national identity, 
fragmentation within the heterogeneous Protestant community revolved 
around competing conceptions of British identity. Tory Democracy, a modem 
constructed political nationalism with an ultimately contingent proto- 
nationalist core, and the Protestant Democracy, a radical hybrid of local 
religious, ethnic and class compounds, an ethno-nationalist movement with an 
intractable anti-Catholic core. This protest cycle was accompanied by erosion 
of residual restraint and control over the forces of popular sectarianism.
Power and leadership over the Protestant working class increasingly devolved 
to militant grassroots organisations and personalities, a complex social 
movemept mobilising at street level to pursue Protestant interests. This loss 
of control over popular sectarianism saw the Conservatives adopt an 
increasingly pragmatic attitude to Protestant collective violence unable to 
either facilitate reform and integration, or exercise restraint over the Protestant 
working class.
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In contrast, Belfast’s dominant Episcopalian-Conservative establishment 
exerted increasingly centralised control over Ulster’s anti-Home Rule forces 
in an effort to preserve the fragile unity and respectability of the emerging 
Ulster Unionist movement. Ulster Unionism was a constructed or invented 
nationalism, an imagined inclusive Protestant identity or religious ethnicity, 
engineered by local elite’s with an explicit national political agenda.
Although modem and constructed, Ulster Unionism was framed by a central 
but contingent proto-nationalist core and juxtaposed in relation to the Irish 
Nationalist ‘Other’. Appealing to local and national Protestant defence, the 
movement was instrumentalised in relation to developments in British 
political culture and identity. The Episcopalian-Conservative establishment 
directly intervened under the umbrella of Unionism in order to draw the 
principal Protestant ‘local proletarian idiom’6 and aggressive agency of 
sectarian collective violence, the Orange Order, into an overarching political 
and organisational strategy. This increasingly centralised strategy of 
resistance enabled Ulster Unionism to exercise effective forms of restraint and 
control over its volatile sectarian support.
(3) The principal arena of sectarian conflict in the two cities was 
profoundly different reflecting the contrasting location of power and control 
over popular sectarianism. These differing arenas were conditioned by the 
dominant Conservative’s relationship to national political culture and identity. 
In Liverpool, the ‘community of the street’7 remained the primary arena of 
sectarian conflict throughout the period. However, the street was not simply 
the principal location of conflict but constituted the main context for engaging 
with, establishing leadership over and mobilising the principal agency of 
popular sectarianism the Protestant working class. The community of the 
street became the domain of the ‘Protestant Democracy’, an increasingly 
powerful sectarian grassroots movement, employing frequently violent forms 
of collective action as a means of social and political influence, leverage and 
power. The Protestant Democracy was an overwhelmingly locality based 
expressive or symbolic community, characterised by exclusionary bonded
6 Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism. 138
7 ‘’Taplin’s review of Neal” , in: International Labor and Working Class 
History, 37 (1990), 96
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social capital, its identity constructed out of local environmental structural and 
cultural resources.
In stark contrast, from 1886 the emerging Ulster Unionist movement 
identified politics and propaganda as the primary means of combating the 
perceived threat posed to the entire Ulster Protestant community by Home 
Rule, or ‘Rome Rule’. Ulster Unionism was an expressive or symbolic 
community, diffused beyond the local or regional, incorporating both bonded 
and bridging social capital. It was culturally constructed out of both local 
environmental factors and instrumentalised in relation to developments in 
national political culture and identity. Within this context the movement saw 
Belfast’s ‘endemic’ sectarian rioting and the role of the Protestant working 
class as an increasingly serious political liability. It was a liability both in 
terms of coalition building within Ulster’s fractious Protestant community and 
in converting sceptical British public opinion to the Unionist cause by 
avoiding perceptions of ‘Ulster bigotry’.
(4) The character of Protestant associational culture in the two cities was 
pivotal in the contrasting success of Liverpool Tory-Democracy and Ulster 
Unionism in their efforts to harness popular sectarianism and control its 
associated violence. Liverpool’s diverse yet inter-connected Protestant 
culture reflected the fragmented and devolved nature of social and political 
power within the Protestant community. This diverse culture proved virtually 
impossible to effectively contain or control on a coherent basis. It became the 
organisational foundation and principal mobilisational mechanism of the 
‘Protestant Democracy’. Through this culture the ‘Protestant Democracy’ 
employed, amongst other means, frequently violent forms of collective action 
in order to secure its objectives.
Whereas Liverpool’s Protestant culture was primarily an agency of 
grassroots leverage, influence and power, its Belfast counterpart was 
principally a vehicle of increasingly centralised Ulster Unionist political 
control. Through its integration of the principal bridge to the Protestant 
working class, the Orange Order, representative Unionist culture largely 
succeeded in drawing popular Protestant agitation away from the street. It 
helped Ulster Unionism to minimise national perceptions of explicit 
sectarianism by circumscribing the role and influence of the Order within the
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coalition and emasculated potentially divisive sources of alternative power 
and leadership within the Protestant community. Crucially, in terms of 
collective violence, it succeeded in harnessing and mobilising the strategic 
Protestant working class, channelling its energies into ‘constructive’ forms of 
action whilst simultaneously ‘policing’ this belligerent sectarian constituency.
Consequently, Liverpool and Belfast provide two excellent paradigms 
for exploring the relationship between political movements and popular 
collective violence through an understanding of the location and distribution 
of power and leadership within such relationships. Liverpool Tory 
Democracy was an example of a political movement that lost control over 
popular sectarianism, a dynamic social force responsible for large-scale 
collective violence in the city. With this loss of control there subsequently 
developed a pragmatic relationship between formal Conservative politics and 
organisation and the increasingly belligerent politics of the street practised by 
the ‘Protestant Democracy’. In contrast, Ulster Unionism was an example of 
a political movement that succeeded in effectively containing and controlling 
the forces of popular sectarianism. Through its initiatives it drew popular 
Protestant agitation away from the volatile community of the street into 
formal disciplined structures and organisations as part of an increasingly 
centralised, co-ordinated political strategy. In the process it succeeded in 
minimising the potential for serious sectarian violence in Belfast. No doubt 
this greatly contributed to Ulster Unionism’s ultimate success in the critical 
‘battle of politics’8 in relation to Home Rule.
To sum up, Liverpool’s experience of popular sectarianism during 1880- 
1921 illustrates that sectarian violence, the contingent outcome of a protest 
cycle triggered by the opportunities and constraints revealed by 
democratisation in a multi-ethnic environment, continued to co-exist and 
interact with an expanding political system. Sectarian violence was 
marshalled and deployed by a modem ethno-nationalist movement as part of 
its repertoire of contention, a highly effective form of collective action and 
social protest. The case of Belfast during the same period reinforces the 
argument that collective violence, even within multi-ethnic environments, can
8 Harbinson, The Ulster Unionist Party. 32
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be channelled and reshaped with the advance of modem democratic political 
systems. Democratisation presents opportunities for the expansion of 
protected consultation, reform and alternative modes of collective action and 
methods of negotiation and resolution of diverse and conflicting interests.9
However, the picture is not quite so simplistic when we look at the 
transformations that occurred in the prevalence and attitude towards sectarian 
violence in the two cities towards the end of the period. From 1911 onwards, 
Liverpool experienced a dramatic decline in large-scale sectarian violence 
coinciding with the erosion of the city’s relative exceptionalism in terms of 
national political culture and identity. This transition compelled the local 
Conservative establishment to re-evaluate its relationship to popular 
sectarianism and endemic violence in light of the following key local and 
national developments.
(1) During and after the 1911 Transport Strike there was concerted 
external intervention in Liverpool’s affairs. This intervention was caused by 
the fear of ‘social revolution’ embodied by the strike and the perceived role of 
street mobilisation in the widespread disturbances.
(2)The insidious local impact of secularisation as part of the uneven 
modernisation process. In the short term this contributed to local 
ecclesiastical institutional decline, religious renewal and conflict. However, 
after the First World War Liverpool witnessed a diminution in the significance 
of sectarianism within local political culture and communal interaction.10
(3) The extension of the franchise in 1918 progressively channelled 
militant Protestant energies away from the street into political agitation. 
Although Liverpool’s political culture remained highly distinctive, the rise of 
the Labour Party signified the encroachment of a more representative national 
politics predicated upon socio-economic class. This was facilitated by:
(4) the resolution of the divisive Irish Question in 1921.
(5) and the undermining of the local ‘cultural and community 
infrastructure’ of sectarianism by mass inter-war slum clearance.11
9 see Tilly, The Rebellious Century. 286-7
10 Patrick Pasture, ‘’The Role of Religion in Social and Labour History” , in 
Voss & Linden, eds, Class and Other Identities. 111
11 Belchem, ‘’The Peculiarities of Liverpool” , 17
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In contrast with the passage of the Fourth Home Rule Bill in 1920 and 
the creation of Northern Ireland, Belfast became increasingly marginal to 
British political culture and identity resuming its status as the capital of a 
largely parochial sectarian ‘local state’. In light of these new political realities 
Ulster Unionism re-evaluated its relationship to popular sectarianism. It 
adopted a more pragmatic approach to Protestant collective violence no longer 
overly preoccupied with national perceptions or political considerations.
These dramatic transformations highlight the complex and contingent 
relationship between democratisation and collective violence. Within multi­
ethnic environments democratisation provides opportunities for both 
reshaping popular contention and for triggering protest cycles leading to the 
formation of social movements employing violence as part of their repertoire 
of contention. Another highly important factor in determining the 
‘prevalence’ of collective violence is the fundamental character of the political 
movement in question. In other words, the degree to which a particular 
movement is motivated and influenced by primarily local considerations, or 
national political culture and identity. Despite the erosion of parochialism as 
part of the uneven modernisation process, Belfast and Liverpool illustrate the 
complex interplay between the locality and the nationalisation of British 
political culture and identity. They highlight the contingent impact of these 
processes upon distinctive local cultures and communal identities. They could 
reshape and reorient these communities in the national image and/or provoke 
fragmentation and conflict. The British working class continued to be shaped 
by local factors such as a dominant religious, ethnic or class culture and 
identity. These symbolic communities could circumscribe wider class 
allegiance and reinforce or conflict with local or national conceptions of the 
nation. Within a multi-ethnic environment, religious, ethnic, class and 
national compounds could coalesce during a protest cycle, generating ethno- 
nationalist movements employing violence as both social protest and cultural 
defence. Therefore, a key determinant in sustaining collective violence can be 
the degree to which a political movement is intrinsically parochial in character 
and outlook or largely dependent for its survival and success upon 
engagement with national political culture and identity.
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The former category of political movement is largely motivated by local 
political and cultural imperatives and primarily dependent upon and 
accountable to a dominant local community. If elements within this crucial 
power-base are responsible for perpetrating acts of collective violence an 
intrinsically parochial political movement is more likely to adopt a pragmatic, 
tolerant attitude to their excesses. The adoption of a tolerant or pragmatic 
attitude may be seen as an acceptable corollary of ensuring local political 
hegemony through the retention of a volatile core constituency’s continued 
political support. On the other hand, a primarily outward-looking political 
movement which mediates or subordinates particular local imperatives and 
cultural practises to wider regional or national culture and identity is less 
likely to adopt a pragmatic approach to acts of collective violence amongst its 
support. Such violence could be seen as profoundly damaging to the 
movement’s wider political legitimacy and influence and as potentially 
jeopardising the overarching cause they represent.
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A.F.I.L-A11 For Ireland League
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